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Introduction 
 
“Bêtise” 
 
“…[The philosopher] dispossesses [humanity]…inviting it to think of itself as an enigma.” 
 
– Merleau-Ponty2 
 
Philosophers have always found clever ways to doubt what most people take to be 
obvious truths, and while philosophy may, at its best, illuminate important matters and                  
contestable assumptions about the world that we would otherwise overlook – that is, while 
philosophy may rightfully reveal to us the strangeness or questionability of what we have 
passively accepted as familiar or unquestionable – at other times, at its worst, it may just as well 
loosen our hold upon or cause us to repress the very basic, concrete truths that most merit 
attentive consideration and that, in many cases, urgently demand renewed affirmation in our 
lives. In order to see things clearly – or in order to critique our prevailing assumptions about the 
world so that we may begin to do so – it is surely the case that we need to take a certain distance 
from them, but a central insight of phenomenology (and a point that Merleau-Ponty consistently 
insists upon) is that the abstractions or conceptual frameworks we typically achieve through such 
a critical distance, as well as those already well-established abstractions and conceptual 
frameworks upon which we rely precisely in order to take such a critical distance from the world 
in the first place – in short, the hard-won and long-sown fruits of our toil to make sense of the 
world – can (and in many cases do) occlude or distort more than they help clarify or reveal. 
Since philosophy and the questions it poses are so often themselves governed by problematic yet 
deeply entrenched prejudices and abstract concepts, what we need is a kind of philosophical 
																																																								
2 The Visible and The Invisible. Ed. Claude Lefort. Trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1968), p.4. 
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reflection that does not simply distance us from unreflective experience (which reflection, by 
definition, must do) but rather one that, however difficult and indeed paradoxical it may be, 
ceaselessly returns us to it, a kind of reflection that can precisely uncover (or rather help us 
rediscover) the truths we know perfectly well by direct acquaintance yet which naturally become 
concealed through our passage into reflective thought and the dormitive comfort of its settled, 
well-worn acquisitions. Such, then, is the aim of phenomenology: the aim of elaborating the 
fundamental structures and features of lived experience, the aim of rediscovering “through a 
process similar to that of an archaeologist…the structure of the perceived world…buried under 
the sedimentations of later knowledge.”3  
Reflective, critical, philosophical thinking is so easily captivated by its own readily 
available stock of sedimented, sclerotic concepts, propositions, and schemas that it hardly merits 
the name. If reflective, critical, philosophical thinking is truly to live up to its name – if 
philosophy is truly to fulfill its “task of wakefulness”4 – then it must open up a space that, quasi-
paradoxically, brings us into deeper, more intimate touch with the fundamental, elemental 
conditions and aspects of our existence rather than alienate us from them or withhold them from 
our view; it must open up, and must continually labor to hold open, a distance between human 
subjectivity and Being and between human subjectivity and other beings that does more to bring 
them together than to separate or exclude them from one another, a distance that precisely, and 
again (quasi-)paradoxically, reveals and in itself realizes our basic, irrecusable solidarity with the 
world and with all of its inhabitants. Taking a reflective distance from things tends to mean 
																																																								
3	Merleau-Ponty, “An Unpublished Text: A Prospectus of His Work.” Trans. Arleen Dallery, in The Primacy of 
Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History, and Politics, ed. 
James. M Edie (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p.5. 
4	Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 
4. 
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considering them in an “abstract” way, yet phenomenology insists that it is precisely our 
abstractions that most often obstruct our view of what is really there to be seen and known, that 
abstractions precisely deform the fundamental bonds we have with the truths or “things 
themselves” that call to be seen, felt, heard, known, or affirmed, that abstractions precisely 
distort what even seeing, feeling, hearing, knowing, and being as such are, and it is thus that, 
once such abstractions have settled at the bottom of our consciousness, we are not only diverted 
into so many intellectual blind-alleys and “pseudo-problems” but also gradually come to see, 
feel, hear, or know less than we should; it is thus that we come to think, and therefore live, 
wrongly. Even if we take to heart, as we should, the various, often powerful criticisms of 
phenomenology that have been proposed over the years, I am utterly convinced that, on this 
basic point, phenomenology is incontestably correct, and that there is never a question of getting 
around, going through, “overcoming,” “refuting,” or discarding phenomenology but only ever a 
question of doing better phenomenology. So, if we truly are to “rediscover the world in which we 
live, yet which we are always prone to forget,”5 we will have to adopt a reflective stance toward 
the world far different from the one to which philosophers are traditionally accustomed, for it 
will have to be one that precisely dispenses with the kinds of abstractions that typically make us 
overlook or forget what has always been there before our eyes or, better put, entangled 
inextricably with our “seeing,” sentient bodies. In order to see the world clearly, we will have to 
achieve a distance from the world that, far from absolutely estranging us from it, would be, as 
Merleau-Ponty puts it, one that is “deeply consonant”6 or “synonymous” with our proximity to it. 
Indeed, this is just what it means to see anything clearly, yet given just how poorly we in fact 
																																																								
5	Merleau-Ponty, The World of Perception. Trans. Oliver Davis (London & New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 39. 
6	The Visible and The Invisible, p. 135. 
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tend to “see things,” we might say that the effort and demand to see clearly is a radical, 
liberatory project. It is precisely this project that animates Merleau-Ponty’s entire philosophy, 
and it is precisely this project that animates my own wish to contribute, in some small way, to 
carrying Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy forward.   
To be clear, phenomenology is far from “naïve realism.” What is precisely “naïve” is 
taking for granted as fundamental and necessary truths what are in fact false and derivative 
abstract schemas and constructs. Phenomenology does not reify everyday appearances because 
those appearances themselves are so often infested with reified concepts and schemas, the kinds 
of concepts and schemas that a rigorous attention to “lived experience” is precisely supposed to 
exorcise. The critical edge of phenomenology, then, is precisely a resistance to reification, and 
this means it is never simply a matter of describing the everyday ways in which things appear but 
is rather a matter of subjecting such appearances to interrogation, a matter of discerning to what 
extent such appearances, or to what extent our ways of articulating such appearances, let appear 
rather than dissemble the true being and meaning of worldly, appearing things. As Merleau-
Ponty suggests, phenomenology is a matter of excavating those basic layers of being and 
meaning that so many everyday appearances, and that so many everyday ways of thinking and 
speaking, conceal but which are nonetheless immanent to them as such. The primary task of 
phenomenology is indeed to bring to renewed awareness the essential features of immediate, 
lived experience, yet paradoxically immediate experience is so often far from “immediate”; 
indeed, though the aim of phenomenology is to clarify the basic features of lived experience and 
to dissolve the persistent philosophical problems and confusions that arise from a failure to do 
so, it is also the case that lived experience can never, in principle, be rendered transparent; this, 
too, is a core phenomenological insight. In fact, phenomenology reveals to us that many of the 
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most basic structures of experience, being, and meaning are radically absent, that presence is 
necessarily grounded in, and saturated with, irreducible non-presence, that light always has its 
source in darkness. However, the aim of phenomenology is, at the very least, to dismantle the 
erroneous frameworks and constructs that gratuitously, and often dangerously, obscure lived 
experience (including, paradoxically, those features of lived experience that must, at least to 
some extent, remain in obscurity) so as to help us see, think, and live more wakefully.    
A central insight of phenomenology, then, is that it is precisely unreflective, lived, carnal 
experience that furnishes us not only with the philosophical questions that we pose but also with 
the very categories and abstractions that often prevent us from seeing the answers to them or 
that, in some instances, lead us to answer them correctly albeit for the wrong reasons. Though 
lived experience is the source of the specious commitments and flawed constructs that suppress 
or distort it, it is also, for that very reason, the best and indeed only resource we have for 
dismantling them, for when our specious commitments and flawed constructs are specious and 
flawed precisely because they contradict and repress their own conditions of derivation and 
intelligibility, it is these conditions that provide or already embody the vital, fundamental truths 
that thwart them. In short, lived experience is the source of all of our truths and errors alike. This 
is what Merleau-Ponty means when he speaks of the “primacy of perception,” and there is no 
question of getting around this thesis. By “perception,” of course, Merleau-Ponty does not just 
mean our subjective engagements with things or the presentation of things to consciousness; 
rather, he means that which makes any subjective engagements with things – or any presentation 
of things to consciousness – possible in the first place. Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s usage of the term 
“perception” departs from its ordinary usage (including its usage in the sciences), for it precisely 
refers to our originary openness to a world that antecedes and founds the very distinction 
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between “the subjective” and “the objective” (a distinction that many philosophers and nearly all 
scientists take for granted as ontologically basic when in fact it is one of those abstractions that 
derives from, yet conceals, lived experience). Nonetheless, we may understand Merleau-Ponty’s 
“primacy of perception” thesis even according to the ordinary sense of term. In the ordinary 
sense of the term, perception is, of course, the source of all illusions, for illusions are perceptual 
phenomena; yet it does not logically follow that perception itself is a mere screen of illusions, for 
the intelligibility of an illusory experience presupposes an antecedent experience of truth: if no 
perception may be regarded as veridical, none may be regarded as false; if everything is illusory, 
nothing is. If there are, then, such things as truths that would dispel our illusions, these are 
simply themselves other perceptions, further appearances in the unfolding of conscious life. 
Thus, as I remarked above, if perception is the generative condition of our falsehoods, so too is it 
the generative condition of our truths, and therefore it is that to which we must attend if we wish 
to exchange the former for the latter. If our errors arise from lived experience and consist in 
precisely concealing lived experience from us, then it is necessary, as best we can, to return to 
lived experience, to better harmonize reflective understanding with pre-reflective living, to think 
with rather than against the phenomena that always already motivate thinking, knowledge, and 
behavior. It is a failure to attend rigorously to lived experience that leads us into error, that leads 
us to reify our derivative abstractions as primary truths, and so the only means we have to resist 
such errors and abstractions is, precisely, to attend rigorously to lived experience, to learn to see 
what has been there “before our eyes” from the very beginning, what has always been 
concretely, materially, elementally enmeshed with us from the first moment we ever truly began 
to see and think, the first moment we ever took leave of prelapsarian ignorance and extended 
ourselves toward a reflective understanding of ourselves and the world. 
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As I have just suggested, rehabilitating what we immediately perceive and know in and 
through our everyday engagements with the world – or bringing to our renewed attention the 
constitutive structures and features of even our most ordinary experiences – may precisely be the 
most productively disruptive power of philosophy, for it is precisely these very things that we are 
most prone to forget; indeed, these are things that we are encouraged to forget not only by certain 
ideologies or systems of power that have a vested interest in their suppression, but even (as 
Merleau-Ponty claims) by the very nature of human thought itself, whose reflective 
accomplishments tend to conceal and even deny their sources in lived, pre-reflective, embodied 
experience, and which consequently lead us to live or to think divided against ourselves: that is 
to say, we come to conceptualize the world in a way that contradicts the manner in which we 
originally, always already experience and exist in it, we then retrospectively regard such a 
conceptualization of the world as a fundamental truth, and finally we allow that 
conceptualization to inform future conduct, shape future relationships and experiences, and 
motivate the direction of further thought. So, for example, though we inescapably and constantly 
exist in a world with others and immediately experience this world as a space of shared, public 
possibilities and meanings, and though our coexistence with others is a necessary condition of 
the possibility of consciousness and selfhood, one might nevertheless abstract one’s 
consciousness or self from the web of relationships that constitute it and come to regard oneself 
as preexisting, or as in some way fundamentally independent of, those relationships, or in other 
words as an isolated, radically autonomous individual; one might conceive of one’s own 
existence – of one’s own consciousness or selfhood – so “abstractly” that one even genuinely 
entertains doubts concerning the existence of others in the first place. Such a conception of 
oneself, of course, is ironically not achievable alone, in solitary meditation, but only by virtue of 
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thoroughly material – not at all abstract – conditions of existence, including political, 
socioeconomic systems and institutions (especially those systems and institutions that depend 
upon people conceiving of themselves as isolated individuals in the first place).  
Here, I will be concerned with a similar false abstraction, namely the hierarchical 
“human(ity)”/“animal(ity)” binary, which is to say the supposed ontological isolation and moral 
supremacy – the categorical, exclusionary “specialness” – of the former term in opposition to the 
latter term. In other words, the false (and pernicious) abstraction which I intend to critique and 
expose as such is a framework of overlapping, mutually reinforcing metaphysical, 
epistemological, and normative commitments that we typically refer to as anthropocentrism, or 
human-centered speciesism. It should hardly need to be elaborated not only that such an abstract 
conceptual framework and value-system is wrong, but that taking it for granted as otherwise has 
had, and continues to have, far-reaching, severely harmful and destructive – biocidal and 
ecocidal – repercussions. Unfortunately, however, anthropocentrism continues to infiltrate how 
we think and live; in many forms, both explicitly and surreptitiously, it dominates how we 
conceptualize ourselves and our relationship with the world, how we construct for ourselves and 
enact a sense-of-self and a sense of community, indeed how we understand – or in fact fail to 
understand – just who or what this very royal “we” signifies in the first place, or how the sense 
of such a singular plural signifier ever comes to be determined at all. Thus, the points that I 
intend to elaborate and defend here – even those which may appear to be “simple” or “obvious” 
– are ones that urgently need to be elaborated and defended.  
False abstractions are themselves already a kind of violence: the violence of conceptual 
and perceptual distortion, the violence of epistemic and ontological erasure, the violence of not 
“doing justice” to what Husserl called “the things themselves.” And in the worst instances, they 
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not only spring from, but also actively advance and retroactively rationalize, material violence 
and injustice. Maybe in the end we will have to admit that all concepts, insofar as they are 
power-laden, procrustean impositions of meaning, are forms of violence. Maybe in the end we 
will have to admit that all concepts, insofar as they impose exclusionary borders upon 
phenomena, entities, and a world that will always resist and exceed them, are fraudulent and 
unjust constructs, that indeed they are little more than pretexts for material (ethical and political) 
exclusions and injustices. Maybe in the end we will also have admit that, far from enabling us to 
think, concepts in fact disable genuine thinking. When we apply a concept to something or place 
something in a category, we typically assume that we know everything that is worth knowing 
about it, that we no longer need to engage with it or think overly much about it: it has its place in 
our tidy inventory of the universe. The problem, of course, is that the universe is anything but 
“tidy,” and the being of a thing tends never to be exhausted or adequately expressed by the 
categories into which we deposit it. Indeed, if there is such a thing as “thinking worthy of the 
name,” then it must mean, paradoxically, to think what is, in a sense “unthinkable,” that is, to 
engage with things that exceed our everyday horizons of thought or that precisely resist the 
categories through which we organize the world. If all we ever do, or if all we ever assume we 
need to do, is apply concepts to things that (we assume) neatly fit within their bounds, then not 
only is there so much we are not going to see or understand, not only is there so much whose 
being or meaning we are going to violate with that reductionism, but such an activity is hardly 
different from rote, clerical filing or bookkeeping and thus hardly involves anything like genuine 
“thinking.” The most important point, however, is that the loss of the ability “to think” has 
consequences, consequences for thought itself and especially for everything it leaves 
“unthought.” So, maybe it is time we admit that an obsession with conceptual analysis and with 
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categorization is eminently a form of thoughtlessness, and since our concepts or categories have 
tangible effects on the world, it is one that is always ethically and politically fraught. Maybe, in 
the end, we have to acknowledge not that concepts enable us to think but that, on the contrary, 
they enable us to not have to think, that concepts in fact do our thinking (and thus our living) for 
us, or that they are, indeed, crutches upon which we lean in order to excuse our common 
thoughtlessness and the myriad normalized evils in which our common thoughtlessness is 
implicated. Maybe the banality of evil already begins with (what traditionally passes for or 
comes to be “conceptualized” as) “rationality,” or with those forms of thoughtlessness that 
disguise themselves as precisely the opposite of thoughtlessness. 
Of course, many philosophers claim that thought is impossible without concepts. I am not 
sure whether or not that is true.7 However, perhaps it is at least reasonable to say that it is 
impossible for human beings to think without concepts (and if that is the case, and if it is 
furthermore the case that certain animals lack concepts, then perhaps that is one advantage that 
such animals have over us). Yet, if concepts are inescapable for us, perhaps our situation is 
nevertheless not hopeless; perhaps we may be able to create concepts that do not normalize evils 
but rather help undo them; perhaps we may be able to create concepts that affirm and help 
																																																								
7	A discussion and assessment of this claim is certainly beyond the scope of the topic at hand. However, the truth of 
such a claim clearly hinges largely on what one means by “thought,” which is itself a concept that is often used 
equivocally. Nevertheless, there are two points worth noting here: first, if one maintains that thinking is impossible 
without concepts by definition – that to think just is to formulate and apply concepts – and that therefore the notion 
of thinking without concepts is inherently contradictory, then the claim that thinking is impossible without concepts 
reduces to a tautology: the claim that “thinking is impossible without concepts” becomes equivalent to the claim that 
“thinking is impossible without thinking”; such a claim has the virtue of not requiring argumentative demonstration, 
but is also one that hardly elucidates what thinking or concepts are. The second (and, I think, far more interesting) 
point is that if we accept the central insight of Merleau-Ponty and others (as indeed we must) that thought is 
necessarily embodied, then even if it is true that thought requires concepts, it must be the case that concepts are 
profoundly different from – or much more than – the conventional ways in which they are, so to speak, 
conceptualized. This further reinforces just how radical phenomenology (or phenomenologically informed ontology) 
is and can be: if phenomenology or Merleau-Ponty is right to maintain and insist upon the essential carnality of 
consciousness and cognition, it follows that we must “reconceptualize” what a concept is; it follows that we must 
rethink our very concept of a concept.   
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strengthen rather than negate or attenuate the bonds of interdependence to which all forms of 
thought and life owe their being; perhaps we are able to critique those concepts that marginalize, 
hierarchize, exclude, and oppress in order to replace them with better ones, ones that are “better” 
in every valence of the term: ones that are truer, more apt reflections of the real conditions of 
things, ones that are in consonance rather than in tension or contradiction with lived 
experience(s), ones that allow to be seen and heard those beings always already in and amidst 
our lives who would otherwise be disappeared and silenced. Perhaps we can develop concepts 
that encourage us to register rather than repress the inherent limitations and violence of concepts 
so that we may be able to think at least more cogently and less violently, or so that we may have 
more hope of doing justice to “the things themselves.” This, at any rate, is perhaps the inherent 
optimism of phenomenological critique. Though it may be received today as a rather quaint or 
naïve notion, perhaps we may hope to come ever closer to Plato’s ideal of the union of the True 
and the Good. I think it is an ideal worthy of our aspiration, and one that recognizes the 
inseparability of ontology and ethics/politics; following the insights of phenomenology, 
however, we will have to look not to the heavens but rather to our immanent, messy terrestrial, 
incarnate existence in order to realize it.     
Thus, phenomenology’s vigilance against reification, which I take to be the primary and 
most distinctive directive of phenomenology, has for me always been more than a mere 
intellectual principle, more than resistance to a mere logical fallacy; it has always been an ethical 
principle, an ethical vigilance, an ethical resistance. Husserl’s imperative “to the things 
themselves!” has always been an ethical imperative. “Doing justice” to the “things themselves” 
must be understood at multiple registers all at once, or as an ethical and political as much as an 
epistemological and ontological project; it means “getting things right” not simply in the sense of 
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formulating correct propositions about them or adopting a correct cognitive or perceptual stance 
toward them, but it also means everything that does – or that should – practically follow from a 
more appropriate and engaged cognitive and perceptual orientation in the world. For Merleau-
Ponty, the central – and supremely difficult – task of phenomenology is “to know precisely what 
we see,”8 that is, to honor and bring to expression as carefully as possible the field of lived 
experience in all its paradoxical, dynamic, conceptually confounding aspects, and insofar as this 
involves the re-attunement of our sensibilities to features of the world, and to entities within the 
world, that we often misperceive, misconceive, or neglect to address even though they appear 
and appeal to us – indeed always already form and nurture us – in plain sight, this is as much an 
ethical task as it is an epistemological or ontological one.  
It is precisely this ethical imperative and task of phenomenology that motivates 
everything to follow, even the arguments that may only seem to address epistemological or 
ontological issues. The ways we categorize the world, the habits of thought and perception 
through which things appear to us, the matrices of concepts and assumptions that inform if not 
determine our cognitive access to, and reception of, the world and its inhabitants, are inherently 
implicated in what we do and how we live, are inherently invested in relations of power, are 
inherently embedded in individual and collective flourishing (or misery), and are therefore 
inherently ethical and political. Epistemological and ontological issues are always already ethical 
and political issues as well, and we mark fixed divisions between them at our and others’ peril. 
There are, in fact, no “purely” amoral or apolitical concepts. No, we cannot logically derive 
“ought” from “is” provided we assume from the start an opposition between the two, but this is 
an opposition that – like all oppositions – demands to be interrogated. Of course, it often makes 
																																																								
8Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. Colin Smith, (London: Routledge, 1962), p. 58.	
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sense to say – and is often urgently necessary to say – that the “way things are” is not necessarily 
the way things should be, that a current state of affairs is unacceptable, that the status quo is 
never inherently good or just, that “natural” is not synonymous with “right” or “desirable,” and 
so on. The Panglossian view that “whatever is, is as it ought to be” is clearly unacceptable; such 
a view does nothing but reify as “natural” or essential an oppressive status quo and thus does 
nothing but serve the interests of oppressors and oppressive institutions. It makes sense, then, to 
insist upon a distinction between “the way things are” and “the ways things should to be,” 
between descriptive and normative registers of analysis, between the “natural” and “the Good,” 
between “is” and “ought.” When, for instance, someone attempts to justify carnivorism because 
it is “natural,” or when someone attempts to justify speciesism because privileging the interests 
of one’s own species supposedly contributes to evolutionary fitness or survival (a friend of mine 
once pointed – literally pointed – to the sharpness of his canine teeth as evidence for the moral 
justifiability of human meat consumption, and another friend once seriously said to me “show 
me a species that isn’t speciesist, and I’ll show you one that’s extinct”), it is surely warranted to 
point out that such views commit a “naturalistic fallacy,” to say the least. And yet, I think that 
phenomenology in general, and that the specific phenomenological inquiry to follow, shows us 
that the supposed divorce between “value and fact,” between normativity and reality, between 
ethics/politics and ontology, is another dualism to be cast into the ash heap of all the others. This 
does not mean we relinquish our ability to critique “the way things are,” but it does mean that 
“values” do not get tacked on to “facts” (or on to “the way things are”) after the fact, that 
“values” (and their normative implications) are already built into the presentations of things in 
lived experience yet (like so many other aspects of lived experience) may become occluded or 
distorted by fallacious abstractions (especially ontological ones). The normative may not be 
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reducible to the ontological, yet it does not follow from that fact alone that the two are truly 
separable, and indeed I do not think that they are; in Merleau-Ponty’s technical understanding of 
this term, they are always intertwined: indeed, to exist in the world as a living being is already to 
be oriented toward what it is to flourish (or to fail to flourish) as the living being one is, and as an 
incarnate being my life, hence my flourishing, is already entangled with a carnal world, already 
entangled with other incarnate lives and flourishings. On this point, Aristotle was absolutely 
correct. Thus, it is not an accident that, time and again, we find that harmful, oppressive 
normative frameworks are constructed on the foundation of specious ontological presuppositions 
– erroneous notions of what it is to be – and that therefore in order to dismantle the former it is 
necessary to dismantle the latter. My contention is that one such framework is anthropocentrism 
(or human supremacism), and the task I have set for myself here is to show the extent to which 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology indeed dismantles the ontological presuppositions upon which an 
anthropocentric worldview is based.          
Philosophizing is always, as Nietzsche relentlessly insisted, laden with affect. Logos has 
never been, and never could be, “pure” (despite its efforts to present itself as such) but is always 
entwined with pathos, always enmeshed with our affective and bodily, hence value-laden, 
attachments to the world and to others. In fact, if we could summarize the basic and most 
important lesson of the past two hundred years of “Continental” philosophy, it would be that 
there is never any such thing as “purity,” that no being, that no source or form of existence and 
meaning, or that no category of identity is ever “pure” in any sense that may be attached to such 
a notion. The relevant point here is that there is no such thing as a form of consciousness, 
cognition, or “rationality” that is not always already suffused with the senses, cares, and passions 
that let things emerge as meaningful – as worthy of attention or concern – for us in the first 
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place. To be consciously engaged with something is always, in some way, to be affected by it, or 
to be emotionally engaged with it. For me, philosophical reflection has always been affectively 
prompted by a whiff of what Derrida, in The Animal That Therefore I am, describes as “bêtise”9 
(which in the English translation of this work is rendered as “asinanity” but which we may 
alternatively, and more bluntly, render as “stupidity”, “idiocy,” “foolishness,” or perhaps 
“bullshit”); it is prompted, in other words, by a vague and inchoate sense (which of course 
demands to be sharpened and argumentatively supported) that some widely held belief is 
erroneous or that some widely accepted practice or institution or value system is unjust, or that 
the justification typically provided for some article of “common sense” is specious. As was the 
case for Hamlet, for myself and, I think, for most who are honest about why they began to do 
philosophy, philosophical reflection begins not so much with sanguine speculative curiosity or a 
desire for some abstruse, ‘capital T’ Truth, but rather more so with the notion – the often 
unbearably nagging, gnawing, haunting sense – that “something is rotten in Denmark” or that 
“the time is out of joint,” or in other words with the realization that commonly accepted 
frameworks of intelligibility – that those systems of concepts and values through which we 
derive meaning and a stable cognitive and practical orientation in the world – are somehow 
amiss, somehow inherently unstable if not downright untenable, somehow wrong; often, it arises 
from the sense that our concepts are inadequate and that, therefore, the boundaries they impress 
upon the world are no longer, or have never really been, adequate, secure, or “right” either: the 
sense that what was once clear and distinct or strictly separated has become (or was always 
already) blurred, or conversely that what was once blurred or occluded has become (or was 
always already) clear and distinct. As I often tell my students, philosophy does not begin in 
																																																								
9	See Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am. Trans. David Willis (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 
p. 18, 31.	
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“wonder” as often as it begins in mortal and moral horror, in the traumas that, to quote Camus, 
“break the chain of daily gestures,”10 in the vertigo of losing one’s grip on once familiar and 
reliable frameworks of meaning; it begins when one confronts a world that is no longer 
congenial to one’s traditional constructions of identity and value, or rather when one’s traditional 
constructions of identity and value are no longer congenial to a wakeful, responsible awareness 
of the world; it begins, in short, when the ground that once provided one’s foothold in the world 
starts to quake, when, as Marx so eloquently puts it, “all that is solid melts into air, all that is 
holy is profaned….”11  
Nothing more profoundly founds our orientation in the world, nothing more strongly 
harnesses how we conceptualize who we are, our place in the order of things, and thus 
everything that matters to us – nothing is more cherished, more supposedly solid and holy – than 
the barriers that seemingly define and allow us reflexively to invoke these very pronouns 
themselves, these “whos” and “ours,” these “we’s” and “us’s.” In other words, nothing more 
deeply constitutes who and what we are than the apparent barriers that commonly shape our 
notions of community or of the extension of this very “we” or “our,” the margins that constitute 
our sense of being/belonging-together or that, at the fundamental, bedrock level of thought and 
existence, delineate and center what we call our “humanity”; but so too, then, is nothing more 
deeply constitutive of who “we” are than those others these barriers were precisely erected to 
exclude, indeed those others upon whose repressed lives, bodies, knowledges, voices, agonies, 
and sacrifices these barriers were erected, those “animal” others outside the apparent margins of 
our humanity who must continually be “otherized”, ignored, doubted, silenced, objectified, 
																																																								
10 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus. Trans. Justin O’Brien (Vintage International, 1991), p. 12. 
11	The Communist Manifesto. Ed. Samuel H. Beer (Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1955), p. 13. 
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denigrated, vivisected, “tested,” imprisoned, “domesticated,” “broken,” or brutalized in order to 
secure such margins and who consequently, by dint of their tacitly disruptive alterities, or rather 
simply because their alterities co-constitute these very sanctified margins in the first place, in 
fact call these margins into question and threaten to profane if not obliterate the holy edifices at 
the center of them. It is my contention that justice – in every valence of the term – demands that 
we precisely do away with all such “centers” and “margins” and with the theoretical frameworks 
(and material institutions and practices) that uphold them so that we may begin to cultivate more 
responsive and responsible – or perhaps, I dare say, more “rational” – habits of seeing, listening, 
feeling, thinking, and knowing, more lucid, compassionate, and hospitable ways of being.           
This project, then, begins with the sense that one such persistent, widely accepted 
framework of concepts, beliefs, and normative principles – one that is as common throughout the 
history of Western philosophy as it remains today throughout the world – is in fact clearly 
erroneous, and that all attempts to justify such a framework are therefore specious (indeed are 
less justifications than rationalizations). The framework or ideology in question is, again, 
anthropocentrism, or some general commitment to human separatism and supremacism, i.e., to a 
set of claims affirming human beings to be exceptional in ways that categorically isolate them 
from, and that mark their existence as intrinsically more important than, anything that is non-
human, or anything that is oppositionally and collectively signified as belonging to “animality” 
or to “nature.” Anthropocentrism, in short, is the notion that human existence is or ought to be 
the center of all meaning and value in the Universe, the default yardstick according to which all 
other things or forms of life can only be at best derivatively meaningful or valuable, or that to 
which all other things, especially non-human animals, are or ought to be subordinate.  
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I have for quite some time harbored the intuition that if anything deserves to be 
considered “bêtise,” it is anthropocentrism, or human-centered speciesism: the underlying 
assumptions, abstract concepts, imaginaries, or “logics” that motivate it, along with the practices 
and institutions that unfold from it and in turn reinforce and perpetuate it. Worse still is that the 
assumptions endemic to the construction of an anthropocentric or human-supremacist worldview 
are so deeply and widely entrenched – so rooted, we might say, in our collective unconscious – 
that even many of the best-intentioned efforts to critique and dismantle them end up reinscribing 
them. My goal, then, is to use the resources of phenomenology in general, and the resources of 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy in particular, to place what once began as an intuitive sense that 
anthropocentrism is wrong (in every valence of the term) on a cogently reasoned and 
experientially informed footing – to demonstrate that anthropocentrism is not logically 
justifiable, phenomenologically founded, or morally and politically acceptable – and to do so in a 
way that provides a corrective to other popular albeit flawed efforts to do the same, as well as 
avenues for further radical reconsiderations and reconfigurations of concepts that, even if 
indispensable, can certainly never be the same again as a result of such a critique, namely 
concepts such as subjectivity, identity, humanity, logos, Being, and community. 
However, lest the above remarks suggest that an exclusively or overly negative set of 
attitudes motivate this project, I hasten to underscore that it also very much a labor of, and 
inspired by, love, an effort that is just as much prompted by a lifelong love for, and fascination 
with, non-human others, and especially by what various relationships and encounters with such 
others have taught me about what it is to love and to be loved, or even about what it is to be at 
all. If I have harbored an intuitive suspicion that anthropocentrism is little more than just another 
unsound and oppressive ideology – a thinly veiled excuse for marginalization, exploitation, and 
	 27	
cruelty – it is due to all the ways in which animals have affected me, taught me, and challenged 
me, all the ways in which they have not only illuminated and enriched familiar elements of my 
field of experience but have also opened up new horizons of meaning, thinking, and being that 
would otherwise be foreclosed by an “all too human” vantage point (and that help check the 
hubristic prejudices that typify such a vantage point). Some version of Thomas Nagel’s famous 
question, “what is it like to be a bat?,” was likely the first philosophical question to have ever 
captivated me, yet it was always the case that such a question was prompted by deep connections 
with non-human forms of life that contravene or at least temper our common, ready-made 
skeptical or pessimistic responses to such a question.  
None of this is to say, as I will further insist, that non-human forms of life or subjectivity 
are perfectly, translucently intelligible to us, or that there are no significant differences between 
different forms of life, differences that might present interpretive or epistemic, as well as ethical, 
quandaries and ambiguities. Indeed, no form of life or subjectivity – including especially our 
own – is ever perfectly, translucently intelligible, and of course significant differences obtain 
between all different forms of life, however interconnected they may be. “Interconnected” does 
not mean identical or undifferentiated, and differentiated does not mean disconnected or 
opposed. As Foucault remarks, “we should keep in mind that heterogeneity is never a principle 
of exclusion; it never prevents coexistence, conjunction, or connection.”12 Merleau-Ponty, 
however, argues not only that heterogeneity is compatible with “coexistence,” “conjunction,” or 
“connection” but that it entails it. These points seem rather simple and obvious, yet few have 
ever adhered to them consistently or correctly drawn their implications, and indeed once we 
																																																								
12 The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979. Trans. Graham Burchell (New York: 
Picador/Palegrave Macmillan, 2008), p 42.  
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examine such points more closely we “enter into a labyrinth of difficulties and contradictions”13 
– we encounter “the paradoxes of which vision is made,”14 the “figured enigmas” and 
“incompossible details”15 of which even Being as such is composed – and thus begin to 
understand why it is so easy to lapse into either reductive (i.e., monistic, mechanistic, 
positivistic, or totalizing) or oppositional (i.e., dualistic or supernaturalist) ways of thinking, both 
of which equally deny or repress rather than confront those very “difficulties,” “paradoxes,” 
“enigmas,” or “incompossibles.”16 Here, in particular, we confront the paradox of alterity: in 
order to have any relationship at all with a genuine Other, that Other cannot be utterly outside 
one’s own horizons of experience and intelligibility, for then the other would not appear as such 
or even be conceivable at all. And yet, the Other must also exceed those very same horizons of 
experience and intelligibility or must remain to some extent inaccessible or irreducibly 
transcendent, for otherwise the Other would not present any “otherness” – would not be other – 
at all. Thus, the main difficulties – hermeneutic as well as ethical – that attend efforts to 
understand or express the being of a non-human other, or the difficulties of explaining how one’s 
own human subjectivity provides access to, and indeed is already structured by relations with, 
non-human subjectivities or alterities, are not different in kind from those difficulties we 
generally confront when we address exclusively human intersubjectivity. In every case these are 
the difficulties of doing justice to otherness. Doing justice to otherness precisely means honoring 
– finding adequate ways to explain, express, affirm, and appreciate – the nature of otherness 
without otherizing others beyond the scope of justice, that is, beyond the boundaries of 
epistemic-phenomenological accessibility or ontological and ethical relationality.  
																																																								
13 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and The Invisible, p.3. 
14 Ibid., p.4. 
15 Ibid., p.4. 
16 Ibid., p. 14. 
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My thesis, then, is the one that Merleau-Ponty came to by the (premature) end of his 
philosophical career, namely that human subjectivity is constitutively embedded in relations with 
non-human subjectivities, that human selfhood is constituted by non-human otherness just as 
pervasively and fundamentally as by human otherness, that the scope of “intersubjectivity” – as a 
(quasi-transcendental) condition of subjectivity – always already includes overlapping networks 
of human and non-human beings alike. Briefly stated, my thesis is that all identities and 
subjectivities – hence all goods – are intrinsically enmeshed. My goal and my hope, motivated as 
much by love as by anything else, is to use Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy – especially the 
ontology developed in his later writings – in the service of justifying this thesis, in the service of 
knowing, hence doing justice to, “what we see,” or in the service of letting be heard the voices 
and truths that are affirmed and understood at one level of our awareness only to be silenced and 
denied at another. The goal is not to show that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is without flaws (for 
indeed no philosopher’s thinking is without flaws or limitations) or without its own 
anthropocentric prejudices and lacunae (which it has), but rather that despite such flaws it offers 
the best resources for founding a genuinely non-anthropocentric ethical framework: a truly, 
consistently non-human-centered conception of ‘the Good.’ The goal is to articulate what I wish 
to call Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of radical community (that is, to trace the development of this 
ontology from his early writings on perception and intersubjectivity to his later concepts of 
“Flesh,” écart, and the chiasm), to articulate the profound consequences this ontology has (and 
which Merleau-Ponty himself suggests) for how we understand the relationship between “the 
human” and “the animal,” and furthermore to draw the ethical consequences of this ontology, or 
more specifically to demonstrate the extent to which this ontology – what we might call 
Merleau-Ponty’s “radical communitarianism” or ontology of radical difference (which, for me, 
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are synonymous) – dismantles the anthropocentricity, or necessitates the displacement of the 
human-centered perspective, of traditional moral and political (as well as metaphysical and 
epistemological) theories and thus provides the basis for a genuinely non-anthropocentric 
concept of moral and political community. The goal is to put Merleau-Ponty’s ontology in the 
service of elevating to renewed, enriched awareness and appreciation the community of human 
and extra-human subjectivities – the radical community of all communities, the primal 
differentiation and attendant overlapping of bodies – that in fact opens up and aliments every 
possibility of thinking, living, and flourishing, possibilities that are, as such, not centrally, 
exclusively, monolithically, or solipsistically “human.” 	
Lastly, I wish to remark on my use of the term “animal” in the discussion to follow. The 
use of this term as a shorthand reference to any living being that is “not human” has been much 
contested in certain corners of contemporary philosophy, and with good reason. A point that is 
almost too banal to be worth mentioning (at least after Darwin) is that human beings are, of 
course, animals themselves, so there is no categorical or ontological opposition between human 
beings and non-human beings, which such a use of the term may suggest. This is often rectified 
by substituting “non-human animal” for “animal.” More importantly, the term “animal” – and 
especially any reference to “the animal” or to “animality” as such – tends to group together 
monolithically, and thus erase, what is in fact a prodigious diversity of forms of life, “an 
irreducible living multiplicity of mortals.”17 Thus, not only does such a term often suppress the 
continuity between human and non-human beings, but in doing so it also suppresses the rich and 
important differences between the multifarious non-human forms of life with whom we share a 
world. Indeed, even to substitute “non-human animal” for “animal” – or even to refer to “non-
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human animals” – is nonetheless to homogenize what is irreducibly heterogeneous. Another 
concern is that insofar as the term “non-human” is intelligible only in contradistinction to the 
term “human,” its use likely depends upon an uncritically assumed conception of  “the human,” 
as though “human” or “humanity” admits of an unproblematic, fixed or stable, essential or 
univocal definition any more so than “animal” or “animality”; and in fact, since the terms of a 
conceptual dyad are interdependent (even though one of them may protest otherwise), if one 
must abandon or, at the very least, radically problematize one of them, so too must one abandon 
or problematize the other. To problematize the category of “the animal” is necessarily also to 
problematize the category of “the human.”    
Moreover, insofar as the term “non-human” implies “the human” as the primary standard 
of reference or default standpoint against which all forms of life are derivatively understood and 
valued, those forms of life designated as “non-human” are hierarchically subordinated (if not 
also opposed) to “the human,” and such categories thus uncritically assume or reproduce an 
anthropocentric framework (which is perhaps the very kind of framework that their user 
otherwise wishes to resist). It is telling that we do not typically organize the world in terms of the 
distinction between, say, “the elephant” and “the non-elephant” or “the spider” and “the non-
spider,” and in fact it was Plato who, in the Statesman, first suggested that it is just as arbitrary to 
carve the world into “the human” and the “non-human”18; furthermore, it would clearly be 
repugnant if we did so in terms of the distinction between “the white skinned” and “the non-
																																																								
18	After “Socrates the Younger” proposes to subdivide the art of “herding” into two arts corresponding to “two 
kinds of living beings, the human race and a second one, a single class, comprising all the beasts,” the “Stranger” 
responds:  
 
“…Perhaps, if there is any other animal capable of thought, such as the crane appears to be, or any other like 
creature, and it perchance gives names, just as you do, it might in its pride of self oppose cranes to all other animals, 
and group the rest, men included, under one head, calling them by one name, which might very well be that of 
beasts. Now let us try to be on our guard against all that sort of thing.” See 263C4-D13, in Plato, Statesman, 
Philebus, Ion. Trans. Harold N. Fowler & W.R.M. Lamb (Loeb Classical Library, 1925), p.27-29. 
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white skinned,” the “male” and “the non-male,” “the Christian” and “the non-Christian,” and so 
on, as though there is something ontologically primary or ethically exceptional about whiteness, 
maleness, or Christianity and, correlatively, something derivative, privative, or inferior about 
their counterparts; indeed, it is impossible to equate “female” or “feminine” with “non-male” or 
“non-masculine” in a way that does not implicitly adopt a patriarchal or phallocentric conceptual 
framework and value system (which, for example, is precisely the very framework Aristotle 
assumed when he defined "woman" as a "mutilated male”19). Likewise, one simply cannot use 
the terms “non-human” or “animal” (provided “animal” is taken to be equivalent in meaning to 
“non-human”) without adopting a humanist, anthropocentric or human-exceptionalist standpoint.  
We must, then, regard the category of “the animal” or of “the non-human,” and consequently the 
category of “the human,” as analogous to those I have just mentioned, and therefore as inherently 
chauvinistic and oppressive. Given the fact that nearly every historical effort to rationalize or 
“naturalize” the marginalization, exploitation, or oppression of others – that nearly every effort 
to exclude certain others from full, equal membership in an ethical and political community – has 
involved “otherizing” such others as “animals” (or as at least being closer to “animality” than to 
full “humanity”), we are already compelled to suspect that the categories of “the human” and 
“the animal/non-human” are never value-neutral, apolitical or “natural” signifiers but are 
fundamentally normative and power-laden constructs, indeed are essentially instruments of 
hegemony and exploitation, categories deployed for the sole purpose of bio/necropolitical control 
and domination.  
The human/animal binary is not only, like every false binary, an obfuscation of reality, 
but it is also, like many such obfuscations, ideologically motivated, coded, and instituted, and not 
																																																								
19	See Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, 737 a27-28.  
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simply a failure of propositional correspondence or conceptual adequation (which it is). 
Likewise, it is naïve (and itself ideologically suspect) to think that racism and sexism are just sets 
of false factual beliefs or weak empirical inductions; of course they often manifest as that, but 
they are also embedded in, and buttressed by, complex webs of socially entrenched, historically 
emergent institutions and relations of power; they embody supremacist conceptual frameworks 
and value-systems, or already established unjust hierarchies, that tacitly, structurally inform 
perception, thought, and behavior, or that interpellate the privileged and oppressive subject-
positions of which our status quo bigotries are but surface symptoms, and as such they blur the 
supposed boundary between the descriptive and the normative, the ontological or empirical and 
the ethical/political; they designate not merely unacceptable propositional attitudes, but 
unacceptable worlds; they are not merely epistemically wrong descriptions of reality but already 
themselves normatively, ethically and politically wrong realities, already wrong ways of 
dwelling in the world, already wrong ways of making or reproducing the world in which one 
dwells.  
Indeed, as I suggested above, ontology and ethics/politics are always intertwined, which 
is to say the boundary between them can never be entirely sharp or decidable. Questions such as 
“what is a woman?” or “what is it to be white?” are obviously loaded, which is to say not merely 
descriptive in meaning. Questions such as “do women and men share similar aptitudes for 
science?” or “are black people more inclined to violence than white people?” are also, to put it 
lightly, problematic and not merely questions of empirical fact, yet questions such as “what is it 
to be human?” or “what makes humans different from other animals?” or “can elephants 
recognize themselves in the mirror?” or “can horses do simple arithmetic?” are not relevantly 
different. If someone applies for a grant to study the cognitive abilities of dogs or whether rats 
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are capable of altruistic behavior, we hardly think anything of it, and indeed there are many 
ethologists today who are engaged in investigating such matters and who have yielded many 
wonderful and fascinating insights into the minds of dogs and rats. Yet, if someone were to apply 
for a similar grant to study the cognitive capacities of Jews or the altruistic capacities of Native 
Americans, such an application would certainly and reasonably raise eyebrows, to say the least. 
None of these questions, however, are categorically different from one another, and it is long 
past due that we learn to regard them that way. There is no such thing as value-free science or 
value-free ontology, and only a naïve, long-discredited positivism could suggest otherwise. 
Every conceptual framework is ideological, every schema or mode of knowledge-production is 
normative. It may seem to be an ad hominem or reductively psychologistic point, but whenever a 
question in philosophy (or in any academic field of inquiry, including especially the so-called 
“hard” sciences) is presented for consideration (not to mention funding), our first response to 
such a question, in the spirit of Nietzsche, ought to be to ask a few questions of our own about it, 
namely “who wants to know it?,” “why do they want to know it?,” and “what do they intend to 
do with the answer to it if indeed they ascertain one?” To put the point another way, and to 
borrow loosely from the rich tradition of American pragmatism, the meaning of a question is 
inherently, largely if not entirely, a function of what we wish to do, or of what we will or will not 
do, with the answer to it once we acquire it. The meaning of any and every question is partly 
constituted by the consequences such a question will have in the world, the difference that 
knowing (or not knowing) the answer to it will (or will not) make in lived experience. Such 
questions are simply inseparable from the particular social conditions that enable or motivate us 
to ask them in the first place.  
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Likewise, concepts are things we apply to the world – typically, they are tools we use to 
classify or group things together according to certain apparently salient and shared characteristics 
– and so regardless of whether or not, in the end, we consider them to be “merely” mental or 
extra-mental objects, they always have extra-mental, material effects; no matter how “abstract” 
they may be, they are always woven into human experience and agency, and therefore they 
always leave their mark on the world and on the bodies they either include or exclude; in short, 
abstractions are never purely abstract but are always already concrete, or always already 
contaminated with the materiality of the world to which they apply or from which they are 
derived, and they – or rather their applications – always have consequences; even if their 
consequences are not matters of much moral or political weight and substance, even to lack such 
weight or substance is a manner of having it: something may only “lack” normative significance 
against or amid a background of values and goods already in place, values and goods it either 
advances, opposes, or leaves intact. Thus, even if something lacks normative “significance,” that 
is itself a normative, hence not truly insignificant, truth about it. Nevertheless, all concepts – 
even those that seem to have nothing to do with matters conventionally or paradigmatically 
regarded as normative – are inherently normative to the extent that they are necessarily 
exclusionary, or to the extent that they always dictate whether something should be counted as 
belonging within or outside their scope. As I remarked above, phenomenological analysis and 
critique consists fundamentally in a resistance to reification, in the refusal to substitute ‘the 
abstract’ for ‘the concrete’ and in the refusal to let such illicit substitutions – especially the false 
binaries they generate and lead us to take for granted as fundamental truths – guide our thinking, 
and now we see that yet another false binary or abstraction we must not reify is precisely the 
very binary of ‘the abstract’ and ‘the concrete’ itself, in addition to that of the ‘descriptive’ and 
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the ‘normative’ or that of ontology and ethics/politics. Show me a question or a concept that 
seems to be as removed as possible from questions of value or matters of conduct, show me a 
question that appears to be of purely epistemic, empirical, or metaphysical import, or show me a 
concept that appears devoid of normative valences, and I will show you one that is nonetheless 
thoroughly entangled with ethical, political, or broadly normative matters, circumstances, and 
phenomena.  
This is not to say that matters of empirical or ontological investigation are necessarily 
nefarious, nor is it to say that all concepts are necessarily oppressive, but it is to say that they are 
always, to paraphrase Foucault, dangerous.20 Certain concepts, for example, may not be 
inherently or irredeemably oppressive, for they may be necessary (strategically or otherwise) in 
order to name and make visible real instances of oppression (e.g., the very concept of oppression 
in the first place). Certain concepts seem to play an integral, unavoidable role in any 
emancipatory politics or commitment to social justice (such as the very concepts of emancipation 
and justice themselves), and it never serves the interests of the oppressed to presume that their 
conditions and lived experiences of oppression are ineffable; what does serve their interests is to 
develop concepts that can empower them to articulate their own oppression, concepts or terms or 
means of expression that may best enable their narratives and histories to be told, heard, and 
understood; even if they are unable to voice clearly their own lived experiences and oppressions 
themselves (as is the case with many non-human animals and many traumatized humans, for 
example), such concepts or means of expression may nevertheless help impart voice and 
visibility to their lived experiences, or may help others bear witness to, and thereby help undo, 
																																																								
20	See Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” in Hubert L. Dreyfus & Paul 
Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd Edition (The University of Chicago Press, 
1983), p. 231. 
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their oppressions. As I suggested above, then, concepts may indeed be indispensable components 
of human experience, thought, and action, and so the point is not to dispense with them 
altogether but rather always to be critically vigilant of them, always to be cognizant of their 
(often repressed) limitations and genealogies, always to be attentive to their intrinsic materiality 
and power, to the social and political conditions, subject-positions, and discursive contexts with 
which they are constitutively ensnared, to the phenomena they may help reveal but also occlude, 
to the truths they perhaps allow us to think and speak but also to the innumerable others they 
silence, deny, or would exclude from the realm of thought and expression. In short, the point is 
never to deploy concepts uncritically but always to register, always to suffer their tragic 
inadequacy, their – and thus our – utter weakness in the face of those things that most call for 
thinking, recognition, and responsible – even loving – engagement, their weakness in the face of 
the irrecuperable excess of the phenomena and truths that most demand our understanding and 
testimony. If we cannot dispense with concepts, then we may at least heed their inexpugnable 
violence and perhaps hope to develop those that, again, may help us think and dwell in the world 
in less needlessly or unjustly violent ways, or that may help open up new horizons of just and 
flourishing living that other concepts or conceptual schemas forbid us to “conceptualize.” As 
Leonard Lawlor argues concerning the manner in which we conceptualize the relationship 
between “humans” and “animals,” the point is not – indeed can never be – to eliminate violence 
altogether; rather, the point is to promote the least, not the worst, violence,21 and I think this 
point is applicable to any philosophical issue. Violence can be deployed for either oppressive or 
liberatory ends, and if there is something ineradicably violent about our concepts, may we at 
least aspire to create and mobilize those that are conducive to the latter and aggressively 
																																																								
21 See Leonard Lawlor, This is Not Sufficient: An Essay on Animality and Human Nature in Derrida (New York, 
NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), especially chapters 2 and 3.  
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antithetical to the former. Philosophy has, or at least ought to have, no other aim than this, and it 
is my contention that Merleau-Ponty’s interrelated concepts of the lived body, perception, Flesh, 
the chiasm, dehiscence/écart, “fecund negativity,” intercorporeity, and “interanimality” (if we 
can even call them “concepts”) are especially suited to it.  
Similarly, questions concerning “what something is” are not necessarily to be eschewed 
or suppressed, for indeed such questions are often unavoidable, yet they are never as “value-
neutral” or as ethically/politically innocuous as they may seem, for they will always, in fact and 
in principle, have consequences for how we treat the thing in question. And in many cases, 
contingent arrangements of power, background schemas of knowledge, and at best questionable 
taxonomies of Being will have already decided for us the answers to such questions before we 
ever pose or think to ask them; the task of philosophy, however, is not only to decide the answers 
to such questions for ourselves, but ceaselessly to interrogate why these questions are worth 
asking in the first place, to clarify what (if anything) is at stake in them and, if necessary, to pose 
different, better and more penetrating questions and even to imagine alternative possibilities for 
questioning and thinking, indeed to challenge commonly assumed limits of the questionable and 
thinkable. The questions with which I am concerned here – questions concerning the nature of 
subjectivity and its relationship to the world and to other subjectivities, questions concerning the 
existence of others and concerning the nature of otherness as such, questions concerning the 
meaning of “humanity” and “animality” or concerning the relationship between “the human” and 
“the animal,” questions concerning the constitution of any identity or relationship, questions at 
the basis of how we conceptualize what it is to be in the world, what it is to be with others, what 
it is to be “other” and indeed what it is to be at all – are eminently and urgently questions worth 
asking, for they are self-evidently questions endemic to how we think and live; and since such 
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questions disrupt and, in the final analysis (provided we have thought them through correctly), 
destroy the concepts and assumptions that found a human-supremacist worldview, and since a 
human-supremacist worldview dominates how we human beings perceive, think, and act in the 
world, or since human supremacism continues to delimit the questions we human beings ask, 
what we human beings (think we) “know” and the kinds of knowledge we seek, as well as the 
worlds or communities – the very “We’s” – we can envision or desire for ourselves, so too do 
they promise to break open new, better, more expansive possibilities of thinking, imagining, 
wondering, knowing, questioning, world-making, and flourishing.        
So, the determination of “humanity” as the exclusion of “animality,” the sense of “the 
animal” as everything that is categorically, absolutely not human, or the derivative or privative 
definition and assessment of “animals” relative to an already bootstrapped Archimedean human 
center of reference, is precisely what we need to interrogate; it is analogous to other binary 
frameworks that are patently unacceptable for ontological and ethical reasons, and it may indeed 
be the foundation of them. The binary, and usually hierarchical, opposition of “the human” and 
“the animal” typically coincides with other classical binary and value-laden hierarchical 
oppositions that we know better than to accept uncritically or at all, such as those between 
“reason and non-reason/emotion,” mind and body, form/ideality and matter, universality and 
particularity, subject and object, self and Other, male and female, masculinity and femininity, 
whiteness and blackness/coloredness, culture/nurture and nature, autonomy and heteronomy, 
etc., and such coincidences, it seems, are not merely empirical curiosities or historical accidents, 
but evidence of conceptual entailment. All dualisms and all supremacisms are logically 
analogous and perhaps even inseparable. Indeed, if it is true that all oppressions are 
intersectional, it must be the case that the “logics,” conceptual schemas, or imaginaries that 
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undergird them are as well. So, in the final analysis, to reject any dualism is to reject all 
dualisms, and to reject any supremacism is to reject all supremacisms. Dualistic worldviews are 
not only bad ontologies, but also bad ideologies, and supremacist worldviews are not only bad 
ideologies, but also bad ontologies. As I have suggested, bad ontology is already bad ideology, 
and bad ideology is already bad ontology, for there are no ideology-free (amoral or apolitical) 
ontologies, nor are there any ontology-free ideologies. And it is nearly always the case, as 
Nietzsche insisted, that dualisms are implicitly also supremacisms, that is, hierarchies in which 
one term is valued or privileged at the expense of the other. The binaries I just mentioned (which 
are of course the binaries that have historically dominated Western philosophy and culture) do 
not simply posit each of their terms as mutually exclusive but also tacitly posit one of them as 
more fundamental or as “better” or “more important” than the other.     
For all of the reasons I have just elaborated, I entirely agree with Derrida’s view that 
since the term “animal” is so problematic and under/overdetermined – indeed, since it is 
fundamentally “asinine” and unjustly violent – it ought to be jettisoned from our lexicon 
altogether:   
It follows that one will never have the right to take animals to be species of a kind that would be named 
The Animal, or animal in general. Whenever “one” says “The Animal”, each time a philosopher, or 
anyone else, says “The Animal” in the singular and without further ado, claiming thus to designate every 
living thing that is held not to be human…well, each time the subject of that statement, this “one”, this 
“I”, does that he utters an asinanity. He avows without avowing it, he declares, just as a disease is 
declared by means of a symptom, he offers up for diagnosis that statement “I am uttering an asinanity.” 
And this “I am uttering an asinanity” should affirm not only the animality that he is disavowing but his 
complicit, continued, and organized involvement in a veritable war of the species.”22  
 
Indeed, everyday uses of the term “animal” are sure signs of thoughtlessness, or sure examples 
of allowing unexamined and overly simplistic categories do our thinking for us. To the extent 
that the user of such a term takes the unique characteristic of humanity to be “rationality” (which 
																																																								
22Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I am, p.31. 
	 41	
is yet another term that we typically use without any rigorous determination of its meaning), then 
his/her usage of the term ironically demonstrates precisely his/her own lack of that very 
characteristic.23 And perhaps the more profound point is that if we must reject or, at the very 
least, radically rethink the category of “the animal,” so too must we radically rethink the 
category of “the human,” for each is unintelligible apart from, or is defined only relative to, the 
other. I will further address these concerns in chapter five, but I hasten to register them here at 
the outset because I will nevertheless continue to use the terms “animal(s),” “non-human(s),” 
“non-human animal(s),” and sometimes “other-than-human animal(s)/other(s)” or simply 
“animal other(s)” or “other Other(s)” interchangeably, and in every instance I am aware of the 
problems that attend their usage. Language is, of course, a blunt (and often oppressive) 
instrument, but for the sake of simplicity – or for the lack of a whole new conceptual vocabulary 
– I will conform to the conventional usage of these terms, and they should be received with all of 
these concerns in mind. In closing, then, this dissertation is indeed a meditation on “bêtise”: a 
meditation on “animality,” and principally a meditation on all of the specious – indeed “asinine” 
or “brutish” – ways in which we conceptualize it in opposition to an equally, correlatively 
specious, asinine, or brutishly conceived sense of “humanity.”       
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
23 It is noteworthy that the term “bêtise” derives from the term bête, which of course means “beast,” “brute,” or 
“animal.” Thus, in French the term “bêtise” can mean not only “stupidity,” “idiocy,” “foolishness,” etc., but also 
“animality,” and it is obvious that Derrida is exploiting this dual-valence of the term here. This is why Derrida    
remarks here that those who uncritically deploy the term “animal” ironically avow in themselves precisely what 
they, in deploying that very term, disavow from themselves, namely their own lack of “rationality” and therefore 
also their own “animality” (insofar as they construct animality as signifying an incapacity for rational thought).  
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Chapter One 
 
“The Incomparable Monster of Solipsism” 
Merleau-Ponty’s Confrontation with Dualism and the  
Classical Problem of Other Minds 
 
“We witness every minute the miracle of related experiences, and yet nobody knows better than we do how 
this miracle is worked, for we are ourselves this network of relationships.” 
 
– Merleau-Ponty24 
 
“There is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom.” 
 
– Nietzsche25 
 
There are certain traditional philosophical problems that are rightly regarded as 
“scandalous.” For Kant, it is scandalous that we lack a compelling proof for the existence of an 
external world.26 Heidegger retorted that what is truly scandalous is that we even seek or demand 
proof for the existence of an external world in the first place.27 I wish to add here that if any 
other perennial philosophical problem is justly considered “scandalous,” surely it is the “problem 
of other minds.” The fact that for so long philosophers have lacked (or even needed to seek in the 
first place) a compelling “proof” of the existence of minds other than their own is unquestionably 
one of the greatest scandals – indeed, one of the most risible embarrassments – of philosophy. 
Merleau-Ponty would also likely agree with such an assessment of the problem, yet he never 
simply dismisses it and in fact explicitly addresses and attempts to “solve” it. Merleau-Ponty 
addresses the problem of other minds consistently throughout his career and even, as we shall 
later see, considers it to arise naturally from the very nature of human subjectivity itself. For 
																																																								
24 Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. Colin Smith, (London: Routledge, 1962), p. xx. 
25 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “Of the Despisers of the Body.” Trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Penguin Books, 2003), p. 62.	
26	See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Preface to the Second Edition, Bxxxix. Trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. 
Wood, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 121.	
27	See Heidegger, Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (New York: Harper & Row, 
1962), p. 249. 
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Merleau-Ponty, the “incomparable monster of solipsism”28 – the illusion of radical, atomistic 
isolation, the false notion of absolute aloneness in the world, the destabilizing sense of oneself as 
utterly bereft of sure and essential attachments to others – is not merely an invention of 
philosophical parlor games but a chimera largely endemic to human consciousness as such,29 yet 
it is one that he sought to vanquish once and for all.  
Before I proceed to elaborate the problem of other minds and Merleau-Ponty’s responses 
to it, I wish to reply briefly here to the potential concern that my discussion in this chapter (and 
in the following chapters) may at times seem to conflate or slide between epistemological and 
ontological registers of analysis. That is, I may seem to move too quickly from questions 
concerning whether and how we know that others exist to questions concerning whether and in 
what manner others do exist. In certain places I may seem to slide from arguments concerning 
																																																								
28	See Merleau-Ponty, “The Concept of Nature I”, in In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays. Trans. John Wild, 
James Edie, John O’Neill (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), p. 150. Merleau-Ponty similarly 
refers to the “incomparable monster” of the solus ipse in The Visible and The Invisible (p. 62), and refers to 
(presumably Cartesian) subjectivity/subjectivism (in the context of discussing theories of painting) as an 
“incomparable monster” in “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence” (see Signs, Trans. Richard C. McCleary. 
Evanston, Il: Northwestern University Press, 1964, p. 47), and also alludes to it in “Science and the Experience of 
Expression” (see The Prose of the World, ed. Claude Lefort, trans., John O’Neill. Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1973, p. 19). Finally, we also find this phrase in Merleau-Ponty’s course notes for Husserl at the 
Limits of Phenomenology, eds., Leonard Lawlor & Bettina Bergo, trans. Leonard Lawlor (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 2002), p. 36. Lawlor mentions in an endnote that the phrase “incomparable monster” 
is lifted from Andre Malraux’s novel Man’s Fate.  
29 It is also important to note that such a notion is commonly inculcated and reinforced by certain ideologies – 
namely, classical liberalism and its offshoots – whose core commitment is individualism. For now I simply wish to 
indicate that I think this is a point Merleau-Ponty would accept, and that it would be uncharitable to attribute to him 
a radically transcultural, ahistorical, or apolitical account of human subjectivity, even if he does identify reasonably 
universal, cross-cultural phenomenological features and structures of lived experience (in fact, Merleau-Ponty 
repeatedly discusses the historicity and cultural embeddedness of human subjectivity, though I cannot discuss this 
aspect of his thought here). So, as will become clear later in this chapter, when Merleau-Ponty suggests that the 
notion of “solipsism” emerges “naturally” from consciousness itself, all he means is that there is necessarily an 
element of individuation or privacy endemic to consciousness, and such a thesis is hardly contestable. Indeed, such 
individuation or interiority makes otherness possible, and vice versa. The problem is that the individuation of 
subjectivity is often misconstrued (by, say, Cartesianism and liberalism) as radical independence or separation from 
others, when in fact it is, as Merleau-Ponty argues, necessarily accomplished through differentiating intersubjective 
relations, variable distances from others that are, at the same time, bonds of continuity with them: in short, there is 
such a thing as “individuality” or selfhood, but individualism is a false abstraction. There are “individuals” or 
“selves” (for otherwise there would be no such thing as life or consciousness at all, as self-reflexivity is a 
fundamental structure of life and consciousness), but they are constituted as such by relations with others all the way 
down.	
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what we can or cannot know to arguments and conclusions concerning what is. For example, in 
the discussions to follow I may seem to confuse skepticism about human and animal minds (the 
claim that we cannot know whether other human and/or non-human minds exist) with antirealism 
about other human and animal minds (the claim that other human and/or animal minds do not 
exist). I agree that there is a real conceptual distinction between skepticism and antirealism and 
that therefore there is, of course, a broader and more basic distinction between epistemological 
and ontological arguments and claims. However, I nevertheless maintain that my apparent 
“slippage” from the former register to the latter is neither careless nor illicit, for epistemology 
and ontology mutually implicate one another; they are always intertwined, even though we must 
admit that the latter is the foundation of the former. The point here is simply that any 
epistemological position or theory necessarily presupposes (even if only tacitly) certain 
ontological commitments. Knowledge, of course, signifies a kind of relationship, namely a 
relationship between a knower (subject of knowledge) and a known (object of knowledge). Thus, 
every epistemology assumes something about the nature of the subject and object of knowledge. 
Forms of skepticism, for example, depend upon the claim that subject and object are constituted 
or situated in such a way that the latter is exterior and inaccessible to the former. As I suggest 
above, ontology (not to mention ethics and politics) is always at stake in epistemology: questions 
of knowing can never be disentangled from questions of being (as well as from questions of 
value), and this is especially evident with respect to phenomenological considerations of 
knowledge, selfhood, and alterity. Indeed, it seems to me that one of the central insights of 
phenomenology is that there is no clear boundary between the order of being and the order of 
knowing (as well as the order of values). As will soon become apparent, skepticism about other 
minds (human and non-human alike) depends entirely upon a false understanding of the nature of 
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consciousness. In short, it presupposes dualism; indeed, it is viable if and only if dualism is true. 
This is precisely why I may often seem to slip between epistemological and ontological registers 
of analysis. Indeed, to demonstrate that skepticism concerning other minds is false is also to 
demonstrate that “anti-realism” concerning other minds is false, for to show such skepticism to 
be false is to show that the dualism upon which it is predicated is false, and to show that such 
dualism is false is to advance a conception of consciousness as fundamentally embodied: but 
since embodied consciousness just is a living body, it follows that every living body is a form or 
expression of “consciousness.” Thus, to refute skepticism concerning the existence other minds 
is at once to refute an anti-realist position on the issue. After all, if knowledge of some “subject” 
or “object” is possible, it must be the case that such a “subject” or “object” exists in the first 
place. Moreover, it is especially easy to “conflate” epistemological and ontological arguments in 
Merleau-Ponty’s work precisely because his phenomenological argumentation blurs the 
supposed boundary between them; often, his argumentative strategy is to show how certain 
abstract concepts or schemas tacitly presuppose yet conceal and distort what is “really there” or 
“really real,” and in showing this he dissolves the apparent problems that are generated by the 
reification of such abstractions. The upshot, of course, is not only that such problems are 
dissolved, but that we also learn something about what is (always already lived as) 
foundationally real.  
The traditional problem of other minds (hence the threat of solipsism) is posed by the  
following question: How do I know that other minds like my own – that is to say, other sentient 
beings, other perceiving, feeling, thinking, and willing subjects - exist? How do I know that there  
really are other minds or conscious entities in the world besides my own? Merleau-Ponty 
summarizes this problem as follows:  
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…How can the word ‘I’ be put into the plural, how can a general idea of the I be formed, how can I speak 
of an I other than my own, how can I know that there are other I’s, how can consciousness which, by its 
nature, and as self-knowledge, is in the mode of the I, be grasped in the mode of the Thou…?30  
 
To start, the problem depends upon the notion that consciousness is essentially insular self-
presence, something entirely private and internal, something whose nature is exclusively defined 
by, and thus something that is only accessible from within, what we call the “first-person” 
perspective: consciousness is directly visible or accessible only to itself, and it is precisely this  
interiority that defines consciousness as such. Yet, such a definition of consciousness rends the 
conscious subject’s ties to the world, to its body, and to those things that figure as “objects” of 
consciousness: since consciousness is defined as a domain of pure interiority, it is thereby set 
over and against, or abstracted from, the domain of material, external things, processes, and  
phenomena, and thus we face the insuperable problem of how the two – how subject and object,  
consciousness and world, interiority and exteriority – may be ontologically and epistemically  
reconciled. Consciousness is withheld entirely from public inspection or presentation and thus  
signifies a domain of reality entirely and uniquely removed from that of perceptible things and  
properties. Consciousness is defined by this privileged, immediate, reflexive, incorrigible access  
that it has to itself (that is, to its own “states,” “qualia,” and “representations”). In this way,  
consciousness is taken to be a purely private or internal theatre of appearances, something  
uniquely defined by the fact that it cannot be accessed or observed from any vantage point 
outside itself, and which is therefore itself a vantage point on the world that somehow has no 
place in it.   
This conception of consciousness is motivated by the obvious fact that only “I” can live 
through my experiences and that I can never truly live through the experiences of another. Just as 
																																																								
30 Phenomenology of Perception, p. 348. 
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no one else can truly make my decisions for me, so too can no one else truly experience my 
experiences (insofar as they are mine). Thus, I perceive other moving bodies in the world, but (as 
Descartes wonders in the Meditations) how can I know that these bodies are “inhabited” by other 
consciousnesses and are not just complex automata (or “zombies”)? Might this animate body that 
I take to be conscious really be nothing more than an empty, pantomiming husk, a mere mimicry 
of sentience, a thing with no inner life at all? How can I really know that “you” are conscious if I 
cannot leap inside your consciousness to find out? As Thomas Nagel correctly points out,31 even 
if I could transport myself inside your flesh, I still would not be able live through your 
experiences; I would only be able to live through my experiences in “your” (but which would then 
really be my own) body. This is to say that if my consciousness is necessarily always only 
“mine,” then I can never escape my own consciousness in order to discover and live through 
another’s. As Kant argued, my experiences are possible only if this very sense of “mineness” 
always accompanies them, or only if in each case they are indexed to something called “me,” 
namely the subject whose experiences they are. This “me” or this “subject” – what Kant calls the 
“transcendental unity of apperception,” and what Husserl will later call the transcendental ego – is 
not the “biographical,” personal, or empirical self or ego, but is rather simply the locus or dative 
pole to which all experiences must centripetally refer, that which makes a unified, hence 
minimally coherent, representation of the world possible in the first place.32 So, I can never know 
“what-it-is-like” for you to be you (assuming that there is anything that-it-is-like for you to be you 
in the first place), for even in the most fantastical science-fiction scenario I would only ever be 
																																																								
31	See Nagel’s influential essay, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?,” published in Mortal Questions (Cambridge 
University Press, 1979), p. 169. I discuss this essay in chapters four and five. 
32 This notion is also close to what Descartes had in mind when he posited the necessary unity or indivisibility of the 
mind: that is, while we can conceive of cutting a body in half, it is not conceivable to cut a mind in half; if you cut a 
body in half, you have two halves of one body, but if you “cut a mind in half,” you would have two separate, 
individual minds, not two halves of one and the same mind.	
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able to know what-it-is-like for me to be “you,” which is not what it is like to be you at all. In 
short, I can only ever see the world through my own eyes. So how is it the case, then, that I may 
suppose that there are any other eyes that see, that there are any visions of the world beyond the 
one I can never abandon? As Levinas puts it, it is “tragically impossible” to “get rid of” oneself: 
The I always has one foot caught in its own existence. Outside in face of everything, it is inside itself, tied 
to itself. It is forever bound to the existence which it has taken up. This impossibility for the ego to not be 
a self constitutes the underlying tragic element in the ego, the fact that it is riveted to its own being.33 
 
Even if, as an exercise in empathy, I imaginatively transport myself into the supposed perspective 
of another, it is still inescapably myself that is thus transported; in imagining the standpoint of 
another person, I nevertheless thereby adopt that standpoint as my own or imagine what it would 
be like for me to have that standpoint.  
We simply cannot escape the inwardness or first-personal givenness of experience. As 
Husserl (following Kant) correctly observes, experience is always in the dative case (that is to 
say, appearances must appear to someone), and yet the dative referent of experience (the subject 
to whom appearances appear) is always “me” (or, at any rate, my transcendental ego): the 
individual, unifying condition or gravitational center of my experiences. And since every 
appearance is inescapably “mine,” it seems impossible to explain how appearances that are not 
mine – hence any intimation of alterity - may appear to me as such: 
Insofar as I constitute the world, I cannot conceive another consciousness, for it too would have to 
constitute the world and, at least as regards this other view of the world, I should not be the constituting 
agent. Even if I succeeded in thinking of it as constituting the world, it would be I who would be 
constituting the consciousness as such, and once more I should be the sole constituting agent.34  
 
If the only perspective upon the world that I may inhabit is my own – if it is always my 
(transcendental) ego that undergirds and constitutes the content of all of my experiences – then 
how is it possible for any other perspective upon the world to invade or displace my own, or how 
																																																								
33	Levinas, Existence and Existents. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. (Duquesne University Press, 1978), p. 84, 89. 
34	Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 350.	
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is it possible for my unique, individuated perspective to open me upon, or to be entangled with, 
perspectives that transcend me, perspectives or objects of experience that my ego does not and 
cannot constitute, a world that is truly public? If all of my possible experiences necessarily refer 
to “me” as their sole constituent subject – if, as Levinas puts it, I am forever “riveted to my own 
being” – then it seems that I can never escape the orbit of my own subjectivity; it seems that I can 
never really perceive, touch, or in any way “know” other subjectivities; in short, it seems that I 
am condemned to solipsism.35  
So, we may say that a table is a public entity, for it is (at least in principle) available to 
direct observation from a multiplicity of possible perspectives; it is an extended, material thing 
composed of an ensemble of sensible properties; I may experience it simply by looking at it, and 
I may move around it so as to disclose its other profiles; I may even touch, taste, or smell it. But 
my experiences of the table are not public as the table itself is. You and I may experience (what 
we assume to be) the same table, but I cannot experience your experience of the table, nor can 
you experience mine. Again, I may have only my own experiences and never the experiences of 
an-other precisely because the experiences of an-other would obviously cease to be that other’s 
own experiences were I to experience them. Numerically distinct individuals have numerically 
distinct experiences, and so the question that arises is whether and how we may ever suppose 
that numerically distinct individuals have qualitatively identical or similar experiences (which is, 
of course, the problem presented by “inverted spectrum” thought experiments). But since, again, 
the only experiences that I can live through or investigate are my own, not only does it become 
problematic to suppose that others may have experiences that are qualitatively identical or 
similar to my own, but more importantly (or more disturbingly) it becomes problematic even to 
																																																								
35	Of course, Husserl famously addresses precisely this concern in his fifth Cartesian Meditation, which I discuss in 
chapter five.  
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suppose that others have any experiences at all (which is to say, it becomes problematic to 
suppose that there are any “others” in the world at all). Not only is it problematic for me to 
suppose that, say, my “red” is your “red,” but it is also problematic for me even to suppose that 
you perceive red at all, and this is the case with respect to any supposed object of perception. 
And if I cannot know whether you perceive any specific thing or quality, then how may I know 
that you indeed perceive anything at all?  
So, to summarize the problem, a table can be perceived, but the perception of a table (that 
is to say, the actual experience of a table that is had by the subject who perceives it) cannot be. I 
can see a table, but you cannot see the table exactly as I see it. You may presumably see the same 
table that I see, but I will never see (or “inhabit”) your vision of it. In fact, I may doubt that the 
table that appears to me really exists, and I may doubt that a table is even appearing to you at all 
when you look at what appears to me to be a table, but I cannot doubt that I am having the 
experience of a table. I cannot doubt that a table (or that a table-like appearance) is appearing to 
me. The singular, interior space of such experiences and apodictic certitudes – that to whom 
appearances uniquely and incorrigibly appear – is traditionally defined as mind, self, or 
consciousness. But since, according to this account, consciousness is not the kind of thing that 
can in principle be displayed for an outside observer – which also means that consciousness is 
essentially not the kind of thing that exists in a bodily or material way, not the kind of thing that 
can be “thing-like” at all – the question that presents itself is how I may ever reasonably suppose 
that any consciousness other than my own even exists in the first place. If when I see an entity 
that I think is conscious I only directly see its body and not its consciousness (because, again, its 
consciousness is not the kind of thing that I can truly “see”, for in order to see it I would have to 
inhabit it myself, which is impossible in principle), then how can I claim to know that this body 
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that I see is indeed conscious at all? If to see your body is not to see your consciousness, how 
may I justifiably claim that you are conscious when all that I can see is your body?  
The problem of other minds (hence the threat of solipsism) only emerges if we assume 
that such an account of consciousness is true, but if such an account of consciousness is true then 
the problem (and the skepticism it suggests) defeats itself as soon as it is posed: If consciousness 
is truly private, then how can I have a notion of other consciousnesses (qua other) such that I can 
even imagine and verbalize the problem in the first place? If consciousness is taken to be 
essentially inaccessible from anything but the first-person perspective, if the only consciousness I 
can know is my own, if consciousness has nothing ontologically in common with anything in the 
external world that can be an object of consciousness – that is, if the being of consciousness is 
essentially divorced from any bodily manner of being or appearing – then why would any bodily 
properties, movements, or appearances prompt me to believe in the existence of other 
consciousnesses in the first place? Why am I not entirely absorbed in my own communion with 
myself, forever sealed away in the cocoon of my own experiences, everywhere transfixed by the 
reflection of my own mind’s eye/‘I’? Why I am not utterly unperturbed by intimations of minds 
or experiences other than my own? A point I will return to below – and one that Merleau-Ponty 
emphasizes in many places – is that if consciousness were entirely private and thus disconnected 
from the supposedly external, material world toward which it is directed, then not only would 
consciousness itself be impossible, but so too would any perception or conception of otherness. If, 
however, we acknowledge that consciousness is not totally closed in on itself, or if we affirm that 
consciousness is necessarily incarnate, which is to say continuous with the sensible world from 
which it is nonetheless differentiated – or if we simply reject mind/body dualism – then we forfeit 
the premise from which the problem of other minds emerges, for then it would no longer be the 
	 52	
case that your body stands in the way of your consciousness; it would no longer be the case that 
your consciousness is something that I can never encounter directly (and may therefore only posit 
inferentially). But again, if consciousness is wholly closed in on itself, then the problem of 
“other” minds still does not get off the ground, for this premise entails that one cannot have any 
notion of minds other than one’s own in the first place: strictly speaking, if the only mind to 
which I have access is my own, or if the features that define mindedness are only accessible from 
the first-person perspective, then the problem of “other minds” would really have to be the 
problem of other “me’s,” which is absurd. If it were true that the mind is entirely private, self-
reflexive, self-transparent, and disembodied – if only features that are exclusively or purely 
“internal” constitute mindedness – then it would be impossible for anything in the external world 
to suggest the presence of another mind36: if the only mind that is a possible “object” of 
experience is my own, there is no possible object of experience that could prompt the notion of a 
mind that is not my own. Thus, the problem of other minds seems to efface itself as soon as it is 
raised: either I cannot and do not have a conception of consciousnesses other than my own, in 
which case the problem of other minds could never occur to me, or I do have veridical 
experiences of others, in which case the only “problem” is not whether I have such experiences, 
but rather to explicate the essential features and conditions of such experiences, and it is precisely 
this task that Merleau-Ponty takes up in many of his works.  
The point I have just raised is one that I will return to in chapter five: doubt concerning 
the existence of others always tacitly depends upon a prior awareness and knowledge of others. 
Such skepticism or solipsism is self-defeating because it necessarily presupposes the truth of its 
own negation. Now, though I think this accurately captures Merleau-Ponty’s position on the 
																																																								
36	These considerations constitute Merleau-Ponty’s main criticism of traditional analogical solutions to the problem 
of other minds, which I discuss below.  
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problem, he does not deal with it as quickly or dismissively as such an account may suggest; 
indeed, he takes the problem of other minds seriously: he admits that it is a well-founded 
problem and labors to formulate a compelling answer to it. As I have just discussed, the problem 
of other minds presupposes what we might call the “privacy of perception” thesis: the thesis that 
experience is a private spectacle arrayed before the gaze of an atomic, self-transparent 
consciousness. That is to say, the traditional problem of other minds presupposes the thesis that 
subjectivity only exists in the first-person singular, that the seat of subjectivity is a monadic, 
isolated, and disembodied subject, or that the “inner life” of the conscious subject is so “inner” 
that it has no conceivable continuity with anything “natural” or outwardly perceptible, no 
possible rapprochement with anything “external.” According to such an account, subjectivity is 
constitutively, irreconcilably separated from the “objective,” extra-mental, external world; it is 
an absolute rupture from materiality or visibility, a presence that can only be, and which 
uniquely is, present to itself, a no-thing-ness that has no place among things, a negation of 
nature, a “gap in the world” or a “flaw in the great diamond” of Being.37  
As M.C. Dillon succinctly puts it, “there is a problem of other minds because others are 
conceived as minds.”38 That is to say, the essential presupposition of the problem of other minds 
– the ontological commitment that motivates it and that also renders it unsolvable39 – is dualism: 
the idea that “everything that exists exists as a thing or as a consciousness, and there is no half-
way house.”40 This account of conscious life renders the conscious lives of others forever out of 
reach and indeed unintelligible in principle, but since it is clear that we are conscious of others – 
																																																								
37 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 207. 
38	M.C. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, Second Edition. (Northwestern University Press, 1997), p. 114. 
39	Of course, one attempted solution is the traditional argument from analogy, but, as Merleau-Ponty argues and as I 
discuss below, such arguments from analogy are fallacious, and dualism does indeed render the problem of other 
minds unsolvable. 
40	Phenomenology of Perception, p. 37.	
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and since it is moreover the case (as I will elaborate in chapter five) that consciousness itself 
depends upon a consciousness of others, or that there is no self prior to community, no 
subjectivity without intersubjectivity – it is an account that Merleau-Ponty vehemently, and 
rightly, rejects. In short, if we reject any form of dualism – that is, if we accept the claim (as we 
must) that consciousness is truly embodied, or if we come to see the living, behaving body itself 
as the site and immediate expression of conscious existence – then consciousness ceases to be 
imprisoned within the space of its own “immanent” content; experience is no longer a wholly 
internal play of appearances or representations; it is no longer the private spectacle of a 
transcendental, homuncular ego. The “ego” or subject is, on the contrary, essentially an 
incarnate subject – a living body – that is as such always already outside itself, constituted in and 
through its incessant contact and inextricable entanglements with a world and with others.  
Thus, to solve the problem of other minds is to solve the paradox of a “consciousness 
seen from the outside, of a thought which has its abode in the external world.”41 Dualism renders 
a solution to the problem of other minds impossible because it takes the internal domain of 
consciousness (the domain of immanence) and the external domain of sensible objects or bodies 
(the domain of transcendence) to be mutually exclusive (“incompossible”) domains of reality, 
such that the notion of a “consciousness seen from the outside” (that is, the notion of an 
embodied consciousness) is a contradiction in terms, a “paradox” that cannot be undone. But 
such an apparent paradox is, in fact, undone in every moment of pre-reflective experience, or 
every time I simply feel or perceive something. Indeed, this seemingly paradoxical yet 
exceedingly familiar rapport and complicity with what is outside oneself – or what we might call 
this basic ecstasy of the self: one’s implicitly and constantly felt participation in that which 
																																																								
41	Ibid., p. 349.	
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resists and exceeds oneself, which is otherwise simply known as auto-affection or corporeal 
reflexivity – necessarily constitutes what we call “interiority” or a “self” in the first place. This 
may seem paradoxical or abstruse, but it is in fact attested by the most rudimentary and mundane 
sense-experiences we can have. As I cannot touch something without at the same time being 
touched by it – and thus, as I cannot touch something without also reflexively, albeit tacitly, 
sensing or “touching” my very own tangibility, which is to say my continuity with that which 
nevertheless transcends me – so too is it the case that, in general, I may have a reflexive sense of 
myself (hence be a “self”) only through my contact with an external, carnal world. In short, it is 
only by virtue of its participation in what is other than itself that a self or form of life exists at all. 
Just as I may see myself only if I am visible, or just as I may touch myself only if I am tangible, 
so is it the case with any self-relation or form of reflexivity: there can be no interiority that is not 
necessarily coupled with exteriority, no “inside” that is not always already doubled by an 
“outside,” hence no consciousness without a body, no selfhood without otherness. As Merleau-
Ponty claims, “inside and outside are inseparable. The world is wholly inside and I am wholly 
outside myself.”42 Contact is always contact-with-otherness. Auto-affection is necessarily hetero-
affection. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty “there is an indivision of my body, of my body and the world, 
of my body and other bodies, and of other bodies between them.”43 Interiority is constituted as 
such only through a peculiar involution wherein it is woven into, yet not completely dissolved 
into, the fabric or “flesh” of exterior things and phenomena. As I will further elaborate later in 
this chapter, the contact with oneself (the self-presence or self-reflexivity) that minimally defines 
what it is to be a mind or self is possible only if such self-contact is not absolute, or only if such 
																																																								
42	Ibid., p. 407.	
43	Merleau-Ponty, Nature: Course Notes from the Collège De France. Ed. Dominique Séglard. Trans. Robert 
Vallier. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2003), p. 279. 
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contact does not seal the self away in a vacuum of pure, impregnable solitude but is rather 
contact-at-a-distance with what is irrecuperably outside or not itself. In short, self-presence is 
possible only if it is not self-coincidence, and this non-coincidence of the self with itself that 
makes self-presence (hence interiority or consciousness) possible is cleaved by the intercession 
of the sensible, carnal world. In other words, consciousness is mediated precisely by its 
continuity with, or its extension into, what is precisely outside or other than itself. It is only 
because consciousness is continuous with the public, corporeal world toward which it is directed 
that it can be directed toward such a world – hence be minimally “conscious” – at all. This is one 
of Merleau-Ponty’s main arguments for the claim that consciousness must be incarnate, that 
experience is always “in the flesh.”  
No matter how obvious this truth about consciousness or experience may appear to be, it 
is intractably paradoxical or downright unthinkable for much of classical thought, and it entails 
nothing short of a radical rethinking of ontology, a radically new conception of the nature of 
subjectivity, world, and Being, which is precisely what Merleau-Ponty aims to develop. Again, 
the Cartesian opposition between mind (subject) and body (object) renders the notion of an 
embodied mind absurd. If the mind is essentially a non-extended substance and if the body is 
essentially an extended substance, then the idea of an embodied mind would have to be the idea 
of an “extended non-extended thing,” which is as patently incoherent as the idea of a square 
circle. Thus, despite Descartes’ insistence in the sixth Meditation that “I [my mind] is not present 
in my body as a sailor is present in a ship,”44 this is in fact the only account of the mind-body 
relationship that his dualism entitles him to accept (and which therefore ought to be a sufficient 
																																																								
44	Meditations on First Philosophy, published in	The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. II. Trans. and ed. 
John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 56.	
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reductio of his dualism45). Descartes’ ontology simply renders the supposed “intermingling” or 
“unity” of mind and body impossible in principle, and this problem has been discussed ever since 
Descartes first published the Meditations. Consciousness must be embodied, but Merleau-Ponty 
recognizes that the embodiment of consciousness remains unintelligible as long as we begin 
from a dualistic standpoint. Thus, Merleau-Ponty rejects any alternative to dualism that tacitly 
trades on what he calls “bad ambiguity,” which is to say a conception of the relationship between 
consciousness and the body as a mere “mixture…of interiority and exteriority,”46 for such an 
account presupposes and reinstates the very dualism it pretends to overcome. Such a “mixture” 
or “intermingling” of opposites is unintelligible and can only be established by definitional fiat. 
If we begin from the standpoint that mind and body belong to mutually exclusive domains of 
reality, we will never be able to bring them together. What we need, then, is an account 
according to which “mind” and “body” are not “things” that need to be “brought together” in the 
first place. What we need is precisely a “middle term” beneath or beyond the poles of subject and 
object – something that is neither pure subjectivity nor brute materiality, something that is 
neither “mind” nor “body” as traditionally conceived – in order to account for how subjectivity 
can truly have a place in the world (as well as a place amid other subjectivities), and this middle 
term is precisely what Merleau-Ponty calls the “lived body” (or “corporeal schema”). In this 
way, Merleau-Ponty solves the classical problem of mind/body interaction (as well as the 
classical problem of other minds) by rejecting the ontological categories that logically entail it in 
																																																								
45	In a letter to Descartes from June, 1643, Princess Elizabeth goes so far as to suggest that it would better to 
attribute materiality or extension to consciousness than to conceive of consciousness as an immaterial, non-extended 
substance and to posit an inexplicable capacity for such a substance to interact with one that is material and 
extended: 
 
“…I admit that it would be easier for me to concede matter and extension to the mind than it would be for me to 
concede the capacity to move a body and be moved by one to an immaterial thing.” – Quoted in Daniel Garber, 
Descartes Embodied (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 172.				 
46	Merleau-Ponty, “An Unpublished Text.” Trans. Arleen Dallery, in The Primacy of Perception, p. 11.  
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the first place, which is to say that he dissolves the problem: the mind/body problem is no longer 
a problem because we no longer begin with the assumption that mind and body are two 
absolutely distinct kinds of things that must somehow be united (or “intermixed”); the traditional 
binary opposition of mind (subject) and body (object) is not, in fact, an ontologically or 
epistemically foundational and immediate given, but is rather an abstraction that is tacitly 
founded upon the lived body and later reflectively inflected or reified as primary. So, in order to 
overcome dualism in all of its forms, we must not begin from the traditional opposition between 
subject (mind) and object (body) but must endeavor to think below or outside this opposition, 
which (as Merleau-Ponty insists in his later works) entails a radical revision of the very 
categories of subject and object and thus, again, a radical revision of ontology itself.47  
I cannot fully elaborate all of Merleau-Ponty’s criticisms of dualism here, though it 
suffices to say that a main aim of Merleau-Ponty’s early work is precisely to show that all forms 
of dualism are reification fallacies and to use phenomenology in order to expose how reified 
abstractions or idealities emerge, often inevitably, from our concrete, thoroughly corporeal, pre-
reflective engagements with a world. From a phenomenological perspective, the cardinal sin of 
reason is reification,48 or what Whitehead names the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.”49 In 
																																																								
47	Merleau-Ponty will later clarify that the lived body, as that which antecedes and founds the distinction between 
subject and object, discloses the nature of Being as such, for Being is precisely neither subject nor object (and is 
therefore also not a “substance”). Thus, Merleau-Ponty writes:		
	
“Our purpose is not to oppose to the facts objective science coordinates a group of facts that “escape” it – whether 
one calls them “psychisms” or “subjective facts” or “interior facts” – but to show that the being-object and being-
subject conceived by opposition to it and relative to it do not form the alternative, that the perceived world is 
beneath or beyond this antinomy, that the failure of “objective” psychology is – conjointly with the failure of 
“objectivist” physics – to be understood not as a victory of the “interior” over the “exterior” and of the “mental” 
over the “material”, but as a call for the revision of our ontology, for the reexamination of the notions of “subject” 
and “object.”” - The Visible and the Invisible, p. 22. 
48	There are many different alleged examples of this fallacy throughout the history of philosophy. One such 
example, according to Nietzsche (and Buddhism), is the notion of an enduring, discrete and substantial ego; another 
example, according to Marx, is the notion that certain social conditions and relations are “necessary”, “inevitable”, 
or “natural” when in fact they are historically emergent (hence contingent) and the sense of their necessity or 
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general, this fallacy is the illicit substitution of the abstract for the concrete; it is, as Merleau-
Ponty puts it, the substitution of a map for the terrain, the confusion of a re-presentation for what 
originally presents itself to consciousness; that is, it involves the inflection of a conceptualization 
or idealization as a reality prior to, and independent of, lived experience, when in fact such a 
conceptualization or idealization always already presupposes lived experience for its formulation 
and intelligibility (or as its “condition of possibility”); in other words, it involves what Merleau-
Ponty calls a “retrospective illusion”50 in which a derivative, second-order acquisition or 
construction is registered as a primary, first-order fact or reality. Merleau-Ponty indicts not only 
philosophers but also especially the sciences for their tendency to reify abstractions, that is, to 
confuse the models and idealizations through which they attempt to explain reality with reality as 
such:	
The entire universe of science is constructed upon the lived world, and if we wish to think science 
rigorously, to appreciate precisely its sense and its scope, we must first awaken that experience of the 
world of which science is the second-order expression. Science neither has, nor ever will have the same 
ontological sense as the perceived world for the simple reason that science is a determination or an 
explanation of that world…To return to the things themselves is to return to this world prior to 
knowledge, this world of which knowledge always speaks, and this world with regard to which every 
scientific determination is abstract, signitive, and dependent, just like geography with regard to the 
landscape where we first learned what a forest, a meadow, or a river is.51  
 
In this famous passage from the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty suggests, as I 
have just mentioned, that reification is the substitution of the map for terrain; again, it is to 
regard as ontologically and epistemically primary what is in fact a derivative or secondary 
reflective accomplishment. The sciences (particularly given their reliance upon mathematical 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
“naturalness” merely serves to entrench a particular set of class interests; another example, according to Deleuze, is 
the subordination of difference to identity; another example, according to Aristotle, is the Platonic separation of 
form from matter; and yet other examples, which are discussed at length by Merleau-Ponty, are sense-atomism and 
mind-body dualism.	
49	Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1997), p.51-52, 58. 
50	Phenomenology of Perception, p. 50. See also Structure of Behavior. Trans. Alden Fisher (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 2006), p. 218, and Nature, p. 152. 
51 Ibid., p. xxii. 
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models and formulae) often regard what are in fact second-order, derivative acquisitions as first-
order, a priori truths; they often regard certain idealizations as ontologically basic and 
autonomous when such idealizations always already derive their sense from lived, prescientific 
experience. Of course, it is absurd to regard a map as in any sense prior to or “more real” than 
the landscape to which it applies. It is our living experience of the landscape that enables, 
informs, but also exceeds any possible map or representation of it we may construct. Every map 
presupposes an originary, irreducible encounter and living rapport with the terrain to which it 
applies, and in general it is the lived presentation of the world that affords the possibility of any 
re-presentation or formal account of it. Thus, Merleau-Ponty writes that “scientific thinking, a 
thinking which looks on from above, and thinks of the object-in-general, must return to the 
“there is” which underlies it; to the site, the soil of the sensible and opened world such as it is in 
our life and for our body…”52 The point that is most pertinent to the present discussion is that the 
concept of the living body as a “mere” object, or in general any mechanistic or reductionistic 
analysis or representation of the (living) body, and therefore the conceptual opposition of 
subject(ivity) and object(ivity), is precisely one such abstraction that scientists and philosophers 
alike have tended to reify and which has profoundly impeded the progress of both. Insofar as the 
sciences reduce the living body to the status of a mere object and thus implicitly adhere to a rigid 
distinction between subject and object, they accept without question what is in fact not a 
“scientific” schema or empirical truth at all but rather a basic commitment of Cartesian 
metaphysics and epistemology.  
So, since the traditional opposition between subject (mind) and body (object) is a product 
of reflection (i.e., is a conceptual abstraction), for Merleau-Ponty it is necessary to direct our 
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	 61	
attention to pre-reflective (lived) experience. Such an abstraction tacitly depends upon yet 
suppresses real, elemental features of our existence, especially our living bodies and the webs of 
“reciprocal relations”53 between self, world, things, and others in which we are always already 
entangled through our bodily being. Lived experience (or what Merleau-Ponty otherwise calls 
“perception”) is precisely below the opposition between subject and object; indeed, it refers to 
the primordial, immediate openness to a world that enables and informs any act or 
accomplishment of reflection, including the conceptual opposition between subject and object. 
The lived body is the body that unreflectively orients and sustains my engagements with a world, 
the body through which I am directed toward, and always already involved in, practical tasks and 
possibilities; it is the body that I experience (kinesthetically, affectively, agentially) before I 
reflectively apprehend (that is, objectify) it, the body through which I am individuated, thrown 
into projects and relations with others, and given to myself before I ever think or utter the word 
“I.” Thus, in this turn to lived experience Merleau-Ponty discovers the “good ambiguity” of the 
lived body, for the lived body is neither purely subject nor object but partially both at the same 
time, and is therefore the basis of the very distinction (and supposed separation) between subject 
and object in the first place. Again, for Merleau-Ponty the supposed subject/object divide is not 
ontologically basic but is rather an abstraction derived from the lived body and its constitutive 
engagements with a world. The lived body stages precisely an intertwining or enmeshment of 
subject and object that antecedes and resists the alternatives of dualism and reductive (usually 
materialistic or positivistic) monism.54 Subject and object, interiority and exteriority do not 
																																																								
53	Phenomenology of Perception, p. 55.	
54	Of course, in a very broad or highly qualified sense Merleau-Ponty may be said to be a “materialist,” “naturalist,” 
or “monist,” since he does not think that there is anything “supernatural,” which is to say anything that exists outside 
the carnal, sensible world. For Merleau-Ponty, there is no world beyond this one, no “second-world” or reality 
“behind the scenes,” nothing that can exist in a truly timeless or incorporeal manner. Thus, I think it is accurate to 
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designate absolutely segregated kinds of things or domains of existence, but are rather two co-
constitutive poles of one and the same phenomenon, two compresent aspects of one and same 
movement and site of givenness; they are “two abstract ‘moments’ of a unique structure which is 
presence,”55 “the nodes and antinodes of the same ontological vibration,”56 which is to say two 
inseparable yet distinct aspects of one and the same ground and genesis of meaning (sens) – two 
sides of “an openness upon a world” (ouverture au monde)57 – that are only later rent asunder 
into antithetical and autonomous categories of being.  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
say that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology is, as Deleuze would put it, an ontology of “immanence” (where “immanence” is 
taken to mean not the internal domain of consciousness but rather the contrary of supernatural, theological ideality 
or transcendence). However, “materialism”, “naturalism”, or “monism” tend to connote some form of reductionism 
according to which reality consists of nothing but matter in motion and the mechanistic laws that govern it, or 
according to which subjectivity is exhaustively explained, determined, and described by, say, physics, physiology, 
neurochemistry, stimulus-response mechanisms, modes of behavioral conditioning, and so on, and Merleau-Ponty 
resists and criticizes such views just as much as he criticizes forms of dualism or supernaturalism. As Merleau-Ponty 
recognizes, dualism (Cartesian or otherwise) on the one hand, and reductionism or monism (the most common form 
of which is mechanistic materialism or behaviorism) on the other, are really two sides of the same coin. That is to 
say, most reductionistic accounts of consciousness, or most “monistic” accounts of reality, presuppose a conceptual 
opposition between the mental and the physical and thus sustain or reproduce the very dualistic framework that they 
purport to repudiate. For instance, once Descartes set up an opposition between mind and matter, the most 
commonly suggested solutions to the “problem of interaction” involved denying the fundamental reality of one or 
the other (it hardly needs to be mentioned that other non-monistic solutions to the problem of interaction, such as 
occasionalism and parallelism, merely explain the inexplicable on the basis of something equally or even more 
inexplicable): either reality only consists of matter in motion and material properties (materialism), or reality only 
consists of minds and mental properties (Berkeleyan idealism); either reality only consists of extended substances 
(material things) and their modifications, or reality only consists non-extended substances (minds) and their 
modifications. Of course, both views assume from the start a categorical opposition between mind and matter, and to 
that extent they do not really overcome or “solve” dualism at all but rather “compensate for one abstraction with a 
counter-abstraction” (The Visible and the Invisible, p. 68). Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, such supposed solutions to 
dualism are not only problematic on their own terms, but they also concede too much to the dualism they reject. 
Merleau-Ponty rejects dualism because he takes this very opposition between mind (subject) and matter (body, 
object) to be a false abstraction, but in thus rejecting dualism he also rejects those reductionistic or monistic 
alternatives that equally presuppose such an opposition. Moreover, while Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology of “flesh” 
may suggest a kind of monism, it is potentially misleading to categorize it as such because the term “monism” also 
tends to connote an ontology of substance, which Merleau-Ponty rejects (as we will see, he explicitly denies that 
“the flesh of the world” is a “substance”). This is a point I will raise again in chapter five, for it is here that we see 
how Merleau-Ponty’s early phenomenology of the lived body informs his later ontology. Throughout all of his 
works, but especially in his later considerations of Being and nature, Merleau-Ponty attempts to develop a third 
alternative beyond the classical alternatives of dualism and (reductionistic) monism: a genuine ontology of 
difference.      	
55	Ibid., p. 430. 
56	Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and The Invisible, p. 115.	
57	See, for example, ibid., p. 35.	
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So, at the level of lived experience (or at the level of the lived body), there is simply no 
radical separation between “consciousness” and “the body”: the lived body is not a “mere” 
object, for it is precisely that through which I have any access to objects at all. My living body is 
not a mere object among other objects because it is precisely that which mediates my relations 
with objects in the first place; it is not a mere “thing,” for it is precisely the condition of the 
possibility of any perception or reflective apprehension of “things”; it is “our general medium for 
having a world.”58 Moreover, only a dead or inanimate body is a “mere” object, and it is only 
through an act of reflection, whereby we view our bodies from the detached perspective of a 
medical examiner or surgeon, that we come to conceptualize them in such a manner. But at the 
same time the living body is clearly not not an “object” either; it is not absolutely divorced from 
the order of “things” (as only an incorporeal spirit would be), for it too is flesh; neither a “mere” 
thing nor a negation of “thinghood,” neither interiority without exteriority nor exteriority without 
interiority, the living body “forms between the pure subject and the object a third genus of 
being.”59 Indeed, the notion of “the body” as a brute object or mechanism is simply the 
counterpart to the notion of the mind as an incorporeal spirit or (to borrow Gilbert Ryle’s famous 
expression for it) “ghost in the machine,” and so to give up one of these notions is also to give up 
the other. If consciousness is not a “ghost in a machine,” then the (living, or “minded”) body is 
not a mere “machine” (or interior-less object), either. Again, the lived body – my body such as I 
experience it pre-reflectively – is not an ordinary object because it is precisely that which affords 
me access to objects in the first place, and by the same token it is not a pure subject either, for 
the concept of a pure subject is intelligible only in contradistinction to that of a brute object: 
																																																								
58	Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 146	
59	Ibid.,	p. 350. 
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since the concept of an object is founded upon the lived body, so too is the concept of a subject. 
It follows that the opposition between subject and object is founded upon the lived body, and the 
lived body is therefore something that does not belong entirely to either side of that opposition. 
To regard subject and object as absolutely opposed to one another and to regard such an 
opposition as ontological basic is, then, to reify a derivative, reflective conceptualization; such a 
conceptualization – indeed, any dualistic, subject/object conceptual schema – implicitly depends 
upon yet represses our being as living bodies engaged with, and thus embedded within, a 
material, sensible world. Like all false abstractions, the oppositions between subject and object, 
mind and body, spirit and matter/mechanism, consciousness and nature/world are dismantled by 
the very conditions that enable and even naturally motivate their formulation in the first place. 
So, since my (lived) body is precisely a “thing” that subtends and institutes my very 
access to things, a thing that primordially anchors and orients my existence in the world, and 
since, therefore, my body is a sentient body – a body that touches, sees, and otherwise senses the 
world, and moreover a body that implicitly touches, sees, and senses itself in and through sensing 
the world – it is not a “mere” thing or object, but at the same time it is sentient by virtue of its 
continuity with the things or phenomena that it senses (that is, by virtue of its own inherent 
tangibility, visibility, or general perceptibility):  
To make the body appear as a subject of movement and as subject of perception – if that is not verbal, it 
means: the body as touching-touched, seeing-seen, the place of a kind of reflection and, thereby, the 
capacity to relate itself to something other than its own mass, to close its circuit on the visible, on a 
sensible exterior…this circuit of the body touching itself, nearly closing itself in on itself, [is] closed by 
the synergic prehension of a thing…they [the things] “touch me” just as much as I touch them. Not 
surprising: they are that on which the synergy of my body opens; they are made of the same stuff as the 
corporal schema; I haunt them at a distance, they haunt me at a distance. I am with them in a relation of 
Einfuhlung; my within is an echo of their within.60 
 
																																																								
60	Merleau-Ponty,	Nature, p. 209, 223, 224. 
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To perceive a thing is to be reflexively (albeit initially unreflectively) exposed to one’s own 
embeddedness in an external world, that is, to one’s own corporeity. The most rudimentary level 
of experience – even the “simplest” perception – reveals to me “my body in its doubleness, as 
thing and vehicle of my relation to the things,”61 which is also to say it reveals to me my 
essential implication in, or apparently paradoxical continuity with, that which is other than me, 
my indissoluble, umbilical adhesion to a transcendent world and to those other bodies (sentient 
and non-sentient alike) that equally belong to it. Thus, “the usual alternative: the body as one of 
the things, or the body as my point of view on the things, is put back in question: it is both…”.62 
The living body is self-reflexive and intentional, and the reflexivity and intentionality that 
defines life or consciousness is constituted only in and through its exposure to, or enmeshment 
in, a carnal world:  
The visible can thus fill me and occupy me only because I who see it do not see it from the depths of 
nothingness, but from the midst of itself; I the seer am also visible. What makes the weight, the thickness, 
the flesh of each color, of each sound, of each tactile texture, of the present, and of the world is the fact 
that he who grasps them feels himself emerge from them by a sort of coiling up or redoubling, 
fundamentally homogenous with them; he feels that he is the sensible itself coming to itself and that in 
return the sensible is in his eyes as it were his double or an extension of his own flesh.63 
 
Consciousness must already be incorporated into the tissue of phenomena. Consciousness is 
inherently reflexive, and reflexivity entails integration – what Merleau-Ponty will later call a 
“strange kinship”64 – with otherness: integration with a corporeal world and with other living 
corporealities. This reflexivity of perception means that perception itself is necessarily 
implicated in the world one perceives; it means that “my body simultaneously sees and is seen,” 
that “that which looks at all things can also look at itself and recognize, in what it sees, the “other 
																																																								
61	Ibid., p. 223. 
62	Ibid., p. 224. 
63	Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 113-114. 
64	See Nature, p. 214, 271. 
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side” of its power of looking,”65 and in general it means that what we call “the self” is always 
included in that from which it is differentiated as such, that the self emerges “through the 
inherence of sensing in the sensed”66; it means that one’s openness to what is outside oneself 
(one’s life, intentionality, or interiority) must be embedded within, or must not be entirely 
outside, that which is precisely “outside” oneself; it means that consciousness must itself share 
an exteriority with the very exteriority of those things toward which it is directed, which is also 
to say that consciousness must be a modality of worldly, bodily being. 
So, Merleau-Ponty argues that subjectivity and corporeity, self and world are 
inextricably, internally entangled; they are distinct yet inseparable and interdependent, which is 
to say neither syncretically unified nor dualistically opposed; such an intertwining of 
consciousness, body, and world is beyond the classical alternatives of identity (sameness) and 
non-identity (negation). Indeed, this intertwining antecedes, subtends, and enables the ways in 
which it later comes to be distorted as either an antinomy or subsumptive totality. It is only later 
that we bifurcate consciousness and carnality/world – interiority and exteriority – into “being-
for-itself” and “being-in-itself,” res cogitans and res extensa, respectively. Merleau-Ponty 
therefore characterizes the relationship between (embodied) subjectivity and the world (in its 
emergence into meaning or presence) as essentially dialogical (or co-constituting):  
The sensor and the sensible do not stand in relation to each other as two mutually external terms, and 
sensation is not an invasion of the sensor by the sensible…and in this transaction between the subject of 
sensation and the sensible it cannot be held that one acts while the other suffers the action, or that one 
confers the significance on the other…The sensible gives back to me what I lent to it, but this is only what 
I took from it in the first place. As I contemplate the blue of the sky I am not set over against it as an 
acosmic subject; I do not possess it in thought, or spread out towards it some idea of blue such as might 
reveal the secret of it, I abandon myself to it and plunge into this mystery, it ‘thinks itself within me’, I 
																																																								
65	“Eye and Mind,” in The Primacy of Perception, p. 162.	
66	Ibid., p. 163. 
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am the sky itself as it is drawn together and unified, and as it begins to exist for itself; my consciousness 
is saturated with this limitless blue.67 
 
Thus, I am “conscious of the world through the medium of my body” and at the same time I am 
“conscious of my body via the world.”68 Merleau-Ponty repeatedly emphasizes the reciprocal, 
bilateral constitution of subjectivity and world, claiming (against Sartre) that “if it is through 
subjectivity that nothingness appears in the world, it can equally be said that it is through the 
world that nothingness comes into being.”69 As we have seen, for Merleau-Ponty this 
intertwining of subjectivity and world (which will later inform not only his account of 
intersubjectivity, but also his mature conception of Being as chiasm, or as the genesis of identity 
and meaning through differentiation) is attested by the reflexivity of the living body (which is 
itself exemplified by the touching-touched relation). Insofar as the living body senses itself it is 
differentiated from ordinary (“mere”) things,70 but at the same time this reflexivity of the living 
body implicates its inherence in the world of things from which it is thereby differentiated; such 
reflexivity is simultaneously disjunctive and conjunctive, which is to say it is (like a literal 
decussation71) a site of intersection or a point of ingress and egress through difference, a 
particular divergence that not only enables but also is convergence; it is a spacing (écart) that, 
like the skin, simultaneously separates and brings together the poles of “inside” and “outside,” an 
																																																								
67	Phenomenology of Perception, 214.	
68	Ibid, p. 82. 
69	Ibid., p. 452. 
70	See, for example, ibid., 93.	
71	Indeed, Merleau-Ponty will later refer to the kind of relationship exemplified by such reflexivity – the kind of 
relationship that constitutively obtains between mind and body, body and world, self and other, and so on – as a 
“chiasm” (see below), and he borrows this term from biology, where it refers to the crossing of optic nerves in the 
brain that enables stereoscopic vision. But of course, the term “chiasm” etymologically derives from the Greek letter 
chi, which is written in the shape of an X.      
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openness or distance that is not an ontological void72 but rather a “pregnancy of meaning”73 and 
the very “vinculum of the self and things.”74  
The hand that touches is at the same time a hand that is touched, and indeed the agency of 
touching is necessarily reflexively coupled with the passivity of being-touched: in order to touch 
a thing, it is therefore necessary that I myself am tangible, which is to say ontologically 
continuous with the object I touch. However, this continuity (or “indivision”) is not identity or 
coincidence, for if it were there would be no distinction at all between my sentient body and the 
thing that I touch or sense, which means that there would be no sentience – no experience of any-
thing – at all:  
When I find again the actual world such as it is, under my hands, under my eyes, up against my body, I 
find much more than an object: a Being of which my vision is a part, a visibility older than my operations 
or my acts. But this does not mean there was a fusion or coinciding of me with it: on the contrary, this 
occurs because a sort of dehiscence opens my body in two, and because between my body looked at and 
my body looking, my body touched and my body touching, there is overlapping or encroachment, so that 
we must say that the things pass into us as well as we into the things.75 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, “my body in its doubleness, as thing and vehicle of my relation to the 
things” means that there are “two “sides” of an experience, conjugated and incompossible, but 
complementary” whose “unity is irrecusable.”76 In other words, the reflexivity endemic to 
																																																								
72	See, for example, The Visible and The Invisible, p. 272. Merleau-Ponty’s term “écart” designates the separation 
or spacing between foreground and background that enables perception as well as the differences between signs that 
engender linguistic meaning. He later extends the insights of Gestalt psychology and structuralist linguistics to 
ontology and uses this term to refer to the differentiation that is necessarily constitutive of any relation or distinct 
manner of being. It is very close to what Derrida will designate as “différance,” and I think it is equivalent to what 
Deleuze will call “difference in-itself” or simply “difference,” but to justify such comparisons would be beyond the 
scope of the present discussion. I will draw more attention to these connections in chapter five.       	
73	Phenomenology of Perception, p. 431.	
74	Merleau-Ponty, “The Philosopher and His Shadow”, in Signs, Trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 166. In his later writings (including this one), Merleau-Ponty refers to this 
“vinculum” – this field that brings things together precisely by differentiating them from one another – as “flesh,” 
which I further discuss in chapter five. 
75 The Visible and the Invisible, p. 123. 
76	Nature, p. 223.	
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experience is at once an opening from within and onto a world (a “dehiscence”77), which is to 
say a kind of relationship that does not obey a classical logic of identity and negation, for it is 
one wherein a “subject” is constituted as such only in and through its differentiating contact or 
continuity with a world and other things. That is to say, the relationship between subjectivity and 
an extra-subjective or pre-subjective, public (“objective”) world – hence the relationship between 
subjectivity and corporeity, and by extension the relationship between my (embodied) 
subjectivity and other (embodied) subjectivities – is not oppositional, but neither is it reductively 
assimilative or syncretic (or sublative); rather, it is what Merleau-Ponty will later call a chiasm, 
or intertwining. Subjectivity – that is, the reflexivity or intentionality that defines what it is to be 
“a subject” – does not emerge in isolation from the world; it does not exclude or negate 
exteriority, which is to say it does not have its seat in the “interiority” of its private reflective 
awareness of itself, or in what is otherwise known as the “cogito.” As Ted Toadvine explains, for 
Merleau-Ponty “the auto-affection that comes to fruition in perception and reflection is not 
achieved within the immanence of consciousness…reflection would therefore be understood as 
the coming-to-self of the a-subjective life of things.”78 Consciousness is always consciousness 
																																																								
77	Dehiscence” is yet another artful term (borrowed from botany) that Merleau-Ponty uses for “divergence” or 
differentiation. Since this word originally means the splitting or opening of a plant at maturity, it is the perfect term 
for how Merleau-Ponty wants to think difference. The first thing to notice is that this kind of difference or 
differentiation is never oppositional or absolute separation; that is, the parts of the plant that split apart from one 
another remain part of the same plant (which is itself rooted in the world). Thus, “dehiscence” for Merleau-Ponty 
illustrates a non-oppositional differentiation, a differentiation that entails overlapping; it refers to a generative 
opening-upon-being that is immanent to Being itself and exemplified by the reflexivity of the flesh of the living 
body. While “dehiscence” is synonymous with “écart” (for both terms refer to that separation that constitutes 
relationality as such), I think it is perhaps preferable to use the former term since it seems to be more “verbal” or less 
“static” than the latter; it suggests that Being is not just a static network of what Merleau-Ponty calls “chiasmatic” 
relations (see below), but is rather a process – what in the Nature lectures Merleau-Ponty calls a 
“primordial…autoproduction of meaning” (Nature, p. 3) – through which such relations are instituted and sustained. 
Despite the spatial metaphors that Merleau-Ponty often uses in order to articulate chiasmatic relationality, we must 
not forget that temporality is also constitutive of such relations, and that such relations are therefore always 
emergent and processual. 
78	Ted Toadvine, Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Nature (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2009), p. 
75. 
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“of” the world not only in the sense that it is directed toward the world but also in the sense that 
it is, through its body, “caught in the fabric of the world,”79 and if it were not “of” the world in 
this latter sense of the preposition, it could never be so in the former sense. For this reason, 
Merleau-Ponty claims that we should conceptualize subjectivity not (as Sartre does) as a “hole” 
in being but rather as a “hollow” or “fold,”80 as an irremediable absence that is nevertheless not 
opposed to bodily, behavioral presence but is rather the “other side of it,”81 which is to say 
immediately given with it, precisely, for example, as the concave is given with the convex,82 or as 
the hidden profiles and contours of a thing are given with those that are disclosed to direct 
perception, or as form is given with matter, or as the meaning of a sentence is given with its 
words and letters, or as sorrow and joy are given with the countenance of a face or the timbre of 
a voice or melody. 
Descartes famously claimed that while I cannot doubt that I have a mind, I can doubt that 
I have a body. Now, while Descartes fallaciously infers from these two premises that mind and 
body are separate substances,83 we can now see that we may also reject the second premise: I 
																																																								
79	Eye and Mind”, in The Primacy of Perception, p. 163.	
80	Phenomenology of Perception, p. 215. As we will see, Merleau-Ponty also uses the terms “hollow” and “fold” to 
describe subjectivity throughout his later writings (and especially in The Visible and The Invisible). 
81	See, for example, The Visible and The Invisible, p. 259.	
82	Merleau-Ponty explicitly compares the relationship between mind and body to the relationship between the 
concave and the convex, which I mention below. 
83	As many commentators have noted, Descartes’ dubitability argument commits the “intensional fallacy”, in which 
one illicitly takes an intensional predicate (a predicate that describes a propositional attitude) to be a “real” or 
extensional predicate (a predicate that describes the thing that a proposition is about). For example, Lois Lane may 
not be able to doubt that Superman can fly, and yet she may be able to doubt that Clark Kent can fly, but it clearly 
does not follow that Superman and Clark Kent are numerically distinct individuals. Likewise, while I may not be 
able to doubt (the proposition) that I have a mind, and while I may be able to doubt (the proposition) that I have a 
body, it does not follow that my mind and my body are separate substances. From the fact that I can doubt the 
existence of my body and from the fact that I cannot doubt the existence of my mind, it follows that “I have a body” 
and “I have a mind” are different propositions, but it does not follow that my body and my mind are different or 
separable things; “dubitability” and “indubitability” are simply not real properties of things. Thus, this argument for 
dualism is invalid. Here, however, I am also suggesting that one of the premises in the argument is false: it is not in 
fact the case that I can doubt that I “have” a body. 
	 71	
cannot doubt that I “have” a body any more than I can doubt that I “have” a mind; both are 
equally indubitable, for there is no sentience (hence no “mindedness” or interiority) without self-
reflexivity and intentionality, and there is no self-reflexivity and intentionality without contact 
with an external world, and there is no contact with an external world – no contact with things 
outside oneself, which is simply to say no contact with anything at all – without exteriority or an 
“outside,” without (a shared) flesh. Indeed, even the claim that I “have” a body is as misleading 
as the claim that I “have” a mind (as though there is such a thing as a “me” that is distinct from 
my mind): since my mind is embodied, I am my body just as much as I am my mind; more 
accurately, I am a living body, which is simply to say an embodied mind or self:  
My body does not appear to me as an object, a set of qualities and characteristics linked to one another and 
thus understood. My relation to it is not that of the Cogito to the cogitatum, the “epistemological subject” 
to the object. I and it form a common cause, and in a sense I am my body. Between it and me there cannot 
properly be said to be a relation, since this term designates the behavior of one object in reference to 
another. Here it is a question of presence, adherence, and intimacy.84      
 
I may doubt that I have a body only because I think of my body as something that I “have” in the 
first place and thus overlook or forget my (ontologically non-objectifiable) living body, the body 
that I precisely am. The fundamental relation between mind and body is not a relation between a 
subject and an object (and to that extent, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, it may in a certain sense be 
misleading even to consider it to be a “relation” at all85) but is precisely that which precedes, 
founds, and makes intelligible any relation between a subject and an object in the first place.   
																																																								
84	Merleau-Ponty, “Being and Having”, in Texts and Dialogues on Philosophy, Politics, and Culture, Eds. Hugh J. 
Silverman and James Barry Jr., Trans. Michael B. Smith, (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2005), p. 102. 
85	Since, for Merleau-Ponty, there is nevertheless a real difference between consciousness and the body (that is, 
since, for Merleau-Ponty, consciousness and the body are not reducible to one another), I think it still makes sense to 
speak of a “relation” between them, though it is a kind of relation that has traditionally not been recognized or 
conceptualized in philosophy (Merleau-Ponty will later refer to this kind of relation as “reversibility” or a “chiasm”; 
the remark I have quoted comes from an early essay published in 1936, long before Merleau-Ponty formulated his 
concept of chiasmatic relationality, and it should also be noted that this essay is a piece of commentary on Gabriel 
Marcel’s book of the same title). Here, it seems that Merleau-Ponty hesitates to speak of a “relation” between mind 
and body because he is equating the concept of a relation with that of an external relation. 
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Thus, contrary to Descartes, it is in fact a disembodied mind that is inconceivable. If a 
mind were truly disembodied, it would not be localized or situated anywhere and would thus not 
be individuated as such. That is, if consciousness truly had no “extension,” then there would be 
no limit between consciousness and anything else: there would be no way to distinguish where 
consciousness ends and, say, the rest of the world begins; but if that were the case, then 
consciousness would have no exposure to, or no directedness toward, anything other than itself 
(for consciousness would not be differentiated from anything in the first place), and that means 
that consciousness would in fact not be “conscious” at all, since consciousness must be 
intentional: it must be (either pre-reflectively or thematically) directed toward something other 
than itself. And to say that consciousness would not be directed toward anything outside itself is 
not to suggest that it would be only self-directed, for if it is not differentiated from anything, then 
it has no identity or distinct existence or “selfhood” to be directed toward at all.  
Moreover, if the mind is essentially non-extended, then it is absurd even to say (as 
Descartes does) that it is “in” a body. Where in a body would we locate it? To say that it is 
located in, for example, the brain is not to solve the problem, for where “in” the brain should we 
locate it? We cannot say that consciousness is confined within a single portion of the brain, nor 
can we say that it is “spread” throughout the whole brain, for it cannot be restricted to or spread 
throughout any region of space if it is not extended.86 We see, then, that the self-presence that 
																																																								
86	A telling indication of the inconceivability of a disembodied consciousness is perhaps the fact that ghosts or 
spirits are never depicted as utterly incorporeal or formless; they are always given some kind of form, “body”, or 
localizable existence, for otherwise they would not be perceptible at all; and they are also always depicted as able to 
interact with the physical world. Even in certain religions committed to the idea of an afterlife, the soul that is 
supposed to depart from the body is taken to be a different kind of “body” (say, an “astral body”). All of this is 
parodied, for example, in the Ghostbusters films, in which ghosts are portrayed as made of “ectoplasm.” More 
seriously, however, the point I have been making is perhaps an underappreciated tenet of the Christian tradition, 
according to which not only is the human person essentially an embodied being (hence the Christian conception of 
the afterlife consists not in the ascension of a disembodied soul to a supernatural Heaven – a notion imported from 
Plato – but rather in the resurrection of the body), but moreover, and even more radically, so too is God. That is 
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essentially characterizes the cogito is impossible without, and immediately implicated in, 
corporeality. As Dillon writes:  
Only with the emergence of the explicit (Cartesian) cogito, which is a relatively late and sophisticated 
development, does consciousness become thematically aware of itself. The point here…is that the 
autonomy of thought which is presupposed by Cartesian dualism (and which makes the task of explaining 
its incarnation impossible) is neither primordial nor absolute: what degree of independence thought 
acquires it must work to gain, and it remains always to some extent circumscribed by its original 
incarnation.87 
 
If consciousness were not situated in a world – if it were not incarnate – it would have no 
perspective upon, or no place from which to perceive, anything, and a view from nowhere is, of 
course, no point of view at all. And again, the lived/living body (that is, an embodied mind) is 
not a “union” or mere “mixture” of spirit and matter, for such a concept of it assumes the very 
dualism at issue.  
We can also test the conceivability of a disembodied consciousness by performing a kind 
of thought experiment or phenomenological reduction (similar to the one that Husserl performs 
in order to test solipsism or the conceivability of a truly isolated ego). We can try to strip away 
from experience anything that in any way depends upon the living body for its intelligibility. 
First, we have to eliminate visual perception and anything whose meaning derives from it; 
second, we clearly have to strip away the senses of hearing, smell, and taste. Lastly, and perhaps 
most radically, we must strip away the sense touch. So, can we really imagine what it would be 
like to exist without these perceptual capacities? Have we arrived at something like “pure” 
thought in communion with itself? To borrow a phrase from analytic philosophy of mind, would 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
exactly what that doctrine of the incarnation means: God had to become incarnate. One can also consider the ritual 
of taking communion, in which one enters into communion with Christ through a symbolic act of cannibalism (or, if 
taken literally, through a process of transubstantiation which, however mysterious or inexplicable it may be, is 
nevertheless taken to be a certain transformation of matter). To its credit, Christianity originally maintains that for 
anything (even God) to exist at all, it must be embodied.	 	
87	M.C. Dillon, “Sartre on the Phenomenal Body and Merleau-Ponty’s Critique,” in The Debate Between Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty, ed. John Stewart (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998), p. 139. 
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there be anything that it is like to exist in such a way? Would such a consciousness even be able 
to formulate or entertain any ideas or “representations”? Of course, we can reasonably question 
what such representations would be about if such a consciousness has never had any kind of 
perceptual awareness of anything: whenever we form a mental image of something, and even 
when we think about the most abstract concepts (like mathematical concepts, for example), we 
always in a way “visualize” them internally; we place them before our mind as the object of a 
kind of vision. Of course, the mental visualization of a number is different from the visual 
perception of a color, but it seems that we cannot but borrow from vision even when we entertain 
the most putatively “private” and abstract ideas. Moreover, as Merleau-Ponty argues, even the 
most abstract concepts – geometrical space and relations, quantifiable time and motion, 
measurable figures and magnitudes, and so on – tacitly depend upon the lived body and its 
perceptual engagements with a world. For example, I can construct and represent to myself 
objects or shapes in geometric space only by virtue of a prior non-representable spatiality or 
orientation toward things, a perspectival presentation of the world to, through, and around my 
body that is prior to any re-presentation of that world in imagination or on graph paper. I can 
formulate geometrical concepts only because my living body, as what Husserl calls an “absolute 
here” or “zero-point of orientation,” grounds and radiates certain sense-directions or vectors of 
organization without which such concepts are unintelligible. That is, vectors such as “left”, 
“right”, “up”, “down”, “above”, “below” “on”, “under”, “in”, “through”, “parallel”, 
“perpendicular”, “diagonal”, “straight” “across”, “adjacent”, and so on, necessarily refer to and 
depend upon my body and its pre-reflective orientation in space, and thus geometric idealizations 
– indeed all mathematical idealizations – implicitly derive their meaning from these bodily 
vectors of orientation.  
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Even more to the point, it is most difficult, and perhaps impossible, to imagine 
experience without touch. Touch is a “sense” that is so fundamental that we easily take it for 
granted. As Aristotle suggested, it is wrong to consider touch to be one sense among the others, 
for touch seems to be the very basis of all of the other senses, and indeed it seems to be the very 
basis of experience itself. To try to conceive of what it would be like to exist without touch is to 
try to conceive of what it would be like to exist without any kind of contact with anything 
external to oneself, and for Merleau-Ponty this is precisely inconceivable. In order to conceive of 
conscious existence without a sense of touch, it is not even adequate to try to imagine what it be 
like to suffer from so-called “locked-in syndrome.” Such a condition (as depicted in the 
autobiography and film The Diving Bell and the Butterfly) is one in which all (or most) of a 
person’s body is paralyzed and immobilized, and so one feels “locked” or “trapped” in one’s 
body. Now, while the term “locked in syndrome” is problematically Cartesian, such a syndrome 
demonstrates precisely the antithesis of a Cartesian account of consciousness. Such a condition is 
so horrific precisely because consciousness is embodied: in this condition, we are painfully all 
too conscious of our embodiment. In lived experience, one typically does not notice one’s body 
as an object set over and against oneself, and that is precisely because one’s body is primarily not 
external to oneself as an ordinary thing or instrument but is rather the very condition of one’s 
access to things or instruments, the “vehicle” of one’s existence in the world. It is precisely 
because one’s existence in the world is fundamentally structured by what Merleau-Ponty calls a 
“corporeal schema” that a condition such as “locked-in syndrome” is so disruptive and even 
possible in the first place. The inability to feel, move, or in any way exercise control over one’s 
body is perhaps the most profound – and most horrifying – upheaval in one’s being-in-the-world, 
but it would not be so if lived experience did not thoroughly depend upon the body and its vital 
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potentialities, or if one’s embodiment were merely an accidental or contingent rather than 
fundamental feature of one’s existence. Indeed, the cognitive-intentional structure of “locked-in” 
syndrome is itself a mode of corporeal intentionality: one wants to sense and animate one’s body, 
but tragically one is unable to do so; all of one’s desires and efforts to engage the world freely 
with one’s body are thwarted, and that is why the condition is so disturbing. The subject of The 
Diving Bell and The Butterfly (Jean-Dominique Bauby) was initially taken to be in a vegetative 
state, and at first the most painful aspect of his condition was his inability to communicate his 
presence to others. This begins to show that the desire and ability to communicate with others is 
also essentially a particular mode or expression of corporeal intentionality; indeed, all 
communicative acts are bodily. When Bauby did successfully communicate with his nurse, he 
did so by blinking his left eyelid, which was the only part of his body that he could move (and he 
composed the text of The Diving Bell and the Butterfly letter-by-letter by blinking his left eyelid 
when the appropriate letter was mentioned as his nurse recited the alphabet). It hardly needs to 
be mentioned that such an activity was entirely bodily. So long as we are alive, we never cease to 
communicate – and never cease to need to communicate – with and through our bodies.  
So, what makes so-called “locked-in” syndrome so terrible is precisely the fact that 
consciousness is never truly “locked in” the body, as the Cartesian name for this condition 
suggests. Here, however, it is perhaps more philosophically important to notice that even when 
Bauby would fantasize about leaving his body and taking flight, he did not so much fantasize the 
existence of a pure, disembodied spirit but rather (explicitly and implicitly) fantasized the 
experience of a different bodily manner of being (he would imagine himself as a butterfly, hence 
the title of the book). Lastly, to imagine consciousness without a sense of touch, it is not enough 
to imagine suffering from “locked-in” syndrome, because even locked-in syndrome does not 
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abolish touch altogether. A person (like Bauby) who suffers from such a condition still to some 
extent feels the “weight” or “mass” of his or her own body; such a person still feels tethered to 
carnal, terrestrial reality, for if that were not so it would be impossible even to make sense of the 
experience or possibility of such a condition: one would not feel “locked” or “trapped” in 
anything at all.  
So, a truly disembodied consciousness – a consciousness with no sense of touch – is, if it 
is possible at all, even more alien than what an experience of locked-in syndrome is like. And, as 
I have mentioned, there is good reason to think that such a consciousness is not possible. One 
might say that a disembodied consciousness would at least be conscious of itself, but without a 
body – without especially any sense of touch or sight – it seems impossible that such a 
consciousness could differentiate itself from anything, and if one cannot in any way differentiate 
oneself from anything, then one simply does not have a “self” of which to be conscious in the 
first place. Without a body and its sensory/perceptual-motor capacities, one cannot conceive of 
having an existence that can in any way be localized: as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty observe, 
without any “here,” there can be no sense of any “there,” and vice versa. Thus, it seems that 
whenever we attempt to imagine a genuinely disembodied existence we always in some way 
carry our bodies with us; such a “reduction” to a disembodied sphere of being fails because we 
always end up smuggling into it the very embodiment we are attempting to exclude from it. Even 
if we concede that a disembodied consciousness is ontologically possible, we still have said 
enough to show that one of Descartes’ main arguments for dualism is unsound. Descartes asserts 
(without justification) that I can conceive of myself existing without a body (and that I can 
therefore doubt that I have a body), but our phenomenological reflection has shown that I cannot 
conceive of existing without my body; even if, in general, a disembodied mind is logically or 
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metaphysically possible, the issue for us here is whether we can consistently conceive of it, and 
that does not seem to be the case. If we consider the experiential content that remains after all 
bodily constituted meaning has been subtracted from experience, it seems that we are left with 
hardly anything, and likely nothing, that is recognizable as “experience” at all. 
We have to understand that the lived/living body (embodied consciousness) precedes the 
classical, reflective bifurcation of reality into mind (res cogitans) and body (res extensa), subject 
and object, and is thus not exclusively one or the other. So, for Merleau-Ponty my corporeality – 
the embeddedness of my existence in an external, perceptible world – is just as certain as my 
own consciousness. The certainty of one’s own carnality is implicitly given with the certainty of 
the Cartesian cogito, for the reflexivity and intentionality of reflective consciousness begins with, 
and always depends upon, the pre-reflective reflexivity and intentionality of the living body88 in 
its constitutive exposure to a (carnal) world.89 It is precisely its necessary openness to a (carnal) 
																																																								
88	In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty refers to this pre-reflective reflexivity as the “tacit cogito,” 
for it denotes the presence of the self to itself prior to conceptual or linguistic articulation (see, for example, 
Phenomenology of Perception, p. 404). However, Merleau-Ponty later abandons this term for a number of reasons. 
First, the notion of the tacit cogito seems to be too similar to Sartre’s notion of the pre-reflective cogito: while Sartre 
takes the pre-reflective cogito to mark a radical rupture from the sensible world or a negation of the being of 
“things,” for Merleau-Ponty the tacit cogito registers our inextricable enmeshment with the sensible world, which is 
to say our carnality. Thus, the main reason that Merleau-Ponty eventually abandons the term is that it may seem to 
reinstate the sort of dualistic subject-object framework that he seeks to overcome (whether tacit or explicit, a 
“cogito” nonetheless seems to be a subject set over and against an object or world). Merleau-Ponty wants to make 
clear that the pre-reflective reflexivity of the lived body is an event of differentiation (a “dehiscence”) that precedes, 
institutes, and couples the poles of subject and object. Second, Merleau-Ponty eventually abandons the term due to 
the extent to which it might connote a sort communion of the self with itself prior to thought (and especially prior to 
language), the notion of which he rejects. Indeed, he rejects the notion that there is ever anything like a singular, 
“pure,” “primitive,” prelapsarian origin for the meaning or being of anything, and eventually makes it clear that 
phenomenology, in attempting to return to lived, pre-reflective experience, paradoxically can never have as its aim 
returning to anything like a self in unmediated communion with itself prior to thought and language.  
89	Though this may initially appear to be a strange comparison, I think that Merleau-Ponty’s argumentative strategy 
here resembles that of Kant’s refutation of idealism in the Critique of Pure Reason. Of course, given how different 
these two thinkers are, one should not push this comparison too far, but their respective arguments seem to be 
similar in at least one important way. Setting aside the details and merits of his proof of an external (mind-
independent) world, Kant intends to “turn the tables” on the idealist or skeptic by showing that the very thing that 
the idealist or skeptic takes to be indubitable (i.e., “inner experience,” or one’s own conscious existence and 
representations) in fact entails that which he/she denies or doubts (the existence of an external world); that is, Kant 
attempts to demonstrate that the reality of an external world is just as certain as the reality of one’s own 
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world that demonstrates the incarnation of consciousness. Thus, “we have no idea of a mind that 
would not be doubled with a body…”90      
As I mentioned above, the embodiment of consciousness – which, again, ontologically 
precedes and founds yet therefore disrupts the traditional opposition between subject and object 
– is attested at the most basic, immediate level of experience, but that is also precisely the reason 
it is naturally taken for granted and overlooked. Nevertheless, at the most basic or immediate 
level of experience there is no absolute disjunction between subject and object, mind and body, 
but rather “I apprehend my body as a subject-object, as capable of ‘seeing and suffering,’”91 as 
simultaneously agential/intentional and passive/affective. What is foundationally real is the lived 
body, which enables the very distinction between subject and object in the first place and which 
therefore cannot be placed entirely on either side of that distinction:  
Naïve consciousness does not see in the soul the cause of the movements of the body nor does it put the 
soul in the body as the pilot in his ship. This way of thinking belongs to philosophy; it is not implied in 
immediate experience…Our intentions find their natural clothing or their embodiment in movements and 
are expressed in them as the thing is expressed in its perspectival aspects. Thus, thinking can be “in the 
throat”, as the children questioned by Piaget say it is, without any contradiction or confusion of the 
extended and the non-extended, because the throat is not yet an ensemble of vibrating cords capable of 
producing the sonorous phenomena of language, because it remains that privileged region of a qualitative 
space where my signifying intentions manifest themselves in words.92  
 
My lived/living body – the body that opens me to a world prior to reflection – is neither a body 
“united with” a mind nor a mind “lodged in” a body but is a body that simply is minded or 
conscious, a body that, precisely by virtue of being a living body, immediately expresses what 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
consciousness (or “internal” space of appearances), for the latter constitutively depends upon, or implicitly refers to, 
the former. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty attempts to demonstrate (particularly in the “Cogito” chapter of the 
Phenomenology of Perception) that the very thing that the dualist takes to be indubitable (i.e., the cogito, or the 
reality of one’s own thinking self, or reflective consciousness) in fact entails that which he/she takes be to doubtable 
(one’s own embodied being-in-the-world, as well as one’s own embeddedness in relations with others). Merleau-
Ponty indeed refers to Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism” in the preface to the Phenomenology of Perception (p. xvii), 
where he credits Kant with anticipating the phenomenological concept of intentionality and its implications.    	
90	Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and The Invisible, p. 259. 
91	Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 95. 
92	Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, p. 188-189.	
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we call consciousness or intentionality (in much the same way that a work of art expresses a 
meaning, or in much the same way that the words on this page express a thought). We tend to 
think that thinking is something we do independently of our bodies, or that thought is a faculty 
that is somehow “in” our body (say, “in” our heads) but that is nevertheless not “of” or 
“performed with” or “accomplished through” our bodies. We tend to think of thinking in this 
way particularly when we withdraw into intense, solitary meditation (as Descartes does at the 
beginning of his Meditations), for this is when we are most prone to forget our bodies. Moreover, 
we tend to become keenly aware of our bodies precisely when (say, due to injury or illness) they 
seem to resist our conscious volitions and interrupt our intellectual and imaginative labors, and 
therefore we view them as obstacles to thinking (and acting); in such experiences I find myself 
alienated from my body, and thus I come to see my body as an object distinct from my 
conscious, thinking and willing self. As Heidegger famously discusses toward the beginning of 
Being and Time, tools that are “read-to-hand” (i.e., incorporated into and pre-reflectively 
deployed through our practical schemas and comportments in the world) originally and most 
often only become “present-to-hand” (i.e., objects of reflective awareness) when they break 
down, and though it is incorrect to categorize the living body as a “tool” (for to do so is already 
to objectify it), it is nevertheless analogously true that we become aware of our bodies as objects 
when they precisely disrupt or cease to cohere with our habituated modes of bodily coping and 
comportment.  
Of course, the point here is that the lived/living body is irreducible to the body as an 
object, yet it is the former that we naturally tend to overlook, for it is the latter that most often 
captivates us, and to which indeed we only have access, reflectively. Thus, as Merleau-Ponty 
observes, our lived/living bodies are always to some extent absent or opaque to us, and for this 
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reason we typically forget that we are (living) bodies. While I am always aware of my (living) 
body, this awareness is always only implicit and lacunary: 
…I observe external objects with my body, I handle them, examine them, walk around them, but my body 
itself is a thing which I do not observe: in order to do so, I should need the use of a second body which 
itself would be unobservable.93 
 
Merleau-Ponty does not mean here that I am never aware of my living body. What he means is 
that I can never be aware of my living body as an external object (and that my living body is not 
merely an external object) because it is the very condition of my awareness of external objects in 
the first place. The living body is certainly not a disengaged spectator, self-transparent subject of 
experience, or an impenetrable, interior citadel of introspection, but at the same time neither is it 
merely an external object of experience. As Merleau-Ponty suggests, the lived body is analogous 
to the punctum caecum that enables the visual perception of an object: “I have the utmost 
difficulty in catching my living glance when a mirror in the street unexpectedly reflects my 
image back at me…In so far as it sees or touches the world, my body can therefore be neither 
seen nor touched.”94 Thus, my living body is always present to me, but it is only present 
implicitly or unreflectively; it is always present, but it is always a present absence. So, when I 
am aware of my body as a “mere” object it is not, in fact, my lived body – not the body that I am, 
or not the body through which I exist – of which I am aware, for again my lived body is precisely 
that through which I can apprehend anything as an object in the first place. When I reflectively 
distance myself from my body, it is not my lived body from which I distance myself, for it is 
only through my lived body that there are any conceivable or real “distances.”95 Ironically, it is 
																																																								
93	Merleau-Ponty,	Phenomenology of Perception,	p.	91. 
94	Ibid., p. 91-92. 
			95	It may seem to be the case that Merleau-Ponty simply reiterates Husserl’s distinction between Körper (the body  
as an external, material object, or what Sartre calls the “body-for-others”) and Leib (the phenomenal or personal 
body, or what Sartre call the “body-for-itself”, which is to say the body that I experience as my own, the body that I 
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my non-objectifiable lived/living body that allows me to objectify my body and consequently 
entertain the notion that I am essentially a disembodied subject. Ironically, then, to pretend to 
conceive of oneself as a disembodied subject it is in fact necessary to be embodied, and one only 
conceives of oneself as disembodied insofar as one forgets or represses the lived/living body that 
one always already is, the bodily being that enables, hence escapes, objectification.  
 The crucial point that I wish to make here, then, is that when I come to see myself – that 
is, when I come to see my mind or mental activities – as separable from my body and from the 
world in which my body is embedded, or when I come to see consciousness, thought, or even 
“intelligence”96 as something that my body does not or cannot possess and manifest in its own 
right, it is because I overlook my lived/living body in favor of my body as a physiology textbook 
would depict it, namely as a dead, vivisected, detached object. However, my living body is 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
experience “from the inside” as the locus of my sensations and volitional movements), but in fact this is not the case.	
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the lived body is sometimes confused with Husserl’s concept of “Leib” or Sartre’s 
concept of the body-for-itself, and indeed Merleau-Ponty himself often invites this confusion (Husserl, for example, 
often refers to “Leib” as the “lived” body). While he is certainly influenced by Husserl’s distinction between Körper 
and Leib, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the lived body is not strictly equivalent to Husserl’s Leib or Sartre’s body-for-
itself. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty develops a sustained critique of Sartre’s (and by extension Husserl’s) distinction 
between the body-for-itself and the body-for-others, for in the end this distinction amounts to a new dualism (indeed, 
it introduces what some have called a “body-body” problem). For Sartre, the body-for-itself and the body-for-others 
belong to mutually exclusive orders of reality; for Sartre, it is not simply that they do not exactly coincide with one 
another, but rather that they “exist on two incommunicable levels” (see Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, p. 140), 
and this is precisely what Merleau-Ponty denies. As I have attempted to make clear, for Merleau-Ponty the “lived 
body” is neither the objective body (Sartre’s “body-for-others”) nor the subjective or phenomenal body (Sartre’s 
body-for-itself), but rather antecedes and founds the distinction between the two. The lived body precedes and opens 
up the distinction between subject and object such that I can even mark a distinction between my body as a subject 
of experience and my body as an object of experience in the first place. For further discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s 
critique of Sartre’s conception of the lived body, see Dillon’s “Sartre on the Phenomenal Body and Merleau-Ponty’s 
Critique” (published in The Debate Between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, ed. Jon Stewart (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1998), p. 121-143), and for a clear account of Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Husserl’s 
conception of the lived body, see Taylor Carman’s “The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty” (published in 
Philosophical Topics Vol. 27, NO 2, Fall 1999, p. 205-226).  
96	I have qualified “intelligence” here in quotation marks for good reason. Though I do think there is a sense in 
which (in the spirit of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy and also following Nietzsche, who I quote below) we may 
ascribe “intelligence” to any form of behavior once we have discarded the Cartesian mind/body dichotomy (which is 
the basis for conceptualizing the body as a mere “machine,” hence as an entity devoid of consciousness and certainly 
without any characteristic or faculty we could rightly call “intelligence”), Merleau-Ponty is suspicious and critical of 
the very notion of “intelligence” insofar as it seems unavoidably entangled with precisely a Platonic/Cartesian 
distinction between consciousness/logos and “mere” materiality/mechanicity. This is precisely what Merleau-Ponty 
suggests in a passage in his Nature lectures, which I discuss in chapter five. 
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inherently conscious or intentional. My living body is irreducible to any reflective, objectifying 
conceptualization, model, or analysis of it for the simple reason that it is not a mere object, or not 
simply one object among others. A body dissected under a microscope, or a body seized “as 
between forceps”97 by the gaze of a surgeon, medical examiner, anatomist, or scientist in a 
laboratory, is simply not a living body. The body viewed on an operating table, much like the 
manner in which a mechanic or plumber views a car or a sink, is a derivative abstraction. As 
Merleau-Ponty suggests in the passage quoted above, it is indeed the case that my (living) body 
“thinks,” and moreover we can say, as Nietzsche does, “that the body is a great intelligence,”98 
that there is indeed a “rationality” that is distinctive of, and intrinsic to, every kind of living 
body, an expressivity, intentionality, or communicative agency that precisely constitutes it as 
such. In short, we do not (or cannot) conceive of our bodies as inherently conscious or “minded” 
only insofar as we conceive of them as (mere) objects or machines.99 “Thus,” Merleau-Ponty 
																																																								
97	Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and The Invisible, p. 128.	
98	Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “Of the Despisers of the Body.” Trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Penguin Books, 2003), p. 61. 
99	Here, we may notice that Merleau-Ponty suggests an objection to yet another one of Descartes’ famous 
arguments for dualism, namely the “divisibility” argument. In the Meditations, Descartes argues that since the body 
is divisible and since the mind is not divisible, it follows (assuming the contrapositive of the principle of the 
indiscernibility of identicals, i.e., if two things do not share all of the same properties, then they are not one and the 
same thing), that the body and the mind are separate and distinct things. Descartes’ argument is valid, and criticisms 
of it typically target the premise that the mind is not divisible. However, Merleau-Ponty suggests a novel (and 
arguably more compelling) criticism that targets the other premise, which has traditionally been considered 
unassailable: the premise that the body is divisible. Is this premise true? That depends on what is meant here by “the 
body.” All objects are extended in space and all things extended in space are divisible, so of course the objective 
body is divisible, since it is an object extended in space. The problem here is that Descartes either conflates the 
“objective” body with the lived/living body or does not even distinguish between the two at all. The “objective” 
body is indeed divisible, but (as we have seen, and as Merleau-Ponty goes to great lengths to demonstrate) the 
objective body is not the lived/living body, and the latter simply cannot be understood as a partitionable entity or as a 
“mere” object whose components exist partes extra partes. The lived/living body involves a dynamic, holistic 
intentional orientation toward, and involvement within, the world that enables any perception or conception of 
objects in the first place. So, though Descartes is probably correct to assert that a peculiar unity characterizes 
consciousness and distinguishes its manner of being from that of ordinary material objects, a similar unity also 
characterizes what Merleau-Ponty calls the lived body. It is true that the mind is not a divisible object, but it is also 
true that the lived body is not a divisible object, and so the ontological difference between mind and matter – 
between conscious existence and corporeality – is not, as Merleau-Ponty continually labors to demonstrate, the 
impassable chasm, or the binary opposition, that Descartes took it to be; at the very least, the supposed difference 
between mind and body to which Descartes appeals no longer necessarily supports the conclusion that they are 
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concludes, “the permanence of one’s own body, if only classical psychology had analyzed it, 
might have led to the body no longer conceived as an object of the world, but as our means of 
communicating with it…”100 To begin with a distinction between subject (mind, thought, or self) 
and object (body) as things that designate and belong to essentially separate orders of being is to 
reify a derivative abstraction as ontologically primitive, when in fact what is ontologically 
primitive is the intertwining of the two, or that which is not entirely one or the other but 
(ambiguously) both: the lived/living body. If we recognize this reification for what it is, we can 
finally account for the embodiment of subjectivity: we can see that living bodies themselves just 
are forms of “thought” or subjectivity.  
 One might notice that Merleau-Ponty’s conception of (embodied) subjectivity is very 
close to Aristotle’s conception of the soul (psyche), and a comparison of the two may be 
instructive. In a provocative passage at the end of Book I of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
suggests that reason (logos) and non-reason (to alogon, which encompasses desire and the 
passions) are two intertwined aspects of the soul, though he does not proceed to argue for this 
claim:  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
categorically distinct or separable: the mind is not a divisible object, but neither is the lived body. Thus, Descartes’ 
argument is only sound if one equates “the body” with the “objective body,” yet they are not the same. In short, 
Descartes’ argument succeeds in showing that the objective body is separate and distinct from the mind, but the 
lived body is not the objective body, and so it does not demonstrate that embodiment as such is separate and distinct 
from mindedness or that mindedness is disembodied. Neither the mind nor the lived body are divisible objects, and 
this is not an accident: as Merleau-Ponty shows, to be “a mind” is to be a living body, and to be a living body is to 
be a mind. Descartes assumes that something may be either a body or a mind but not both, and he assumes this 
because, as we see in his divisibility argument, he equates “the body” with the “objective body,” or because he is 
only able to conceptualize the body in the manner of a physiologist or forensic pathologist. The lived body is not a 
mere (divisible) object, yet it is also not not an object either; thus, as we have seen, it defies Descartes’ ontological 
categories inasmuch as it is neither an object or decomposable mechanism nor an immaterial subject or spirit, and as 
such it is the only kind of thing that can resolve (or rather dissolve) the problem concerning the relationship between 
body and mind precisely because it is already, in a sense, both at once, or rather because it is something that 
antecedes the distinction between both: it is the only kind of mind that is truly conceivable or worthy of the name, 
namely an embodied mind. 
100	Phenomenology of Perception., p. 92.	
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Now some things about the soul are said in an adequate way even in popular writings, and one ought to 
make use of them, for example, that there is an irrational part of the soul and a part having reason. 
Whether these are distinct in the same manner as the parts of the body, or of any divisible thing, or else 
two in meaning while they are inseparable in nature, as are the convex and the concave in the 
circumference of a circle, makes no difference for the present concern.101 
 
Though Aristotle does not pursue this point here, I think it is clear that it is one that he accepts; 
indeed, his suggestion that the rational and irrational “parts” of the soul may not, in fact, be 
properly understood as “parts” at all makes a very significant difference. Aristotle’s comparison 
of the relationship between reason and non-reason in the human soul to the relationship between 
the convex and the concave in the circumference of a circle marks a profound departure from the 
traditional, Platonic/Cartesian account of rationality (and I think that it is indispensable for 
understanding the account of human praxis and virtue he develops elsewhere). It is clear that 
Aristotle conceives of the relationship between the rational and non-rational “parts” of the soul in 
this way because it is clear that he does not conceive of the soul as a partitionable entity at all; it 
is not, for him, a “thing” composed of discrete, independent parts (often in agonistic competition 
with one another), and it is also not something that descends into and magically animates the 
body like a pilot in a ship. In De Anima, Aristotle applies his hylemorphic understanding of 
natural beings (developed in the Physics and in the Metaphysics) to a special class of natural 
beings: living (or ensouled) beings. Aristotle maintains that the soul just is the actualization 
(energeia, or “being-at-work”) of a living body, the organic ordering and expression of vital 
bodily powers and processes. Thus, the human soul just is the actualization or putting-to-work of 
the potentialities of a human body. While the human soul, then, is not to be strictly identified 
with the human body, it is not “disembodied” either, for it is precisely the characteristic 
movement or activity of a human body, the functional unfolding or mobilization of a human 
																																																								
101	Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1102a30. Trans. Joe Sachs (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2002), p. 20. 
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body’s distinctive manner of being-in-the-world. Similarly, grasping is not the same as the hand 
itself that grasps, but it is the enactment of a material power endemic to the hand as such. For 
Aristotle, the soul can no more be separated from the body than the activity or gesture of 
grasping can be separated from the hand, or seeing from the eye, or digestion from the stomach. 
In short, the soul is related to the body as actualization is related to potency, or as form is related 
to matter. The soul is not radically disjunct from the body, for it is precisely the actualization of 
the potentialities of a living body, potentialities for a certain style of embodied coping. The 
human soul, then, should not be understood “substantially” (as a “thing with parts”) but verbally, 
as a special kind of self-organizing movement (kinesis) or work (ergon). This means that when 
Aristotle speaks of “parts” of the soul, these should be understood not as the “parts” of an entity 
but as moments of a movement, activity, or process. Thus, as Aristotle remarks, soul and body 
are – like the convex and concave – “two in meaning” but inseparable in nature, conceptually 
distinguishable – indeed irreducibly different – yet ontologically interwoven or copresent aspects 
of one and the same phenomenon. Remarkably (and perhaps not coincidentally), we find that 
Merleau-Ponty also claims that the relation between mind and body is analogous to the relation 
between the concave and the convex:  
The bond between soul and body is not a parallelism…it is to be understood as the bond between the 
convex and the concave, between the solid vault and the hollow it forms – No correspondence (parallelist 
or of pure occasionalism) is to be sought between what takes place “in the body” and what takes place “in 
the soul” in perception…the soul is planted in the body as the stake in the ground, without point by point 
correspondence between ground and stake – or rather: the soul is the hollow of the body, the body is the 
distention of the soul. The soul adheres to the body as their signification adheres to the cultural things, 
whose reverse or other side it is.”102 
 
Thus, for Merleau-Ponty (and similarly for Aristotle), mind and body, consciousness and 
behavior are distinct yet inseparable and co-given. This is why Merleau-Ponty refers to 
																																																								
102	The Visible and The Invisible, p. 232-233. 
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consciousness here as a “hollow,” for it is distinct from the body yet nevertheless immanent 
“within” it; it is other than “brute” matter yet not a “nihilation” of materiality; it is not pure 
nothingness, but neither is it a mere thing.  
 There is, then, a kind of “thinking” or “intelligence” that is immediately manifested in 
and through the behavior of a living, behaving body, or in the manner in which a living body 
copes with its world and signifies itself as such. This is not to say that there is no distinction at 
all between my subjectivity and my (living) body (which would be reductive), but it is to say that 
my subjectivity is inseparable from, and enacted by, my living body. Thus, “…we must go back 
to the working, actual body – not the body as a chunk of space or a bundle of functions but the 
body which is an intertwining of vision and movement…We see only what we look at. What 
would vision be without eye movement? And how could the movement of the eyes bring things 
together if the movement were blind? If it were only a reflex? If it did not have its antennae, its 
clairvoyance? If vision were not prefigured in it?”103 The dynamic comportments, the affective 
and projective engagements of a living body – even the “simple,” unreflective glances and 
adjustments of our eyes – are the most basic expressions of intentionality. The holistic, pre-
conceptual understanding that a living body has of its “parts” and capacities in relation to one 
another and to other things, and the inexorable expression of such an understanding in and 
through its projects, habits, and behavior, just is consciousness, intentionality, “thinking,” or 
“intelligence” at the foundational level. For example, I am able to handle things without having 
to calculate (as a computer program or robot would) the precise distances and angles that obtain 
between them and the relevant parts of my body, nor do I need to take stock of my body’s 
powers in order to deploy them in various actions and projects. I can reach for and take hold of 
																																																								
103	“Eye and Mind”, in The Primacy of Perception, p. 162.	
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the computer mouse beside my keyboard, I can cross my legs and adjust the glasses on my face 
and scratch my head, I can move from the refrigerator in my kitchen to my oven and then from 
my kitchen to my bedroom, and so on, all without any knowledge of trigonometry or 
kinesiology:  
If I stand holding my pipe in my closed hand, the position of my hand is not determined discursively by 
the angle which it makes with my forearm, and my forearm with my upper arm, and my upper arm my 
trunk, and my trunk with the ground. I know indubitably where my pipe is, and thereby I know where my 
hand and my body are, as primitive man in the desert is always able to take his bearings immediately 
without having to cast his mind back, and add up distances covered and deviations made since setting 
off.104  
 
Thus, “my body has its world, or understands its world, without having to make use of my 
‘symbolic’ or ‘objectifying’ functions,”105 and to not consider this manner of “having” or 
“understanding” a world to be consciousness or thought “worthy of the name” – to not see 
mindedness “in” the comportments of a living body, or to not see behavior as the enactment or 
presencing of subjectivity – is either to assume the living body to be a mere thoughtless 
mechanism (which is itself to assume a dualistic conception of the distinction between the being 
of consciousness and the being of the body), or it is to assume that perceiving, thinking, and 
“knowing” is accomplished by a subject reflectively set over and against an object (or 
representation), that the “subject” of perception, thought, and knowledge is the classical 
“epistemological subject” who stands absolutely detached from the things he/she seeks or claims 
to know. However, we have seen that lived, embodied experience – that the relation between 
consciousness and the body and between embodied consciousness and the world – is below or 
beyond such binaries and abstractions. So, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, we can rightfully say that 
the hands that grasp, search, caress, or gesticulate “think,” that the feet and legs that walk or 
																																																								
104	Phenomenology of Perception, p. 100. 
105 Ibid., p. 140.  
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dance “think,” that the eyes that survey a landscape or a painting or that shed tears in sorrow or 
joy “think,” that the ears that perk up to listen to something amid clamor and that immediately 
hear meaning in the sounds of the world “think,” that the throat that stretches to speak or sing 
“thinks,” that the body that orients itself in space, that fluidly navigates and adjusts itself to its 
milieu, that perceives, greets, and mimics other bodies as they do the same, that becomes tense 
with fear or dread, that becomes ecstatic with love and desire, that extends itself beyond its skin 
into various tools or instruments,106 “thinks.” It is not an immaterial, homuncular ego – not an 
absolutely disengaged (and therefore disembodied) spectator or “kosmotheoros”107 – that thinks: 
it is the whole living body in its affective, motivated, meaning-laden, synergistic involvements 
with a world and with other living bodies that does so; it is the living body that is always a form 
and therefore direct manifestation of thought itself.    
 With respect to the topic under discussion here, the most crucial point, then, is this: since 
we can (and must) conceive of subjectivity as genuinely embodied, my experiences of other 
subjectivities are no longer inexplicable or doubtable. Since subjectivity is grounded in and 
																																																								
106	One such example that Merleau-Ponty employs is the way that blind people can in-corporate walking sticks into 
their corporeal schemas; through practice and skillful coping, a walking stick becomes an extension of a blind-
person’s body, and everyone can (to greater and lesser degrees) master instruments in this way. “…Those actions in 
which I habitually engage,” Merleau-Ponty writes, “incorporate their instruments into themselves and make them 
play a part in the original structure of my own body” (Phenomenology of Perception, p. 91). Thus, there comes a 
point at which a blind person’s walking stick is no longer an “instrument” at all: the walking stick becomes a part of 
the blind person’s corporeal schema: it becomes as much a part of the structure of his or her body as is the arm with 
which he or she wields it: 
 
Once the stick has become a familiar instrument, the world of feelable things recedes and now begins, not at the 
outer skin of the hand, but at the end of the stick…Habit does not consist in interpreting the pressures of the stick on 
the hand as indications of certain positions of the stick, and these as signs of an external object, since it relieves us of 
the necessity of doing so. The pressures on the hand and the stick are no longer given; the stick is no longer an 
object perceived by the blind man, but an instrument with which he perceives. It is a bodily auxiliary, and extension 
of the bodily synthesis. - ibid., p. 152. 
 
This in-corporation (or habituation) of instruments is one of the best examples of the expressivity of the body, for it 
shows that the body does not end at the skin; it shows that the body can prosthetically extend and transform itself, 
that the structure of my body is never entirely fixed, that living flesh is not a brute substance but rather a dynamic, 
responsive, and labile power or style of existence. 
107 See e.g., Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 113. 
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enacted through the living body – since every living body is inherently conscious or intentional – 
I immediately (non-inferentially) encounter other subjectivities when I encounter other living 
bodies: I encounter other subjectivities or intentionalities in and through the living bodies and 
behaviors with which they are suffused and co-given as such. The fact that consciousness is not 
entirely “private” or self-enclosed – that is, the fact that consciousness is not wholly divorced 
from materiality or exteriority but is rather internally coupled with it – is not only a necessary 
condition for consciousness as such, but is also especially a necessary condition for any 
awareness of other consciousnesses. It is only because subjectivity is essentially embodied and 
engaged with a world – it is only because “subjectivity is not motionless identity with itself,”108 
or it is only because “knowledge and communication sublimate rather than suppress our 
incarnation”109 – that not only subjectivity but also intersubjectivity is possible.110 As I will 
further elaborate below, if the mind is necessarily incarnate, then there is no longer a “problem of 
other minds.” If consciousness is necessarily “in” the flesh, then my awareness and putative 
knowledge of other consciousnesses is no longer intractably mysterious or problematic; 
moreover, my awareness or knowledge of other consciousnesses is no longer restricted to an 
awareness or knowledge of other human consciousnesses, for non-human animals are living 
bodies (that is, incarnate consciousnesses) as well. We can solve (or dissolve) the problem of 
other minds (human and non-human alike) if and only if we overcome dualism, or if and only if 
we affirm and are able to conceptualize rigorously the embodiment of thought and 
consciousness, the flesh of the mind that already roots it in symbiosis with the world and with 
other (enfleshed) minds.  
																																																								
108	Merleau-Ponty,	Phenomenology of Perception, p. 426. 
109	Merleau-Ponty, “An Unpublished Text,” in The Primacy of Perception, p. 7.	
110	As I will later elaborate, this is also why subjectivity is always already intersubjectivity.  
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Among the many arguments Merleau-Ponty provides against dualism, perhaps the one 
that is most important here is the one that might initially appear to beg the question against the 
Cartesian skeptic and dualist, namely one whose central premise precisely affirms the commonly 
accepted fact that we have knowledge, or veridical awareness, of other subjectivities. In short, 
the argument in question is that since dualism makes intersubjectivity – any genuine knowledge 
or awareness of others – impossible, and since it is clear that we are always, inextricably and 
necessarily, embedded in real webs intersubjective relationships, it follows that dualism must be 
false. This argument is valid and its premises are true. It is the second premise, of course, that 
would seem to beg the question against the Cartesian skeptic or dualist, yet it is one that has 
already been implicitly addressed and independently supported in the foregoing discussion of 
Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Cartesian ontology, and it is one I will elaborate further in chapter 
five, where I will articulate the profound ontological consequences of Merleau-Ponty’s account 
of intersubjectivity, namely how such an account leads Merleau-Ponty to formulate an ontology 
of radical difference, which is also to say an ontology of radical community. For now, however, I 
wish to take some time to examine in further detail the premise that dualism makes 
intersubjectivity impossible, or that it is impossible to account for our experiences and 
knowledge of “other minds” from within a Cartesian framework. 
As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty argues that the only way to overcome skepticism 
concerning other minds is to overcome the Cartesian ontological presuppositions that motivate 
and entail it. In order to refute skepticism about other minds, it is not only sufficient but also 
necessary to refute dualism, and this is precisely what Merleau-Ponty seeks to do in his early 
works. So far, however, while we have seen Merleau-Ponty’s case for why refuting dualism is 
sufficient for refuting skepticism concerning other minds, we have not yet discussed in much 
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depth why, for him, it also necessary to refute dualism in order to refute other-minds skepticism. 
So, it may seem that there is yet the possibility that one may reject such skepticism without 
having to reject the dualism that usually supports it. However, for Merleau-Ponty there is no 
such possibility: dualism logically renders any conception or awareness of otherness impossible. 
Dualism is essentially inconsistent with any awareness or supposed knowledge of other minds. 
So, on the one hand, Merleau-Ponty aims to dismantle Cartesian solipsism (and by extension, as 
we will see, the anthropocentrism and classical liberal individualism it founds and of which it is 
the purest expression) by dismantling the dualism upon which it depends, yet on the other hand 
Merleau-Ponty also advances an argument from the opposite direction: while he presents the 
argument that Cartesian solipsism is false because dualism is false, so too does he argue that 
dualism is false because Cartesian solipsism is false. One of the key premises of the latter 
argument is one that has just been mentioned, namely that dualism renders any awareness or 
conception of alterity logically and phenomenologically impossible. And though Merleau-
Ponty’s defense of this premise has already been mentioned briefly, I think it is important to take 
some time to explicate it more fully by considering his critique of traditional efforts to ground 
the possibility of our awareness and knowledge of other minds. The reason for this is not only 
that Merleau-Ponty’s repudiation of traditional attempts to ground our supposed knowledge of 
other minds not only answers potential lingering objections to his claim that dualism is 
essentially inconsistent with such knowledge, but also that it directly informs – indeed, logically 
entails – his subsequent repudiation of anthropocentric delimitations of such knowledge. In this 
way we will be able to develop a better understanding not only of Merleau-Ponty’s positive 
alternative to conventional accounts of our knowledge of other minds but also of the extent to 
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which this alternative radically challenges conventionally assumed and speciously (and 
speciesistly) imposed boundaries concerning who or what may count as “other” or as “minded.” 
 Cartesian dualism engenders a number of problems that Descartes himself was unable to 
solve and that are, in fact, inherently unsolvable from within a Cartesian or dualistic framework. 
If consciousness is ontologically divorced from materiality or from “nature,” if “subject” and 
“object” designate and belong to entirely separate, irreconcilable domains of existence, then by 
definition there is no possible causal, ontological, or epistemic relationship between them. This 
point is essentially tautological, yet it has been, and even continues to be, frequently overlooked. 
If mind is separate from body and world, then it is impossible to explain how, for example, one 
can claim to “know” that anything “in” the mind – that the content of any thought or experience, 
that any perception or appearance or “representation” – “corresponds” to anything outside of it, 
and it is likewise impossible for anything thus defined as “mental” to appear or have any sort of 
place among those things categorically opposed to it as mere “things,” no place at all among 
those things defined as  “material” or “natural.” Indeed, on these terms, one cannot claim to 
know that there is anything “outside” one’s purely internal theatre of appearances – any material, 
natural world external to consciousness – in the first place. If I may only have direct cognitive 
access to my own mind, then I can never have direct, certain knowledge of anything that would 
be beyond it: anything outside my own mind and its representations would be accessible only 
indirectly and would therefore be quite far removed from the realm of certainty. Dualism simply 
posits consciousness as a sphere of impregnable isolation, as an “inside” with no “outside”; like 
Narcissus, it is frozen within its own reflection upon itself, eternally imprisoned within its own 
relationship with itself, forever closed off from anything that might be outside or other than 
itself. Therefore, we are left with skepticism concerning not only the putative existence of any 
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specific external entity or state of affairs (including, in particular, other people and their “inner” 
lives), but also concerning the existence of an external, material world in the first place.   
Nevertheless, in the wake of Cartesian dualism, many philosophers attempted to 
construct a bridge between mind/subject and body/object, between self and world, or between 
the ‘interior’ and the ‘exterior.’ All such attempts, however, were doomed to fail for the simple 
(again, tautological) reason that “separate” means separate: once mind is sundered from 
body/world, once the interior domain of conscious experience is absolutely segregated from the 
domain of exterior things and phenomena, one will never be able to bring them together. In 
general, if two kinds of things are defined as essentially “separate and distinct” (as Descartes 
defines the mental and the material), then it will be a fool’s errand – indeed, a category mistake – 
ever to attempt to unite or reconcile them. Cartesian ontology carves a diremption in Being that 
can never, in principle, be overcome or sutured. However well-intentioned it may have been for a 
number of post-Cartesian thinkers to attempt to salvage or rationally ground from within a 
dualistic, Cartesian framework our supposed knowledge of the existence of extra-mental things 
such as material objects, a material world, or other minds, all such attempts seem to forget what 
“separate and distinct” means, or they forget the theoretical commitments that make knowledge 
of such things problematic in the first place; to his credit, Descartes himself did not forget. 
Descartes understood the implications of his dualism, and for this reason he (in)famously needed 
to rely upon an appeal to divine beneficence in order to neutralize the skepticism and solipsism 
that his ontology otherwise entails. Descartes also (in)famously denied that animals had minds 
(or “souls”), and consequently regarded them as nothing more than machines; yet, in the end it 
was merely certain theological commitments and prejudices – not genuine logical consistency – 
that permitted him not to extend this same skepticism or anti-realism to other (apparent) humans. 
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In any case, Descartes is able to claim that he knows that other human bodies are “ensouled” 
only because God exists and would naturally never deceive him about such an irresistible, “clear 
and distinct” notion.111 Of course, if one needs to smuggle in God Himself as a deus ex machina 
in order to rescue one’s philosophy from unacceptable and even absurd logical consequences, 
then logically one’s philosophy likely is not worth rescuing, or is not able to be rescued, in the 
first place.  
 Merleau-Ponty understands that in order to solve such problems, it is necessary to 
abandon the erroneous ontological commitments, or the entire conceptual framework, that 
generates them. That is to say, in order to “solve” such problems one must, in fact, dissolve them 
by repudiating the matrix of false assumptions and abstractions that entail them in the first place. 
Among the big, “scandalous” problems we inherit from Cartesian dualism is, again, the “problem 
of other minds.” In case the point is not already sufficiently clear, it is worth elaborating that this 
problem is logically entailed by mind/body dualism and is therefore one that cannot be solved 
from a dualistic starting point or from within a dualistic conceptual schema; it can only be 
“solved” by genuinely dismantling dualism itself, or by refusing to accept from the start a 
categorical, binary opposition between subject and object, interiority and exteriority, 
																																																								
111 An apposite response on the part of a critic of Descartes’ view of animals might have been to insist that he/she 
has a “clear and distinct” idea that animals do indeed have minds based upon all of the complex and diverse 
behaviors they exhibit, so why would God deceive him/her about that? What would Descartes have been able to say 
in response to someone who claimed to possess a “clear and distinct” notion that animals have minds? Is there any 
argument he could provide, without begging the question, that would be able to establish that one could not have 
such a clear and distinct idea? In other words, Descartes would seem to have to insist that one cannot have a clear 
and distinct idea that animals have souls because it is obviously false that they do, but of course that is exactly the 
point that the critic denies in the first place. So, in the end it seems that the only reply Descartes would be able to 
offer would be simply to assert without argument that God only imbued humans with souls, which precisely lays 
bare the arbitrary prejudice upon which his denial of animal mindedness rests (and which is rather ironic given that 
Descartes’ explicit project is to establish a science of knowledge independent of theological authority or revelation, 
as ultimately the latter is what he would have to rely upon in order to insist that animals lack souls).    
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consciousness and world. It is, of course, precisely this radical project that occupies Merleau-
Ponty’s entire philosophical career.  
 However, a considerable number of philosophers have in fact sought to resolve the 
problem of other minds without abandoning dualism. In many such cases, it is not so much that 
these philosophers explicitly embrace a traditional dualistic metaphysics and seek to render our 
knowledge of other minds consistent with it, but rather that they simply attempt to resolve the 
problem in such a way that presupposes or (re)inscribes a dualistic standpoint. At any rate, it is 
precisely just such a “solution” to the problem of other minds that dominated discussion of the 
problem, and which was taken to be the only conceivable albeit imperfect solution to it, until the 
development of phenomenology in the early twentieth century. The supposed solution in 
question is the famous argument from analogy for other minds, according to which knowledge of 
other minds may be genuinely founded inductively, or more specifically may be considered a 
particular kind of warranted analogical inference: namely, the inference that another body is 
conscious because it exhibits movements and behaviors that are typically if not invariably 
associated with conscious states or volitions in one’s own case. Bertrand Russell advances a 
representative version of this argument:  
From subjective observation I know that A, which is a thought or feeling, causes B, which is a bodily act, e.g., a 
statement. I know also that, whenever B is an act of my own body, A is its cause. I now observe an act of the kind B 
in a body not my own, and I am having no thought or feeling of the kind A. But I still believe, on the basis of self-
observation, that only A can cause B; I therefore infer that there was an A which caused B, though it was not an A 
that I could observe. On this ground I infer that other people’s bodies are associated with minds, which resemble 
mine in proportion as their bodily behavior resembles my own.112 
 
That is to say, I know in my own case, introspectively, that my mental states or volitions are 
commonly accompanied by, and are even in most cases apparently the proximate causes of, 
various bodily states, movements, and behaviors, and so since I observe other bodies like mine in 
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appearance and constitution move and behave in the world in ways similar to my own, I may 
rightfully infer that these other bodies are likewise conscious, that these other bodies I see 
moving about the world around me are not, as Descartes wondered, mere “automata” but are 
residences of minds as well. Of course, as Russell himself admits, it is never certain that the 
movements or behaviors of other bodies might not have causes different from the mental or 
volitional kind of which I am aware in my own case.113 Though I must admit that my knowledge 
of the existence of others falls quite short of the apodicticity that characterizes my knowledge of 
my own existence, I may claim to possess genuine knowledge of the existence of others 
nonetheless, provided I do not take, as Descartes did, apodicticity to be a necessary condition of 
knowledge. Absolute certitude is, after all, far too high a bar for knowledge. Knowledge need not 
be founded upon pure deduction or bear the imprimatur of a priori indubitability. As A.J. Ayer 
remarks in an essay in which he elaborates and defends his own version of the argument from 
analogy: 
Let us allow it to be necessarily true that I cannot know the experiences of others in the way that I know my own. It 
by no means follows that I cannot have good reasons to believe in their existence. Such reasons will indeed be 
																																																								
	
113	The classical “problem of interaction” also clearly rears its head here. In the passage cited above, Russell does 
seem to suppose that mental states may be the causes of bodily effects. Of course, any argument from analogy for 
other minds (such as the one that Russell himself proposes) presupposes a dualistic conception of mind and body 
that renders any sort of causal interaction between them impossible in principle. That is, the argument from analogy 
assumes that mind and body are essentially disjunct such that it is impossible for a body to directly manifest mental 
states or characteristics; this is, after all, the reason why it is assumed in the first place that we can only ever infer, 
rather than know by direct acquaintance, that a body possesses a mind. The problem, of course, is that this assumed 
disjunction between mind and body is inconsistent with the notion that states of the former may causally interact 
with states of the latter, and vice versa.  
 Such a problem, however, may not be fatal, for it may be replied that all that is necessary to warrant such 
an analogical inference are frequently observed correlations between mental states and bodily appearances or 
movements. It is sufficient to observe in one’s own case that certain bodily behaviors and phenomena tend to follow, 
or to be accompanied by, certain mental states. One need not be committed to the existence of a robust, traditional 
causal connection between mental and bodily/behavioral phenomena. Thus, it is noteworthy that David Hume, who 
of course famously suggests that it is fallacious to infer what we call “causality” from observed spatiotemporal 
contiguities, provides an argument from analogy not only for the existence of other human minds but also for the 
existence of animal minds (for this argument, see Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, “Of The Reason of 
Animals”). Such arguments from analogy, then, need not assume any sort of conventional causal interaction 
between mind and body, and are fatally flawed for other reasons (which I discuss below).  
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supplied to me by experiences of my own…But they may be good reasons nonetheless. Even if knowledge is 
defined so strictly that one can never rightly claim to know what others think or feel, it will be true that we can attain 
to states of highly probable opinion. It may well be thought perverse to insist on speaking of highly probable opinion 
in cases where attention to ordinary usage should lead us to speak of knowledge; but this is not a point of any great 
importance. What is important is that many of the statements which one makes about the experiences of others are 
fully justifiable on the basis of one’s own.114 
 
Even though absolute certitude is surely great if we can acquire it, most would feel compelled to 
admit that we may genuinely “know” – or at least may justifiably believe – things with 
probability rather than strict certainty or logical necessity, and that induction is also, therefore, a 
legitimate source of knowledge; in fact, it is the source of most of what passes as “everyday,” 
“common sense” articles of knowledge. Though there are perhaps a number of things that we can 
and do indeed know with absolute certitude, we need not stipulate that such certitude is required 
for all plausible instances of knowledge, for it seems that there are many kinds of things we may 
reasonably claim to know on the basis of an adequate degree of probability (such as scientific 
principles and predictable everyday states of affairs). If the weight of our evidence or the 
strength of our reasons suffices to make it at least probable that a claim is true, so too does it 
suffice to establish that we “know” (or are at least justified in believing) it to be so. Evidence 
may be defeasible yet strong nonetheless.  
 So, there are all kinds of things that we may rightly claim to know, and that we can only 
know, inductively, and other minds are simply one of these things. As Ayer suggests, if our lack 
of absolute certitude concerning other sorts of truths we come to believe through induction (such 
as the fact that the sun will rise tomorrow) does not distress us, neither should our lack of 
absolute certitude concerning the existence of other minds. Claims concerning the content and 
mere existence of other minds may be, and indeed can only be, justified through analogical 
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induction, but this is sufficient to ward off skepticism or solipsism. I may not be able to know 
that others exist in the same way or with the same certitude that I know my own existence and 
interior life, yet analogical reasoning of the sort elaborated above is nevertheless adequate to 
establish that I know that others exist, that other interiorities likewise accompany and animate 
those bodies that constantly address me in the drama and flow of everyday experience.  
 Though it has been subjected to much debate and criticism and has undergone a number 
of revisions and refinements as a result, some version of this argument from analogy for other 
minds is advanced by numerous post-Cartesian thinkers, from Bishop Berkeley and David Hume 
to John Stuart Mill, A.J. Ayer, and Bertrand Russell. Indeed, the merits of this argument, or at 
least in general the merits of founding knowledge of other minds on the basis of some form of 
induction, continue to be discussed today. Since Cartesianism is supposed to be long dead, it is 
remarkable that discussions of the problem of other minds and of attempted inductive solutions 
to it persist in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of mind. In fact, it is largely taken for 
granted that some form of inductive reasoning is the only conceivable way to establish 
knowledge of other minds, and to that extent the specter of Cartesian dualism has yet to be 
exorcised.  
Here, I am not going to engage all of these contemporary discussions concerning the 
problem of other minds and analogical or inductive solutions to it. I will not elaborate all of the 
different, more refined and nuanced formulations of the classical argument from analogy that 
have been proposed, nor will I discuss all of the criticisms of such arguments that have been 
made. The point I wish to draw our attention to here is simply that if any such argument from 
analogy for other minds succeeds, then it is not the case that dualism condemns us to solipsism. 
If it is possible to establish analogically our knowledge of the existence of others, then whatever 
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other reasons one may have to repudiate Cartesian metaphysics, the threat of “the incomparable 
monster of solipsism”115 cannot be one of them (as indeed it is for Merleau-Ponty). Merleau-
Ponty, again, argues that dualism renders knowledge or even any rudimentary perception of 
otherness impossible in principle, but if that is correct, it must be the case that all efforts to found 
one’s knowledge or perception of otherness upon inductive inference must fail, for such efforts 
are precisely consistent with, and are in fact necessitated by, a dualistic conceptual framework. 
So, in order to vindicate my (and Merleau-Ponty’s) contention that knowledge of other minds, or 
that the basic presence of others in experience, requires a radical alternative to Cartesian 
ontology, it is necessary to examine attempts to secure such knowledge on inductive grounds and 
to show why they fail (as indeed Merleau-Ponty himself does in nearly every work in which he 
addresses intersubjectivity).  
 As we have seen, since a Cartesian account of the nature of consciousness entails that I 
can only ever have direct access to my own consciousness, so too does it entail that I can only 
ever, at best, have indirect access to other consciousnesses. This means that if one wishes to 
rescue Cartesianism from solipsism, one must provide an account of how this indirect access to 
other consciousnesses is possible, which is to say one must explain how it is possible for one’s 
supposed knowledge of other consciousnesses to be based upon inductive inference. The 
aforementioned argument from analogy is precisely the primary argument that aims to establish 
how it is possible to know that other minds exist when the only mind to which I have direct or 
immediate access is my own. For these reasons, Merleau-Ponty in fact explicitly addresses 
supposed analogical solutions to the problem of other minds and aims to show that all such 
solutions are irremediably flawed. Although, as I have mentioned, there a number of different 
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versions of the argument from analogy that have been propounded, Merleau-Ponty’s criticisms 
apply to all conceivable versions of it, and thus to all conceivable attempts to rescue dualism 
from solipsism. Ultimately, then, if his criticisms of such arguments are correct, Merleau-Ponty’s 
contention that dualism necessarily renders others cognitively and experientially inaccessible, 
and that it is therefore necessary to dismantle dualism in order to provide a cogent account of not 
only subjectivity but also especially of intersubjectivity, is justified. Moreover, Merleau-Ponty’s 
positive, phenomenological alternative to traditional approaches to the problem of other minds 
destroys not only skepticism concerning other human minds but skepticism concerning non-
human minds as well, and thus has profound implications for how we understand the nature and 
scope of intersubjectivity; it begins to help us see, or helps us relearn to see, the community of 
living bodies (or of embodied minds) that allows us to withdraw into meditation and imagine 
ourselves as alone or as one of a kind – as either the only individual mind, or as the only generic 
kind of mind, in the world – in the first place.    
 Dualism abolishes my access to anything outside my first-person perspective, which of 
course includes not only my access to an external, material world, but also my access to others 
who might, and who in fact do, share this world with me. Dualism defines consciousness as 
utterly disembodied, or as ontologically excluded from anything considered “material” or 
“sensible” or externally observable, which means it also defines consciousness as a purely 
internal and uniquely private space of appearances and representations, as that which exclusively 
and only has direct access itself. Dualism, therefore, entails that the mind is only ever directly 
accessible from its own immanent, first-person vantage point, which is to say the only mind to 
which I may have direct and immediate, hence certain, access – the only mind whose existence 
and states of being I can genuinely claim to know for sure – is my own. Consciousness is 
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knowable only introspectively, never extrospectively. Since consciousness is taken to be 
essentially unavailable to direct public perception or scrutiny, it follows that I may only ever be 
acquainted with other minds at best indirectly, which is to say inferentially. When I encounter 
others in the world, I only directly encounter their bodies, so if we accept a classical dichotomy 
between mind and body, it follows that I never directly encounter an other’s mind when I 
encounter his or her body. The body will always stand as a barrier – never a direct bridge – 
between my consciousness and the consciousness of an ostensible Other. So, insofar as I take a 
body to be conscious or “minded” – insofar as I take a body to be the body of a genuine “Other” 
– it can only be because this body somehow indirectly signifies its consciousness or alterity, or it 
can only be because this body somehow motivates me to infer, or to posit through a mediated act 
of judgment rather than through immediate, direct acquaintance, its consciousness or alterity. 
 So, it is clear enough that if mind and body are relegated to mutually exclusive domains 
of being, or if the only mind to which I have direct and immediate access is my own, then the 
body of a supposed other can never afford me direct access to that other’s mind (or otherness). 
But how, then, is it really possible to have any epistemic or perceptual access to the existence of 
others? The traditional answer, as we have seen, is our capacity for analogical inference. As 
Merleau-Ponty tells us, however, there is a crucial, fundamental question (which has traditionally 
been overlooked) concerning how such analogical inferences themselves are possible. It is 
typically assumed or asserted without argument that bodily appearances, expressions, or 
movements naturally constitute evidence that moves us to posit (analogically) an animating 
consciousness beyond, “behind,” or “within” them. But why or how would anything I observe 
from a “third-person” perspective ever prompt me to infer the existence of another 
consciousness, provided that the very characteristics taken to be essential to consciousness are 
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defined as precisely inaccessible from a “third-person” perspective? If the features that uniquely 
define consciousness cannot be disclosed from a third-person perspective – if indeed 
consciousness is condemned to its own unique, internal first-person perspective – then how is 
any “second-person” perspective possible? How in fact can the ‘I’ ever perceive a ‘Thou’ if 
anything other than itself must be ontologically categorized as merely an ‘it’? How, indeed, 
would one ever acquire a sense or concept of alterity in the first place, such that one might ever 
harbor doubts, or ever be prompted to make any inferences concerning, the existence and interior 
lives of others? As Merleau-Ponty argues, if we begin with an opposition between subject and 
object, and if we define the subject in terms of characteristics that are essentially perceptible only 
from within the subjectivity of the subject itself, then it is impossible for the subject ever to 
perceive anything outside itself that would for it be anything other than a mere object; that is, it 
would be impossible for a subject ever to perceive another subject, for nothing in the external 
world would exhibit those characteristics defined as essential and exclusive to subjectivity: 
Perhaps we can say that it [my cogito] is ‘transferable’ to others. But then how could such a transfer ever 
be brought about? What spectacle can ever validly induce me to posit outside myself that mode of 
existence the whole significance of which demands that it be grasped from within? Unless I learn within 
myself the junction of the for itself and the in itself, none of those mechanisms called other bodies will 
ever be able to come to life; unless I have an exterior others have no interior. The plurality of 
consciousness is impossible if I have an absolute consciousness of myself…if it is perfect, the contact of 
my thought with itself seals me within myself, and prevents me from ever feeling that anything eludes my 
grasp.116 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s trenchant criticism of arguments from analogy for other minds largely consists, 
then, in indicating that if dualism is strictly accepted, even mere “correlations” between mental 
states and bodily appearances that I observe in my own case would not logically or epistemically 
warrant the analogical inference that other bodies have minds, for if dualism were true – if 
consciousness really were divorced from embodiment or materiality – there would be no reason 
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why any bodily or material phenomena would or should ever register as relevant evidence, or as 
any sort of signifier, of consciousness in the first place. That is to say, even if I observe certain 
regular correlations between certain mental states and certain physical states or movements in 
my own case, if I am truly committed to a radical ontological division between the mental and 
the physical, why would I ever take any physical states or movements to bear any meaningful 
relationship to the structures and features of my inner, subjective life? And why moreover would 
they ever register to me as intelligible indications of other inner lives? Why or how would a 
bodily movement or appearance function as an outward signifier of some internal, mental 
signified? These questions, of course, are rhetorical, for indeed if I adhere to dualism 
consistently, then nothing that belongs to the body or to the outer, material world could or would 
ever count as having any intelligible relationship to anything that belongs to consciousness. As 
M.C. Dillon explains, there is simply no escape from solipsism that would be logically consistent 
with a Cartesian conception of consciousness: 
If one takes the Cartesian cogito as one’s philosophical foundation…then the alter ego becomes a 
problem that cannot be solved. The Cartesian cogito, thought reflecting thematically on itself, functions as 
the paradigm of what it is to be a conscious subject and how it is possible to know a conscious subject. 
But these two aspects coincide in the Cartesian cogito in such a way that, if one accepts the paradigm, 
then the only way to know a conscious subject is to be that conscious subject reflecting on itself…because 
I cannot witness your cogito, I cannot know that you exist as a thinking thing. Consequently, if one 
defines human being as res cogitans, the only human being I can be certain is a human being is myself. 
Solipsism is intrinsic to Cartesian thought.117  
 
Thus, as Merleau-Ponty claims, it is only possible to perceive (and thus ever be motivated or in a 
position to infer) that other bodies are minded if from the start “I learn within myself the junction 
of the for-itself and the in-itself,” that is, only if I “know” that mind and body are in fact not 
divorced or separable from one another through the very phenomenon of my own lived/living 
body, which is precisely the intertwining of the two before any incision of reflective thought 
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categorizes them as otherwise. If it is at all possible for me to perceive or comprehend any 
material, bodily being as conscious, then I must, at the very least, be pre-reflectively aware of 
consciousness as precisely a modality of material, bodily being. The only way it is possible to 
perceive or infer that an “object” in the world is indeed a “subject” is if, in fact, we already know 
through lived experience that to be a “subject” is precisely not to stand or exist in opposition to 
the being of objects – that to be a subject is not to be a “pure” subject, or a subject such as it has 
been traditionally conceived – but is rather to be already incarnate, already suffused with and 
situated through flesh, already ecstatic or inherently coupled with an irrecusable exteriority. In 
short, in order for a “subject” to perceive an “object” as another subject it is necessary that the 
former not be a “pure” subject and that the latter not be a “mere” object but rather that they both 
be (to put it imperfectly, as Merleau-Ponty does on a number of occasions) at once a “subject-
object,”118 which is to say neither exclusively one nor the other but something else altogether, 
namely (as I have already elaborated) a living body. Only if interiority is not purely “interior” but 
also always already inextricably enmeshed with exteriority (i.e., with flesh or a body) may the 
exteriority of a supposed other ever disclose that other’s interiority or otherness. In general, one 
simply cannot sunder consciousness from the external, material or natural world and then claim 
it is possible for it to appear or have any place there. Only if consciousness is truly embodied – 
which is to say, only if consciousness is not “in” a body but is rather a form and enactment of 
bodily existence itself – may a body ever manifest consciousness.  
 One may reply that arguments from analogy do not depend upon other bodies directly 
exhibiting characteristics of subjectivity, for these arguments recognize that such characteristics 
are entirely internal. Indeed, if bodies really could directly exhibit mental characteristics, we 
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would not need to infer their mindedness analogically in the first place. The claim, rather, is that 
bodies may constitute or express probable signs of mental states and attributes; it is from such 
signs, of course, that we presumably infer them to be inhabited by minds. Again, if we begin 
from the assumption that mind and body are absolutely separate kinds of things, and if we define 
the mind as inaccessible from any standpoint outside itself – if we stipulate that the only mental 
qualities or interior experiences to which I may have direct access are my own – then it is 
impossible for a body to directly presence a mind. Thus, provided we assume a dualistic 
conceptual schema, then insofar as I take a body to possess a mind, it can only be because this 
body somehow indirectly indicates the presence of a mind. Since I can never directly perceive a 
mind when I perceive a body, the only manner in which I may take a body to be minded is on the 
basis of certain bodily signs that somehow prompt me to infer that it houses a mind. Since I 
cannot have direct access to another’s interiority, I must somehow achieve indirect access to 
another’s interiority through his/her exteriority.  
 However, it should already be clear that the above reply entirely misses the point of 
Merleau-Ponty’s aforementioned objection to analogical “solutions” to the problem of other 
minds. Provided that Being is bifurcated into the domain of subjects and the domain of objects 
and that neither the twain shall ever meet, the rub here is how indeed a body, which of course 
belongs to the domain of objects, may “somehow” indirectly suggest or prompt one to infer the 
existence of a subject. Of course, Merleau-Ponty argues that dualism in fact renders this 
“somehow” inconceivable. Dillon, in his exposition of Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
intersubjectivity, thus reiterates a crucial point elaborated above, namely that Cartesianism 
simply does not permit any external, corporeal entity or phenomenon to manifest consciousness 
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in any manner (whether directly or otherwise) precisely because it posits consciousness as 
strictly, entirely internal and incorporeal:      
The traditional problem of other minds grows out of the mistaken assumption that we begin life in a 
solipsistic mode and learn somehow to recognize other human beings as such. The “somehow” remains 
inexplicable because the minds that define humans as human are conceived as hidden to all but first-
person experience.119  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s point, then, is not only that dualism obviously makes it impossible for a body to 
exhibit consciousness directly (which presumably the Cartesian dualist readily admits), but that 
dualism also makes it impossible for a body to exhibit consciousness indirectly – or to present 
any characteristics that might stand as signs of consciousness – as well; indeed, if a body could 
never directly exhibit consciousness, it would never do so at all. If those attributes defined as 
essentially and exclusively mental are also defined as completely withheld from material, third-
person presentation, then it is impossible in principle for material, third-person phenomena to 
present them in any manner (even “indirectly”). Given the supposed divorce between internal, 
first-person mental states or phenomena and external, third-person material or bodily 
phenomena, it is inexplicable why the latter would ever show up for us as, or in any way 
intelligibly presence or signify, the former:  
If it were really my “thought” that had to be placed in the other person, I would never put it there. No 
appearance would ever have the power to convince me that there is a cogito over there, or be able to 
motivate the transference, since my own cogito owes its whole power of conviction to the fact that I am 
myself. If the other person is to exist for me, he must do so to begin with in an order beneath the order of 
thought.120    
 
Again, the question Merleau-Ponty poses, and which is conspicuously unaddressed in most 
treatments of the issue at hand, is this: if consciousness is strictly private – if it is defined 
precisely by the fact that it lacks the publicity of external, material things – how is it possible for 
other consciousnesses to appear to me, or how is possible for me to perceive certain bodies as 
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conscious? If bodies are public entities and minds are private theatres of appearances, then how 
can the (public) properties or appearances of a body indicate mindedness? Merleau-Ponty’s 
answer, of course, is that it is clearly impossible in principle for any corporeal phenomenon or 
entity to manifest that which is already posited as strictly incorporeal; to elide this fact is, again, 
to forget, or to fail to adhere consistently to, the very framework that makes such a relationship 
between mind and body problematic in the first place, namely the framework within which one 
assumes or posits a strict, categorical division between the two. In short, Merleau-Ponty’s point 
is that if I cannot directly perceive the consciousness of an-other in and through the other’s body, 
I will never be able to perceive it at all, and if I can never perceive the consciousness of an-other, 
I will a fortiori never be prompted to reflectively (i.e., analogically) posit or infer anything about 
it. In other words, Merleau-Ponty’s point is that any inference (analogical or otherwise) that 
others exist depends upon a direct, pre-inferential or non-analogical acquaintance with the 
consciousnesses of others, but direct acquaintance with other consciousnesses not only means 
that dualism must be false because dualism precisely rules out the possibility of being directly 
acquainted with any consciousness except one’s own, it also means (as I will elaborate further 
below) that no argument from analogy may function as a “proof” that other consciousnesses exist 
without begging the question, that is, without tacitly deploying as a premise precisely the 
conclusion it is supposed to demonstrate.  
 So, Merleau-Ponty argues that if your “exteriority” (that is to say, your body and its 
physical movements) and your “interiority” (that is to say, your consciousness or your unique, 
solitary space of appearances and representations) signify utterly disjunct, incommensurable 
orders of reality, I can never (by definition) get past your exteriority in order to reach your 
interiority: no features that belong to your exteriority (nothing that characterizes your body and 
	 109	
how it operates in the world) could ever justify or even motivate the judgment that your 
exteriority “clothes” or indicates any interiority at all. It will not do to say that I might 
extrapolate other minds from my own, since if it were the case that I may have no direct 
acquaintance with any mind other than my own – if it were the case that the properties that 
essentially define mindedness are purely internal – then there may be no external properties or 
objects that would logically warrant or even psychologically motivate such an extrapolation in 
the first place. If mind and body were truly ontologically divorced from one another, no bodily 
appearances or movements would ever warrant or induce the induction that a mind resides 
“behind” or “within” them. Thus, if my knowledge or access to others can truly only be founded 
upon an analogical inference that I draw from my own unique, privileged, inward experience of 
myself, then nothing will ever warrant or induce such an induction on my part, for ex hypothesi 
there is a gulf between my interior and supposed others’ exteriors: an absolute, categorical 
separation between my inner experience and certainty of myself on the one hand, and the 
experiences I may have of external things or of the bodies and movements of such presumed 
others on the other hand. Given a dualistic starting point, I must admit a fundamental and 
insuperable disanalogy between my own interior consciousness of myself and the appearances of 
an exterior, material body that would not only logically invalidate but also perceptually short-
circuit any analogical transference from the former to the latter. In other words, given the posited 
incommensurability of internal, subjective consciousness and external, “objective” bodily 
movements and appearances, not only would such an “analogy” between them never be 
rationally justified, but no perception or appearance of an external body would ever motivate it to 
be drawn in the first place.  
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 Thus, in the context of discussing Husserl’s treatment of the problem of other minds, 
Merleau-Ponty underscores the point elaborated above, which is a point he makes in nearly every 
work in which he addresses intersubjectivity: it is logically (indeed tautologically) impossible for 
consciousness to appear in the external world – and that it is therefore impossible for me to 
perceive let alone infer the existence of consciousnesses outside my own – if consciousness is 
defined exclusively in terms of its purely interior, immediate, reflexive relationship with itself, or 
if it is defined as existing in such a manner that is essentially removed from publicly observable 
things and appearances: 
The Cartesian cogito poses the problem of self and others in terms that seems to render a solution 
impossible. In effect, if the mind or self were to define itself by its contact with itself, how could the 
representation of other people be possible? The self only has signification insofar as it is consciousness of 
self. Everything can be doubted by him except for the fact he thinks; everything can be doubted except for 
the fact that he sees; etc. All experience presupposes contact with oneself. All knowledge is possible only 
by this primary knowledge. Other people will be a self which appears to me from without; this is 
contradictory.121     
 
This, again, is why Cartesianism makes any experience or knowledge of otherness impossible in 
principle. If the mind or self is strictly defined in terms of what is accessible only from or to the 
first-person perspective – that is, if consciousness is equated with reflective consciousness or 
with supposedly unmediated and incorrigible self-presence – then by definition no “second-
person” perspective would ever be possible, for no “third-person” phenomena (that is, no bodily 
appearances or movements) could ever disclose what the mind or self experiences in communion 
with itself (which is here taken to define experience, mindedness, or selfhood as such). If 
dualism is true, then the ‘first-person’ and the ‘third-person’ are simply irreconcilably divorced: 
if consciousness is pure interiority, then it is by definition invisible from the outside; if interiority 
and exteriority are defined as mutually exclusive orders of reality, then my interiority and the 
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interiority of an Other can never in principle be visible to one another, and therefore the “inter” 
in “inter-subjectivity” would be inconceivable, or the very concept of intersubjectivity would 
simply be an oxymoron. In short, if the mind is not embodied, I would never be able even to 
perceive let alone legitimately infer the mindedness of a body. The point, then, is not to begin 
from a dualistic position in the first place. The only thing that can “mediate” a relationship 
between the interior and the exterior – hence a relationship between self and other – is a “middle 
term” that is, as such, neither purely interior nor wholly exterior but rather ambiguously both at 
the same time, which is to say something else altogether (which conventional philosophical 
terminology cannot adequately describe) from which the poles of interiority and exteriority, 
subject and object are abstracted and later reified as fundamentally separable and mutually 
exclusive: and such a middle term is precisely the lived/living body.  
 Since dualism entails yet also, and for that very reason, renders insoluble the problem of 
other minds, in order to “solve” this problem it is necessary to dismantle the dualism that 
engenders it in the first place; and in order to dismantle dualism, it is necessary to return to lived 
experience, for lived experience is, again, precisely that from which the classical opposition 
between subject (mind) and body (object) is abstracted and reified in the first place and is, 
consequently, that which also resists and unsettles that opposition. The subject(mind)/object 
(body) binary is carved by an act of reflection, and yet all acts of reflection are tacitly dependent 
upon our pre-reflective openness to, and involvement within, a world, our entanglement with 
things and others that such a binary precisely represses; and like all instances of repression, 
Merleau-Ponty shows that the subject/object binary self-deconstructs insofar as it constitutively 
depends upon, hence implicitly affirms, the very thing it contradicts or pretends to deny: in other 
words, the supposed binary opposition between subject (mind) and object (body) in fact 
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paradoxically depends upon the enmeshment of the two in and through the phenomenon of the 
lived body, a phenomenon that, as such, defies categorization as either the one or the other and 
thus disrupts or undoes that very binary (“either/or”) opposition (as Derrida would say, the 
condition of the possibility of subject/object, mind/body dualism is also its “condition of 
impossibility”). It follows, then, that in order to undo such a binary along with all of the 
erroneous ontological and epistemic commitments that it generates, or rather in order to 
reintegrate ourselves into the world from which reflective or conceptual thought often estranges 
us, it is necessary that we attempt to better harmonize thinking or conceptuality with precisely 
the field of pre-reflective (lived) experience upon which it always already depends. More 
specifically, since solipsism is the unavoidable logical consequence of a dualistic standpoint, in 
order escape from solipsism it is necessary to refuse to accept from the start such a standpoint 
and to undertake the difficult task of developing new concepts, or new means of expression, to 
replace those that may derive from or implicitly reinstate it: new concepts or means of 
expression that are, in fact, consonant rather than in contradiction with lived experience, 
concepts or means of expression that precisely illuminate rather than repress or distort the skein 
of carnal relations and imbrications with which all forms of knowledge and all constructions of 
selfhood and otherness are inextricably woven. For Merleau-Ponty, this is the primary the task of 
phenomenology, and since such a task is necessary in order to develop a cogent understanding of 
our relations with others (or a cogent understanding of “otherness” itself), we may we say it is 
always already – indeed primarily – the task of ethics as well. 
 So, Merleau-Ponty shows that there can in fact never be a cogent analogical solution to 
the problem of other minds, for the very framework that makes such a solution necessary (that is, 
the very framework that generates the problem in the first place) is also the very framework that 
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makes it logically impossible. If there really is such a radical, insuperable asymmetry between 
my knowledge of my own mind and my supposed knowledge of the minds of others, or if it 
really is the case that I begin entirely enclosed within my own interior, homuncular space of 
representations, then my consciousness would, by definition, be impenetrably isolated, 
impervious to any intimation of otherness, unbreachable by anything truly exterior to it; my 
consciousness would precisely be defined by a privacy that can never be invaded, a solitude that 
can never be disturbed, a position that can never be decentered. If we begin from the assumption 
that the ego begins atomistically individuated and isolated, it will never be anything but that: it 
will never be able to step – or to be swept – outside itself, and solipsistic isolation would thus be 
its primal and ineluctable condition. If I am wholly enveloped within a monadic, internal space 
of representations, or if in general subjectivity is originally and perpetually withdrawn from the 
sphere of public existence and appearance, then not only would no experience ever be able to 
motivate me to infer the existence of others, but no experience would ever be able to impart to 
me the notion of otherness that I presuppose and deploy in performing such an inference, or in 
even entertaining doubts concerning the existence of others, in the first place. As I will elaborate 
below, analogical reasoning cannot, without begging the question, account for how we originally 
“know” or acquire a conception of other minds, and therefore in order to account for how we 
originally know or acquire a conception of other minds it is necessary to repudiate the dualism 
that restricts our knowledge or conception of other minds to analogical reasoning.     
 If consciousness is truly embodied, it is in and through the conduct of the living body that 
we encounter it, and our “knowledge” of other “consciousnesses” is no longer an inscrutable 
mystery:  
If I experience this inhering of my consciousness in its body and in its world, the perception of other 
people and the plurality of consciousnesses no longer present any difficulty. If, for myself who am 
reflecting on perception, the perceiving subject appears provided with a primordial setting in relation to 
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the world, drawing in its train that bodily thing in the absence of which there would be no other things for 
it, then why should other bodies which I perceive not be similarly inhabited by consciousnesses? If my 
consciousness has a body, why should other bodies not ‘have’ consciousnesses?122  
 
Now, a quick and decontextualized reading of this passage might suggest that Merleau-Ponty 
does indeed offer an argument from analogy for other minds: I analogize from the embodiment 
of my own consciousness to the consciousnesses of other animate bodies. What Merleau-Ponty 
has in mind here, however, is nothing of the sort. As we have already seen, Merleau-Ponty 
consistently rejects all such arguments from analogy, and wherever he presents one it is always 
only in order to set it up for refutation. Throughout his writings on intersubjectivity, Merleau-
Ponty seems to advance two major, distinct criticisms of such arguments from analogy for other 
minds, so although he never explicitly distinguishes them in such a manner, I think it is helpful 
to do so in the following way123: on the one hand, there is what we might call the “inconsistency 
objection,” which we have just discussed, and which consists in showing that analogical or 
inductive “proofs” for other minds depend upon (usually suppressed) dualistic ontological 
commitments that are in fact logically incompatible with the possibility of the very knowledge of 
other minds they are supposed to prove: in short, all such arguments from analogy rely upon 
(usually implicit) premises that are inconsistent with their conclusions, ontological assumptions 
that in fact derail the ontological or epistemic theses one originally thought such reasoning could 
justify. On the other hand, there is what we might call the “circularity objection,” which is the 
one I now wish to elaborate.  
																																																								
122Phenomenology of Perception, p. 351. 
123 In a number of places Merleau-Ponty also points out that arguments from analogy for other minds are not only 
fallacious on their own terms (for they beg the question and tacitly rely upon metaphysical assumptions that are in 
fact inconsistent with any knowledge or notion of otherness) but are also empirically falsified by what we know 
about child psychological development. An infant does not “draw an analogy” or perform an inference in order to 
imitate the smile of an adult or to recognize the happiness in it. We might consider this to be a third objection to 
such analogical accounts of our knowledge of others in addition to the two just mentioned, and it is one that I 
discuss briefly below.  
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Merleau-Ponty argues not only that the metaphysical (i.e., dualistic) assumptions that 
motivate analogical “proofs” of other minds make any perception or conception of otherness 
impossible in principle but also that, setting such metaphysical assumptions aside, such supposed 
“proofs” of other minds are unavoidably question-begging (or viciously circular), for in order to 
infer analogically the consciousness of another I must tacitly presuppose that which ex hypothesi 
I am only able to know or conceptualize after I have drawn the inference: I must assume or draw 
upon that which such analogical reasoning is precisely supposed to demonstrate or explain in the 
first place (namely, the other’s consciousness or my very concept of otherness as such); such an 
act of analogical judgment can only be occasioned by a prior perception of behavior or 
intentional action,124 by some sort of experience that suggests the presence of an Other. That is to 
say, why would I ever be prompted to infer analogically that some being is conscious if it has not 
in some way already presented to me some quality that signifies consciousness? Yet is it not 
precisely the perception or judgment of such a quality that is precisely at issue here? Is it not this 
sort of perceptual predication of alterity or reflective attribution of mental properties that such 
analogical reasoning is supposed to warrant in the first place or that is itself supposed to be the 
consequence or conclusion of such analogical reasoning? It is precisely through analogical 
reasoning that a body’s consciousness or mental attributes are supposed to be posited, or it is 
precisely through analogical reasoning that one is supposed to acquire any concept or sense of 
alterity, yet, as Merleau-Ponty indicates, it is clear that another’s consciousness or mental 
attributes or that some sense of alterity must already, in a sense, be “posited” in order for any 
																																																								
124 As I will elaborate in the next chapter, Merleau-Ponty advances a similar argument against what I call 
“projectionism”, i.e., the common charge that attributions of specific mental states or of minds in general to various 
non-human animals are mere “projections” of human characteristics and experiences, which is the most salient form 
of skepticism concerning animal consciousness today. Moreover, we will also see that similar criticisms apply to 
Allen and Bekoff’s view that ascriptions of intentionality to animals are justified as “inferences to the best 
explanation.” 
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such analogical inference to take place at all. We must keep in mind that the claim under 
discussion here is that analogical reasoning is the only possible basis of our knowledge or 
conception of other minds; the claim at issue here is that arguments from analogy – and that only 
arguments from analogy – may “prove” the existence of other minds, or in other words that it is 
only through a process of analogical inference that we acquire a concept of otherness; yet it is 
clearly the case that analogically reasoning that others exist depends upon some sort of prior 
perception of otherness, so either such analogical reasoning depends upon some sort of prior 
non-analogical perception of otherness, in which case such analogical reasoning is not the 
“basis” of our knowledge or notion of otherness at all, or such prior perceptions of otherness are 
analogical inferences, in which case such analogical reasoning always assumes as a premise 
precisely the conclusion it is supposed to demonstrate or explain (i.e., begs the question) and 
indeed plunges us into the abyss of an infinite regress, thus rendering our concept of otherness 
unexplained or without foundation.  
 Merleau-Ponty’s second trenchant criticism of supposed analogical “proofs” of other 
minds, then, is that in order to infer analogically the consciousness of another body I must first 
perceive this body as conscious (that is, as behaviorally, intentionally engaged with a world), but 
this prior perception of another body’s consciousness clearly renders the analogy in question 
circular or redundant. Thus, Merleau-Ponty clarifies the point he articulates in the passage 
quoted above as follows: 
There is nothing here resembling ‘reasoning by analogy’…The other consciousness can be deduced only if the 
emotional expressions of others are compared and identified with mine, and precise correlations recognized between 
my physical behavior and my ‘psychic events’. Now the perception of others is anterior to, and the condition of, 
such observations, the observations do not constitute the perception.125  
 
																																																								
125 Ibid., p. 352. Emphasis mine. 
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Though subtle, the point Merleau-Ponty makes in this passage is the one I just began to explain. I 
am only ever prompted to infer the mindedness of a body by a prior perception of its 
mindedness; how, then, is this prior perception of mindedness possible? What accounts for it? If 
we say that it is the result of a yet prior analogical inference, then we are begging the question or 
reasoning in a circle (or slipping into an infinite regress of analogies): i.e., How do I know other 
minds exist? According to the account under scrutiny here, I know that they do only as a result of 
analogically inferring their existence. But what prompts me to make such an inference? I am 
clearly prompted to make such an inference by some sort of perception of qualities that suggest 
the existence of another mind. And what is the basis of this perception of mental qualities in 
another entity? Given that we have already agreed that analogical reasoning is the only possible 
grounds for our “knowledge” or conception of otherness, the only permissible answer to this 
question is yet prior analogical inferences, and so on. The circularity involved in regarding 
analogical reasoning as the fundamental basis of our knowledge of other minds should now be 
clear: on the one hand we are appealing to analogical reasoning in order to demonstrate the 
existence of others, yet on the other hand we are tacitly assuming the existence of others – tacitly 
drawing upon some prior acquaintance with otherness – whenever we perform such analogical 
reasoning. Thus, all analogical “proofs” of other minds assume as a premise precisely the 
conclusion they are supposed to demonstrate (for again, such arguments from analogy are 
supposed to be the foundation of our “knowledge” of otherness), namely an acquaintance with 
(or “knowledge of”) the existence of others. And if we say that this prior acquaintance with 
otherness that all such arguments from analogy assume as a premise is yet itself derived from 
prior analogical inferences, then we confront an infinite regress of analogical inferences: an 
analogical inference that another mind exists is necessarily prompted by some prior perception or 
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judgment that another entity possesses certain relevant features (that is, certain features that may 
be taken to suggest the possession of a mind), and this prior perception or judgment of such 
“relevant” features in another entity is itself claimed to be derived from prior analogical 
inferences, and these prior inferences will themselves have to be derived from yet prior 
perceptions of mind-signifying qualities in others, and these will also, yet again, have to be 
derived from yet prior analogical inferences, and so on ad infinitum. 
 Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s argument is that even though we might make inferences about 
others in particular instances, the traditional argument from analogy is fatally flawed as an 
account of our fundamental knowledge of others, for it not only cannot explain how it is logically 
possible for us to infer (or why we might ever be experientially prompted to infer) the existence 
of others analogically since the analogies in question are premised on observed correlations 
between two kinds of phenomena already posited as categorically separate and opposed, but 
moreover, as we have just seen, such an argument cannot explain how we originally encounter 
other consciousnesses without begging the question; that is, it cannot constitute an explanation of 
how any sense or concept of otherness – including especially the very sense or concept of 
otherness one implicitly deploys in precisely drawing any inference that others exist – is 
originally instituted in experience, for such an explanation would be viciously circular: if the 
argument from analogy is supposed to explain how we achieve a concept of otherness, or if it is 
supposed to justify the supposition that others exist, then it presupposes as a premise precisely its 
own conclusion, for we must already possess and draw upon a concept of otherness in order to 
infer that any particular others exist. Thus, we would be left with the argument that we 
(fundamentally) know that others exist because we are rightly able to infer that they do via 
analogical induction, and that we are able to infer that others exist via analogical induction 
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because we have some prior, fundamental knowledge of otherness. This, of course, is nonsense. 
The issue at hand is precisely our primary knowledge of, or encounter with, otherness. Though it 
is possible for me to infer things about others in particular cases, the primary basis of my 
awareness and knowledge of otherness – that which originally constitutes a sense of otherness in 
experience – cannot be analogical inference for the simple reason that any analogies I may draw 
between myself and others always already depend upon, or sublimate, a prior awareness and 
knowledge of otherness, an awareness or knowledge of otherness that cannot, without lapsing 
into circularity or an infinite regress, be predicated upon yet prior analogies.  
 So, it is clear that reasoning analogically about other minds necessarily assumes and is 
motivated by a general sense or concept of otherness. For Merleau-Ponty, then, the crucial 
question is this: where does such a sense or concept of otherness come from? Again, we cannot 
say, without begging the question or reasoning in a circle, that it comes from other, prior 
analogical inferences, for our ability to perform such inferences is precisely what is in question. 
In addition to the fact that it is simply empirically false (i.e., contrary to elementary 
developmental psychology) that we originally relate to and acquire knowledge of the minds of 
others through inductive reasoning, it is logically impossible that we do so as well. If we appeal 
to analogical reasoning as the ground of our conception or knowledge of otherness, we cannot 
then appeal to any conception or knowledge of otherness as the ground of our capacity to reason 
analogically about others: were we to do so, we would be committed, on the one hand, to the 
(correct) claim that reasoning analogically about others depends upon a certain prior conception 
or “knowledge” of otherness, and yet on the other hand we would be committed to the claim that 
we acquire such a prior conception or knowledge of otherness through analogical reasoning. This 
is, again, absurd. It is clearly circular to claim that reasoning analogically about others is the 
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source of our knowledge of otherness and that there is a knowledge of otherness that is the 
source of our ability to reason analogically about others. We cannot say, then, that analogical 
inference is the source of our sense or “knowledge” of otherness when analogical inferences 
about others logically presuppose and derive from a sense or knowledge of otherness in the first 
place. So, if we wish to understand how it is possible that we make inferences about other minds, 
we must account for how we acquire a conception of other minds in the first place, and this 
requires that we appeal to, or rather rediscover, the source of otherness in experience, or the 
ontological condition that lets life and consciousness come to presence in the world and which is, 
as such, necessarily below the level of analogical inference.  
 We see, then, that if the concept of otherness we deploy in making analogical inferences 
about others cannot itself be derived through analogical inference, it follows that analogical 
inferences concerning the existence and characteristics of other minds in principle depend upon a 
notion of otherness that is already operative in our thinking and field of experience, a notion of 
otherness that precisely cannot derive from prior analogical inferences but that must rather be 
constituted in and through an ontologically and epistemically primitive relationship with others, 
a givenness of alterity that makes any inferences about others possible. How exactly others can 
be originally given in experience, of course, remains to be explicated. Husserl labored to explain 
it and arguably had difficulty doing so from within a conceptual framework that remained 
committed to grounding meaning in the meaning-making intentional acts of an autonomous ego 
or that (arguably) remained burdened with Cartesian oppositions between subject and object, 
mind and matter, immanence and transcendence.126 Merleau-Ponty, as we have already seen and 
																																																								
126	However, I do think that Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity is far more subtle or sophisticated, or far less 
obviously flawed, than it is often taken to be, and I will further discuss this point in chapter five. This is not to say 
that I think it is without flaws. Merleau-Ponty is often rightly very critical of Husserl’s account of subjectivity, yet 
	
	 121	
as we will further see, jettisons such Cartesian oppositions and explains intersubjectivity, or the 
givenness of alterity in lived experience, as made possible by (and indeed as always already 
implicated and realized in and through) the essential embodiment of subjectivity – or by the non-
disjunctive yet also non-reductive relationship between consciousness and behavior – and as 
therefore rooted in what he calls intercorporeity, in pre-reflective couplings or reciprocal 
exchanges of bodily powers, affects, meanings, comportments, and modes of intentionality. If 
there were no such pre-analogical ground for our conception of otherness or for our knowledge 
of the existence of others – that is, if propositional or inferential knowledge of others were not 
founded upon an irreducible knowledge of others by acquaintance – we would remain trapped in 
the circularity we have just discussed: we would be left with having to claim that reasoning 
analogically about others derives from a prior knowledge of otherness and that such prior 
knowledge of otherness is derived from reasoning analogically about others. It is for this reason 
that supposed analogical “solutions” to the problem of other minds cannot function as such 
solutions at all, for all such arguments from analogy deploy (at least implicitly) in their premises 
a concept of otherness that they cannot, as such, non-circularly explain or ground. If some sort of 
experiential acquaintance with others is necessary in order to prompt us to infer that others exist, 
then we cannot claim that it is a process of inference that grounds or mediates our acquaintance 
with others. We cannot appeal to analogical induction in order to explain how we primarily come 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
he also, I think, appreciates Husserl’s arguments and insights in ways that are not simply more charitable but also 
more accurate than many of Husserl’s later critics. In the end, though, Merleau-Ponty will argue that 
phenomenology (or philosophy generally) must break decisively from the transcendental tradition. He claims, for 
example, that his own “theory of reflection” is not a “going back to conditions of possibility” (The Visible and the 
Invisible, p. 177) and even suggests that intersubjectivity in particular defies the traditional opposition between the 
transcendental and the empirical, between immanence and transcendence, and thus anticipates what Derrida and 
others will later call “quasi-transcendental.” As Merleau-Ponty remarks in his essay “The Philosopher and 
Sociology”: “Now if the transcendental is intersubjectivity, how can the borders of the transcendental and the 
empirical help becoming indistinct?” (Signs, p.107). That being said, Merleau-Ponty’s own account of 
intersubjectivity is very much indebted to Husserl’s. Husserl’s treatment of intersubjectivity strongly presages and 
informs Merleau-Ponty’s, and in chapters two and five I will try make this clear. 
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to be acquainted with others if an acquaintance with others is a precondition for ever performing 
such an induction. Therefore, there cannot be any non-circular inductive proof that others exist, 
or any non-question-begging inductive explanation of our original conception of otherness, for 
such a proof or explanation of otherness would have to assume precisely the very thesis or 
concept (namely the thesis that others exist or the very concept of otherness as such) that it is 
supposed to prove or explain in the first place. The only way to avoid such circularity, then, is to 
realize that analogical inferences about the minds of others necessarily depend upon a pre-
analogical or pre-inferential encounter with alterity, and Merleau-Ponty precisely elaborates how 
such encounters with alterity are possible and always already actualized in lived experience.  
 Not only is such an account logically necessary, it is also, if we honestly and rigorously 
attend to experience, the only one that correctly describes and explains the phenomenon of 
intersubjectivity; it is the only account that captures what is actually going on when we perceive 
and engage – when we address and are addressed by – others in the world:  
When I motion to my friend to come nearer, my intention is not a thought prepared within me and I do not perceive 
the signal in my body. I beckon across the world, I beckon over there, where my friend is; the distance between us, 
his consent or refusal are immediately read in my gesture. There is not a perception followed by a movement, for 
both form a system that varies as a whole. If, for example, realizing that I am not going to be obeyed, I vary my 
gesture, we have here, not two distinct acts of consciousness. What happens is that I see my partner’s unwillingness, 
and my gesture of impatience emerges from this situation without any intervening thought.127 
 
When I recognize and extend myself outward toward my friend from across the street – when, 
say, I see my friend and summon her to come meet me – I no more need to “infer” her presence 
and intentional attitudes, and I no more first need to consider reflectively my own behavioral 
response to her presence and intentional attitudes, than I need to calculate distances and angles in 
order to, say, reach for the pencil on my desk: I immediately, directly perceive my friend and her 
intentions in her bodily presence and conduct, and my subsequent responses to her are likewise 
																																																								
127	Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 111.	
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immediately elicited from the meanings – the practical attitudes and intentions – that are 
immanent to her conduct. As Merleau-Ponty suggests here (and to use a term that he borrows 
from psychology and that deeply informs both his early and late philosophy), my friend and I 
constitute, or rather inhabit and are constituted by, a Gestalt, a holistically given, meaning-laden 
situation of which we and our behaviors are from the start entangled, codetermining moments. 
Thus, “in intercorporeal communication as in language, significations come through in whole 
packages…”128 It is only when there is a breakdown in our communication, only when our 
exchange of intentions and common expectations is disappointed or disrupted, or only when 
something intervenes to upset or challenge our ordinary, default perceptual hold on the world, 
that we are reflectively thrown back to ourselves and prompted to formulate and scrutinize 
judgments concerning one another’s intentions or to infer “internal” thoughts and attitudes from 
“external” (bodily) evidence; similarly, intersubjective agreement constitutes our fundamental, 
default assumptions about reality: if, for example, I see something (say, a squirrel) cross our 
path, I assume that you see it too, and only if you claim not to see it, only if your experience fails 
to align with my own, do I wonder whether or not what I have seen is real and am therefore 
prompted to consider my sense of reality reflectively; even yet more similarly, it is only when 
my body is not functioning as it normally does (it is only when it is afflicted with injury or 
illness) that I need to consider reflectively how to, say, grasp the pencil on my desk. So, when I 
encounter or greet others in the world, we already inhabit a space of shared meanings and 
potentialities, a context in which we already coexist with one another and in which, therefore, we 
are immediately present to one another as others, or in which our subjectivities mutually come to 
																																																								
128 Merleau-Ponty, Signs, “Introduction,” p. 19. 
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presence for one another through our overlapping manners of behaviorally inhabiting and 
negotiating the world we share.  
 Since subjectivity is inherently embodied, or rather since to be a subject is to be a living 
body, in everyday experience I no more infer that an entity possesses subjectivity than I infer that 
it is a living body, which is to say, of course, that I do not “infer” this at all but rather perceive it 
immediately: 
…When I say that I see someone, it means that I am moved by sympathy for his behavior of which I am a 
witness and which holds my own intentions by furnishing them with a visible realization. It is our very 
difference, the uniqueness of our experience, which attests to our strange ability to enter into others and 
re-enact their deeds…From the moment I recognize that my experience, precisely insofar as it is my own, 
makes me accessible to what is not myself, that I am sensitive to the world and to others, all the beings 
which objective thought placed at a distance draw singularly nearer to me. Or, conversely, I recognize my 
affinity with them; I am nothing but an ability to echo them, to understand them, to respond to them.129 
 
Since subjectivity is inherently invested in, and inseparable from, habituated modes of coping 
with and responding to the world – that is, since subjectivity is inherently entwined with 
behavior, and since behavior is inherently embedded within and polarized toward a holistic 
context of practical possibilities, exigencies, and affordances – I directly encounter other 
subjectivities when I encounter their behaviors; and not only do their behaviors directly disclose 
their subjectivities because their subjectivities are inseparably entangled with their modes of 
outward, bodily, behavioral expression, they do so, moreover, because they also directly disclose 
to me or mirror my own, for the perceptual powers, affects, and vulnerabilities of our living 
bodies – even just insofar as they are living bodies – overlap if not coincide with one another, 
and for that reason are just as reflexively transferable to one another as are the parts of my own 
body with respect to the image of them I confront in a mirror: in short, because minds are 
embodied, every living body is already “a mind,” and no living body – no matter how different 
																																																								
129	Merleau-Ponty, “The Metaphysical in Man,” in Sense and Non-Sense, Trans. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia 
Allen Dreyfus (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 93-94. 
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in its form or expressive capacities it may be from my own – is radically, ontologically divorced 
from my own. Indeed, insofar as we are living bodies, and insofar as every living, behaving body 
traces in its movements, carries in its very joints the world to which it addresses itself, so too 
does it speak to me of my own world, or at the very least of another world that may be glimpsed 
at the periphery of my own, one whose horizons osculate if never quite cross my own: simply put 
(and as we will further discuss), to share flesh is also to share a world, and to be a living body is 
to share life or subjectivity with any and all other living bodies.  
 My living body is, from the first moment I begin to engage the world, already paired with 
the living bodies of others, and though Merleau-Ponty, following Husserl, speaks of a direct 
(pre-reflective, non-inferential) transference of corporeal schemas between living bodies, it is 
perhaps more accurate to say that what happens between living bodies is not so much a 
transference of meanings between them (as though they each stand apart from one another as 
autonomous loci of meaning in the first place) but rather a coming to presence of meanings that 
are always already, endlessly in the making between, through, and amid them; quite literally like 
a conversation, it is an already participatory genesis or co-production of meaning wherein 
distinctions between the participants involved are certainly not effaced but wherein, nevertheless, 
one cannot sharply demarcate where the contributions of one ends and where those of the others 
begin. Thus, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, “it is never a matter of anything but co-perception. I see 
that this man over there sees, as I touch my left hand while it is touching my right…”130 In our 
intercorporeal relationships and engagements, what we have are not exchanges of meanings 
already fully formed by, or on the side of, each living, conscious body apart from one another, 
but rather the emergence of meanings constituted reflexively and reciprocally (laterally) by or 
																																																								
130	“The Philosopher and His Shadow”, in Signs., p. 170. 
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from the sides of all of the living bodies involved all at once: living bodies and the perceptions, 
lives, and worlds they communicate are not monadic snapshots or segregated sites of being but 
are threads of a common tapestry, parts of a (never completed or settled) whole that is present in, 
yet never exhausted by, each of them, a world that they constitute and negotiate together and 
therefore immediately perceive and affirm in one another. Subjectivity suffuses behavior and 
behavior is embedded within, and unintelligible apart from, a milieu or situation that motivates 
it, but this means that behavior itself, and therefore subjectivity as such, is already presenced as a 
Gestalt, or as a meaningful, perceptual whole in which mind and body are co-given before they 
are later reflectively bifurcated and thus before we take to wonder whether appearances of the 
latter are veridical indications of the existence or content of the former.  
 Like all phenomenological insights, Merleau-Ponty’s account of our knowledge of other 
minds is something we all know perfectly well in and through everyday experience – something 
that is ceaselessly confirmed and attested for us before our very eyes – yet it is also, semi-
paradoxically, something we are inherently prone to overlook, a truth that is always “buried 
under the sedimentations of later knowledge.”131 As Merleau-Ponty constantly reminds us, the 
abstractions we later come to acquire through reasoning and reflection (such as the oppositions 
between subject and object, consciousness and body, self and Other) naturally conceal and 
distort the conditions, relations, or phenomena that allow us to acquire them in the first place, or 
which constitute the always implicitly present generative ground of our concepts, propositions, 
and inferences: the soil, so to speak, that nourishes reflection and its (very late-in-coming, and at 
best partial and lacunary) accomplishments.  
																																																								
131 Merleau-Ponty, “An Unpublished Text”, in The Primacy of Perception, p. 5. 
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 It is important to underscore that no one can deny that we may make inferences about the 
minds of others in particular cases; indeed, we do this all the time, and such inferences – whether 
correct or incorrect, whether carefully considered or hasty – are integral to everyday social 
cognition. What is at issue here, rather, is the question concerning the fundamental condition of 
such inferences, the question concerning the originary basis – the ontological precondition - of 
our conception or “knowledge” of other minds. To be clear, Merleau-Ponty’s argument is not 
that we are never able to reason analogically about the minds of others, but rather that analogical 
reasoning cannot be the basis of our access to (or “knowledge” of) them, for the ability to reason 
analogically about other minds in particular instances always already, tacitly depends upon a 
general, more basic sense or “knowledge” of otherness that must, as such, be pre-analogical or 
pre-inferential; again, such a sense or knowledge of otherness cannot be derived analogically or 
otherwise inferentially for the very reason that it is the ground of all analogies or inferences 
concerning others. Thus, as Dillon explains, “I may use analogical reasoning to think myself into 
another’s viewpoint in a thematic exploration of the empathetic identification, but, as Merleau-
Ponty argues, analogical inference begs the fundamental question of how the other is primally 
instituted as alter ego.”132 If others were accessible or knowable only inferentially, they would 
not be accessible or knowable at all, for there would be no non-question begging basis for such 
inferences if there were no non-inferential (or pre-inferential) contact and involvement with 
others that would ground and inform them. Again, we cannot say that we are justified in inferring 
that others exist on the basis of prior veridical inferences that they do, for such reasoning is 
viciously circular; and likewise, we cannot claim that analogical inference is the source of our 
concept of otherness when we must already possess and deploy such a concept of otherness in 
																																																								
132 Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, p. 116. 
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precisely performing such inferences in the first place, for that, too, is viciously circular: it is 
absurd to claim that the concept of otherness we assume and deploy in analogically inferring that 
others exist is acquired as a result of such inferences themselves. It follows that reflective, 
inferential, or cognitive knowledge of others must be “mediated” by, or founded upon, an 
immediate, pre-reflective, direct acquaintance with others. It follows that there must be a 
presencing of otherness in lived experience that antecedes and makes possible any inductive 
inferences or predicative judgments concerning others. All analogical inferences and reflective, 
predicative judgments concerning others – like all inferences and reflective, predicative 
judgments in general – must be founded upon an “operative intentionality…which produces the 
natural and antepredicative unity of the world and of our life…”.133 Any analogies I may 
reflectively draw between my own inner life and the inner lives of others necessarily derive from 
an originary and continual commingling of my own existence and “inner” life with the existence 
and inner lives of others, from what Merleau-Ponty describes as an “extraordinary 
overlapping,”134 a “strange system of exchanges”135 or a “consummate reciprocity”136 between 
myself and others – that is, between my living body and other living bodies – below the level of 
reflective inference and conceptualization.  
 Since, as we have seen, it is fallacious to claim that analogical reasoning is the basis of 
our knowledge of others – since we cannot (without begging the question) appeal to such 
reasoning in order to explain how we ever encounter or acquire the notion of otherness that 
enables us to reason in such a manner in the first place – it follows that we must admit that we 
encounter others independently of analogical reasoning, that we encounter others as a 
																																																								
133	Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. xviii. 
134	Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” in The Primacy of Perception, p. 162. 
135	Ibid., p. 164.	
136	Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 354.	
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precondition for ever being able to reason about them analogically. This is why, for Merleau-
Ponty, no iteration of the classic argument from analogy – indeed no inductive argumentation 
whatsoever – may constitute our primary justification for claiming to know that others exist. 
Again, Merleau-Ponty’s argument is that any inductive inferences concerning the minds of 
others (or even concerning the very existence of other minds) necessarily depend upon a non-
inductive, pre-inferential exposure to otherness, and that such an exposure to otherness would, 
again, be impossible if minds were disembodied, completely solitary and private interiorities, 
theatres of appearances never accessible directly from any standpoint outside themselves. But if 
we are exposed to others directly, below the level of inductive inference and predicative 
judgment, and if, therefore, minds are not totally isolated and private interiorities, then not only 
is solipsism neutralized from the start but so too are inductive efforts to neutralize it, or rather so 
too is the supposition that inductive reasoning primarily justifies our beliefs concerning the 
minds of others along with the dualistic metaphysics that implicitly motivates and necessitates 
such inductive “justifications” in the first place. Thus, the traditional problem of other minds is 
rendered moot in virtue of the antecedent, pre-inferential “knowledge” of otherness that all 
analogical inferences concerning others require in order to get off the ground. In short, either we 
truly encounter and know others prior to, or independently of, analogical reasoning, or we do not 
and cannot encounter and know them at all. And if we can truly encounter and know others prior 
to, or independently of, analogical reasoning, it follows that the dualistic presuppositions that 
make such reasoning the necessary and only conceivable condition of such knowledge must be 
false. 
 I have taken a lot of time to elaborate Merleau-Ponty’s critiques of traditional efforts to 
resolve “the problem of other minds” not only because it seems to be a strangely neglected 
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aspect of his work,137 but also because it is in fact indispensable to his own positive account of 
our relations with others and because it has truly profound consequences. Merleau-Ponty’s 
																																																								
137 It seems difficult to find extensive scholarly discussions of Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of the traditional “problem 
of other minds.” M.C. Dillon seems to provide the best, most detailed discussion of this in his remarkable (and still, 
I think, unrivaled) work Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology. Lawrence Hass also provides a wonderfully clear account of 
Merleau-Ponty’s response to the problem of Cartesian solipsism – and situates Merleau-Ponty’s approach to the 
problem in relation to traditional arguments from analogy as well as Sartre’s own attempt at a phenomenological 
alternative to such analogical arguments – in his Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 2008; see chapter 4). My exposition of Merleau-Ponty here is indebted to both of these works. Yet, I 
nonetheless have not been able to find any expositions of Merleau-Ponty’s criticisms of conventional analogical 
“solutions” to the problem of solipsism as detailed as the one I have attempted to provide here, and so I hope that my 
discussion of this will help fill a particular gap in Merleau-Ponty scholarship.  
 As for why there is such a gap in the first place, it is difficult to say for sure, but my intuition is that many 
Merleau-Ponty scholars seem to resist the notion that Merleau-Ponty was primarily interested in the traditional 
epistemological “problem of other minds” and prefer to insist that he – like others in the phenomenological or, more 
broadly, “Continental” philosophical tradition – was more concerned with the ontological “problem of alterity”; that 
is, rather than concerning himself with justifying our knowledge of the existence of others, Merleau-Ponty should be 
read as more-or-less having considered the latter to be a pseudo-problem and was more invested in explicating the 
phenomenon of intersubjectivity: how it is possible for otherness to be presenced in lived experience, or how it is 
possible for the self to have a relationship with something that must be truly, irreducibly other than itself. I also 
suspect that this interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of intersubjectivity is motivated by the general notion 
that the classical “problem of other minds” belongs to “analytic”/Anglo-American epistemology and philosophy of 
mind in opposition to “Continental,” existential-phenomenological ontology, and while many have worked to put 
Merleau-Ponty in conversation with the former tradition, Merleau-Ponty scholars in general seem anxious to 
distance Merleau-Ponty from the categories and concerns of “analytic” philosophy and to place and read him firmly 
in the “Continental” tradition.  
 Whatever the case may be, I believe that such an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of 
intersubjectivity is wrong for two interrelated reasons (one that is textual and one that is conceptual): first, to put the 
point bluntly, to regard Merleau-Ponty as unconcerned with the traditional epistemological problem of other minds 
requires a willful suppression of important parts of his own texts and arguments. The passages I have already cited 
are sufficient to demonstrate this point. Merleau-Ponty repeatedly and explicitly addresses the question concerning 
how it is possible for me to know that others exist, and he devotes extensive consideration not only to the ways in 
which Cartesianism makes such knowledge impossible but also to the flaws inherent in traditional efforts to 
establish such knowledge. Moreover, Merleau-Ponty insists it is a problem that not only must be taken seriously but 
also one that is, like most philosophical problems (no matter how “scandalous”), “motivated” or “well-founded” (see 
e.g., The Structure of Behavior, p. 216) , i.e., one that naturally arises from the structure of our conscious existence 
itself: since reflection tends to overlook or distort its own pre-reflective conditions of existence, it is naturally led to 
reify the abstractions it acquires through its own reflective acts (which is to say, it tends not to regard the 
abstractions it acquires as abstractions at all; it regards them as first-order truths rather than as the derivative 
concepts or models that they are), and such abstractions (like the opposition between subject and object) are 
precisely what generate philosophy’s most persistent and seemingly intractable problems, including especially the 
“mind-body” problem and “the problem of other minds” (two classical philosophical problems that are clearly 
implicated in one another). In particular, Merleau-Ponty even claims, as I discuss below, that there is a “solipsism 
rooted in living experience” (Phenomenology of Perception, p. 358) and excoriates philosophies that “know nothing 
of the problem of other minds” (ibid., p. xii). Merleau-Ponty is quite clear that he follows Husserl in taking seriously 
the “paradox” of the alter ego (ibid., p. xii), by which he means the problem of how it is possible to perceive and 
know others provided that consciousness or otherness is supposed to be invisible from the outside. Indeed, for 
Merleau-Ponty, taking alterity seriously requires taking the problem of other minds seriously.  
 Second, the very notion that there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between the so-called “epistemological 
problem of other minds” and the “ontological problem of alterity” is simply untenable; it is not a distinction that 
Merleau-Ponty accepts, nor is it one that we should accept. For Merleau-Ponty, such a distinction is, so to speak, a 
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question is the question concerning how exactly it is possible that we are able to reason 
analogically about other minds at all, and this question is one that is curiously never addressed 
by those who appeal to such reasoning in order to establish our knowledge of others. Setting 
aside for the moment the fact that an entirely isolated or self-enclosed self is impossible, or that 
any minimal awareness of oneself entails an awareness of others, Merleau-Ponty’s question is 
that if we begin from the assumption that the self is totally isolated or enclosed within its own 
private theatre of experience, what could ever move it to suppose that other selves exist in the 
world, or what kinds of appearances or phenomena could ever pierce the veil of its own so as to 
intimate appearances or phenomena that are not its own? How exactly could an experience of 
something exterior to myself evoke in me my strictly interior presence to myself and thereby 
motivate me to posit (by analogical comparison with my own case) the presence of another self, 
the existence of an “interior” that is not my own? It is usually simply taken for granted that 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
“distinction without a difference,” or at the very least it is one that marks a difference not between two rigorously 
separable problems but rather between two aspects of one and the same problem. Of course, as I mentioned far 
earlier in this chapter, this is not to deny that there is often a meaningful distinction to be drawn between 
epistemological questions and issues and ontological ones, or between epistemological and ontological registers of 
analysis. It often does make sense, of course, to distinguish between the “order of knowing” and the “order of 
being,” and discussions of philosophical issues can often quickly become muddled by failing to distinguish between 
them. As I often have to remind my students, there is an important difference between reality and what we do or can 
know about reality, and it is clearly a fallacy to infer what is or is not real from what we do or do not, or can or 
cannot, know.  
 However, as I also remarked earlier in this chapter, epistemology and ontology cannot be absolutely 
divorced from one another, and indeed Merleau-Ponty understands the fact that phenomenological argumentation 
necessarily blurs the distinction between them, or rather reveals the fact that they are always already implicated in 
one another. Every epistemological claim, theory, or framework logically depends upon a number of ontological 
presuppositions, and every ontology has consequences concerning the nature and scope of human knowledge. Any 
concept or theory of knowledge entails assumptions concerning the nature of ourselves as knowers and concerning 
the nature of our supposed actual or possible objects of knowledge. With respect to the problem of other minds, it 
should already be exceedingly clear that skepticism about other minds depends upon problematic ontological 
commitments concerning the nature of the mind and its relationship to the material world, and that dismantling such 
ontological commitments is therefore necessary for dismantling the skepticism they support (indeed logically entail). 
In order to establish how it is possible for the self to perceive otherness or to know that others exist, it is necessary to 
formulate a proper account of the nature of selfhood and otherness; reciprocally, such a proper account of selfhood 
and otherness immediately implies the manner in which we are able to perceive or “know” others. Thus, as I 
discussed earlier in this chapter, epistemological and ontological problems simply cannot be radically separated 
from one another, and the “problem of other minds” is a particular, exemplary instance of the interrelationship 
between them. The question concerning how we may know that others exist has everything to do with how we 
conceptualize the nature of consciousness and its relationship to physical reality, and vice versa. 
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sometimes things in the world stir one to posit the existence of an Other, that sometimes bodily 
movements prompt one to analogically extend oneself (or one’s own mental qualities) to other 
bodies; but how is this kind of analogical transference really possible? How can such 
“telepathy”138 really come about? How can such analogies come about? What is their condition 
of possibility? This question is profound not only because it was essentially never posed prior to 
phenomenology but also because, as Merleau-Ponty shows, the answer to it reveals that 
analogical reasoning cannot possibly constitute the source of our conception or knowledge of 
otherness and therefore brings to our attention a non-analogical or non-inferential “knowledge” 
of others that neutralizes both skepticism concerning the existence of others as well as inductive 
or analogical responses to such skepticism. Even more importantly, this non-inferential 
knowledge of others (which Merleau-Ponty explicates as rooted in intercorporeity) has 
implications beyond merely resolving a Seventeenth Century epistemological puzzle that no one 
really worries about or takes seriously in everyday life, for it entails a radical reconceptualization 
of the basic ontological categories and constructs that govern how we traditionally understand 
ourselves and the world, which is to say a radical reconceptualization of just what it means to be 
a self or to inhabit a world in the first place: it means that we have to reconceptualize not only 
the boundaries that determine the self but correlatively, for that very reason, the boundaries that 
determine “otherness” as well; indeed, as we will see when we turn to examine Merleau-Ponty’s 
late ontology, it even means reconceptualizing just what a boundary itself is. 
 Merleau-Ponty contends, then, that we may begin to formulate a “solution” to the 
problem of other minds only once we abandon the idea that consciousness is something hidden 
																																																								
138 See e.g., Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p.189-190, 244. 
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behind the movements and gestures of the body and learn to see these movements and gestures 
themselves as immediate, direct expressions – not intermediary signs or indirect evidence – of 
conscious existence: 
…The problem comes close to being solved only on the condition that certain classical prejudices are 
renounced. We must abandon the fundamental prejudice according to which the psyche is that which is 
accessible only to myself and cannot be seen from outside. My “psyche” is not a series of “states of 
consciousness” that are rigorously closed in on  themselves and inaccessible to anyone but me. My 
consciousness is turned primarily toward the world, turned toward things; it is above all a relation to the 
world. The other’s consciousness as well is chiefly a certain way of comporting himself toward the world. 
Thus it is in his conduct, in the manner in which the other deals with the world, that I will be able to 
discover his consciousness.139  
 
Merleau-Ponty argues that we would not be able to perceive, let alone infer, the consciousness  
of a body if consciousness were not always already, intrinsically embodied, if consciousness 
were not always already “in the flesh.” However, to say that consciousness is “in” the flesh is 
not, of course, to say that it is “inside” or “within” it like a pilot in a ship, which would simply 
restate the very dualism we must reject. Consciousness, rather, is “in” the flesh in the sense in 
which, say, an expression is “in” a face, or in the sense in which a melody is “in” a certain 
arrangement of notes, or in the sense in which meaning is “in” the words on a page or “in” the 
image of a painting. This is why Merleau-Ponty often compares the manner in which 
consciousness or alterity is presenced by the living, behaving body to the manner in which 
linguistic meaning is presenced by words and sentences on a page or to the manner in which 
artistic meaning is presenced by paint on a canvas:  
Where is the other in this body that I see? He is (like the meaning of the sentence) immanent in his body 
(one cannot detach him from it to pose him apart) and yet, more than the sum of the signs or the 
significations conveyed by them. He is that of the which they are always the partial and non-exhaustive 
image – and who nonetheless is attested wholly in each of them. Always in the process of an unfinished 
incarnation – Beyond the objective body as the sense of the painting is beyond the canvas.140  
 
																																																								
139 Merleau-Ponty, “The Child’s Relations with Others.” Trans. William Cobb, in The Primacy of Perception, p. 
116-117. 
140	Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and The Invisible, p.209-210.	
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I no more need to infer that your living body “contains” consciousness than you need to infer 
that the previous sentence “contains” a thought; you no more need to infer subjectivity from my 
behavior than you need to infer meaning and intentionality from any instance of language: you 
see or read immediately through the words on a page to their meaning, and the same is true with 
respect to behavior. For Merleau-Ponty, as meaning is to material, linguistic and artistic 
expression, so is consciousness to behavior: they are essentially inseparable and co-given, yet not 
reductively equivalent. The interiority of an Other must be radically absent to me, for I can 
never, in principle, “inhabit” it myself lest it cease to the Other’s interiority, yet it is nonetheless 
a present absence, an absence that is immediately, directly co-given with and through the Other’s 
bodily presence. One’s interiority is an absence that is always entwined with one’s exteriority or 
behavior.  
  The most important conclusion to be derived from the foregoing discussion (and the one 
that will be integral to the arguments of chapters three and four), is that bodily gestures and 
comportments are inherently, immediately modes and presentations of intentionality, and are 
therefore inherently “mental” phenomena. Moreover, since all minds are necessarily embodied, 
to be a “mind” is to be a living body, and to be a living body is to be a mind. An embodied mind 
just is a living, behaving body, and it follows, then, that all living, behaving bodies are “minds,” 
that indeed there are indefinitely many kinds of minds in the world because there are as many 
kinds of minds as there are kinds of living bodies. Of course, this does not mean that mind and 
body are one and the same; rather, it does mean that mind and body are inseparable, entwined, 
co-present aspects of one and the same phenomenon (which, again, we call the lived/living 
body), and likewise it means that “solitude and communication cannot be the two horns of a 
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dilemma, but two ‘moments’ of one phenomenon…,”141 that to be in contact with oneself is 
already to be in contact with others (and vice versa), that selfhood (“solitude”) and alterity 
(“communication,” or the extension of the self to others) are reciprocally constitutive aspects of 
being-in-the-world, two interdependent moments of the phenomenon we call intersubjectivity. 
Interiority and exteriority, then, are co-constitutive rather than separable and opposed aspects of 
conscious existence, and it is in virtue of that interdependence that my presence to myself and 
that an other’s presence to him/herself are not irreconcilably divorced from one another but are, 
on the contrary, always already open to one another and, at the most basic level of reality, 
intertwined. Since “inside and outside are inseparable”142 – since conscious existence is 
essentially incarnate – self-presence not only does not exclude or negate the presence of others 
but, on the contrary, already includes and depends upon it. The presence of others is already, in 
fact and in principle, implicated in my own presence to myself. Again, the embodiment of 
consciousness is precisely what lets consciousness, and therefore also alterity, come to presence 
in the world.    
 Consciousness, then, necessarily permeates the living body or is, rather, the very 
enactment of a living body as such; it is the intentionality that is directly, immediately expressed 
by the living body and its comportments. Consciousness is inseparable from, and therefore 
directly perceptible in and through, the dynamic, projective engagements through which a living 
body skillfully copes with its milieu and signifies itself as such. Perception is never withdrawn 
entirely into an internal space of appearances or representations, for indeed it refers to our 
inaugural and continually renewed openness to a world that allows us to distinguish between 
“internal” appearances in opposition to “external” reality in the first place: it is that site and 
																																																								
141 Ibid., p. 359. 
142	Ibid., p. 407. 
	 136	
movement of givenness that antecedes and unsettles any reflective diremption of “subject” and 
“object,” yet it is nevertheless not a “transcendental” structure insofar as transcendentality 
traditionally designates ideality (that is, existence outside of nature or an essentially fleshless 
manner of being). Perception is neither merely “one of the facts thrown up in the world”143 nor is 
it entirely the internal presence to itself or intuitus mentis of a cogito, but is the dialectic rapport 
between a living body and its world. We only ever perceive with and through our lived/living 
bodies, which means perception is always already a bodily performance, always already an 
intentional, behavioral act. The lived/living body is always already a perceiving, behaving body, 
always already a sense-making style of being.  
Sentience is, at the most basic level, corporeal reflexivity (or auto-affection), and this 
reflexivity that constitutes the living, sentient body precisely entails, or is always already, contact 
with, and an intentional directedness toward, a world and other bodies. Interiority, then, is 
essentially a radical, incessant openness to, orientation toward, and hence envelopment within, 
exteriority. Since it is essentially embodied, consciousness is not, as Sartre would have it, pure 
“nothingness”; it is not a “nihilation” of “Being(-in-itself)” or of “nature” but is rather a “fission 
of Being from the inside…at whose termination, and not before, I come back to myself.”144 To 
be conscious is to be flesh in touch with itself, and to be flesh in touch with itself is simply to be 
a perceiving, affective, acting body; it is essentially to be embedded within, or extended or 
																																																								
143 Ibid., p. 207.	
144	Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” in The Primacy of Perception, p. 186. This “fission of Being from the inside” is 
exactly what Merleau-Ponty elsewhere refers to as “dehiscence,” which again (like the term écart, with which it is 
synonymous in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology) means the generative differentiation through which any distinct thing or 
phenomenon is constituted as such, or rather a non-oppositional divergence between things that is necessarily 
accompanied by their overlapping and that is the crux of any fundamental ontological relationship. Dehiscence is 
especially exemplified by the reflexivity of the living body, but for Merleau-Ponty it is endemic to any being, 
identity, or phenomenon, and very may well be equated with Being as such. Though “dehiscence” and écart are 
synonymous in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, the former (as I mentioned earlier) is derived from botany, whereas the 
latter is derived from Gestalt theory, in which it refers to the spacing between foreground and background that 
constitutes any perception. 
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displaced into, meaningful and value-laden relations with a carnal world and with other 
carnalities.  
 We see, then, that Merleau-Ponty advances a radical repudiation of the very starting point 
of Cartesian doubt: Descartes begins from the unargued thesis that he has indubitable, immediate 
access to his own mind, yet this is simply false: as Merleau-Ponty argues, I only have access to 
my own mind in and through my relations with the minds (or rather living bodies) of others; I 
only achieve subjectivity amidst other subjectivities. For Merleau-Ponty, there must be an 
“inextricable involvement”145 with others that precedes and enables any beliefs or doubts I may 
formulate about them and which is also, for that reason, the source of the very concepts of 
mental qualities and characteristics I may ever introspectively ascribe to myself and thus ever 
analogically ascribe to others. As I will elaborate below and again in the chapters to follow, I 
have no “inner” life at all – no “I”, no interiority or reflective sense of self – if I have not already 
been exposed to, addressed by, and immersed with other “inner” lives, for the self can only exist 
as such if it is already differentiated from, thus implicated in community with, others.  
 Thus, Merleau-Ponty does not entirely deny but nevertheless considerably undermines 
the traditionally supposed asymmetry between my consciousness of myself and my 
consciousness of others, for if there is a difference between them, it is not because the former 
consists of my coincidence with, or transparency to, myself, whereas the latter consists of my 
relationship with that with which I can never coincide or which must be absolutely opaque to me. 
In other words, the difference between the self’s reflexive relationship with itself and the self’s 
relationship with others cannot be understood in terms of a difference between, on the one hand, 
pure, unmediated immanence (or total, internal coincidence with oneself) and, on the other hand, 
																																																								
145 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and The Invisible, p. 84. 	
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absolute transcendence (or total non-coincidence with, or oppositional exclusion from, what is 
outside oneself). Merleau-Ponty repudiates any dualistic opposition between immanence and 
transcendence, selfhood and alterity (indeed, as we will later see, he even repudiates the very 
opposition between the traditional alternatives of identity and dualistic non-identity, coincidence 
and oppositional non-coincidence). This is not to say that there is no such thing as genuine, 
irreducible transcendence or alterity (as we will also later see, Merleau-Ponty is quite clear that 
every relationship is necessarily constituted by infinite, irremediable distance), but it is to deny 
that there is ever anything like “pure” immanence or “pure” transcendence, for they are always 
already entwined with – always already reciprocally conditioned and contaminated by – each 
other. To put it somewhat less abstractly, the self’s reflexive relationship with itself is constituted 
by an equally reflexive relationship with others. Of course, there is an essential, irreducible 
difference between the self’s relationship with itself and its relationship with others: if others are 
genuinely other, then in principle the self cannot perceive or know them exhaustively or 
“without remainder”: others must infinitely exceed the self’s horizons of experience and 
knowledge. This is simply the point that I can never live through or inhabit another’s lived 
experiences: the interiority of an Other would logically cease to be that other’s interiority were I 
to inhabit it, for then it would be my own. The point I wish to underscore here, however, is that 
the supposed radical asymmetry between my relationship with my own mind and my relationship 
with the minds of others which traditionally motivates skepticism concerning other minds, or 
which often conjures the specter of solipsism, is false: though the self’s relationship with itself is 
qualitatively different from its relationships with others, both are equally reflexive, for (as we 
have already seen and as we will further see) they are primordially coupled or co-constitutive: I 
never was, and never could have been, in pure, isolated communion with myself in the first 
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place, for in order for me to have any relationship with myself at all it is necessary that I have 
already been exposed to and affirmed by others, that I have already journeyed beyond myself 
into a world shared with others. The self exists as such only insofar as it has always already 
returned to itself from its passage into otherness, which precisely means that its return to itself is 
never settled, that its reflexive (and sometimes reflective) movement back to itself is always at 
the same time its departure from itself, that its constitutive movement inward is at the same time 
its extension outward, that it is never wholly “at one with itself” for it is always outside or ahead 
of itself, that “ as Hegel said, to retire into oneself is also to leave oneself.”146  
 In short, self-reflexivity can never be self-coincidence, so if there is any “asymmetry” 
between my relationship with my own mind and my relationship with the minds of others, it 
cannot consist in the fact that I “coincide” with my own mind yet never “coincide” with the 
minds of others, or that my own mind is transparent to me while the minds of others are entirely 
opaque to me, or that my own internal “mind’s eye”/“I” can never elude me while the mind of an 
Other (if indeed I am permitted to suppose it exists) is but a Skinnerian black box, an 
unplumbable, brackish abyss. The supposed transparency of one’s own consciousness is yet 
another vestige of Cartesianism, and so too is the correlative notion of the utter inscrutability of 
another’s consciousness. I can never coincide with another’s consciousness, but it is likewise the 
case that can I never coincide with my own. The subjectivity of an Other can never be 
transparent to me, but neither can my own subjectivity ever be transparent to me. The reflexivity 
of the living body is analogous to that of the “self” or “mind,” and of course the latter is 
grounded in, and is an extension of, the former. To touch is also, necessarily at the same time, to 
be touched; in order to touch something, it is necessary that I myself be tangible and reciprocally 
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“touched” by the thing that I touch, yet the agency of touching and the concomitant passivity of 
being-touched – the hand or body that touches and the hand or body that is touched – never 
coincide with one another; they are phenomenologically and ontologically co-constitutive – they 
are “two leaves”147 of one and the same living body, two moments of one and the same body’s 
																																																								
147 Ibid., 137. Merleau-Ponty often likes to use the metaphor of “leafs”/“leaves” in order to describe the relationship 
between two different yet compresent and co-constitutive phenomena or orders of being. As Robert Vallier remarks 
in a footnote in his English translation of Merleau-Ponty’s courses on Nature, the term that is translated as “leaf” is 
feuillet, which can refer to the literal leaf of a tree yet also to a “folio-leaf” or simply the “leaves” (i.e., pages) of a 
book. Vallier provides a rich account of the various senses one might associate with these terms in Merleau-Ponty, 
but in most contexts I think the latter sense is primary. That is, when Merleau-Ponty remarks that two “things” (or 
orders of being) are “two leafs/leaves,” the context usually makes it clear that we should understand this to mean 
that they are related to each other like two sides of single page, because in most contexts he is clearly describing two 
distinct things are nevertheless compresent or inseparable, or things that are two different yet co-given aspects of 
one and the same “thing” (as are the two sides of a page in a book). The instance I have quoted here is a clear 
example of this, because in its context Merleau-Ponty is discussing the relationship between the “objective body” 
(the body as an object) and the “phenomenal body” (the body I experience as a subject of sensation and perception), 
suggesting that they are two irreducibly different yet nonetheless inseparable, compresent aspects of one and the 
same phenomenon: the lived body; the non-oppositional or non-disjunctive divergence or interval between the body 
as object and body as subject constitutes the phenomenon of the lived body (thus, as I remarked earlier, Merleau-
Ponty does not place “the lived body” on the side of “the phenomenal body” as, say, Sartre and (arguably) Husserl 
do, but understands it rather as a being constituted by “two leaves.” Below, I refer to Merleau-Ponty’s usage of the 
image of “two lips,” which communicates the same point. For Vallier’s discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s usage of the 
terms “leafs”/“leaves,” see Nature, p. 305 (footnote 7). 
 Lastly, though I think this expression is a reasonable metaphor for what Merleau-Ponty is trying to 
describe, it is important to acknowledge that Merleau-Ponty himself is reticent about it and registers its limitations. 
Thus, almost immediately after he compares the objective and phenomenal aspects of the lived body to “two 
leaves,” he writes:  
 
One should not even say, as we did a moment ago, that the body is made up of two leaves, of which the one, that of 
the “sensible,” is bound up with the rest of the world. There are not two leaves or two layers…To speak of leaves or 
layers is still to flatten and to juxtapose, under the reflective gaze, what coexists in the living and upright body. If 
one wants metaphors, it would be better to say that the body sensed and the body sentient are as the obverse and the 
reverse, or again, as two segments of one sole circular course that goes above from left to right and below from right 
to left, but which is but one sole movement in its two phases. - The Visible and the Invisible, p.137-138. 
 
We clearly see Merleau-Ponty struggling here to articulate the relationship he wishes to articulate, and I appreciate 
the honesty with which he conveys that struggle. Of course, he suggests here that perhaps rather than conceive of the 
objective and phenomenal aspects of the body as “two leaves” or “layers” we might better conceive of them as two 
inseparable aspects or moments of a movement in which they turn about one another in the manner of a double-
helix, yet if anything this nicely illustrates our inevitable confrontation with the limitations of language when we 
attempt to describe the basic structures of lived experience and Being, structures that, as Merleau-Ponty repeatedly 
insists, confound the traditional categories we use (especially in philosophy) to talk about the world and that will 
never be fully available to reflective thought. The task of phenomenology, of course, is to attempt to create new 
concepts or means of expression that may better honor the fundamental structures and features of our relationship 
with the world (and of Being as disclosed through our relationship with the world), a task that will always be 
unfinished. It is for this reason, I think, that Merleau-Ponty so often turns to art and that for him, in the end, perhaps 
art just is what phenomenology (and philosophy broadly) ought to be.      
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“momentum of existence”148 – yet they are nevertheless irreducibly different or non-identical; 
they are two moments of that dehiscence through which a body becomes sentient precisely by 
sensing, hence becoming other to, itself. Thus, the self’s coincidence with itself – just like the 
sentient body’s coincidence with itself, or just like the coincidence of touching and being-
touched – is, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, only ever “imminent and never realized in fact.”149 Such 
coincidence or identity “always miscarries at the last moment”150 or “eclipses at the moment of 
realization,”151 and for this reason “we must accustom ourselves to understand that “thought” 
(cogitatio) is not an invisible contact of self with self, that it lives outside of this intimacy with 
oneself…”.152 As I will now elaborate, the fact that the self “lives outside of intimacy with itself” 
is precisely what allows it to live in intimacy with others; indeed, it is already the self’s intimacy 
with others.  
 I can never, in principle, coincide with another’s consciousness or interiority, yet it is also 
the case that I can never truly coincide with my own, for (as we have seen) consciousness is 
necessarily ecstatic, or constituted precisely by its contact with what is other than or outside 
itself: in short, self-reflexivity is self-othering; auto-affection is always also hetero-affection. The 
movement through which life or subjectivity is constituted as such is always a “reflection by ec-
stasy.”153 My mode of access to my own mind and my mode of access to the minds of others 
may be different, but it does not follow that the former is direct whereas the latter is indirect: 
rather, they are both modes – albeit different modes – of direct access. Thus, “we have pointed 
out elsewhere that consciousness seen from outside cannot be a pure for itself. We are beginning 
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151 Ibid., p.147. 
152 Ibid., p.234. 
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to see that the same applies to consciousness seen from the inside.”154 Though others, precisely 
in order to be others, must not be accessible to me in the same manner in which I am accessible 
to myself, it does not follow that my access to myself is “direct” or immediate whereas my 
access to others is only “indirect” or inferential: there is a significant phenomenological 
difference between my access to my own subjectivity and my access to other subjectivities, yet 
both are equally modes of direct access. My access to my own mind and my access to the minds 
of others may be qualitatively different, yet both may be, and both nonetheless are, modes of 
direct access. In other words, first-personal givenness is not the only mode of direct perceptual 
givenness: only dualism supports such a restriction of direct access or givenness to the “first-
person” perspective. Another’s subjectivity may not be given to me in the same manner in which 
my own is directly given to me, but that does not mean that another’s subjectivity is not directly 
given to me. The Other’s subjectivity is given to me in a manner quite different from the manner 
in which my own is given to me, but, as we have already seen, both are nonetheless modes of 
direct givenness.  
 Moreover, as we have also already seen, my direct givenness to myself can never be 
coincidence with myself, or can never be transparent givenness to myself. Contrary to Cartesian 
conceptions of it, the first-personal mode of givenness – the self’s givenness to itself – is never, 
in principle, transparent. I am never transparent to myself, and not only does that mean, as 
Merleau-Ponty argues, that I am accessible to others and that others are accessible to me, it also 
means that there are aspects of myself – aspects of my own interiority – that are only accessible 
to me through others, that there are things only others can ever show or tell me about myself. As 
we know quite well from everyday experience, I can never quite see myself in the manner in 
																																																								
154 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.215, n2. 
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which others see me, yet I am largely defined by the perspectives of others. Perhaps I have a 
tendency to apologize too much or to acquiesce too readily to the opinions and criticisms of 
others, yet I may be utterly incognizant of my diffidence. Perhaps I have a tendency toward 
arrogance or obnoxiousness in my interactions with others of which I am unaware. Perhaps there 
is a phony quality to the manner in which I express certain emotions (perhaps I express, say, 
happiness or sadness a bit “too much” given the context). Perhaps I express an intense aversion 
to something yet, unbeknownst to me, I do so “a little too intensely,” that is, in manner that 
suggests I “protest too much,” and thus am perhaps not quite as repelled by it as I claim to be. 
Perhaps I am not completely (if at all) aware of how deeply unhappy I am, yet my unhappiness is 
projected through my behaviors in all kinds of ways that are apparent to others yet unbeknownst 
to myself, and it takes someone to notice this and to ask me whether I am “fine” in order for me 
to realize that indeed I am not. These are just a few common, empirical examples of 
consciousness’ opacity to itself, and though I have no doubt that Freud is right about the 
existence of the unconscious, one does not necessarily need to turn to psychoanalysis in order to 
understand this fact, for an essential structure of any form of consciousness is that it be engaged 
with a world (and with others) that always, as such, distances it from itself: it is an essential 
structure of consciousness that consciousness be distanced from itself.  
 So, I may act and express myself in the world in ways in which I am consciously 
unaware, yet these nevertheless reflect deep elements of my personality, and it takes others to 
show them to me, just as it takes others to show or to teach me anything about my conscious 
existence in the world at all. As I will further discuss, I am defined all the way down by my 
relations with others, and that means that who or what I am is so much more than whatever is 
disclosed to me about myself from the first-person point of view, that what or who I am is 
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already extended into others, already supported by webs of carnal, intersubjective 
interdependencies. There is such a thing as “interiority,” yet it is never quite as “interior” as 
philosophy traditionally conceives of it. When one withdraws from the world in supposedly 
solitary meditation, it is easy to become mesmerized by the reflective gaze one bends back on 
oneself and to define knowledge by the supposed privileged immediacy of one’s reflective 
givenness to oneself, yet one thereby forgets that in lived experience this immediacy that appears 
to characterizes one’s relationship to oneself is not quite as “immediate” as it reflectively 
appears, for indeed it has always already been “mediated” by one’s truly immediate fleshy 
contact with others and with a world. This is one reason why Ricoeur remarks that 
“…phenomenology begins by a humiliation or wounding of the knowledge belonging to 
immediate consciousness.”155 The aim of phenomenology is to elucidate the essential structures 
of lived, immediate experience, yet paradoxically this often means revealing lived, immediate 
experience to be not quite so “immediate” indeed, for it means revealing my supposedly most 
immediate experiences – that is, my internal experiences of myself – to be “mediated” by 
relations with things and others that throw me outside myself, carnal relations with a world and 
with other carnalities that always defer or despoil the perfect immediacy that would characterize 
transparent presence to, or true communion with, myself. As Derrida will later argue, even the 
self-presence one experiences in one’s internal monologue with oneself is never a “pure,” true 
communion with oneself, for there is necessarily an irreducible interval or diachrony between 
“speaking” and hearing oneself speak. Self-presence is always also self-absence, and Merleau-
Ponty consistently makes this very point throughout all of his writings. Merleau-Ponty 
repeatedly emphasizes “the key idea…that perception qua wild perception is of itself ignorance 
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of itself, imperception…,”156 that consciousness – even logos – simply does not have its seat in a 
subject in full possession of itself, that the auto-affection of the sentient body – and that 
consequently the reflexivity of consciousness, thought, or “the voice” – is also always the hetero-
affection or self-othering of that body in and through its involvements with a world. 
 Merleau-Ponty concludes that “there is, then, no privileged self-consciousness, and other 
people are no more closed systems that I am myself.”157 I do not think it can be underscored 
enough that this claim articulates not only the condition of the possibility of intersubjectivity but 
also the condition of the always already actualized fact of intersubjectivity. I can never be 
transparent to myself precisely because I am embodied and because it is only through my bodily 
contact with a world that I am ever in contact with myself, yet my embodiment is immediately, 
directly, always already contact with embodied others. Not only does my embodiment make me 
directly accessible to others, but the embodiments of others likewise make them directly 
accessible to me, and moreover to be an embodied subject is already to be constituted by one’s 
access or exposure to other embodied subjects. “The perceiving mind is an incarnated mind,”158 
and though this is why I am never able to perceive either myself or other minds “without 
remainder,” it is also why I am able to perceive myself and other minds at all.  
 So, it is precisely because subjectivity is embodied that “the subject loses its purity and 
its transparency,”159 and moreover “the other can be evident to me because I am not transparent 
for myself, and because my subjectivity draws its body in its wake.”160 These claims are, as we 
have seen, intimately connected. My lack of transparent presence to myself is the price I pay for 
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being “a self” at all, the price I pay for the possibility of anything being perceptually present to 
me. Not only is my non-coincidence with myself constitutive of my presence to myself (hence 
constitutive of “me”), it is also what enables anything to be present to me at all, including others. 
If I were to coincide with myself, or if I were to be given transparently to myself, my perceptual 
life or “selfhood” would instantly be extinguished; I would lapse into an intrauterine, syncretic 
absorption in Being; I would slip into that proverbial “night of identity in which all cows are 
black,”161 that prelapsarian repose in communion with the world prior to the birth of self-
consciousness; I would have no “self” – no subjectivity or identity – at all. Self-reflexivity (or 
auto-affection even at the most germinal level) is essentially non-self-coincidence, hence the 
repeated deferral of any transparent, panoptic internal view of oneself. If absolute transparency 
or privacy were to constitute interiority as such, then no interiority would truly have access to 
any other interiority, nor would interiority as such even be possible in the first place. A 
“hermetically sealed self is no longer a finite self”162 and is, therefore, no “self” at all. 
 As I will further discuss in chapters four and five, “the mind’s eye” can never take a 
“God’s eye” perspective toward anything, including of course especially itself, yet we have 
already seen above that the conditions that make possible my perceptual access to the world – the 
fundamental structures of perception itself and in particular my lived body – must, as such, 
always elude ordinary perception, or may only be present, paradoxically, as radically absent. The 
self can never be fully present to itself or must, to a great extent, be radically absent to itself 
because, in order to be present to itself at all, it must pass through the world that is other than 
itself, or must pass through others that are others to itself. Again, this also simply means that the 
self must be an embodied self. My lived/living body through which I have access to a world and 
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to others (as well as access to myself via a world and others) is also what forbids me from ever 
being present to myself completely, and moreover my lived/living body itself, as we have seen, 
can never be completely present to me either. Even “vision is not a certain mode of thought or 
presence to self; it is the means given me for being absent from myself…”.163 Perhaps the most 
important, then, is that the very starting of Cartesian doubt (and thus the very starting point of 
Cartesian solipsism) – that is, the cogito, or the self’s reflective first-personal relationship with 
itself – is not a fundamental, unmediated given but is always already a later efflux of one’s 
passage outside oneself or of the carnal presence of the world to oneself and is, for that reason 
alone, deprived of an absolutely transparent or private interiority. As Merleau-Ponty summarizes 
this point: 
…Self-possession and coincidence with the self do not serve to define thought, which is, on the contrary, 
an outcome of expression and always an illusion, in so far as the clarity of what is acquired rests upon the 
fundamentally obscure operation which has enabled us to immortalize within ourselves a moment of 
fleeting life.164 
 
We can, like Descartes, shut up our ears and close our eyes and withdraw from our bodies in 
meditation, but though we may withdraw ourselves from our bodies and from the world we never 
cease to be embodied and in the world, and our sensuous, embodied being-in-the-world never 
ceases to be the primordial and inescapable condition of all of our flights into meditation and of 
the comforting illusion of solitude. We are very proud of our ability to say “I”, very proud of our 
power to bend the ray of consciousness back on itself and to excavate behind our thoughts a 
thinker, behind our deeds a doer, behind our experiences a subject, but this thinker, this doer, or 
this subject that (I think) I am is not in fact there a priori behind the scenes of experience – 
outside of space and time, insulated from the winds and tides, the vicissitudes and contingencies 
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of worldly existence – waiting to be discovered, nor is it something that bootstraps itself into 
being the moment I think it. We might posit the cogito as ontologically and epistemically 
anterior to sensuous, carnal, intersubjective life, but it is really a contingent, later-order 
accomplishment of that life, a derivative and only ever fugitive expression of a life that has to 
labor continually to express itself as such, yet once expressed it naturally forgets the crucible 
from which it came to expression, the agon of worldly, carnal, affective relations – the flesh – 
that it always already is. The “I” appears as an autonomous, solitary, purely internal and self-
relational, disembodied spectator behind a screen of appearances – it appears before itself, by 
itself – only after “it” has gathered itself together, that is, only after it has returned from the 
world, comported itself, tensed its vocal cords, flexed its neck, drawn its breath, mobilized every 
imperceptible nerve and muscle, and summoned the power of speech (which it only learned how 
to access from others in the first place) in order to utter that simple little word, a word that, once 
uttered (whether outwardly or inwardly), acquires the appearance of absolute privacy, the sense 
of pure immediacy, or the aura of transcendental primacy. 
 So, if anything is truly “immediate,” it is not the subject’s relation to itself in 
introspection but rather its contact with others and with a world through its behaving, affective 
body. The subject’s constitutive reflexive relation to itself immediately implicates itself in what 
is outside or other than itself, for (as we have seen) it is only insofar as it is sensible that the 
subject can sense itself; it is only through the circuit of the world that a subject can relate to itself 
and thus be a subject. A body senses itself only in and through sensing its world, and therefore in 
sensing itself a body is already other than itself, already outside itself, already in the world. My 
incarnation – my autochthonous, affective and intentional attachments to sensible, material 
reality – thus allow me to be present to myself, but they also, in precisely the same manner, 
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allow me to be present to others and allow others to be present to me: if I am sensible to myself 
(i.e., conscious) only because I am myself sensible (i.e., embodied), it is no longer mysterious 
how I may be conscious of others, for others are likewise conscious of themselves only because 
they too are sensible, or only because they too “have” an outside or a body, or rather only 
because their consciousnesses are also already blended into a surface of contact with the world, 
already “sunk into corporeity.”165 For two or more subjects to be incarnate subjects is for them 
to be extended into the same carnal world, and for them to be extended into the same carnal 
world is for them already to be extend into or to “encroach upon”166 one another. 
Intersubjectivity, then, is simply the meeting of two or more such surfaces of contact and, in the 
first instance, is often literally the touching of two or more bodies. To be sentient is minimally to 
be self-reflexive, and self-reflexivity is affectivity: it is the capacity to be sensitive to, hence 
affected by, things external to oneself. And it is precisely this reflexivity that defines the living, 
sentient body. Moreover, this reflexivity through which all lives or subjectivities irrupt into being 
enables, and indeed already is, intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is the commingling of two or 
more sentient (self-reflexive) forms of flesh that are sensitive to one another as such in and 
through the very same sensitivity to a world that constitutes them as the sentient, self-reflexive 
forms of flesh that they are. In its fundamental or nascent condition, intersubjectivity is simply 
the spark of one body’s reflection upon itself kindling and intensifying, and reciprocally being 
kindled and intensified by, the spark of another’s; it is the rippling of carnal senses and 
sensitivities across sentient carnalities, the propagation of affects across affective bodies; it is the 
reflexive, direct sensing of the reflexivity of another living body through the similar reflexivity 
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of one’s own. If am able to sense another life, it is because my opening onto a world is the very 
same opening through which other lives pass into it as I pass into theirs; it is because the 
affective threshold through which one passes into the world is also that through which the world 
and others pass into oneself. This may sound at best poetic and at worst woefully abstract, but it 
is attested by very ordinary and concrete phenomena: it is, for example, why taking hold of 
another’s hand is significantly different from taking hold of, say, a doorknob; it is why caressing 
(or being caressed by) an ‘Other’ is significantly different from brushing up against a cushion or 
stroking a piece of fabric; it is why petting, say, a living cat is significantly different from 
palpating or dissecting the cadaver of one; it is why masturbation is significantly different from 
sex with a partner; it is why it is nearly impossible to tickle oneself; it is why when, say, a spider 
unexpectedly crawls across one’s arm or foot one immediately flinches (regardless of one’s 
attitudes toward spiders), and such a response is categorically different from how one would 
immediately respond to an object or piece of fabric that might suddenly touch one’s body: all 
such affects – all such stimulations and tremulations – disclose what we might call the “Ur-
phenomenon” of intersubjectivity, that exposure of the self to what is other than itself (including 
to other selves) without which it would not exist at all and on the condition of which it may 
never wholly coincide with, or be transparent to, itself.  
 As we have already established, whenever we encounter another life or subjectivity, we 
do not first infer its presence but rather perceive – indeed, feel – it directly through the same 
corporeal reflexivity through which we perceive or feel anything at all, we “first have a wince, 
like we have when we find a caterpillar where we weren’t expecting it”167 because the reflexivity 
of one (self-)reflexive body reflexively senses the reflexivity of another reflexive body, because 
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two sites of reflexivity are, at least to some extent, bound to reflect (or mirror) one another, 
“because one ek-stasis is compossible with other ek-stases,”168 because two (self-)reflexive 
bodies cannot but, in and through their (self-)reflexivity, reverberate upon or resound within one 
another as such, because the reflexivity through which a body is open to itself and to its world – 
the reflexivity in virtue of which a body is a living, conscious body – is precisely that opening or 
“invagination”169 through which all living, conscious bodies ceaselessly slip into and out of one 
another, because flesh that folds back upon itself inescapably enfolds, and is in turn enfolded by, 
others that do so likewise, since such flesh is never “a sack in which I am enclosed”170 but – 
analogous to the literal skin of the body – is a site or surface of perpetual openness to, and 
contact with, other flesh. “…Because my eyes which see, my hands which touch, can also be 
seen and touched…because our flesh lines and even envelops all the visible and tangible things 
with which it is nevertheless surrounded, the world and I are within one another…,”171 yet if “the 
world and I are within one another,” then others (who are likewise within the world) and I are 
already within one another as well. If I truly am in and of the world through the corporeality that 
I share with it, then the world and everything that comes along with it is already part of my 
corporeality, including especially the corporealities of others. If I truly belong to the perceptible 
world, then “whenever I try to understand myself the whole fabric of the perceptible world 
comes too, and with it come the others who are caught in it.”172 If my subjectivity is extended 
into the world through its corporeality, then it is already extended into the corporealities of other 
subjectivities that are themselves likewise extended into, or likewise extensions of, my world. 
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Thus, we are already seeing not only that subjectivity is always already intersubjectivity, but also 
that (inter)subjectivity is always already intercorporeality.  
 We see, then, that non-self-coincidence is an openness to oneself that is equally and at the 
same time an openness to the world and to others, an openness to oneself and to others that is 
impossible without the lived body and that is constituted by the lived body in composition with 
other bodies. The self is always a self “by divergence (d’écart),”173 and its divergence from itself 
is also its incorporation into a world and into other corporealities. This is the second part of 
Merleau-Ponty’s claim that my lack of transparent givenness to myself is the condition of my 
access to others: it is the condition of my access to others not only because it is indeed the 
condition of my access to anything, but also because it is entailed by the incarnation of my 
subjectivity (and thus the incarnation of other subjectivities) without which, as we have seen, 
subjectivity would never be able to come to presence, or would never be directly perceptible, in 
the world at all. My adhesion to the world – that is, my incarnation – is what simultaneously 
mediates my relationship to myself and my relationships with others; it is what simultaneously 
differentiates me from myself and from others and thus reflexively couples me with others, 
reflexively couples the view I have of myself (my interiority) with the views that others take on 
me (my exteriority), reflexively couples the views that others have of themselves with the views 
that I take on them, reflexively couples the views that we each have of ourselves and of one 
another. As I will mention again in chapter five, the dehiscence of perceiver and perceived that 
constitutes the lived body – that is, the institution or self-differentiation (or auto-affection) of any 
sentient, self-sensing body – is at the same time the dehiscence of self and Other. This is 
precisely why Merleau-Ponty claims that “the experience of my own body and the experience of 
																																																								
173 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 249. 
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the other are themselves the two sides one same Being.”174 I may be exposed to myself and to a 
world because I “have” an outside, and I am exposed to others as such by virtue of the fact they 
too have an outside: that is, I am open to the others by virtue of our shared exteriority.  
Intersubjectivity is possible because interiority is always already doubled by, or coupled with, 
exteriority. I may be an Other to an Other and an Other may be an Other to me because we each 
have an outside, because in order to be conscious of anything at all consciousness cannot be 
ontologically divorced from that of which it is conscious, which means that consciousness must 
be embodied: the ontological condition of an awareness and knowledge of others is in fact the 
very same ontological condition of consciousness (and self-consciousness) itself: embodiment. I 
am aware of others through the very corporeal reflexivity by virtue of which I am alive or 
conscious at all. Thus, my opening upon myself is an opening upon the world, and the Other’s 
opening upon him/herself is likewise an opening upon the same world, but my opening upon the 
world and the Other’s opening upon the world are equally an opening upon one another, for they 
are two aspects – “two leaves”175 or “two lips”176 – of an opening of or within the world itself.  
Since “in the flesh there is no longer the alternative of the in-itself and the for-itself,”177 
the interiority of an Other is a certain kind of absence that is necessarily coupled with, hence 
directly perceptible in and through, the other’s bodily presence or exteriority. This is how others 
may be directly, non-inferentially accessible in such a way that preserves rather than negates 
their otherness: their interiorities are accessible directly through their conduct while nevertheless 
																																																								
174 Ibid., 225. 
175 Ibid., p.137. 
176 Ibid., p.136. In the English translation this is rendered as “two laps,”	but	this is a mistranslation of “les deux 
levres” (“two lips”), so I am rendering it here as Merleau-Ponty intended (and which is also the way that makes the 
most sense). I also wish to acknowledge that in its context, Merleau-Ponty is only describing the relationship 
between the “objective” and “subjective”/“phenomenal” aspects of the sentient body, but I think his description of 
the relationship between them applies just as well to the relationship between sentient bodies, between self and 
Other.	
177 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 210. 
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not coinciding with it. Thus, “I know unquestionably that that man over there sees…because it is 
visible in his eyes’ grasp of the scene,”178 and in virtue of the fact that all forms and 
manifestations of mindedness are inherently incarnate, and moreover in virtue of the fact that 
“my perceptual opening to the world…is more dispossession than possession,”179 I am likewise 
able to “know” and even share in the pleasures and pains, joys and sorrows, desires and thoughts 
of others, and indeed it is only because I have already been acquainted with these things in others 
that I may have ever begun to understand what they are in my own case or what they are as such; 
it is for this reason that the standpoint of Cartesian skepticism, as well as the standpoint from 
which I analogically extend mental states to others, is derivative rather than ontologically or 
epistemically primary. Thus, Merleau-Ponty proclaims that “the perception of other people and 
the intersubjective world is problematical only for adults.”180 Despite the “egocentricity” that is 
often attributed to them (by Piaget181 and others) at certain stages of their development, children 
																																																								
178 Merleau-Ponty, “The Philosopher and His Shadow”, in Signs, p. 169. 
179 Ibid., p.170. 
180 Phenomenology of Perception, p. 355. 
181 Merleau-Ponty develops a number of sustained criticisms of Piaget throughout his writings on child psychology. 
I cannot fully elaborate his engagement with Piaget here, but the criticism of Piaget that is most germane to the 
present discussion (and to Merleau-Ponty’s account of intersubjectivity in general) is the one that targets Piaget’s 
concept of infantile “egocentricity.” Though Merleau-Ponty does agree that maturation from young childhood to 
“adult” consciousness involves a process of “de-centering” (see “The Child’s Relations with Others,” in The 
Primacy of Perception, p 110), he takes issue with the ascription of “ego-centricity” to infancy and early stages of 
childhood, for at that level there is no awareness of oneself as a distinct self among others; rather, there is a 
“syncretism” that is precisely an “indistinction between me and the other.” Thus, “at first, the me…is entirely 
unaware of itself” (ibid., 120). Though Merleau-Ponty acknowledges that Piaget’s concept of egocentrism is a 
“subtle concept which often exceeds criticisms made of it” (see Child Psychology and Pedagogy: The Sorbonne 
Lectures 1949-1952, p. 141) because it does quite ascribe to infants a robust self-consciousness, he nonetheless 
suggest that the concept of “egocentricity” involves an illicit imposition of a structure of adult consciousness upon 
child conciousness, the fallacious transference of a concept only acquired in adulthood to infancy. Thus, Merleau-
Ponty asks (clearly rhetorically), “Can we now conclude that the analysis of the child’s concepts by an adult is a 
satisfactory method?” (see ibid., p. 141). This reinforces the point that Cartesian solipsism (which misconstrues the 
individuation achieved in adulthood as radical isolation from others) involves, we might say, a repression of 
childhood. The ascription of adult ego-centricity to infancy demonstrates a similar forgetfulness of childhood (a 
forgetfulness naturally motivated by the fact that in early childhood one precisely lack a robust sense of 
individuality) and, in some cases, leads us to reify ourselves as fundamentally isolated when in fact our very sense of 
individuality, and consequently our sense of isolation, only arises from a primordial syncretic involvement with 
others.    
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(especially infants) never doubt that other minds exist in the world and constantly, implicitly 
affirm that they do; nor do young children ever engage in the complicated processes of reasoning 
that philosophers have traditionally supposed we do whenever we affirm that another entity is 
conscious or “minded”: 
At a very early age children are sensitive to facial expressions, e.g., the smile. How could that be possible 
if, in order to arrive at an understanding of the global meaning of the smile and to learn that the smile is a 
fair indication of a benevolent feeling, the child had to perform the complicated task I have just 
mentioned? How could it be possible if, beginning with the visual perception of another’s smile, he had to 
compare that visual perception of the smile with the movement that he himself makes when he his happy 
or when he feels benevolent – projecting to the other a benevolence of which he would have had intimate 
experience but which could not be grasped directly in the other? This complicated process would seem to 
be incompatible with the relative precociousness of the perception of others.182 
 
Though philosophical questions can never just be decided by empirical evidence, philosophers 
often ignore empirical evidence at their peril, and the classical problem of other minds is an 
illustrative example of this. Setting aside all of the arguments developed up to this point, it is 
also the case that the notion that we are primarily aware of others, or that we fundamentally 
“know” or come to believe that others exist, as the result of some process of inference is simply 
inconsistent with child psychology. Children are immediately aware of the fact that others exist, 
and indeed appropriately recognize and respond to specific mental states and attitudes in others, 
without performing any kind of analogical reasoning and without formulating predicative 
judgments. For example, infants clearly understand what a smile means without inferring it or 
without access to the concepts necessary to formulate a predicative judgment about it. Infants 
pre-reflectively, directly sense the meanings of various facial expressions long before they ever 
acquire a reflective sense-of-self and thus long before they are able to analogically posit mental 
attitudes in others. Of course, as Merleau-Ponty argues here, this would not be possible if 
inductive reasoning were the fundamental and necessary source of our awareness and knowledge 
																																																								
182 Merleau-Ponty, “The Child’s Relations with Others,” in The Primacy of Perception, p. 115. 
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of others. This would not be possible if the minds of others were only indirectly, rather than 
immediately and directly, accessible through their conduct. Merleau-Ponty’s point here, then, is 
not just a point about human psychological development; rather, it is a philosophical point that is 
disclosed through certain facts about human psychological development, namely that subjectivity 
cannot be withdrawn into an entirely enclosed interiority, for then it would never be accessible 
directly from the outside, and as Merleau-Ponty has already argued, if subjectivity were never 
directly accessible from the outside, it would never be accessible at all. And as we see here, 
infants would never be able to respond appropriately to the emotional or existential meanings of 
various facial expressions and bodily gestures if such meanings were not directly presented by, 
or immanent to, those expressions or gestures themselves. If the minds others could only ever be 
posited indirectly (as the result of, say, an analogical inference), then the fact that young children 
can correctly intuit the mental states or attitudes of others would be utterly inexplicable. Thus, 
everything I have argued up to this point is powerfully reinforced by the patent fact that children 
are able to perceive directly – not infer – other minds. It is only after one develops a robust 
sense-of-self through a long process of individuation (which is also already socialization) that 
one might become so mesmerized by oneself and by the putative privacy of one’s own 
experiences that one takes to doubt the existence of others. Children immediately affirm or take 
for granted that other minds (even that other non-human minds) exist, and as Nietzsche 
profoundly asks, “why should one not speak like children?”183 We might say that the traditional 
problem of other minds (like perhaps a number of other traditional philosophical problems, 
especially certain ones in ethics and political philosophy) arises from a repression of childhood. 
																																																								
183 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “Of the Despisers of the Body.” Trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Penguin Books, 2003), p. 61. 
	 157	
Though it may seem like a crude oversimplification to say so, we might say that a baby’s 
response to his/her mother’s smile is a sufficient refutation of Cartesianism.184  
 We have seen that Merleau-Ponty demonstrates that intersubjectivity is primarily 
intercorporeity. This means that intersubjectivity happens through the direct exchange or pre-
reflective coupling of motor projects and corporeal schemata, through the synergistic 
envelopment of bodily intentions and expressions. I immediately recognize the behaviors of 
others as modes of engagement with the world or as possible projects that are available to my 
own body, and immediately perceive them to be expressive of attitudes and affects that likewise 
surge through my own flesh. I often immediately take up the motor-intentional projects of others 
and immediately mirror the attitudes or affects of others, and vice versa. “This conduct which I 
am able only to see,” Merleau-Ponty writes, “I live somehow at a distance. I make it 
mine…Reciprocally I know that the gestures I make myself can be the objects of another’s 
intention.”185 This is to say that the gestures of another living body are immediately meaningful 
to me as gestures, that is, as orientations toward a world, as modes of directedness to meaning,  
as projects polarized toward things and tasks that I might apprehend or adopt as well and that are, 
as such, “instantaneously transferable.”186 Thus, Merleau-Ponty writes, 
…I experience my own body as the power of adopting certain forms of behavior and a certain world, and 
I am given to myself merely as a certain hold upon the world; now, it is precisely my body which 
perceives the body of another, and discovers in that other body a miraculous prolongation of my own 
intentions, a familiar way of dealing with the world.187 
 
																																																								
184 That is, it is a sufficient refutation of Cartesianism provided we understand or extrapolate how subjectivity must 
be constituted in order for such a feat to be accomplished, and that means having to do ontology. So, I am not 
suggesting that Cartesian metaphysics can simply be refuted empirically. I am suggesting that sometimes empirical 
phenomena depend upon, hence disclose, deeper ontological conditions or truths, which is a claim that I do not think 
is controversial.   
185 “The Child’s Relations with Others”, in The Primacy of Perception, p. 118 
186 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 141. 
187 Ibid., p. 353-354. 
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To perceive a living, behaving body is to perceive a “prolongation” of my own bodily 
comportments, capacities, and affects; it is first to perceive not an “alter-ego” whose privileged 
internal and putatively private awareness of itself I can never breach or inhabit but an alter-body 
whose powers, intentions, and vulnerabilities inherently, reflexively overlap and implicate my 
own. The “intentional threads”188 of my living body are already interwoven with those of other 
living, coping bodies, and, as we have seen, I would have no consciousness of myself or of my 
body at all if it were not for this fabric of carnal relations that my body weaves in concert with 
other bodies, this shared fabric through which my own incarnate subjectivity and the incarnate 
subjectivities of others are already threaded, this shared fabric that therefore weaves me into a 
“subject” or “self” just as much as I, through my bodily involvements, weave it.  
 So, to perceive a living body is not to perceive an “automaton” or a “mere” object or husk 
of matter, and neither is it to infer the existence of an ego “inside” of such a thing; it is to be 
dispossessed and swept up by the conduct of an Other; it is to perceive directly another life, 
another sense-making organism, another creative, artful agency, another “mind.” When I 
perceive a behaving body, I do not first perceive an “interior-less” exteriority and later posit 
analogically its interiority. Such a supposed divide between interiority and exteriority is a false 
abstraction, and like every false abstraction, it is one that always comes too late: the poles of 
interiority and exteriority are, in fact, already entangled in the phenomenon of the living, 
behaving body, and it is only a derivative act of reflection that tears them asunder. As we have 
seen, behavior is always already an irreducible presentation of interiority or alterity. For 
example, we all recognize a difference between, say, a living tiger and an animatronic model of a 
tiger, but this difference is a basic and significant difference indeed. The skeptic naturally 
																																																								
188Ibid., p. xiii, 72, 106, 130. 
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worries that any animate body I perceive in the world might in fact really just be a particularly 
ingenious automaton, an entity whose movements are indistinguishable from those of “real” 
living, conscious bodies yet which is nonetheless devoid of life or consciousness, an entity that 
tricks me into taking it to be sentient when in fact it is just a machine or a “zombie.” I think we 
have already laid to rest the dualistic assumptions upon which this kind of skepticism always 
rests, but as Lawrence Hass insightfully points out189 (in a way that recalls, I think, the basic 
point of the famous “Turing test”), if we ever built a robot whose movements truly were 
completely indistinguishable from living behavior, then its movements would just be living 
behavior. Hass’ argument targets the claim that someday a robot’s behaviors might so perfectly 
imitate “real” behavior that it would be able to “fool us” into believing that it is sentient, a claim 
that is commonly proposed, of course, in order to support skepticism about other minds. “If it is 
possible to be fooled in this way, or if we accept the possibility that such a machine might 
someday be created,” so the skeptic reasons, “then why not think that every apparently sentient 
body is not likewise a mere machine, albeit a highly complicated one that can mimic sentience?” 
The problem here is that in order to say that a machine merely “mimics” sentience but does not 
really possess it, one must appeal to something that distinguishes the mere machine from the 
truly sentient body, but to do this is to forfeit the skepticism one initially intended to establish. 
That is to say, the dilemma here is that either a sentient, behaving body is truly indistinguishable 
from the movements of a machine, in which case the movements of such a “machine” just are 
the movements of a sentient, behaving body, or one has to abandon the notion that they are 
completely indistinguishable, in which case one tacitly appeals to some knowledge of the 
difference between the two, and either alternative defeats the skepticism one intended to 
																																																								
189 I am summarizing and paraphrasing Hass’ argument here. See Hass, Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy 
(Bloomington/Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008), p. 109-110. 
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establish. Either the behavior of a robot really is living, sentient behavior, or one must tacitly 
appeal to something that distinguishes its movements from those of “real” living, sentient 
behavior, and one forfeits skepticism in either case. 
 In the end, Merleau-Ponty shows us that the “problem of other minds” collapses into the 
“problem of other living, behaving bodies,” but such a problem is surely absurd; that is, to put 
the problem this way is to dissolve it, since there is obviously no justifiable doubt about the 
existence of other living, behaving bodies. In short, to perceive a “mind” is to perceive a living 
body, and to perceive a living body is to perceive a mind. It should be clear from everything we 
have seen thus far that Merleau-Ponty does not reduce subjectivity to the living body or equate 
mental phenomena with behavior. Merleau-Ponty is not a “behaviorist,” and he went to great 
lengths to distance his own views from those that fit that label (as I mentioned earlier, his first 
book, The Structure of Behavior, is largely devoted to refuting behaviorism and other 
reductionistic theories in psychology). However, in case this point is not yet sufficiently clear, I 
now wish to address more directly the fact that Merleau-Ponty does not advance, and explicitly 
rejects, a “behaviorist” account of subjectivity. 
 Now, there are different versions of “behaviorism.” The methodological behaviorism 
formulated and practiced most famously by J.B. Watson and B.F. Skinner is not exactly the same 
as the theory of “logical behaviorism” in philosophy of mind (developed mainly by the logical 
positivists who came to be known collectively as the “Vienna Circle,” and articulated in perhaps 
its most well-known form by Gilbert Ryle). The behaviorism of Watson and Skinner was an 
approach to studying and formulating explanations of human behavior in empirical psychology 
that broke from former, more speculative or “introspective” approaches (especially 
psychoanalysis), whereas “logical behaviorism” is in fact a theory concerning the nature of 
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consciousness as such (or at least a theory concerning the semantics of talking about 
consciousness190). Thus, Watson’s and Skinner’s behaviorism is, we might say, less 
“ontologically robust” than logical behaviorism (since they do not really intend to provide a 
“theory of mind”), yet their approach to understanding behavior – regardless of the extent to 
which one describes it as merely a preferred “methodology” – is not without its own 
(problematic and indeed erroneous) ontological commitments. Watson and Skinner intended to 
make psychology “more scientific” by forcing it to restrict its attention only to empirical 
evidence. For them, the mind is inherently unobservable from the outside (and naturally we 
already know how Merleau-Ponty responds to such a notion); it is, as Skinner often put it, a 
“black box.” No one can really know what goes on inside someone else’s mind. However, one 
can know how a person behaves, and one might even be able to test predictions about how a 
person might behave in the future. So, if psychology is to be “scientific,” it must remain tethered 
to observable evidence and not make speculations about things that cannot, in principle, be 
observed in the outside the world. This means that psychology must only make predictions and 
test hypostheses about human behavior. One cannot know what goes on inside the “black box” 
of the human mind, yet one can observe behaviors (i.e., outputs) and link them to equally 
observable “stimuli” and the physiological mechanisms that mediate them (i.e., inputs). This is 
																																																								
190 This form of behaviorism largely arose from the “ordinary language philosophy” associated with logical 
positivism, according to which philosophical problems can and ought to be dissolved by appealing to the ways in 
which we ordinarily talk about the world. According to this approach, then, we can answer a question such as “what 
is consciousness?” by considering the ways in which we talk about it. So, when I say someone is “in pain,” what do 
I usually mean? According to logical behaviorism, I mean that someone is behaving in a way that indicates a pain 
state. And what do I mean by “pain?” According to logical behaviorism, I mean the ways in which someone would 
be disposed to behave under certain conditions. Thus, for the logical behaviorists, whenever we talk about mental 
states, we are always just talking about either behaviors or behavioral dispositions, and so if we focus on what we 
actually mean when we talk about consciousness, we can dissolve many of the persistent metaphysical problems that 
typically beleaguer attempts to understand it. Of course, this view is problematic for many reasons, not the least of 
which is that it does not really capture everything that we actually mean when we talk about consciousness in the 
first place.   
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why behaviorism in psychology tends to reduce human behavior to various forms of 
“conditioning,” as it explains behavior in terms of mechanisms that consistently yield certain 
behavioral “outputs” on the basis of certain environmental “inputs.” Of course, we have already 
seen why such a reductive understanding of behavior, and why the assumed divorce between 
mind and body that such a reductive understanding of behavior tacitly presupposes, is 
unacceptable, and thus Watson and Skinner stand as illustrative examples of how science is 
always based upon metaphysical and epistemological commitments (often quite poor or ill-
considered ones).  
On the other hand, The Vienna Circle’s and Ryle’s “logical behaviorism” was an attempt 
to develop an anti-Cartesian account of consciousness, yet it was (as are all reductionistic 
theories of consciousness) simply a logical offspring of the metaphysical framework Descartes 
cemented, and thus was not at all an alternative to that framework. Logical behaviorism truly 
does equate the mind with behavior. In logical behaviorism, “mental states” just are “behavioral 
states.” This is not to say that mental states are only actual, occurrent behaviors; they can also be 
dispositions to behave in certain ways. Thus, anger, for example, consists not only in the ways in 
which I might actually display anger but also in the ways in which I might be disposed to display 
it given certain factors or conditions. I might exhibit anger in any number of ways, yet even if I 
am not currently exhibiting it, I might be disposed to do so if, say, I were cut off by another 
driver while changing lanes on the highway, and this disposition too is “anger.” In this way, 
logical behaviorism is able to accommodate the existence of mental states that are, in a way, 
“internal” inasmuch as they are latent, yet such states are surely not “spiritual” or non-physical. 
That is, the disposition to express anger in a certain way is analogous to, say, “brittleness,” or the 
potential of an object to break under certain conditions: a disposition to shout, curse, or stamp 
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my feet may be, in a sense, “internal” until something triggers me to act in such a way, yet it is 
no more non-physical than, say, the brittleness of a window. This is why Ryle argues that the 
Cartesian notion the mind as a “ghost in the machine” (which is a phrase he coined) is fallacious 
because it misdescribes as disembodied or “spiritual” a phenomenon that is thoroughly physical; 
again, it makes no more sense to regard anger as “immaterial” as it does to regard the brittleness 
of a window as “immaterial.”  
Logical behaviorism is a deeply flawed and now outmoded view for many reasons, and I 
am not going to survey all of the criticisms of it that have been advanced. Here, it will suffice to 
mention that the most important problem with the theory – the one that commonly motivates 
most people to reject it – is that it utterly fails to accommodate (or even simply denies) the 
essential qualitative or “what-it-is-like” character of experience. That is to say, logical 
behaviorism truly denies what we call “interiority.” According to logical behaviorism, to be 
“angry,” “sad,” or “happy” just is to perform certain behaviors (or just is to be disposed to 
perform certain behaviors) that commonly indicate anger, sadness, or happiness. This means that 
logical behaviorism cannot accommodate any distinction between genuine feeling and pretense, 
between really feeling, say, happiness and merely feigning it. Moreover, on its own terms, 
behaviorism simply cannot claim that there is anything more to a mental state than the ways in 
which one does or might behaviorally exhibit it; on this view, a disposition to behave in some 
way is as “internal” as a mental state can get. Behaviorism, then, denies or ignores what are 
commonly referred to as “qualia,” i.e., the “painfulness” of pain, the “redness” of red, the 
“happiness” of feeling or being happy, and so on, and therefore cannot indeed account for the 
difference between feeling pain rather than pleasure, seeing red rather than green, feeling happy 
rather than sad. Again, there is nothing to being in a mental state beyond behaviors or behavioral 
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dispositions.191 Thus, logical behaviorism attempts to remedy the Cartesian divide between 
interiority and the body by eliminating interiority entirely from its account of subjectivity and 
picture of reality, yet in doing so it in fact concedes rather than truly remedies that divide and 
entails consequences that are just as untenable as the Cartesian concept of subjectivity it opposes. 
It should be obvious why Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is emphatically opposed to any 
version of behaviorism. All versions of behaviorism – whether that of Watson and Skinner or 
that of Ryle and the logical positivists – assume from the start a divide between interiority and 
exteriority. That is, they in fact concede conceptually the very Cartesian mind/body dichotomy 
they pretend to oppose. Behaviorism and Cartesianism both presuppose a divorce between 
interiority and exteriority; indeed, behaviorism is really just the reactionary counterpart to 
Cartesianism: the latter opposes interiority (“mind,” res cogitans) to exteriority (“body,” res 
extensa) whereas the former either reduces interiority to exteriority or treats interiority as an 
inscrutable “black box” behind or “within” exteriority. It should be clear by now that Merleau-
Ponty does not trade dualism for a reductive, positivistic monism. To understand lived 
experience and the relationship between subjectivity and embodiment properly, we should 
probably develop a whole new vocabulary and abandon the categories of “interiority” and 
“exteriority” altogether (which is arguably what Merleau-Ponty attempts to do in his later 
works). Nevertheless, we have seen that Merleau-Ponty does not reject the distinction between 
interiority and exteriority but argues that they are intertwined in and through the lived/living 
body. Merleau-Ponty never reduces interiority to behavior; he never denies the “what-it-is-like” 
or lived-through dimension of experience; he does not deny that only I can live through my pain 
																																																								
191 Though perhaps it has become a cliché, the following joke is often used in order to illustrate this problem: two 
behaviorists are in bed after having had sex. In their post-coital state, one of them turns to the other and asks, “I 
know it was good for you, but was it good for me?” 
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or that I can never truly live through your pain. We have already seen that Merleau-Ponty affirms 
an irreducible difference between my own experience of, say, grief or anger and the manner in 
which such an experience might be conveyed publicly (either by myself or by others).  
However, we have also already seen that Merleau-Ponty does deny that this lived-
through, qualitative dimension of conscious experience renders the consciousnesses of others 
radically inaccessible. Nothing “mental” is ever disembodied, so even in the most “private” 
aspects of my life I never cease to be “in touch” with other incarnate beings: 
…Our glances are not “acts of consciousness,” each of which claims an invariable priority, but openings 
of our flesh which are immediately filled by the universal flesh of the world. All depends, in short, upon 
the fact that it is the lot of living bodies to close upon the world and become seeing, touching bodies 
which…are a fortiori perceptible to themselves. The whole enigma lies in the perceptible world, in that 
tele-vision which makes us simultaneous with others and the world in the most private aspects of our 
life.192 
 
I will further elaborate what Merleau-Ponty means by “the flesh of the world” in chapter five, 
but we have seen that, for Merleau-Ponty, if subjectivity is possible at all it must be distinct from 
yet also ontologically continuous with the world. This means that subjectivity must be incarnate. 
So, “the flesh of the world” (in one of its valences) designates the ontological continuity between 
(incarnate) subjectivity and the (carnal, sensible) world, and so too, then, does it designate the 
ontological continuity between subjectivity and other (likewise incarnate) subjectivities. Thus, 
“the presence of the world is precisely the presence of its flesh to my flesh…I am “of the world” 
and…I am not it…,”193 and because my flesh is enmeshed with the world’s flesh, because my 
vision, for example, must not be ontologically divorced from the visibility of the world disclosed 
to it and must, therefore, itself be “visible” in some way, because “between what I see and I who 
see… we catch sight of a complicity,”194 or because in general “each landscape of my life” is a 
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“durable segment of the durable flesh of the world,” my subjectivity or vision is “qua visible, 
pregnant with many other visions besides my own.”195 So, if interiority were wholly interior or 
self-enclosed, then there would, in fact, be no such thing as “interiority” in first place, and it 
would especially be impossible to account for how one interiority could ever relate to or access 
another. We learn, then, that in a sense “interiority” is a misnomer. It is true that interiority does 
not reduce to exteriority, but it does not follow that interiority and exteriority are opposed or 
mutually exclusive. Interiority and exteriority are the warp and woof of one and the same 
phenomenon, two aspects of an enfleshed expression of the world’s flesh, two aspects of a 
particular expression of the “flesh of the world” that we are.  
To underscore a point I mentioned earlier, if we truly reject the traditional opposition 
between subject/mind and object/body, then we surely cannot say that the former reduces to, or 
is exhaustively manifested by, the latter, for in general to reduce one term of a binary to another, 
or to reject one term of a binary in favor of the other, is nevertheless to accept conceptually from 
the start, and thus not at all to dismantle, that very binary: one assumes an opposition between 
mind and body and in order to “solve” the problems engendered by that opposition one attempts 
to eliminate it by eliminating one of its terms, but such an attempted “solution” never 
interrogates or repudiates, and therefore leaves intact, the dualistic schema from which it 
proceeds in the first place; indeed, any proposed “solution” to dualism that begins with the 
conceptual opposition between mind and body ultimately reinstates, and thus in no way actually 
“solves,” that very dualism: again, such reductionism or monism is simply the reactionary 
counterpart to dualism. Trading dualism for behaviorism (or for any reductionistic account of 
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subjectivity) is simply “compensating for one abstraction with a counter-abstraction.”196 
Merleau-Ponty understands that the only way to dismantle or radically critique a binary is to 
refuse to accept from the start the conceptual opposition between its terms: if those terms may no 
longer be taken to be separable or mutually exclusive, neither may one of them be taken to 
collapse into, or to be absorbed by, the other. The answer to dualism, then, is never to erase one 
of its two antithetical terms in favor of the other one but is rather not to begin from, and thus to 
find a way to think below or beyond, that very conceptual antithesis in the first place; any other 
kind of “solution” to dualism leaves intact or reinstates the very dualism it is intended to solve, 
and is thus no solution at all. So, rejecting the opposition between consciousness and the body 
obviously means that the two are not categorically divorced from each other, yet at the same time 
it cannot and does not mean that consciousness simply collapses into, or entirely coincides with, 
bodily functions, processes, expressions, or behaviors.  
Alterity is possible only if interiority is inseparable from yet not reducible to exteriority, 
and this is precisely Merleau-Ponty’s view. For alterity to be possible, the other must be 
accessible to me directly yet never completely or exhaustively, and only the embodiment of 
subjectivity makes this possible or intelligible: only because others are directly presenced in and 
through their bodies may they be accessible to me in a such a way that does not extinguish their 
otherness or in a way the preserves the requisite excess of their subjectivity. So, for Merleau-
Ponty, the mind is never equivalent to behavior, yet it is nevertheless the case that the limit 
between them is never sharp or decidable. There is an “internal connection between my body’s 
movement and the psyche” that “confuses the frontiers of soul and body.”197 As is the case with 
all expressive phenomena, the mental characteristics or meanings expressed through behavior are 
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intrinsically infused into, and partially constituted by, behavior itself, yet they are not strictly 
identical to behavior. Thus, “behavior creates meanings which are transcendent in relation to the 
anatomical apparatus, and yet immanent to the behavior as such…”198  
Importantly, this is also what makes not only correct but also incorrect judgments of 
others possible. Skeptics often think that the possibility of formulating erroneous beliefs about 
others implies an absolute divide between self and others, yet such a divide would make both 
correct and false beliefs about others impossible. Indeed, if false beliefs about others are 
possible, so too must correct beliefs about others be possible, and solipsism makes both true and 
false beliefs about others (or any beliefs about others) impossible. Far from warranting solipsism, 
the possibility of making mistaken judgments of others presupposes our enmeshment with 
others. As Merleau-Ponty argues, the behavior and consciousness of an Other – that is, the 
exteriority and interiority of a living body – are intertwined yet not reductively equivalent to one 
another. So, if dualism is false, then “there is no precise border between attitude and action.”199 If 
dualism is false, then “…we no longer see where behavior begins and where mind ends.”200 This 
inseparability yet non-coincidence of interiority and behavior is precisely how it is paradoxically 
possible have contact with Others in a way that does not dissolve or negate their otherness; it is 
how we may access the inner life of an Other in a way that preserves the requisite inaccessibility 
(or excess) of that life.  
This non-disjunctive distance between consciousness and behavior – which is also 
precisely the distance between self and Other – is the very distance that at once makes 
communication and miscommunication between subjects possible. The lived body does not 
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belong entirely to either side of the classical subject/object divide, and this ambiguity of the lived 
body grounds intersubjectivity and thus the second-order intersubjective phenomena of correct 
and incorrect judgments of others. So, while behavior always inherently means the presence of 
an “inner life” or intentional existence, we can always be wrong about what is behaviorally 
meant – about what is lived or intended on the “other side” of a behaving body – in specific 
instances and circumstances. A point to which I will return in chapter three is that this is what 
makes intersubjective life not only inexhaustibly rich but also filled with risk, always 
beleaguered by the possibility of error, disillusionment, and disappointment:   
When I say that I know and like someone, I aim, beyond his qualities, at an inexhaustible ground which 
may one day shatter the image that I have formed of him. This is the price for their being things and 
‘other people’ for us, not as the result of some illusion, but as the result of a violent act that is perception 
itself.201 
 
My perception of an Other is “violent” in the sense that it tends to level the Other’s otherness, to 
regard as static or rigorously determinable (that is, as unambiguous) the Other’s subjectivity 
which is, as such, always in a process of becoming and always in excess of whatever aspects of it 
may appear to me, always irreducibly, inexpugnably “ambiguous.” However, we should never 
harbor any such illusions that others are ever reducible to the ways in which they appear to me. 
That is, we should never harbor any illusions that would expunge from intersubjective life 
precisely the ever-present, essential possibility of disillusionment. It is precisely because the 
Other’s subjectivity is embodied that I can coexist with him/her at all, yet it is because the 
Other’s subjectivity never completely coincides with his/her body or behaviors that he/she is, 
indeed Other, that I can always be wrong about his/her “inner” life. We can know others, but we 
can never know them completely or without remainder, and this is why knowing others is always 
filled with risk. I am sure that my partner loves me, and I am sure that she does through all of 
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shared lived experiences we have had with each other. Is it possible that really does not love me? 
Is it possible that she is just a sadistic sociopath who derives pleasure from performing such a 
long con on someone? Of course that is possible. So, when I say she loves me, my claim is surely 
not utterly ungrounded; it is surely supported by evidence, even by evidence that most would 
agree support the claim beyond any reasonable doubt. Yet, such a claim can never be established 
beyond all possibility of doubt, and so if I believe that my partner loves me, I am also always 
taking a risk; I am staking a commitment in the world, one that can always be upset. However, 
without such a risk or commitment, no relationship with her – no love between us – would be 
possible at all, and what is true concerning my relationship with my partner is true concerning all 
relationships between embodied beings. My beliefs about my partner may be true or they may be 
false, and even if they are true now they may always become false later, yet whether they are true 
or false, and whether or not I know them to be such, is fundamentally rooted not in abstract 
reasoning or induction but in the imbrications of our sentient bodies, in experiences we always 
share together in the flesh. Getting to know an Other, befriending an Other, or loving an Other is 
always a risk I take, always a never completely secure commitment I make, and thus it is one that 
may someday leave me disenchanted, disconcerted, betrayed, or heartbroken. Yet it is always a 
risk worth taking, always a commitment worth making, because if it were not, then no risks or 
commitments ever would be; life as such would not only never be worth living, it would never be 
lived at all.  
 For Merleau-Ponty, then, “if there is an other, by definition I cannot install myself in him, 
coincide with him, live his very life: I live only my own. If there is an other, he is never in my 
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eyes a For Itself, in the precise and given sense that I am, for myself.”202 This is why, contrary to 
any reductive behaviorism, Merleau-Ponty is so committed to the qualitative, first-personal, or 
“interior” dimension of lived experience that he affirms that there is a “truth of solipsism.”203 Of 
course, by this Merleau-Ponty obviously does not mean that solipsism is strictly true. The “truth 
of solipsism” here simply refers to the fact that the Other cannot be present to me as he/she is 
present to him/herself, and conversely that I cannot be present to others in quite the same way 
that I am present to myself. In short, “the truth of solipsism” is precisely this separation or 
dehiscence between subjectivity and behavior and also, therefore, between self and Other. There 
is an irreducible qualitative and inward dimension of experience. All experience does involve 
some aspect of individuation and privacy, and indeed such individuation is just as essential to 
experience as communalization or intersubjective affirmation.204 If I had no sense of myself as a 
distinct self at all, I would not be sentient at all. Even the most “rudimentary” forms of auto-
affection are ways in which a form of life or a “self” are differentiated from a world and from 
others. The problem is that classical (i.e., Cartesian) solipsism misconstrues this individuation 
endemic to lived experience as radical isolation. As M.C. Dillon explains in his exposition of 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of intersubjectivity:     
Solipsism is not merely a philosophical mistake; it is rather an aspect of human life that has been 
misunderstood by philosophers and psychologists theorizing within ontological standpoints incapable of 
doing justice to the full range of human experience from alienation to solidarity, from forlorn isolation to 
reciprocated love. While it is true that traditional forms of solipsism arise from a willful neglect of the 
lived body, it is also true that these extremist accounts are responsive to a well-grounded segment of 
human experience: my body may be shaped in the same fashion as yours, but it is my body, not yours, 
and I experience it in a way that I cannot experience yours. An adequate account of intersubjectivity must 
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be able to accommodate both privacy and communion within a unitary and coherent view of human 
experience.205    
 
Merleau-Ponty clearly argues that Cartesian dualism and solipsism are false, but for him they are 
nevertheless examples of “well-founded” or “motivated” errors,206 errors that arise naturally (and 
perhaps inevitably) from lived experience even though, at the same time, they contradict it. In 
order for two or more beings to relate to one another, they must be irreducibly distinct, for 
otherwise there would only be an amorphous, syncretic indistinction of perspectives, which is to 
say there would be no real perspectives or selves at all. Thus, the very space that separates or 
differentiates us is at the same time the very space that brings us together.207 The “truth of 
solipsism” is precisely this very distance between beings that, far from isolating them from one 
another as traditional solipsism would misconceive it, in fact that brings them together and is 
necessary for them to have any contact with one another at all, since without such a distance 
between them they would not even be distinct beings in the first place. And as we have seen, this 
distance between beings is also what makes miscommunication or misunderstanding between 
them possible. The “truth of solipsism” is also this possibility of being wrong about others that is 
endemic to intersubjectivity, this ineffaceable ambiguity that attends (or rather is) the 
intertwining of consciousness and behavior, interiority and flesh.  
As I mentioned at the beginning of this discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of the 
problem of other minds, this problem is one that he (following Husserl) takes seriously. In the 
preface to the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty repudiates any “transcendental 
idealism” that “rids the world of its opacity and transcendence” and that therefore “knows 
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nothing of the problem of other minds”; from such a perspective, there is “no difficulty in 
understanding how I can conceive the Other, because the I and consequently the Other are not 
conceived as part of the woven stuff of phenomena” and thus there is “nothing hidden behind 
these faces or these gestures…no domain to which I have no access.”208 Such a view might 
“solve” the problem of other minds, but it does so for the wrong reasons, or perhaps it is more 
accurate to say that such a view does not solve the problem because it cannot even recognize that 
there are grounds for one in the first place. Now, I think it is clear that what Merleau-Ponty says 
here about “transcendental idealism” he would also say about behaviorism (or about any kind of 
reductionism that expunges interiority from the world). Thus, despite his devastating critiques of 
dualism and solipsism, the problem of other minds is not one that Merleau-Ponty simply 
dismisses. Merleau-Ponty does not think that our experiences of others are unproblematic, and he 
does not he simply posit by fiat and without further explication our coexistence with others. 
“There is a solipsism rooted in living experience,”209 and this refers to the fundamental, 
inescapable first-personal givenness of experience, the ipseity or “mineness” that is essential to 
consciousness. Though consciousness must be entwined with behavior, this “solipsism rooted in 
living experience” is precisely the distance that must obtain between consciousness and 
behavior, hence also between self and Other; it designates those aspects of conscious existence 
or selfhood that cannot be exhaustively publicized. Subjectivity is directly disclosed through the 
conduct of the living body, but it is never disclosed without remainder, and the “solipsistic”  
element of experience is precisely that remainder; it includes precisely those aspects of one’s 
own subjectivity that will always be withheld from others and, conversely, those aspects of other 
subjectivities that will always be withheld from oneself, those aspects of subjectivity that can 
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only ever be present as absent. The “truth of solipsism” is not the truth of classical solipsism but 
the falsehood of behaviorism; it is the truth that interiority is never reducible to exteriority even 
though it is also constituted by its extension into it, that consciousness is never reducible to 
behavior even though it is always already entwined with it. Here, the “truth of solipsism” is in 
fact the contrary of solipsism in the classical sense, for it designates not only a basic condition of 
experience as such but especially a basic condition of the experience of others.  
In closing, it is necessary to reject both dualism and reductive behaviorism in order to 
overcome skepticism concerning other minds while at the same time accommodating the 
distance that necessarily obtains between self and Other. That is, a third alternative beyond 
dualism and behaviorism (or reductionism in general) is necessary in order to explain, on the one 
hand, the possibility and fact of our access to others as well as, on the other hand, the fact that 
others will never be completely accessible to us and that we may therefore always be mistaken 
about their experiences or intentions in particular instances. Subjectivity is never reducible to 
behavior, yet there is no decidable limit between them. I experience myself as a singular, 
individual self, and I have a kind of access to myself that no one else may have. My experiences 
– precisely as mine – cannot be experienced by another precisely as I experience them: no one 
can feel my pain exactly as I feel it, and no one may legitimately dispute the fact that I feel it. 
Given that this is the case, and given that it is also nevertheless the case that we believe that 
others exist and that we participate in the intentions and thoughts, pains and pleasures, joys and 
sorrows of others – or given that it is also indeed the case that the presence of others is 
necessarily constitutive of our very self-concepts and sense of the world – the question that 
presents itself is how both of these things can be the case at the same time. Of course, this is 
possible only if dualism is false, or only if my internal reflection upon myself does not reveal to 
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me a self that would be entirely isolated or sealed off from the external world, or only if my 
experience of myself implicates and reveals to me an “outside” or a publicity – a surface of 
contact with things and others, or a participation in transcendence – just as immediately or just as 
certainly as it reveals to me a unique and supposedly impregnable “inside” or “sphere of 
immanence/ownness.”  
So, as Merleau-Ponty argues, “…my experience must in some way present me with other 
people, since otherwise I should have no occasion to speak of solitude, and could not begin to 
pronounce other people inaccessible.”210 What fundamentally renders solipsism or ‘other-minds 
skepticism’ along with well-meaning efforts to resolve such solipsism or skepticism through 
inductive reasoning incoherent is that all propositional doubts – indeed all propositional attitudes 
in general – concerning others presuppose, as the primary condition of their intelligibility and 
formulation, pre-propositional, perceptual or bodily involvements with others, lived experiences 
of and with others that are “beneath the level of the verified true and false.”211 That is to say, 
such solipsism or skepticism depends upon a tacit, lived affirmation of – or what Merleau-Ponty 
will later call a “perceptual faith”212 in – the fundamental reality of that which it pretends to 
doubt or deny, and so we may say, to borrow again from Derrida, that the condition of the 
possibility of solipsism or skepticism is at the same time the “condition of its impossibility.” 
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Solipsists or skeptics (and later, we shall see, human chauvinists) cannot help but implicitly 
affirm in their spheres of lived experience the very others whose rightful place there they 
explicitly refuse to grant or acknowledge, or cannot help but continually affirm in their pre-
reflective engagements with the world the operative presence of those others that they otherwise, 
upon reflection, disavow. The pretense to doubt or deny the existence of others will never 
amount to anything more than just a pretense, a protestation that “doth protest too much”; it will 
never be anything more than an exclusion that does not truly exclude, a position that already 
constitutively incorporates within itself, or that already depends upon a “prelogical bond”213 
with, precisely that which it purports to exclude from itself or its purview. Indeed, anything that I 
ever thus impossibly, self-defeatingly “exclude” from myself or from my world is always 
excluded as Other(s), is always truly, irreducibly Other yet also, paradoxically in virtue of its 
otherness, already there to give shape to myself and to my world, already there at (or more 
precisely as) the horizons of my space of existence, indeed (or yet more precisely) already there 
in the folds of my enfleshed field of experience, already enlaced with the inseverable “intentional 
threads”214 that tether my body to my milieu and me to Being. Moreover, since consciousness is 
necessarily embodied, since “the perceiving mind is an incarnated mind,”215 since to be a mind is 
to be living body (and vice versa), we will soon see, as we must, that my lived, tacit affirmation 
of others entails an affirmation of all living bodies as others, which is to say an affirmation of the 
presence of human and non-human others alike.  
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Chapter Two 
 
“An Absence that Counts in the World” 
Paradoxes of Perception, Alterity, and Expression in Merleau-Ponty 
 
“Perception is…paradoxical. The perceived thing itself is paradoxical…”  
 
– Merleau-Ponty216 
 
We often find that the most profound and fecund philosophical truths are those that are 
the most obvious and mundane yet also, and precisely for that very reason, those that are most 
easily overlooked. One of these is the simple truth – one we all know perfectly well through 
ordinary experience – that we directly perceive absences as well as presences, and that indeed 
presence always includes, and is conditioned by, absence. The fact that we do not merely 
perceive “presences” but also, at the same time, absences, and moreover the fact that some of 
these absences can only ever be “present” as absent, or the fact that there are certain absences 
that can never be brought to full, ordinary presence precisely because they are constitutive 
conditions of presence, are facts that are obvious yet also quite startling once we notice them and 
begin to take them seriously, facts that indeed disrupt many of the conventional ways in which 
we conceptualize experience and the nature of reality and that therefore, if we think through 
them rigorously, have profound philosophical consequences, not the least of which concern our 
access to others.  
 Every experience of presence is doubled by an equally direct and immediate experience 
of absence. For example, if I view a building from the balcony of my apartment, the side or angle 
from which I view it is the one that is presently “present” to me, yet also and just as directly or 
immediately “present” to me are all of the other sides of the building that I am not presently 
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viewing: the profile that is now in front of me already, inherently alludes to all of the other 
profiles that it conceals, the other profiles it must conceal in order to face me in the first place. 
These other absent profiles of the building are just as directly “present” to me as the one that is 
presently facing me; they are present to me precisely as absent. Presence and absence are both 
modes of direct perceptual givenness, and indeed they are always co-given. Lived experience is 
precisely a play or ordered flow of presence and absence: I encounter a particular object (say, a 
table) from a certain angle or vantage point; from this angle, a particular profile of the table is 
disclosed to me, yet its other profiles are also disclosed to me, except they are disclosed to me 
precisely as absent. And I might proceed to move around the table so as to bring to presence its 
now non-present profiles, so as to make presently present those aspects of the table that were 
presently absent. As I move around the table so as to bring its absent profiles to presence, the 
profile that was formerly facing me – the profile that was presently or frontally present to me – 
withdraws into absence. As I move around it, the presently present profiles of the table 
continually cede their presence to those that are now emerging from absence into presence.  
 Experience is this continual flow of presence into absence and of absence into presence, 
and Husserl develops his own (cumbersome yet nevertheless often helpful) terminology for 
articulating this. I think it will be helpful for what follows to recall this terminology. We perceive 
what is presently (or frontally) present to us, but in experience we also perceive just as directly or 
immediately any number of absences. However, in order to distinguish between my perception 
of the side of the building that is now facing me and my simultaneous perception of its absent 
sides, Husserl says that while I “perceive” the side that is now facing me, I “apperceive” the 
sides that are now absent to me. Thus, for Husserl “apperception” simply means the direct 
perception of any absence. Similarly, Husserl terminologically distinguishes between the modes 
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of givenness indexed by “perception” and “apperception,” between the mode of givenness in 
which something is presently or frontally present and the mode of givenness in which something 
is presently absent. For Husserl, those things that are presently or frontally present to me – those 
things I perceive – are presented to me, whereas those things that are presently absent to me – 
those things that I apperceive – are “appresented” to me. In Husserl, “appresence” is 
synonymous with “absence,” and “appresentation” is simply the presentation of an absence. 
Thus, “appresentation” means “making present to consciousness a “there too”, which 
nevertheless is not itself there…a kind of making “co-present…””.217 So, I “perceive” what is 
(presently) present, and I “apperceive” what is (presently) absent; similarly, what is (presently) 
present is “presented” to me as such, and what is (presently) absent is “appresented” to me as 
such. A building presents to me the side that now faces me yet at the same time “appresents” all 
of its other sides that are not facing me, all of the other sides that must be absent in order for this 
one to be (presently, frontally) present. 
 It is important to underscore the point that every direct perception of presence entails an 
equally direct apperception of absence: it is not the case that I perceive a particular profile of a 
building and only afterward “apperceive” its absent profiles, and still less is it the case that I 
perceive, say, the north-facing side of a building and then infer that it has south-facing, east-
facing, and west-facing sides. Any profile of a thing that is presently present to me is, indeed, 
presently present only through or on the basis of all of its presently absent profiles, and that is 
why its presently absent profiles are given simultaneously with whatever profile it presently, 
frontally presents to me. Something can only present itself in experience by concealing other 
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things; likewise, a particular profile of a thing may present itself to me only because, at the same 
time, it hides its other profiles. Experience is necessarily structured by this compresence and 
interplay of presence and absence because, first of all, experience is always an experience of 
wholes (Gestalts). Although this may appear to be a rather obvious truth, it was one that was lost 
on many psychologists and philosophers (in particular, classical empiricists and logical 
positivists) who defined perception in terms of atomistic “sense-data”: discrete sensations or 
sensible qualities that the mind would receive from the external world through the body’s sense 
organs, internally process, and then somehow construct and project outward as “whole” objects. 
The idea here is that an apple, for example, can be analyzed into various simple (irreducible, 
hence atomistic) sensible qualities (it’s color, it’s shape, perhaps its smell and texture, and so 
on), and that these impress themselves upon the senses and get reconstructed in the mind and 
projected into the world as what we call “an apple.” Such sense-data are the simple “building 
blocks,” so to speak, of the content of experience. However, and to put the point bluntly, this 
theory of perception is so patently absurd that it is astonishing – even scandalous – that it was 
able to hold sway for as long as it did. It was, of course, repudiated by the Gestalt psychologists 
who argued (correctly) that the fundamental unit of perception is not the “sense-datum” but the 
whole from which such “sense-data” are only later abstracted. The primary object of perception 
is a perceptual whole that is always “greater than the sum of its parts.”  
 Husserl and Merleau-Ponty both follow Gestalt psychology in taking perceptual wholes – 
not “sense-data” – to be the irreducible “units” of perception, for indeed, as Merleau-Ponty 
argues at the beginning of the Phenomenology of Perception, there are no such things as 
atomistic “sense-data” or sense-impressions. Such a sense-datum or “pure sensation” is 
understood as “the experience of an undifferentiated, instantaneous, dotlike impact,” yet, as 
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Merleau-Ponty argues, “this notion corresponds to nothing in our experience.”218 If we actually 
attend to what we experience, we notice that it is only ever possible to perceive something 
against or amid a background or context (or what Husserl calls a “horizon”). To perceive is 
always necessarily to perceive “a figure on a background.”219 There is always a background that 
lets anything come to presence: to see anything at all is to see something situated relative to other 
things and against a background or in the midst of a context or world without which it would not 
be able to show itself – indeed, would not even be “a thing” or a “phenomenon” – at all. For 
anything to be perceptible it surely must be differentiated from other things (and from the world), 
but this means that from the start even the “simplest,” most “rudimentary unit” of experience can 
never be an atom – some sort of isolated sensation or quality – but must already be relational and 
structured, an appearance that is organized in advance and already meaning-laden in virtue of the 
context amid which it emerges. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “the perceptual ‘something’ is always 
in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a ‘field’…The pure impression is, 
therefore, not only undiscoverable, but also imperceptible and so inconceivable as an instant of 
perception…this pure sensation would amount to no sensation, and thus to not feeling at all.”220 
It is, therefore, ironic that classical empiricism took for granted the existence of something that is 
never, in principle, empirically given but is rather the product of an act of abstraction. 
Experience is from the beginning constituted by a foreground/background configuration of 
appearances and meanings that cannot, as such, be decomposed into any simpler elements. If this 
anterior foreground/background configuration of my perception of a thing or phenomenon were 
to shift in some way, so too would the thing or phenomenon itself that I perceive. Since even the 
																																																								
218 Phenomenology of Perception, p.3. 
219 Ibid., p.4. 
220 Ibid., p.4-5. 
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most “elementary” perception already involves the perception of something against and amid a 
background, it is already organized and intentional and therefore “already charged with a 
meaning.”221  
 Wholes are always – perceptually, logically, and ontologically – prior to any simpler 
elements in terms of which we might later analyze them.222 We see, then, that sense-atomism is 
one of the clearest examples of a fallacy of reification, that is, one of the clearest examples of 
deriving some abstraction or idealization from lived experience, forgetting the process of 
abstraction or idealization from which one derived it, and subsequently regarding it as 
fundamentally real or even, as in this case, as constitutive of lived experience. In this case, one 
begins with a perceptual whole (say, an apple), one then mentally selects and isolates certain 
qualities from it (say, its redness), and then one constructs this isolated quality as a primitive 
component (or “building block”) of the perceptual whole with which one began. This is clearly 
fallacious. This is a clear case of mistaking an abstraction that one derives from experience with 
a concrete, basic structure or feature of experience itself. Thus, “the alleged self-evidence of 
sensation is not based on any testimony of consciousness, but on widely held prejudice.”223 
Moreover, simply because it is possible conceptually to analyze some whole into simpler parts, it 
never logically follows that the parts are “prior to” or fundamentally and exhaustively 
constitutive of the whole. Such reasoning, however, tends to be the basis of most forms of 
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222 Notably, William James advances exactly the same critique of sense-atomism as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty (and 
the Gestalt psychologists). Thus, James writes: 
 
“The ‘simple impression’ of Hume, the ‘simple idea’ of Locke, are both abstractions, never realized in experience. 
Experience, from the very first, presents us with concreted objects, vaguely continuous with the rest of the world 
which envelops them in space and time, and potentially divisible into inward elements and parts…the elements with 
which traditional associationism performs its constructions – ‘simple sensations,’ namely – are all products of 
discrimination carried to a high pitch…” - The Principles of Psychology, Volume One (New York, NY: Dover 
Publications, Inc., 1950), p. 487. 
223 Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p 5. 
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reductionism. In any case, setting aside the fact that this kind of inference is invalid, the 
conclusion inferred is also positively established as false for the reasons just elaborated, namely 
that experience must always already be holistically, relationally organized because any “object” 
of experience must be differentiated from other objects and from a background or horizon 
against which (or rather from a world in the midst of which) it presents itself. For Merleau-
Ponty, it is therefore always the case that “in perception we witness the miracle of a totality that 
surpasses what one thinks to be its conditions or its parts.”224 In short, wholes always come first.   
 What does this have to do with the play of presence and absence in experience? We have 
already seen that in order for anything to appear it must appear amid a context, that is, 
differentiated from a world and from other things, and this also already means that absence 
necessarily accompanies and conditions presence because nothing can appear in such a manner 
without concealing something else. Nothing can become foregrounded without other things 
receding into a background. Nothing can stand out to me without hiding other things in my field 
of experience, and likewise, as we have already observed, no profile of a thing can be presented 
to me without hiding other profiles: 
The [visible things] are always behind what I see of them, as horizons, and what we call visibility is this 
very transcendence. No thing, no side of a thing, shows itself except by hiding the others…to see is as a 
matter of principle to see farther than one sees, to reach a latent existence. The invisible is the outline and 
the depth of the visible. The visible does not admit of pure positivity any more than the invisible does.225  
 
As Merleau-Ponty suggests here, essential to perceptual experience is a dimension of depth, and 
this is simply another way of describing the differentiation that is endemic to lived experience. In 
order for things or phenomena to be perceptible (that is, in order for things or phenomena to be 
“things” or “phenomena”), they must be differentiated from one another and from the world or 
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225 Merleau-Ponty, Signs, “Introduction,” p. 20-21. 
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field of experience amid which they show themselves, which is also to say they must be 
distanced from one another and from the world (and from the perceiver). If there were no such 
differences or distances between things, there would be no “things” to perceive in the first place. 
Thus, “…the sensible order is being at a distance…”.226 A point to which I will return below is 
that if things could present themselves to me fully transparently (as they would from a “God’s 
eye” perspective), they would have no hidden sides or absent profiles and would thus not be 
“things” at all; likewise, if they were never either in front of, behind, to the left of, to the right of, 
in the middle of, above, below, etc., other things, then they would have no distinct, hence no 
perceptible, existence at all.  
 Moreover, as Merleau-Ponty will later observe, the differentiation or spacing between 
foreground and background (which Merleau-Ponty calls écart) cannot itself ever truly be 
“present” to perception for the very reason that it is the fundamental condition of perception: 
what is truly fundamental is neither the figure nor the background but rather the irreducible, non-
figurable space or interval between figure and background, that dehiscence through which things 
emerge into presence as such. In other words, there is a certain depth or “thickness”227 that is the 
elemental condition of experience (and that Merleau-Ponty will later claim even discloses the 
nature of Being); as such, it cannot strictly be “experienced,” yet it is not radically outside 
																																																								
226 Merleau-Ponty, “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” ibid., p. 167. Italics are Merleau-Ponty’s. 
227 Merleau-Ponty often uses this expression to refer to the depth – the relational separation or differentiation – that 
constitutes experience, meaning, and even Being, and which he otherwise (especially in his later writings) calls 
“flesh.” See, for example, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 135, 173, 268, and also “Eye and Mind” (in The Primacy 
of Perception), p.182, where he famously appeals to the “thickness” of water in a swimming pool as an example to 
illustrate the general dimension of depth (or “flesh”) that mediates our perceptual access to things. I will further 
elaborate Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh (and the related concept of écart) in chapter five, but here we are already 
seeing the extent to which, for Merleau-Ponty, a rigorous attention to lived experience discloses not merely 
structures of subjectivity but also structures of Being. This depth that constitutes lived experience discloses the fact 
all relationships, at the most basic ontological level, exhibit both distance and continuity, or rather exhibit continuity 
in virtue of distance. The differentiation that constitutes lived experience – the differentiation between figure and 
ground – discloses Being as differentiation. 
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experience as a “transcendental condition of possibility” would be: it envelops and pervades 
experience; though it is an enabling condition of experience, it is also radically immanent to 
experience and is therefore, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, comparable to an element such as air or 
water (albeit one that is more properly “elemental” than these, since it can never quite be 
experienced in any ordinary way). For example, in order for me see an object there must be some 
distance between myself and the object (as well as distances between the object and other objects 
or between the object the world around it); yet, this distance that enables my vision cannot 
ultimately be an object of my vision for the very reason that it enables my vision. I might 
succeed in thematizing or transforming into an object of vision the distance that obtains between 
myself and, say, the laptop I am now seeing, but in order for this distance itself to be an “object” 
of my vision there will have to be some yet deeper, more fundamental distance between myself 
and it, and so on; ultimately, experience must bottom out at kind of spatiality or difference that 
cannot itself be thematized as an ordinary object of experience. What we see is that ‘seeing’ is 
possible only on the basis of a kind of distance between ‘seer’ and ‘seen’ that can never itself be 
seen, that the visibility of the visible must always itself be absent or invisible.  
Indeed, this originary differentiation between foreground and background is one of those 
kinds of radical absences – one of those absences that is more absent than any ordinary absence 
(such as the other side of a building) – that Merleau-Ponty and others identify as the truly 
fundamental constitutive conditions of experience (and as endemic even to Being as such). In 
any case, for these reasons we see that, in a sense, perception is always necessarily depth 
perception, although it is fundamentally, and paradoxically, the perception of a depth that cannot 
really be perceived precisely because it is what lets anything be perceived in the first place. This 
is why Merleau-Ponty suggests that “depth” ought to be regarded not as a “third” dimension or 
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as merely one dimension among others but as the truly “first”228 dimension, or as the Ur-
dimensionality, so to speak, that conditions and embraces all of the ordinary dimensions with 
which we are familiar. Depth, in other words, is properly not a dimension “in the ordinary sense 
of a certain relationship according to which we make measurements,”229 but is rather the clearing 
or differentiation that subtends, opens up, and constitutes all relationships, including especially 
any relationship between perceiver and perceived, yet it is nevertheless something to which we 
may obliquely attend in virtue of all of the other “depths” – all of the absences or invisibles, all 
of the distances, dimensions, shadows, hidden spaces, folds, and lacunae – that necessarily and 
obviously envelop and configure even the most mundane perceptions.  
 To be clear, the figure/ground structure of perception does not just refer to the fact that I 
perceive objects against a background or horizon; it also refers to the fact that perceptual objects 
themselves inherently have a figure/ground (or horizon) structure. Naturally, all perceptual 
objects are part of a Gestalt, or are imperceptible and unintelligible independently of some 
context in which they appear. However, it is also important to appreciate the fact that objects are 
Gestalts – perceptual wholes - in themselves (if we may talk about them as such, for doing so is 
admittedly, for the reason just mentioned, already an abstraction). This is why Husserl ascribes 
“horizons” to objects and not just to the world in which objects appear. The simple point here – a 
point that further illustrates the fundamental, structural play of presence and absence in 
experience – is one I have already mentioned, namely that an object always presents a certain 
profile to me yet also, at the same time, “appresents” all of its other absent profiles or possible 
manners of appearance to me. That is, the profile of an object that now figures as the content or 
“object” of my perception appears against the “horizon” of all of the other ways in which this 
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object might appear to me (and to others) from other perspectives. Above, I explained the 
primary insight of Gestalt psychology (and of phenomenology) that things always appear against 
a background, and that it is this whole foreground/background configuration of experience that 
is, in fact, the fundamental “unit” of experience. Here, I am explaining the similar point – a point 
that further reinforces the aforementioned foundational insight of Gestalt of psychology, and one 
that Husserl repeatedly emphasizes – that objects themselves are always, immediately 
experienced as wholes. Objects present themselves only from one profile at a time yet also, 
nevertheless, as wholes. This is one of those “figured enigmas”230 that Merleau-Ponty refers to at 
the beginning of The Visible and the Invisible, a basic feature of experience that perhaps appears 
paradoxical when put into words: I only ever perceive something from a certain profile, yet at the 
same time I also perceive it as a whole. This is, again, Husserl’s basic insight that every 
perception is paired with any indefinite number of apperceptions, that every presentation of an 
object in lived experience immediately appresents an indefinite number of other possible ways in 
which that same object may appear, that in general presence is always inflated with 
“appresence.”  
 The simple point here is that even though I may only view something from one profile at 
a time, I nevertheless view it as a whole object and do not merely experience an isolated 
snapshot or slice of it; that is, beyond the particular profile that a thing presents to me, I also just 
as directly and immediately (ap)perceive all of the other profiles it hides from me, all of the other 
profiles it is not presently presenting to me but which it might present were I to take up a new 
perspective toward it. To return to an example I mentioned earlier, when I perceive the front of a 
building I also immediately apperceive the back of it (and all of its other sides); if a building 
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presents itself to me from its northern side, it simultaneously appresents its southern, eastern, and 
western sides to me. In lived experience, if I only see the front of a building I never worry or 
wonder that it might just be a prop from a movie set. As I watch buildings pass me by while 
driving on a highway, I never stop to think that the scene before me is really just a Potemkin 
village. In everyday experience, I take the objects I perceive to be whole or “real” objects, and a 
crucial point here is that I do no infer that they are whole or real. I do not infer that the building I 
now view from the front also has a back: the back of the building is immediately given with its 
front. I do not perform some sort of induction when I take the objects in my field of experience 
to be “whole” or “real”: I directly, immediately take them to be such (for example, I do not think 
to myself that all of the times I have ever seen a building from a distance it has never turned out 
to be merely a movie prop upon closer inspection and consequently conclude that this building I 
am now seeing from a distance is most likely not merely a movie prop). 
 Thus, all perceptual object are manifolds of presence and absence. A thing can only ever 
present itself from one aspect at a time, yet as a whole it is an ensemble of all of the ways in 
which it can appear, and so to perceive any one of its aspects is also at the same time to 
apperceive an indefinite number of its other aspects; again, each present profile of a thing 
appresents its absent profiles, those now hidden sides or aspects of itself that might be disclosed 
to me if I were to adopt a different standpoint toward it. This is exactly what Merleau-Ponty 
means when he claims that “perception is imperception….that to see is always to see more than 
one sees.”231 Perception is always “imperception” because perception always includes the 
perception of absence. “To see is always to see more than one sees” because “to see” is to see 
beyond whatever is presently present, because what is presently present is also already infested 
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with absence. Again, I see a thing from a certain angle, yet I do not just see an isolated “slice” of 
it but rather I see it as a whole, that is, I also “see” those aspects of it that I do not see, and this is 
essential to seeing or perceiving as such232:  
A stone is seen in any at all of its perceptual appearances, in which, strictly, only very little “of it” is 
presented in “actual,” “proper,” perception. If, on account of the one-sidedness and other multifarious 
imperfections, we were not to allow this seeing to count as a “seeing,” as a “perceiving,” then talk about 
seeing would lose its essential sense forthwith.”233  
 
The appresentation of wholeness in and through the partial, “one-sided” presentation of a thing – 
hence the general compresence of presence and absence in experience – is a necessary and not 
merely a contingent feature of experience. It is necessary that we both only perceive objects from 
one profile at a time and also perceive them as wholes (hence also “apperceive” their absent 
profiles), for otherwise experience would be utterly incoherent, a true “blooming, buzzing 
																																																								
232 Husserl surely tends to focus on vision when discussing these points, as it is the sense that perhaps most clearly 
illustrates them, and Merleau-Ponty often appeals to vision as well in order to make similar points. Now, though I do 
think that “ocular-centric” accounts of perception ought to be challenged and rejected, it is important to note that 
both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty recognize and discuss other modes of perceptual givenness, and these too need to 
be taken into account when we consider what it means for an object to present itself as a “whole.” For neither 
Husserl nor Merleau-Ponty do the possible ways in which something may appear only include the ways in which it 
may visually appear. For Husserl, the various ways in which something might appear in, say, my memory or 
imagination, as well as the kinds of cultural meanings that might be associated with it, also belong to what it is and 
to how it appears as a whole, and (as I will further discuss in chapter five) for Husserl every appearance of a thing 
refers not only to other ways in which it might appear to me but also to ways in which it might appear to others. 
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use visual examples and metaphors to explain lived experience, he also frequently discusses other sensory modes of 
givenness as endemic to the givenness of any object or phenomenon (and even argues for a fundamental 
“synesthesia” or overlapping of all modes of sense-perception). In his later writing in particular, Merleau-Ponty 
discusses touch as much as he discusses vision, and I think a compelling case can be made that if Merleau-Ponty 
privileges any sense over any others, it is touch rather than vision that he privileges (at least in his later writings). 
Questions of textual interpretation aside, however, I surely do not wish to advocate an ocular-centric account of 
lived experience. I am using examples here drawn from vision because not only do Husserl and Merleau-Ponty often 
use such examples but also simply because they easily illustrate the salient points I wish to discuss. Nevertheless, we 
should always keep in mind that when we articulate how things appear as “wholes,” we have to understand their 
“wholeness” also to include how they might appear (or rather how they always already appear) otherwise not only 
visually but also tactilely, auditorily, olfactorily, gustatorily, imaginatively, artistically, culturally, historically, and 
so on.         
233	Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book. 
Trans. R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers/Kluwer, 1983), §49a, p. 
185. 
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confusion”234 or mere “wandering troop of sensations.”235 Husserl refers to this perception of 
wholeness in and through the flow of appearances in lived experience as “synthesis”: 
For example, if I take the perceiving of this die as the theme for my description, I see in pure reflection 
that “this” die is given continuously as an objective unity in a multiform and changeable multiplicity of 
manners of appearing, which belong determinately to it. These, in their temporal flow, are not an 
incoherent sequence of subjective processes. Rather they flow away in the unity of a synthesis, such that 
in them “one and the same” is intended as appearing.236  
 
Husserl calls this perception of wholeness “synthesis” because it involves the perception of unity 
or identity in and through the perception of multiple, temporally successive partial profiles of an 
object. When I view something from one angle and then vary its appearance in some way (by, 
say, turning it around with my hand or by stepping around it), I never think that the object I 
previously viewed has vanished and that a new one has suddenly irrupted into presence to take 
its place: I perceive one and the same thing in and through successive changes in its appearance, 
which means, again, that its presence is always already inflated with absence. If this were not so, 
experience would be like a kinetoscope whose frames bear no relationship to one another, a 
sequence of coruscating images or appearances with no connection to one another whatsoever. 
Thus, each appearance of a thing inherently alludes to the infinite number of other ways in which 
it might appear. Things are given as wholes, but since they are never given all at once – that is, 
since they are given as wholes but are never wholly given (as they would be from a God’s eye 
perspective) – and since there is in principle no limit to the possible ways in which they can be 
given (especially since their possible modes of givenness include not only the ways in which 
they may be given to me but also all of the ways in which they may be given to others), this also 
																																																								
234 See William James, The Principles of Psychology, Volume One (New York, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 
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235 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 123. 
236 Cartesian Meditations, §17, p.39. 
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precisely means that they are given as “open and inexhaustible,”237 that lived experience is “the 
fulgurating attestation here and now to an inexhaustible richness…”238  
 So, it is clear that perceptual presence is always partial, allusive, and lacunary, always 
infested with absence, always hemmed in by a halo of opacity. It is clear that “apperception” is 
necessarily constitutive of perception, that “presentation” is necessarily entwined with 
“appresentation,” yet now it is important to underscore that this is not just a fact concerning the 
structure of perception or subjectivity: it is also a fact concerning the nature of presence as such, 
a fact concerning the nature of phenomenality or “thinghood” as such, a fact even concerning 
Being as such. As I just discussed, a thing’s presence is pervaded with absence; the presentation 
of a thing is always already the (ap)presentation of a manifold of absences: for every profile of 
itself that a thing presents to me, there are indefinite others that it withholds from me; the 
disclosure of one profile entails the concealment of others. For anything to come into presence, 
other things must pass away into absence. A thing or phenomenon can become present only if 
others cede their presence to it. Now, one might think that all of this concerns merely a feature – 
even perhaps a limitation – of embodied subjectivity; one might think that all of this is simply a 
matter of the fact that I can only ever view an object from a particular vantage point, or that I 
cannot view an object from everywhere all at once. One might think that it is only because I am 
“encumbered” with eyes and a physical body that I may only ever perceptually access something 
from one profile or angle at a time. In general, one might think that the perspectival situatedness 
of one’s access to the world is simply a fact about perception and knowledge, perhaps even a 
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“flaw” in the constitution of subjectivity to be, if not overcome entirely, mitigated as much as 
possible.239 
However, such a view is completely wrong. The perspectival constitution of our access to 
reality correlatively discloses the perspectival (or rather phenomenal) constitution of perceptible, 
knowable reality itself. Everything we have observed up to this point discloses not merely the 
nature of lived experience but also the nature of “the real,” and thus what might initially have 
seemed to be only psychology or epistemology has already also been ontology. It is true that I 
cannot view an object from everywhere all at once, but this fact is not simply essential to vision 
or subjectivity but also to being a visible or perceptible thing in the first place:  
A perception which would be coextensive with sensible things is inconceivable; and it is not physically 
but logically that it is impossible. For there to be perception, that is, apprehension of an existence, it is 
absolutely necessary that the object not be completely given to the look which rests on it, that aspects 
intended but not possessed in the present perception be kept in reserve. A seeing which would not take 
place from a certain point of view and which would give us, for example, all sides a cube at once is a pure 
contradiction in terms; for, in order to be visible all together, the sides of a wooden cube would have to be 
transparent, that is, would cease to be the sides of a wooden cube. And if each of the six sides of a 
transparent cube were visible as a square, it is not a cube which we would be seeing.240 
 
The fact that one cannot view a thing from all possible sides or angles or all at once is not merely 
a feature of subjectivity, and still less is it some sort of flaw of subjectivity; rather, it is a feature 
of what it is to be a thing or to exist at all. Objects of experience must be transcendent not in the 
sense that they are absolutely independent of subjectivity but in the sense that they can never, in 
principle, be present to subjectivity all at once: they can only be present from certain profiles at a 
time and they can never be exhausted by any single profile. Any single disclosed profile of a 
thing immediately refers to (appresents) innumerable others that are concealed as the very 
																																																								
239 This is, of course, the traditional, Enlightenment view of knowledge and “objectivity”: “objective” reality is 
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condition its disclosure. However, as Merleau-Ponty argues in the above passage, this 
perspectival presentation of things is not merely an essential structure of subjectivity, and even 
less is it an epistemic limitation we either can or should seek to overcome, but is an ontological 
structure of perceived, perceptible things themselves. That is to say, if a thing did not present 
itself to me from a certain profile, if a thing were presented to me from all possible perspectives 
all at once – from everywhere and thus from nowhere – it would not be a thing. It is not simply 
the case that in order for something to be present to me other things must also be absent. That is 
true. But it is also the case that a thing’s transcendence or depth – the fact that a condition of a 
thing’s givenness is that it never be given without remainder, or the fact that certain aspects of a 
thing will always remain opaque or withheld from view – is essential to what it itself is, essential 
to its very “thing-ness.” That absence always accompanies or subtends presence is not simply a 
feature of perception but a feature of the things or phenomena themselves that are perceptually 
present. If something were given to me without any opacity whatsoever, without any absent 
profiles or lacunae, it would be given without any depth or breadth whatsoever, or given from no 
particular position and within no particular context whatsoever: nothing would or could be 
behind it, in front of it, around it, above or below it, or to the side of it. For something to be 
given to me all at once, or from every possible perspective all at once, is in fact for it to be given 
to me from nowhere all, from no perspective at all. But a thing without depth, without concealed 
profiles, without withheld modes of appearance, without aspects or layers always in excess of 
what can be disclosed to any single perceiver at a time, without location, or without a horizon or 
context amid which it appears, is not only not a possible object of experience, it is not a possible 
“object” at all. In short, I cannot view things all at once because I am an incarnate subject, yet 
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my incarnate subjectivity is not a “fault in the clear diamond of philosophy,”241 and it 
correlatively discloses the necessarily incarnate nature of anything – of any being and even of the 
Being of beings – that is disclosed to it.  
 So, though we tend to think of absences as present absences (and though indeed most of 
the absences with which we are familiar in ordinary experience are present absences), we are 
now seeing that, beyond any specific absences that may be present, absence is itself a condition 
of presence, and that therefore there must be certain absences that are not just ordinary present 
absences among others. We are seeing that there must be certain kinds of absences that, precisely 
as conditions of presence, can never be brought to presence (in, say, the manner of the hidden 
profiles of an object), that there must be certain absences that are even more absent than any 
ordinary present absence. We have already discussed one such kind of absence above, namely 
the divergence (écart) – the space and interval – between foreground and background that lets 
anything emerge into presence and meaning. For Merleau-Ponty, there are certain kinds of 
absences or “invisibles” in the world that, though they are immanent and not at all contrary to 
presence or to the visible (or are in-visible) and are thus not “transcendental” in the traditional 
meaning of the term,242 they are more radically absent or invisible than any ordinary absent or 
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242 It is clear to me that what Merleau-Ponty articulates here as “the invisible” – i.e., as those structures or relations 
that make visible or sensible things possible as such yet which are also immanent to them and thus not absolutely 
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Merleau-Ponty develops in his later writings, yet to justify this comparison here in any adequate way would take me 
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non-visible profile of a thing because they are precisely those structures that make anything 
present, visible, or sensible at all:  
Principle: not to consider the invisible as an other visible “possible,” or a “possible” visible for an other: 
that would be to destroy the inner framework that joins us to it…The invisible is there without being an 
object, it is pure transcendence, without an ontic mask. And the “visibles” themselves, in the last analysis, 
they too are only centered on a nucleus of absence.243 
 
Thus, absence is not simply given in experience along with every presence but is itself a 
fundamental condition of givenness, and insofar as it is a condition of givenness it cannot itself 
“be given”; and yet, it is still thinkable and, in a certain strange or paradoxical way, 
“presentable.” The point here is that there are radical absences endemic even to the most 
ordinary objects of experience, radically invisible structures that constitute visible, perceptible 
reality. It is not just the case that presence is always accompanied by absence; it is not just the 
case that every present presence entails a present absence; rather, it is also the case that absence 
is constitutive of presence as such, that absence is not simply always given along with presence 
but is moreover that on the basis of which anything is given or present in the world at all. So, 
when Merleau-Ponty claims, for example, that “consciousness has a punctum caecum”244 and 
that, no matter how much I may reflect on lived experience, “I never catch my living glance,”245 
and when he claims that “things are only half-opened before us, unveiled and hidden,”246 he is 
not only making a claim about consciousness; he is also making a claim about the “things 
themselves” – about even the world itself – disclosed to consciousness; he is making a claim 
about the very nature of presence, namely, that endemic to presence is so much more than 
whatever is or can be “present.” Following Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty understands Being as that 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
too far afield from the topic at hand. However, I hope that my discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology in 
chapter five will go some way toward justifying such a comparison.     
243 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p.229. 
244 Ibid., p. 247. 
245 Phenomenology of Perception, p. 91. 
246 “The Philosopher and His Shadow, in Signs, p. 167. 
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relational process through which things emerge into presence and intelligibility, yet also like 
Heidegger, he acknowledges that such a process, as such, can never truly be brought to presence, 
that all revelation entails concealment and that what is most concealed from us of all is in fact the 
movement of concealment and differentiation (or rather the self-concealing movement of 
differentiation) through which anything is revealed in the world. There is an apoptosis, so to 
speak, endemic to Being, a recession into absence that lets beings come to presence, an 
absencing that enables and that is already presencing, a darkness anterior even to the distinction 
between light and shadow. Thus, Merleau-Ponty affirms (clearly echoing Heidegger) that “…if 
Being is hidden, this is itself a characteristic of Being…”.247 
 So, what is the relevance of this phenomenology of absence to the basic matter under 
discussion here, that is, to the issue concerning our perceptual and epistemic access to others? It 
is clear that subjectivity (or alterity) is a kind of absence that comes to presence in the world, one 
that we must be able to (ap)perceive directly. I can never inhabit another’s consciousness, yet it 
is necessary, as we have seen, that another’s consciousness be given to me directly, not originally 
as the result of an inductive inference. Thus, the fact that a direct (not “indirect” or inferential) 
(ap)perception or (ap)presentation of absence is integral to lived experience in general helps 
disclose the possibility and character of one’s perception and knowledge of others. The 
traditional problem of other minds arises from the false dilemma that affirms that either 
consciousness is entirely self-enclosed or withdrawn from the world (in which case it would 
never be able to appear in the world at all) or that it is exhaustively, transparently on display in 
the world (in which case it would have no interiority at all, and thus would not in fact be 
“consciousness”). To put the dilemma another way: either I must have complete, perfect access 
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to another’s subjectivity, or I may have no access to it at all; either I must be able to fully inhabit 
another’s consciousness (in which case it would not be the consciousness of an Other), or the 
Other’s consciousness must be absolutely inscrutable (in which case I would not be able to 
perceive or know anything about it directly). As Merleau-Ponty, argues, however, this false 
dilemma arises from bad ontology (and bad phenomenology). Of course, we have seen that it 
arises from dualism, but Merleau-Ponty also explains that we can understand it (along with the 
dualism it presupposes) as a failure to acknowledge and accommodate the fact that absences are 
just as woven into the fabric of the real, or just as constitutive of the phenomenal, “natural” 
world, as anything else:  
The other person’s life itself is not given to me with his behavior. In order to have access to it, I would 
have to be the other person himself. Correlatively, no matter what my pretensions to grasp being itself in 
what I perceive, I am in the other person’s eyes closed into my “representations”…But things seem this 
way because we are making use of a mutilated idea of Nature and the sensible world…Sensible being is 
not only things but also everything sketched out there, which figures there, even as divergence and a 
certain absence.248 
 
If subjectivity or alterity is to be present in the world at all, it must be present as a certain kind of 
absence. Thus, as Merleau-Ponty suggests here, it is only a “mutilated idea of Nature and the 
sensible world,” that is, only an ontology that does not take stock of absences in its inventory of 
reality, or only a kind of positivism that restricts “presence” to those things or phenomena that 
are present merely in the ordinary empirical ways, that makes any presentation of otherness in 
the world impossible in principle. However, we have seen that “there are certainly more things in 
the world and in us than what is perceptible in the narrow sense of the term.”249 We have seen 
that absence – not merely “presence” – is itself a fundamental mode of phenomenal givenness. 
 Moreover, not only have we seen that absences are immediately, directly present in the 
world, we have also seen that there are certain kinds of radical absences that are, paradoxically 
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or peculiarly, present precisely as conditions of presence. We have seen not only that certain 
things are immediately present as absent but also that certain things may only ever be present as 
absent. For example, as I just discussed, what Merleau-Ponty calls “the invisible” is not only, and 
surely not at the fundamental level of reality, “another visible”250 or a “positive that is 
elsewhere,”251 that is, something now hidden from view that could be seen from another 
perspective (like the concealed profiles of an object); rather, the basic “invisibles” that permeate 
the world are structures or relations that “consciousness does not see for reasons of principle” 
because they are precisely “what [make] it see,” because they constitute consciousness’ “tie to 
Being…its corporeity,” because they are the “existentials by which the world becomes 
visible…the flesh wherein the object is born.”252 Merleau-Ponty recognizes a number of different 
kinds of absences that can never become present as ordinary present absences, and these are the 
most fundamental kinds of absences in the world, the kinds of absences that suffuse and 
constitute lived experience and even Being as such. For example, Merleau-Ponty acknowledges 
that one of these is death,253 since an awareness of one’s own mortality (and of the mortalities of 
others) is surely a basic structure of human experience even though death itself can never in 
principle be experienced; another is a “past that has never been present,”254 since there can be no 
“present” without a past, yet logically this indicates that, even though we tend think of the past as 
a sequence of former presents, there must be such a thing as a past that is not merely one “past 
present” among others, for a past that is precisely the condition of any possible or actual present 
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253 See Phenomenology of Perception, p. 364. Here, Merleau-Ponty even provocatively draws a direct comparison 
between the alterity of death and the alterity of the Other. It is also important to note that Merleau-Ponty 
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254 Ibid., p. 242. 
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cannot in principle be reducible to any “present” and thus can never truly be “present.” And as 
we have also seen, Merleau-Ponty explicitly regards the lived/living body itself as radically, 
irremediably absent. Since it is the condition of one’s perception of things, the lived body can 
never in principle be “a thing” that one “perceives” (at least not in the same mode in which one 
perceives ordinary things); it cannot be “only one perceived among others.”255 Thus, the 
lived/living body is characterized by a kind of absence that is irreducible to any presence, an 
absence that can never be brought to presence in the manner of an ordinary thing or 
phenomenon.  
 Now, it is clearly the case that subjectivity or alterity is another one of these absences that 
comes to presence in the world; indeed, since I can never “live through” or inhabit the 
subjectivity of an Other, the Other’s subjectivity (or otherness) must precisely be one of these 
radical kinds of absences that nonetheless, paradoxically, is able to come to presence:  
This is what animalia and men are: absolutely present beings who have a wake of the negative. A 
perceiving body that I see is also a certain absence that is hollowed out and tactfully dealt with behind 
that body and its behavior. But absence itself is rooted in presence; it is through the body that the other 
person is soul in my eyes. “Negativities” also count in the sensible world, which is decidedly the 
universal one.256  
 
If, as we have seen, there are not only regular absences but also radical absences that are 
nonetheless directly “present” to us in experience, if absence – even radical absence – can be, 
and already is, a mode of perceptual givenness, then intersubjectivity – the possibility and fact of 
perceiving alterities or other subjectivities in the world – is no longer intractably mysterious or 
logically impossible. The presentation of alterity remains, naturally, somewhat paradoxical and 
far more peculiar than many other kinds of present absences, yet it is a present absence all the 
same. There are many “things” in the world that are present as absent, and indeed there are many 
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“things” in the world that can only ever be present as absent, yet these are nonetheless ways of 
being “present,” and it is essentially the way in which others are present. As Levinas puts it, “this 
absence of the other is precisely its presence as other.”257 As Merleau-Ponty puts it in the above 
passage, the presence of the other must be a certain kind of absence or “negativity,” yet 
regardless of how radically absent it is, it nevertheless cannot be opposed to or the negation of 
ordinary positive, material presence, for if it were, it would not come to presence in the world at 
all. If we claim that the absence or negativity that characterizes subjectivity is truly divorced 
from the natural, sensible world, then we commit ourselves precisely to the sort of dualism that 
we know to be false for many reasons, not the least of which is that it renders any perception or 
knowledge of otherness logically and not only phenomenologically impossible.  
As we will see even more clearly in chapter five, Merleau-Ponty is quite clear that there 
is no “second-world.” For Merleau-Ponty, the sensible world is “decidedly the universal one,”258 
and so we must conceptualize subjectivity or alterity in such a way that honors its irreducibility 
to ordinary sensible presence yet does not deny it a place in the sensible world altogether, or yet 
in a way that does not (re)introduce dualism or theological transcendence. This is why Merleau-
Ponty asserts (implicitly criticizing especially Sartre) that “…the soul, the for itself is a hollow 
and not a void, not absolute nonbeing with respect to a Being that would be plenitude and hard 
core.”259 As we saw earlier, this is also why Merleau-Ponty compares the relationship between 
mind and body to the relationship between the “concave” and the “convex.”260 Like the concave 
curvature of a line, like spandrels in a building, or like negative space in a painting, alterity must 
be an absence that is “hollowed out” by or coupled with – not the antithesis of – positive, 
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material presence. That is, subjectivity must be a kind of absence that, even if it must be 
irreducible to any kind of ordinary presence or more absent than any kind ordinary of absence, is 
not the contradiction of sensible presence; if it were, it would indeed be incorporeal and 
imperceptible. Alterity, then, must be a “negativity that is not nothing,”261 an “absence [that] 
counts in the world,”262 and thus, as Merleau-Ponty affirms, “everything really does come down 
to a matter of thinking the negative rigorously.”263  
 In order to understand how it is possible to experience other subjectivities (and also, as 
we will see in chapter five, in order to think the nature of Being as such), it really is necessary to 
“think the negative rigorously.” This is especially the case because, as I have mentioned, 
subjectivity is not just one ordinary kind of absence or negativity among others. Now, for 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty the presentation of an Other’s living body is just as immediately the 
appresentation of the Other’s otherness or interiority as the presentation of the front of a building 
is also immediately the appresentation of its hidden sides. In general, absence and presence are 
intertwined, and interiority is precisely a kind of absence that is intrinsically, necessarily given 
with and through the presence or behavior of a living body:  
The Bodies which are externally standing over against me are experienced by me in primal presence just 
like other things, whereas the interiority of the psychic is experienced in appresence…To the seen Body 
there belongs a psychic life, just as there does to my Body…various appresented indications, in 
themselves undetermined, work together…psychic being…is co-given to the spectator along with Bodily 
movements in co-presence.264 
Interiority is an absence one (ap)perceives in and through the exteriority of an animate body just 
as directly or immediately as one ap(perceives) any absence. As Husserl claims, subjectivity is 
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given in the mode of “appresence,” and as such it is co-given with the presence of a living body. 
Presentation is always coupled with appresentation, and the presentation of a behaving body is 
coupled with, or always already is, the appresentation of alterity. For Husserl (as for Merleau-
Ponty), the appresentation of an Other’s subjectivity is possible only through the Other’s body, 
and this itself is possible only through what Husserl calls a “pairing” or transference that takes 
place between the Other’s body and my own. Thus, “in order to establish a mutual relationship 
between myself and an other, in order to communicate something to him, a Bodily relation, a 
Bodily connection by means of physical occurrences, must be instituted.”265 As Merleau-Ponty 
will argue, intersubjectivity is possible only as intercorporeity. The way Husserl articulates this 
is that when a behaving body enters my field of experience, I recognize it as such through a 
direct, immediate (non-inferential) perception of certain similarities between it and my own 
lived, behaving body, or through what Husserl calls an “analogizing” apprehension or 
apperception of otherness. Though Husserl refers to this transference of sense between my own 
body and the body of an Other as an “analogizing” apperception, he is clear that there is no 
analogical reasoning taking place at this level. The Other’s otherness is not primarily posited 
through an act of reflective judgment or inference. Thus, “it is clear from the very beginning that 
only a similarity connecting, within my primordial sphere, that body over there with my body 
can serve as the motivational basis for the “analogizing” apprehension of that body as another 
animate organism,” yet “apperception is not inference, not a thinking act.”266 As we have seen, 
Merleau-Ponty proves that analogical inference cannot be the source of our understanding of 
otherness, and likewise for Husserl otherness can only come to presence through a “primal 
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instituting”267 of meaning below the level of induction or reflective judgment. For Husserl (and 
for Merleau-Ponty), I no more infer the subjectivity of a living body than I infer that the building 
I am now seeing from the front also has a back (or other sides that I am not seeing). The 
interiority (or alterity) of an Other is the “other side” of the Other’s behaving body, and “I can 
surmise this other side…through the articulation of the other’s body on my sensible, an 
articulation that does not empty me, that is not a hemorrhage of my “consciousness,” but on the 
contrary redoubles me with an alter ego.”268 Thus, for both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the 
apprehension of an “alter ego” is founded by a pre-reflective (reflexive) coupling of behaviors or 
intentionalities, a reciprocal exchange of meaning between bodies prior to reflective 
conceptualization and inductive inference; it involves a transference of sense in and through a 
lived commingling of comportments and affects, in and through behaviors or modes of 
intentional engagement with the world that, as such, inherently, directly signify (or “appresent”) 
subjectivity, behaviors or intentionalities that inherently overlap with one another before we ever 
take to compare and contrast them and make inferences about them.269  
 There is more to Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity than I can elaborate here, but I 
think it is important to mention that, for Husserl, the lived spatiality of one’s own body – the pre-
reflective sense one has of one’s own body in space relative to other bodies – is integral to the 
reflexive transference of meaning (or “pairing”) between living bodies that institutes one’s sense 
of alterity (as well as, at the same time, one’s sense of oneself):  
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Since the other body there enters into a pairing association with my body here and, being given 
perceptually, becomes the core of an appresentation…that ego…must be appresented as an ego now 
coexisting in the mode There, “such as I should be if I were there”. My ego, however, the ego given in 
constant self-perception, is actual now with the content belonging Here. Therefore an ego is appresented, 
as other than mine.270 
 
When I perceive another living, behaving body – when I perceive a body immediately as like 
unto my own – I also immediately perceive it precisely as “Other” because I immediately 
perceive it as occupying a position in space distanced from my own, yet one which I myself 
might occupy. In other words, I perceive a body inhabiting a “there” that is, as such, immediately 
correlated with my own body’s location in space that I live as a primary, “absolute here”271 or 
“zero-point of orientation”272 that (among other things) grounds and radiates all spatial sense-
directions or vectors of organization. Since I understand immediately that I cannot occupy two 
places at once – that I cannot be both “there” and “here” – I thus immediately perceive another 
living body as, indeed, the living body of a genuine Other. My “here” is always already paired 
with other “heres” (or with the “theres” that Others occupy in the world). I in fact can have no 
sense of my own “here” without also a sense of other places in space that my body might 
occupy, and when I see other bodies living or behaving in the world, I immediately apprehend 
other places in the world where I, too, might dwell in or engage with it, and there is never any 
question of reducing these other living bodies to my own or of mistaking them for my own 
because, though they are akin to my own in certain ways, I know that they do not occupy my 
“here” – neither my current “here” in “objective” space nor the absolute “here” of my own lived 
body that makes “objective” space intelligible – and I know that I cannot occupy two places in 
the world at the same time. So, though my living body is extended into the world and into other 
																																																								
270 Cartesian Meditations, §54, p. 119. 
271 Husserl, ibid., §55, p. 121. See also Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy, Second Book, §32, p.135.  
272	Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book, §18, 
p.61, §32, p. 135, §41, p. 166.	
	 205	
living bodies, there is no possibility that I would ever mistake another living body for being 
merely an extension of my own body. There is surely a kind of “mirroring” that takes place when 
I ap(perceive) an Other,273 but when I do so I surely do not perceive a mere double of myself – 
another “me” – as I would were I to look at myself in a literal mirror, for that is indeed not to 
perceive another place in the world in which I might dwell, nor is it, of course, to perceive a 
genuine “Other” at all. In this way, I think that Husserl correctly captures the difference between 
the sort of reflexivity that constitutes one’s relations with other living bodies and the sort of 
reflexivity demonstrated by one’s experience of one’s own image in a mirror.  
 However, as we have already observed, subjectivity is not just any ordinary kind of 
absence. Even though it is true that I (ap)perceive an Other’s otherness through the Other’s 
behaving body just as immediately as I apperceive, say, the absent profiles of an ordinary object 
of perception, it cannot be true that I apperceive the former in exactly the same way that I 
apperceive the latter, for the former, of course, is not an “ordinary object” of perception at all. In 
ordinary cases of perception (such as perceiving a building), what is presently absent may 
become presently present, but this is not true of alterity: alterity is a present absence that can 
never, in principle, become present in the manner of an ordinary thing or phenomenon; that is, it 
is “hidden” in a manner that is significantly, altogether different from the manner in which the 
absent profiles of an object are “hidden,” and Husserl explicitly argues that this is the case:  
An appresentation occurs even in external experiences, since the strictly seen front of a physical thing 
always and necessarily appresents a rear aspect and prescribes for it a more or less determinate content. 
On the other hand, experiencing someone else cannot be a matter of just this kind of 
appresentation…Appresentation of this sort involves the possibility of verification by a corresponding 
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fulfilling presentation (the back becomes the front); whereas, in the case of that appresentation which 
would lead over to the other original sphere, such verification must be excluded a priori.274   
 
The appresentation of an Other must be irreducibly different from the appresentation of the 
“other side” of an object, because though I may, in principle, step around an object so as to 
disclose its “other side,” there is no possible position in the world I can occupy that would 
similarly disclose an Other’s subjectivity; if an Other’s subjectivity were to be disclosed to me in 
such a manner, I would have to inhabit it myself and it would not, therefore, be an Other’s 
subjectivity at all. In short, in order for the Other to be precisely Other, it is necessary that the 
Other’s otherness be an absence that can never be made “present,” or rather that it be present as 
radically absent, as an absence irreducible to any presence. As Husserl claims here, if the back 
of a building is presently absent to me, I may simply move around it to verify that it does indeed 
have a back, thus transforming what was presently absent into something that is now presently or 
frontally present. Yet, it is obviously impossible to “verify” alterity in such a manner. How 
would one do so? One would have to possess another’s living body and consciousness, yet of 
course in that case it would not be the Other’s living body and consciousness any longer: it 
would be one’s own. Thus, the (ap)perception of an Other involves an “appresentative 
apperception, which, according to its intrinsic nature, never demands and is never open to 
fulfillment by presentation.”275 This is simply what alterity demands, and thus any correct 
account of alterity must come to terms with it.  
 How, then, is it possible for the radical absence of an Other’s subjectivity – or how, 
indeed, is it possible for any kind of radical absence – to come to presence? How is the 
“presence” of a radical absence not a strict contradiction in terms? We have already seen the 
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answer, but now I wish discuss it more explicitly. We do know that such absences come to 
presence – that even radical absence is a mode of experiential givenness – and this is the 
fundamental aporia of lived experience and even of Being; again, it is one of those “figured 
enigmas” or “incompossibilities” that Merleau-Ponty mentions at the beginning of The Visible 
and the Invisible. It is an “impossibility,” yet it is clearly not an impossibility in the strict logical 
sense of the term (as the conjunction of “A” and “not-A”) but rather in Derrida’s particular sense 
of the term: it is an “impossibility,” yet one that is precisely possible, one whose “impossibility” 
is in fact its condition of possibility. To put the point more clearly, it is a phenomenon whose 
possibility discloses to us something below or beyond any strict dualistic (exclusionary 
“either/or”) logic, which is also, for Merleau-Ponty, the logic of lived experience itself, the logic 
of our “prelogical bond”276 with the world.  
 We have already seen that there are many kinds of radical absences that pervade and 
structure experience and that indeed reveal the very nature of Being. There is, first of all, that 
absence that is the very condition of presence and that is therefore irreducible to any ordinary 
mode of presence; there is the originary divergence between foreground and background; there is 
the transcendence – that is, the infinite excessiveness or inexhaustible richness – of a thing in 
virtue of which it is a “thing” at all; there is death; there is the past that has never been present; 
there is the lived body. All of these ontological structures or processes are absent in ways that are 
significantly different from any ordinary present absence. All of these “phenomena” are radically 
absent absences, absences that are more absent than any ordinary present absence, “phenomena” 
that are not just any phenomena, and, as we have seen, alterity is one among them. The 
(ap)presence of alterity is quite paradoxical indeed, yet at the very least it is no more mysterious 
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than any of these other radical absences that also likewise structure and haunt experience. 
Though the givenness of alterity is indeed the givenness of a peculiar, special kind of absence – 
though alterity is the givenness of a radical kind of absence – and though its givenness does 
therefore initially appear to be rather confounding, we realize that it is at least no more 
confounding than of the other equally radical kinds of absences that inflate perceptible reality to 
perceptibility and perception. The absence of an Other’s subjectivity is surely significantly 
different from the absences of an object’s hidden profiles, yet at the same time this radical 
absence through which an Other is given to me (qua Other) is no more radically absent than any 
of the other radical absences through which anything is given to me.  
 No matter how radically, irreducibly or irremediably absent a particular kind of absence 
may be, every absence must nonetheless be immanent to presence; every absence must be 
immanent to perceptible, carnal reality. Even though conditions of givenness cannot themselves 
be “given” (at least not in the manner in which the given is given), they must nonetheless be 
immanent to the given. To deny this is simply to (re)instate a dualistic, “two-world” or 
supernaturalist ontology. No matter how radically absent an absence may be, it can never be 
absolutely divorced from presence without (re)introducing theological transcendence or ideality. 
No matter how radically absent an absence may be, it can never truly be the negation or erasure 
of presence, for then we would never be able to think or attend to it at all. Even those absences 
that are not just ordinary present absences among others are also present in their own peculiar 
manner (or are not utterly non-present, as they would be if they were total erasures of presence). 
So, the Being of beings, for example, may be radically absent, yet it is nonetheless immanent to 
beings and therefore thinkable, expressible, or perceptible even if only very imperfectly or 
allusively and in a manner far different from any ordinary absences. The lived body is always 
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radically absent and yet also, in a way, present. Death is radically absent, yet it too is present. 
The separation between foreground and background that lets anything come to presence in 
experience cannot itself never be present as either a foreground or a background, and yet we are 
nevertheless aware of it and able to speak of it. The past that is not a past present among others 
but is the past that makes possible any present can itself never “be present,” and yet we can 
gesture to it and articulate it (as I just did). Similarly, what Derrida calls différance or “the trace” 
can never be present since it is precisely that movement of differentiation and of recession into 
absence that subtends and conditions all given instances or forms of meaning and presence, and 
yet nonetheless it is not absolutely absent because we can, after all, articulate and gesture toward 
it; if it were absolutely absent, if it were utter erasure, it would be inconceivable or unintelligible. 
If “différance” or “the trace” did not in some way “appear,” it would never have occurred to 
Derrida to write about them and to use them to critique the predominant presuppositions of 
Western metaphysics.277 If we can understand why the “metaphysics of presence” is flawed, it 
																																																								
277	Throughout this discussion I have been seamlessly weaving Merleau-Ponty’s own account of alterity and of the 
constitutive ways in which absences structure experience with Husserl’s, and I have also been suggesting that 
Merleau-Ponty strongly anticipates later movements in Continental philosophy, in particular Derrida’s 
deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence and Deleuze’s philosophy of difference. Such connections will be 
made much more apparent in chapter five when I provide a more detailed exposition of Merleau-Ponty’s later 
ontology. So, here I want to clarify that, throughout this whole discussion, I am not suggesting that Husserl in 
particular ought to be absolved of the charge that he is committed to what Derrida designates as a “metaphysics of 
presence.” Though I do think that Husserl honors the nature of alterity in ways that his critics often fail to appreciate 
or suppress, I am mostly convinced that his phenomenology is indeed part of the tradition of philosophy that 
privileges presence over absence and that even reduces absence to presence; after all, he does remark that 
“…Appresentation presupposes a core of presentation” (see Cartesian Meditations, §55, p. 122). For everything 
Husserl got right, I do think that his failure to recognize the truly radical kinds of absences that structure experience 
– those absences that cannot, in a sense, ever be present – is something for which he is rightly criticized. My 
contention, however, is that Merleau-Ponty is not likewise guilty of this. Though critics like Derrida often use 
Husserl’s phenomenology as a proxy for phenomenology as such and thereby sweep Merleau-Ponty into their 
criticisms of Husserl, I think this fails to cohere with a close, honest reading of Merleau-Ponty’s texts (in particular 
his later writings). This is not to say that I do not think that Merleau-Ponty’s thought is immune to legitimate 
criticisms, but I do not think that a commitment to a “metaphysics of presence” is one of them. I hope that my 
exposition of Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy in chapter five will sufficiently demonstrate this point.  
 Though Merleau-Ponty (in the context of his own exposition of Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity) does 
remark that “absence itself is rooted in presence” (see Signs, p. 172), I think it is clear from many of his other 
writings that he also accepts and argues for the converse claim that “presence is rooted in absence,” for he 
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must be because we are able in some way to glimpse (however partially or peripherally) those 
absences – even and especially those radical absences – that such a tradition excludes from its 
conception of reality or illicitly assimilates to presence. As I suggested above, perhaps the most 
fundamental aporia is that even the most radical absences – even those absences that are more 
absent that any run-of-the-mill present absence, even those absences that we say can never be 
“present” or “given” precisely because they are conditions of presence or givenness – are, 
nonetheless, in a way, “present” or “given” because we do succeed in thinking them, because we 
are indeed able to gesture to them, because if they were not “presentable” in some fashion we 
would never think of them at all, and because if they truly were divorced from the world that is 
present to us in ordinary experience, or because if they were utterly outside of Nature or 
absolutely beyond perceptible, carnal Being, then Being would in fact be sundered into two 
irreconcilable, incommunicable halves, and the relationship of the one to the other would (as is 
always the case with any dualism) be inexplicable. This is why Merleau-Ponty frequently speaks 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
articulates, as we have seen, a number of different kinds of absences that can never be reduced to presence, or that 
can never be brought to “presence” in the manner of any ordinary object of perception or phenomenon. Even as 
early as the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty affirms certain kinds of absences that pervade and 
structure experience that are perhaps far more radical than anything Husserl ever articulated, and in his later writings 
Merleau-Ponty makes it clear that “the invisible,” though immanent to “the visible,” is irreducible to the visible, and 
what Merleau-Ponty designates as écart is something that can never be present because, as the differentiation 
between figure and background, it is the primordial generative condition of presence and meaning (and is thus a 
concept that strongly anticipates – if it is not already – Derrida’s concepts of différance and the trace). As we have 
seen, Merleau-Ponty affirms that presence always rest upon a “nucleus of absence” (see The Visible and the 
Invisible, p. 229).  
 So, Merleau-Ponty clearly comes to regard absence as not simply derived from presence but as a condition 
of presence, and to that extent as something that can never truly “be present”; and yet, Merleau-Ponty’s point is also 
that, if any kind of absence is intelligible at all and if dualism is false, there must be some sense or way in which 
even the most radically absent absences can be present. This is why he deploys the inherently paradoxical notion of 
an “originary presentation of the unpresentable,” which I mention below. Even in the context of the passage in 
which Merleau-Ponty claims that “absence is rooted in presence,” his point is not to reduce absence to presence but 
to indicate, following Husserl, the intertwining of the two, in particular the manner in which they are intertwined or 
co-given in the living body, such that there would be no (ap)presentation of interiority without a living, behaving 
body, yet there would also be no presentation of a living, behaving body without an (ap)presentation of interiority. 
My basic point, then, is that I do not intend to assimilate Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to one another but rather to use 
certain relevant concepts and arguments in Husserl strategically in order to elucidate Merleau-Ponty’s and to 
acknowledge the extent to which Merleau-Ponty is clearly indebted to them.  
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of the paradoxical notion “an Urpräsentation of what by principle is Nichturpräsentierbar,”278 
that is, of an “originating presentation of the unpresentable.”279 There are structures, processes, 
and relations that are “unpresentable” because they constitute “presentability” as such, yet they 
are, nonetheless, “presentable” in some way, for otherwise we would never be able to notice or 
think of them, and were they opposed to the world whose presentability they constitute, we 
would, again, end up with a dualistic, “two-world” ontology. So, as we have seen, absence can 
be a mode of presence: something can be present as absent. But paradoxically, even radical 
absence can be a mode of presence: something can be present even as radically absent. Alterity 
is precisely one of these presentable (and always already present) radical absences, one of these 
modes of being that is present as radically absent; it is an absence more absent than any other, an 
absence that is fundamentally different from any ordinary absence, an absence that is indeed 
radically absent, yet one that nonetheless succeeds in coming to presence; it is not just one 
present absence among others, and yet it is, nonetheless, an absence that is present, and indeed it 
is one that, as I will later discuss, is constitutive of any presence, constitutive of my sense of 
“objective” reality and even of my own presence to myself.  
So, to return the question I posed above, how is it possible for a radical absence to come 
to presence without ceasing to be radically absent? The answer is that it is only possible if 
dualism – dualism of mind and body, of “immanence” (the domain of consciousness) and 
“transcendence” (the domain of reality external to consciousness), or of “the transcendental” and 
“the empirical”/“natural” – is false (along with its reductionistic counterparts). For a radical 
absence such as alterity to have any place at all in perceptible reality, it must do so below all of 
																																																								
278 The Visible and the Invisible, p.  239. Merleau-Ponty often uses this formulation to define what he calls “flesh” or 
“the invisible” (see e.g., Nature, p. 209). 
279 The Visible and the Invisible, p. 203. 
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these oppositions. It must, in particular, disclose an enmeshment of immanence and 
transcendence, of interiority and carnal, perceptible nature. In short, alterity discloses, as its 
condition of givenness, that which is neither purely immanent nor wholly transcendent, neither 
exclusively internal nor entirely external, neither an ego nor a thing: in a word, it discloses the 
lived/living body. In other words, in order for otherness to come to presence it must be rooted in 
what Husserl calls an “immanent transcendency.”280 In Husserl, “immanent transcendency” 
usually refers either to the world or to a perceptual object, for the world is obviously something 
that appears to consciousness – indeed, it is what is ultimately, implicitly intended in every 
intentional act of consciousness – yet it also necessarily outstrips consciousness, and the same is 
true even of an ordinary object of consciousness. This is why Husserl often uses the metaphor of 
a “horizon” to describe “immanent transcendencies,” for like a horizon, the world as such, and 
even the identities of things presented to us within the world, necessarily exceed us; like a 
horizon, the world is always more than the ways in which it presently appears, or always recedes 
from us as we approach it; the more we disclose it, the more of it there always is to disclose. This 
infinite excessiveness or “transcendence” of the world is essential to its presentation, and it is 
also essential to the presentations of ordinary things and of others.  
 Now, for Merleau-Ponty the lived/living body is precisely the “immanent transcendency” 
in virtue of which alterity may be presenced in the world, for it is not a pure consciousness yet 
also not a thing; it is not a thing, but it is also not not a thing. This directs our attention to the fact 
that lived experience is below or beyond the traditional immanence/transcendence dichotomy. 
The lived/living body, as we have seen, is precisely a blurring of the distinction between 
“immanence” and “transcendence,” for it is neither purely internal to an ego nor merely an 
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external object in the world among others. In other words, traditionally in philosophy it is 
assumed that something can only be either immanent or transcendent, either interiority or 
exteriority, yet the lived body is both at once, or is neither purely the one nor the other (which is 
to say, ontologically something else altogether).281 This is, I think, an example of the extent to 
which Merleau-Ponty anticipates deconstruction, for he consistently argues that the “both/and” 
logos of lived experience subtends, conditions, and disrupts the “either/or,” disjunctive logic 
typical of reflective thought. Thus, instead of being either consciousness or thing, either subject 
or object, either immanent (internal to consciousness) or transcendent (external to 
consciousness), the lived body is both at once, or is rather something constituted by the cross-
contamination of the two, which is also to say something else altogether, something that is 
neither entirely the one nor the other.  
We have returned to the point that subjectivity is perceptible in the world only if it is not 
pure interiority but is rather blended into exteriority. “Immanence,” then, must participate in 
“transcendence” if it is ever to have a place within the transcendent world or among transcendent 
things, and though Merleau-Ponty is arguably more successful in conceptualizing this, it is in 
fact a point that Husserl explicitly acknowledges:  
Let us make clear to ourselves how consciousness, so to speak, can enter into the real world, how that 
which in itself is absolute can relinquish its immanence and take on the characteristic of transcendence. 
We immediately see that it can do so only by a certain participation in transcendence in the first, the 
originary sense; and this is obviously the transcendence belonging to Nature; only by virtue of its 
experienced relation to the organism does consciousness become real human or brute consciousness, and 
only thereby does it acquire a place in the space belonging to Nature and the time belonging to 
Nature…282  
 
All presence is coupled with absence, and alterity is an absence necessarily coupled with a 
particular, special kind of presence, namely the presence or expressivity of a living, behaving 
																																																								
281 Again, this is also what Merleau-Ponty means when he speaks of the “ambiguity” of the lived body. 
282 Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book. Trans. F. 
Kersten (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers/Kluwer, 1983), §53, p. 124-125. 
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body. Our bodies are the only faces we may turn toward one another in the world, but since we 
know we cannot accept a strict dichotomy between consciousness and the body, we also know – 
as everyday experience prior to abstract philosophical reflection attests – that to see the bodies of 
others is also already to see their consciousness, and that likewise for others to see my body is 
also already for them to see me. Interiority (life, perception, consciousness, alterity, etc.,) is an 
absence necessarily coupled with, and thus presented in and through, the exteriority of a living 
body. Interiority is the absence at the “other side” of a living body’s presence (that is, at the other 
side of its exteriority). Every mode of presence is also the presencing of an absence, and the 
living body is simply the presencing of one kind of absence – or rather interiority is one kind of 
present absence – in the world among others, albeit a special kind of absence; though it is 
irremediably absent – more absent than any ordinary absence – the interiority of an Other can 
come to presence in the world because it is one aspect of a phenomenon that is precisely below 
the conventional opposition between immanence and transcendence, interiority and exteriority. 
Thus, as Merleau-Ponty writes, “there is undeniably something between transcendent Nature, 
naturalism’s being-in-itself, and the immanence of the mind, its acts, its noema. It is into this 
interval that must try to advance.”283 And the lived/living body (as well as what Merleau-Ponty 
will later call “the flesh of the world,” which the lived/living body precisely exemplifies) is this 
interval. There is “…a sort of dehiscence opens my body in two, and…between my body looked 
at and my body looking, between my body touched and my body touching, there is overlapping 
or encroachment, so that we must say that the things pass into us as well as we into the 
things,”284 yet Merleau-Ponty also makes clear that this “dehiscence that opens my body in two” 
– that is, this non-disjunctive separation between my “objective body” and my “phenomenal 
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body” that constitutes me as a living, sentient body – is also what makes it possible for me to 
pass into other lives and for other lives to pass into my own. It is only because the lived/living 
body is neither a disembodied perceiver nor a mere thing, neither purely a subject nor a brute 
object, but is rather a “‘perceiving thing,’ a ‘subject-object’”285 that I am able to perceive directly 
another’s subjectivity (and that an Other is able to perceive directly my subjectivity) in such a 
way that does not negate its radical absence or inaccessibility.  
 I do not immediately experience my body as a “mere thing,” and while I surely do not 
experience the body of an Other in precisely the same way in which I experience my own, I 
likewise do not immediately experience the other’s body as such as a “mere thing”; as a living 
body, it too is a “subject.” To be “a subject” is to be a “body-subject,” and to be a “body-subject” 
is to be a living, behaving body. In other words, to perceive a living, behaving body (whether my 
own or that of an Other) is already to perceive a particular phenomenal whole (or Gestalt) before 
we later reflectively sunder it into “subject” and “object,” a “for-itself” and an “in-itself.” “My 
body is a Gestalt and it is co-present in every Gestalt,”286 and it is a Gestalt precisely because it 
presents interiority together with behavior and exteriority, or because it presents consciousness 
as a form of flesh and as a relationship with a world. We first perceive an embodied mind before 
we ever oppositionally distinguish between “mind” and “body,” and an embodied mind just is a 
living, behaving body; an embodied mind is an irreducible compresence of interiority and 
exteriority, an “exterior” that immediately appresents an “interior”:  
…Appresentation presupposes a core of presentation. It is a making present combined by associations 
with presentation, with perception proper, but a making present that is fused with the latter in the 
particular function of “co-perception.” In other words, the two are so fused that they stand within the 
functional community of one perception, which simultaneously presents and appresents...Therefore, in the 
object of such a presentive-appresentive perception…we must distinguish noematically between the part 
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which is genuinely perceived and the rest, which is not strictly perceived and yet is there too. Thus every 
perception of this type is transcending: it posits more as itself-there than it makes “actually” present at 
any time…Let us apply this general cognition to the case of experiencing someone else. In this case too it 
should be noted that experience can appresent only because it presents…That implies, however, that from 
the very beginning, what this experience presents must belong to the unity of the very object appresented. 
In other words: It is not, and cannot be, the case that the body belonging to my primordial sphere and 
indicating to me the other Ego…could appresent his factual existence and being-there-too, unless this 
primordial body acquired the sense, “a body belonging to the other ego,” and, according to the whole 
associative-apperceptive performance, the sense: “someone else’s animate organism itself.” Therefore it 
is not as though the body over there…remained separate from the animate bodily organism of the other 
Ego, as if that body were something like a signal for its analogue (by virtue of an obviously inconceivable 
motivation).287 
 
In this passage, if Husserl does not in fact succeed in conceptualizing what Merleau-Ponty 
articulates as the lived body, he comes very close indeed to doing so. As we have seen, Husserl 
frequently insists upon the unity of presentation and appresentation: presentation and 
appresentation are two co-given, co-constitutive moments of any experience. It is never the case 
that a thing first presents itself to me and then appresents something else (say, one of its hidden 
sides). I do not see the front of a building and then think or infer that it must have a back: I see 
the whole building, or rather I see the building as a whole (albeit from a particular profile). 
However, Husserl observes here that this unity of presentation and appresentation – this 
compresence of presence and absence – in experience discloses something peculiar in the 
experience of an Other. Otherness is only ever given as a kind of absence (or as a kind of 
“appresence”), yet like every appresence it must be tied inseparably to some kind of presence: 
whatever is appresented must be “the other side” of whatever is presented, whatever is 
apperceived as absent must be co-given with something perceived as present. Thus, if 
presentation and appresentation truly are united or co-given, then so too are their “objects” or 
referents, that is, so too are what they present and appresent. Since my apperception of an 
Other’s otherness (interiority) is only possible given the simultaneous perception of the Other’s 
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body (exteriority), or conversely since the presentation of the Other’s body is coupled with the 
appresentation of the Other’s otherness, it follows that the Other’s otherness and that the Other’s 
(living, behaving) body, that the other’s interiority and that the Other’s exteriority, must likewise 
be inseparably entangled. Again, the necessary unity of presentation and appresentation entails 
the necessary unity of whatever is thereby presented and appresented. Thus, the necessary unity 
of presentation and appresentation in lived experience discloses, in the experience of an Other, 
an irreducible “unity” of subject and object, or rather an enmeshment of interiority (immanence) 
and exteriority (transcendence), in virtue of which the Other’s otherness may be given as such, 
and this, of course, is what Merleau-Ponty will later call the lived body.  
As Merleau-Ponty insists (and as Husserl himself argues in the above passage), it cannot 
be the case that an Other’s body or behavior stands radically apart from his/her subjectivity or 
otherness, as if it were a sign from which I would (inductively) infer his/her subjectivity or 
otherness. As we have seen and as Husserl also remarks here, if subjectivity and the 
body/behavior were truly disjunct in such a manner, the motivation for such an inference would 
be inconceivable. As we have also seen, according to Merleau-Ponty the lived body is better 
described not as a “unity” of subject and object (since that might convey the notion of two 
opposites that would somehow be joined together) but is rather below the very opposition 
between subject and object and is precisely that from which any distinction between the two is 
abstracted in the first place. The lived body is both subject and object, but this means it is indeed 
something else altogether: neither purely a subject nor merely an object; not a subject, but not 
not a subject; not an object, but not not an object. Only the incarnation of subjectivity enables me 
to have direct access to the subjectivity or otherness of an Other in a way that does not, upon my 
first glance or touch, negate the requisite transcendence or the Other’s subjectivity or otherness. 
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Only living flesh can at once join and separate self and Other because only living flesh is at once 
immanent and transcendent or below the very opposition between immanence and transcendence 
altogether. Only because the living/lived body is both subject and object can I be an other for 
others and can others be others for me. I directly yet non-exhaustively encounter the Other 
through his/her body. I can directly access the Other because (and only because) the Other’s 
subjectivity is embodied, yet because the Other’s subjectivity is never simply reducible to his/her 
body I can never access it without remainder.  
 Since my body enables me to be present to myself, it is also what enables me to be 
present to others, and likewise it is because others are also necessarily embodied that I am able 
apprehend them as such. It is only because subjectivity is incarnate that the Other can truly be 
encountered through his or her body, and reciprocally the fact that I am fundamentally only ever 
able to be present to myself through my own body explains how I am able to be present to others. 
Only because subjectivity is incarnate am I accessible to myself and are others accessible to me. 
Of course, there is a crucial difference between the way in which I am accessible to myself and 
the way in which other subjectivities are accessible to me, for other subjectivities are, in a sense, 
inaccessible to me,288 but only because subjectivity is incarnate – only because subjectivity is not 
a pure, self-transparent ego but rather a living body – can we resolve the paradox Husserl 
attempted to resolve, the paradox of how we can “access the inaccessible,” or the paradox of how 
one can have direct access to an Other who, in order to be Other, must remain inaccessible or 
irremediably distant. Only the incarnation of subjectivity makes possible this strange 
accessibility of the inaccessible:  
…the other’s body which I see and his word which I hear, which are given to me as immediately present 
in my field…present to me in their own fashion what I will never be present to, what will always be 
																																																								
288 We will recall that this is what Merleau-Ponty calls the “truth of solipsism.” 
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invisible to me, what I will never directly witness – an absence therefore, but not just any absence, a 
certain absence and a certain difference in terms of dimensions which are from the first common to us and 
which predestine the other to be a mirror of me as I am of him, which are responsible for the fact that we 
do not have two images side by side of someone and of ourselves, but one sole image in which we are 
both involved, which is responsible for the fact that my consciousness of myself and my myth of the other 
are not two contradictories, but rather each the reverse of the other.289 
 
Only a third alternative below or beyond the classical alternative between subject and object can 
(ap)present the non-presentable: the Other. Since the lived body is both subject and object (hence 
not entirely one or the other), the interiority of the subject is distinct from yet nevertheless not 
“hidden” behind or “imprisoned” within its body, and thus my perception of a living, behaving 
body is immediately (non-inferentially) an (ap)perception of an Other. Behavior, then, is the 
exterior presentation of an interior, yet it is the presentation of an interior that is not “interior” 
like a pilot in a ship but rather like a melody and the affective or emotional meaning with which 
it is co-given, or rather like the hand that grasps or caresses and the particular intentionality of 
desire or affection through which it is mobilized as such: in neither case is the “exterior” a 
barrier to a hidden interior that may only be breached inferentially, and yet there remains a 
distance between a sensible melody and its meaning, between the visible gesture of the hand and 
the invisible intention that animates it, such that they are ambiguous rather than closed or 
transparently determinate phenomena, and thus such that they may invite different 
interpretations, including some that are mistaken to varying degrees.290  
 Thus, the point to which we keep returning is that intersubjectivity is possible only 
through the lived/living body, or only through an intertwining of immanence and transcendence; 
it is possible only “without the body being anywhere pure thing, but also without it being 
																																																								
289 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p.82-83. Italics are Merleau-Ponty’s. 
290	Though we need to understand veracity and error here phenomenologically. Here, “truth” and “falsehood” must 
be understood fundamentally not in terms of the correspondence between a proposition or a belief and a mind-
independent state of affairs, but rather as two moments of phenomenal becoming, or as delimitations of a horizon of 
possible appearances. I discuss this phenomenological account of truth in the next chapter.  
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anywhere pure idea.”291 The ‘inter’ in intersubjectivity is possible only if subjectivity already 
participates in transcendence (in materiality or nature), that is, only if it is embodied. The 
transcendence of the world – indeed its very visibility – refers to the fact that it always outstrips 
whatever I may perceive or see. Yet, I can only perceive or see the world at all if I belong to it, if 
I already participate in its transcendence or visibility. Indeed, I can only see the world on the 
condition that I myself am visible, in just the same way that I can only touch something on the 
condition that I myself am tangible. Vision and touch thus already participate in the 
transcendence – in the visibility or tangibility – of the world seen and touched. It is for this 
reason that subjectivity can in fact itself be seen or touched. Subjectivity can be seen or touched 
because it must itself, through its body, be “meshed into the visible world.”292 My subjectivity – 
for example, my power of vision – can itself be “seen” because “its power depends precisely on 
the fact that it has a place from which it sees.”293 I can see something only if my vision is 
“inscribed in the order of being that it discloses,”294 and likewise I can touch something “only if 
my hand, while it is felt from within, is also accessible from without, itself tangible…”.295 If I 
see or touch something, I must be separated or differentiated from it, for if I were fused with it, I 
would not “see” or “touch” it at all; indeed, if I were fused or strictly identical with it, there 
would be no “it” for me to see or touch. As I mentioned earlier, in order for me to see something 
there must be some distance between myself and the thing that I see; vision is impossible if there 
is no difference between seer and seen. The same point also applies to touch: if I touch 
something, there must be some difference between me and the thing that I touch. However, there 
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292 Merleau-Ponty, “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” p. 166. 
293 Ibid., p. 166. 
294 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 134. 
295 Ibid., p. 133. 
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must also be some sort of ontological continuity between me and the things that I see or touch, 
between vision and touch and the visible or tangible world itself disclosed to and through vision 
and touch. If there were no such continuity at all, there would be no vision or touch at all; if my 
subjectivity were divorced from the objects I see or touch, I would not be able to see or touch 
them: visible and tangible things would be utterly inaccessible to me if there were no continuity 
between us, or if I myself were not visible or tangible. I must be different or separated from the 
things I perceive, yet my perception must also be ontologically continuous with them.  
 Thus, subjectivity in general is possible only because it is enmeshed with the world rather 
than absolutely divorced from it, and this is what enables it to be accessible to, and indeed 
already enmeshed with, other subjectivities. There must be an irreducible difference between 
subjectivity and the extra-subjective world disclosed to it, yet at the same time they must also 
already envelop and interpenetrate one another. There must be both distance and continuity 
between subjectivity and the world if subjectivity is to have any place in the world or even to be 
possible at all. Subjectivity must not be utterly engulfed by the world, yet “he who looks must 
not himself be foreign to the world he looks at.”296 The “sphere of immanence” (or subjectivity) 
must be what Merleau-Ponty calls a “fold or hollow of Being,”297 that is, different from yet at the 
same time continuous and entangled with the carnal world disclosed to and through it. The sense 
of touch is precisely a fold within the tangible world, as it is literally a folding of the tangible 
world back upon itself: when I touch something, I am always in some way touched back by it; 
for me to feel something, I always do so only in virtue of my own tangibility, and I always 
implicitly, reflexively feel my own tangibility whenever I touch something (for example, when I 
touch my keyboard, I do not just feel the solidity or texture of the keyboard, but also that of the 
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fingers I use to touch it; thus, there must surely be some difference or distance between myself 
and what I touch, but we must also be ontologically continuous, i.e., equally tangible).  
 Certain critics (e.g., Deleuze) accuse Husserl (and phenomenology by proxy) of reducing 
“immanence” to immanence to consciousness and urge that, if we are truly to overcome dualism 
or supernaturalism (that is, if we are not to smuggle in theological transcendence “through the 
back the door,” so to speak), we must conceptualize immanence as other than mere immanence 
to consciousness, for this notion always seems to depend upon the correlative notion of a world 
absolutely outside of consciousness. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, “…when immanence 
becomes immanent “to” a transcendental subjectivity, it is in the heart of its own field that the 
hallmark or figure of transcendence must appear…”.298 This is perhaps an accurate criticism of 
Husserl, since Husserl seems to maintain that all meaning – even that of the transcendence of the 
world – is fundamentally constituted by, hence immanent to, consciousness. Husserl often seems 
to conceptualize even the transcendence of the world as immanent to the ego to whom it appears, 
and thus it is reasonable to say that he restricts immanence to the sphere of subjectivity, to the 
relation between noesis and noema. However, I do not think that this critique applies to Merleau-
Ponty, since Merleau-Ponty (as we will further see in chapter five) develops an account of Being 
that is fundamentally below any opposition between “immanence” and “transcendence,” or 
rather develops a concept of immanence that is precisely emancipated from (or irreducible to) 
subjectivity – an immanence that is not merely immanence “to” subjectivity and that in fact 
decenters subjectivity as the locus of all meaning in the world – without collapsing into a 
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reductive monism299; that is, he develops an ontology that is neither a dualism nor a reductive 
naturalism, neither an idealism nor a traditional materialism.  
 The point that is most relevant here, and the one that I wish to emphasize, is that for 
Merleau-Pony it is not just the case that the transcendent world is immanent to consciousness: 
Merleau-Ponty adds that in order for the transcendent world to be immanent to consciousness at 
all, consciousness must itself also be immanent to/within the transcendent world itself; 
consciousness must truly be of the world if the world is ever to be an intentional object for it. 
This is why Merleau-Ponty will repeatedly insist that any “frontal” relationship between 
subjectivity and the world – that is, any relationship in which a subject stands over and against 
the world as an intentional object – is derivative rather than fundamental; rather, what is 
fundamental is the embeddedness of subjectivity in the world, or what Merleau-Ponty often 
describes as the lateral relationship between the two (in Merleau-Ponty, the term “lateral” is 
always strictly contrasted with “frontal”).300 The “sphere of immanence” must belong to the 
“sphere of transcendence,” which also precisely means that there must be a kind of immanence 
prior even to the constitution of a traditional “sphere of immanence,” that immanence is first 
neither merely immanence to consciousness nor the simple contrary of transcendence; it means 
																																																								
299 This concept of “immanence” is, of course, what Merleau-Ponty articulates in his later writings as “flesh.” In the 
same passage from which the above excerpt from What is Philosophy? is taken, Deleuze and Guattari clearly allude 
to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh and accuse it of essentially introducing transcendence in the same manner as 
Husserl’s concept of transcendental subjectivity. Though I cannot fully justify my claim here, I think such a reading 
of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh is absolutely wrong and textually indefensible. “Flesh,” for Merleau-Ponty, is 
emphatically not a “transcendental” structure in the traditional sense of the term, nor is it reducible to the flesh of the 
living body. In Merleau-Ponty’s later writings, Flesh is a generative field of relations – that is, a matrix of 
differentiation – that is prior to any traditional distinction between immanence and transcendence, the transcendental 
and the empirical, or ideality and materiality, and as such it is essentially equivalent to Deleuze’s own concepts of 
‘difference in-itself’ and the ‘plane of immanence.’ I hope such a comparison will become clear in the course of my 
further discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh in chapter five. 
300 This is why Merleau-Ponty calls for the development of what he often refers to as an “intra-ontology,” which 
would be an ontology that only thinks Being from the “midst” of Being; it would be a thinking of Being that does 
not adopt a “frontal,” object-directed stance toward it, for such a stance deforms the original relationship between 
thought and Being.   
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that there must first be a kind of immanence that even allows anything to be immanent to 
consciousness in the first place, and which thus in fact antecedes and institutes the traditional 
distinction between immanence and transcendence (and which Merleau-Ponty will later call 
“flesh”). This is one reason Merleau-Ponty proclaims that there is a “paradox of immanence and 
transcendence in perception.”301  
So, Merleau-Ponty might say that Husserl was on the correct path but simply did not take 
it far enough. For Merleau-Ponty, the Husserlian conception of “immanence” cannot truly 
accommodate the genuine “transcendence” of the world, that is, the excessiveness of the world 
beyond consciousness, nor can it accommodate the fact that consciousness truly belongs to the 
world that exceeds it (for indeed, both of these notions are correlative). This is why, despite his 
indebtedness to Husserl, Merleau-Ponty claims that “psychological or transcendental immanence 
cannot account for what a horizon or a “remoteness” is any better than can “objective” 
thought.”302 Simply put, if the “transcendental” is contrary to the “natural,” then a transcendental 
subjectivity cannot truly belong to the transcendent world (or to “nature”), and if it cannot belong 
to the world, then neither can the world truly elude its grasp (and, moreover, the world does not 
truly elude such a subjectivity if, as Husserl supposes, such a subjectivity never finds in the 
world any meaning that it has not already deposited there). For now, the most important point is 
that, for Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology in fact demands a decisive break from transcendental 
immanence, or rather it demands that we reconceptualize “immanence” in such a way that 
emancipates it from its bondage to an ego behind the scenes of natural phenomena and that 
would, as such, not dissolve it into transcendent nature (which would equally be a mistake) but 
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would rather place it below or outside the traditional opposition between immanence and 
transcendence altogether.  
For Merleau-Ponty, it is precisely the inherence of subjectivity in the world (or the 
incarnation of subjectivity) that discloses (or simply is) such an the intertwining of immanence 
and transcendence, and it is precisely this intertwining of immanence and transcendence in 
incarnate subjectivity – or rather, as Merleau-Ponty also often puts it, it is this “ambiguity” of the 
living body – that makes the presence of alterity possible and that is, indeed, already the presence 
of alterity. Again, consciousness must itself be an “immanent transcendency,” or in other words 
a living body; consciousness must be incarnate, and it is because it is incarnate that not only is a 
world accessible to it but that it is, moreover, accessible to others. As we saw earlier, my vision 
is possible only if it already participates in or belongs to the visibility of the world that is open to 
it, and this precisely means that my vision is itself, in a way, visible. “It is a marvel too little 
noticed,” writes Merleau-Ponty, “that every movement of my eyes – even more, every 
displacement of my body – has its place in the same visible universe that I itemize and explore 
with them.”303 It is in this way that a “consciousness seen from the outside”304 is not a logical 
absurdity; it is in this way that alterity can precisely be a “negativity that is not nothing”305; it is 
in this way that we can truly say that “the soul animates or be-souls the Body,”306 that “the soul 
is indeed ever one with the body.”307 It is because “…I am that animal of perceptions and 
movements called a body”308 that when others see my living, acting body – when they see my 
body engage with the world – so too do they see me, and so too do I see them in the same 
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manner. Alterity must be a negativity, but it must be a negativity that is neither the categorical 
antithesis of ordinary positive (material, perceptible) presence (which would introduce dualism) 
nor a mere lack of such presence (which would reduce it to an ordinary absence such as, say, the 
back of a building, and which would thus fail to respect the phenomenon that it is); it must not 
merely be another “possible positive presence” (like a hidden profile that can be revealed), yet it 
must also not merely be a negation of positive presence, or something with no real place at all in 
perceptible, carnal reality, for then it would not be perceptible or real at all: it would either be the 
absolute erasure of presence or something utterly supernatural. So how, again, is it possible – 
how is it not indeed a blatant contradiction – for alterity (or for any kind of radical absence) to be 
present? How is it possible for an absence that is irreducible to any presence – for an absence 
that can never, in a sense, be present or given – to be precisely “present” or “given”? It is 
possible for such absences to be given (and it is the case that such absences are always already 
given) in lived experience because “Being is univocal,”309 because there is nothing in experience 
or in existence – nothing present, nothing absent, nothing even radically absent – that is not 
incarnate.  
We have seen that it is impossible to access one’s own mind in total isolation, and this 
means that it is also impossible to possess or acquire even any concepts of mental qualities and 
faculties in total isolation. For example, it is only because I already exist in a world teeming with 
joys and sorrows, borne by and stretched between shared pasts and shared anticipations of 
futures yet to come, that I know what “joy” and “sorrow” or what “memory” and “time” (or what 
any of the emotions that attend memory and temporality) are. As Alison Jaggar writes in her 
account of the social construction of emotion:     
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The emotions we experience reflect prevailing forms of social life. For instance, one could not feel or 
even be betrayed in the absence of social norms about fidelity: it is inconceivable that betrayal or indeed 
any distinctively human emotion could be experienced by a solitary individual in a presocial state of 
nature. There is a sense in which any individual’s guilt or anger, joy or triumph, presupposes the existence 
of a social group capable of feeling guilt, anger, joy, or triumph. This is not to say that group emotions 
historically precede or are logically prior to the emotions of individuals; it is to say that individual 
experience is simultaneously social experience.310 
 
Much philosophical work, both within and outside of phenomenology, has been done on the 
nature of emotion, and I cannot survey all of it here. However, it will suffice to observe that 
emotions are necessarily endemic to how consciousness – how a living body – inhabits and 
encounters its world and that, to be more precise, they are necessarily infused with bodily 
expressivity, that they are always in principle expressible through or, perhaps better put, are 
always expressions of the intentionality and physiognomy of a living body. That is to say, 
emotions are necessarily experienced and intelligible as such as particular patterns of behavior or 
styles of conduct, and as patterns of behavior – as habituated ways of processing and 
meaningfully articulating salient elements of the world, as not merely internal “stimulations” or 
“disturbances” but, more fundamentally, as common ways of responding to and of 
communicating the manifold meanings that the world impresses upon and summons within us – 
they are acquired, sedimented, and known just like any other: by direct acquaintance with, and 
through the repeated mimicry of, those very patterns of behavior in others within situations that 
elicit them and that lend them their essential meaning as precisely ways of responding to 
meaning.  
That emotion is not only constitutive of a living body’s rapport with the world but is, in 
particular, constitutive of its rapport with others is an obvious point and hardly requires 
justification, yet it is one that is nonetheless frequently overlooked and even suppressed by 
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certain entrenched conceptual frameworks, namely those that regard emotions as either entirely 
private mental phenomena or as entirely reducible to physiological phenomena. All of the 
emotions with which we are familiar are only intelligible as intersubjective phenomena, as 
phenomena that emerge between subjects within a social situation or context, as special valences 
of meaning and value that saturate and inform the ways in which subjects relate to one another 
and to the world in which they dwell. Experiences of happiness, sadness, and anger are 
essentially implicated in typical modes of comportment toward the world – in the performances 
of a body at grips with the world – and especially in particular modes of relating to others, in 
particular modes of affecting and of being affected by others and the social situations in which 
one inescapably finds oneself. Simply put, emotions – just like any kind of “mental state” – are 
hardly intelligible as such if they are relegated to “the mind” conceived as separate in principle 
from the body, from the world, and from others, for we already know that all of these are 
“involved in an inextricable tangle.”311 Indeed, among mental phenomena, emotions are most 
clearly unintelligible if divorced from the living body’s conduct in the world amidst and in 
synergy with other living bodies. This is not to say that such emotions have no interiority or 
qualitative dimension or that they are reducible to forms of conduct (as I have already discussed, 
Merleau-Ponty is emphatically opposed to any kind of crude behaviorism or reductionism, and 
even devoted his first book, The Structure of Behavior, to refuting such views), but it is to say 
that they are essentially polarized toward fulfillment in, and are indeed inseparable from, the 
living body’s conduct and physiognomy, that they are immanent to the living body’s styles of 
outward self-presentation, and moreover that they essentially structure and derive intelligibility 
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from – that they constitute and are reciprocally constituted by – an intersubjective field of 
experience.  
As Merleau-Ponty demonstrates, nothing “inward” is ever completely inward but is 
always already extended outward, always already othered, always already directed beyond itself 
toward a world and toward others. Thus, all mental phenomena are inherently entwined with the 
living body and its behaviors, and all forms of behavior are intersubjectively constituted: I know 
how to act in certain ways because others have already taught me how to do so. I understand my 
own subjectivity only through the subjectivities of others with whom my own is embedded. I 
understand the powers, potencies, and vulnerabilities of my own body only because others mirror 
and affirm them through their own bodies and behaviors. I understand my own experiences – 
including especially my own emotional responses to the world – only because others already 
enact them through their own corporeal powers and habits of expression. What would, say, anger 
be outside of a context in which not only are there others who make me angry but others who 
express and communicate it, others who teach me what anger is precisely by performing it for 
me? And what would anger be divorced from a situation or context that elicits it? I know what 
anger is not only because others have simply made me angry but because others literally show 
me anger, and anger is – like every emotion – not merely a physiological “stimulation” but a 
responsiveness to meaning, a way in which one is connected to the world and to others. For all of 
these reasons, Merleau-Ponty insists upon the inherently corporeal, behavioral, and therefore 
intersubjective nature of emotion:   
It was thought to be self-evident that I can grasp only the corporal signs of anger or fear from the outside 
and that I have to resort to the anger or fear I know in myself through introspection in order to interpret 
these signs. Today’s psychologists have made us notice that in reality introspection gives me almost 
nothing. If I try to study love or hate purely from inner observation, I will find very little to describe: a 
few pangs, a few heart-throbs – in short, trite agitations which do not reveal the essence of love or hate. 
Each time I find something worth saying, it is because I have succeeded in studying it as a way of 
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behaving, as a modification of my relations with others and with the world, because I have managed to 
think about it as I would think about the behavior of another person whom I happened to witness.312 
 
The point that Merleau-Ponty makes in this passage is, I think, a profound one. Here, Merleau-
Ponty invites us to perform a certain thought experiment (indeed, a kind of epoché): he asks us 
strip away from an emotion everything but the raw, physical sensation of it, that is, to abstract 
from it anything that might in any way derive its meaning from its manner of behavioral 
expression or from the intersubjective context in which it might occur. So, take sadness for 
example: remove from sadness all social markers or meanings, and remove from it all of the 
behaviors commonly associated with it; abstract sadness from all of the ways in which one might 
express it or see others express it (such as a frown, the shedding of tears or crying, a slump in 
one’s posture, a tremulation in one’s voice, and so on), and abstract it entirely from any 
conceivable situation that might elicit it (a breakup, the death of a loved one, being fired from 
one’s job, a bad grade on an exam, a paper rejected for publication, a tragic moment in a film or 
play, an instance of injustice, and so on). What thus remains? Are we to say that we are still left 
with “sadness”? We are, of course, left with very little, if anything at all, that truly resembles or 
conveys the lived experience of “sadness,” and still less can we say that in abstracting sadness 
from behavior and from all conceivable intersubjective contexts we have uncovered its 
“essence.”  
This, I think, is a great example of the manner in which phenomenological reflection – in 
particular, a certain kind of “eidetic variation” – can in fact yield important truths, truths we all 
know by direct acquaintance yet might fail to appreciate in any other way. As Merleau-Ponty 
argues here, if we imaginatively vary “sadness” in such a way that we divorce it from all forms 
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of behavioral expression and from any possible situation in which one might feel it in oneself or 
encounter it in others – that is, if we just pare it down to some sort of putatively atomic, raw 
physical sensations – then at most we end up with an inventory of banal and vague symptoms – 
“trite agitations,” like a “throb” here or a “rush” there, a “welling up” here or a “trembling” there  
– that not only do not at all capture what it is like to experience it but that indeed hardly serve to 
differentiate it from many other emotions (such as shame, embarrassment, jealously, love, anger, 
and so on). The point that Merleau-Ponty makes here about emotion, then, is the same one that 
he makes about all “mental” or “subjective” phenomena, namely that they are not originally or 
ever entirely intelligible in a purely inward or introspective way, and thus still less is it the case 
that I fundamentally know what they are in isolation from my corporeal relationships with others 
and with the world, and even less still do I fundamentally know that others “have” or experience 
them by inferring that they do after comparing them to my own case. One does not first 
encounter emotions in a purely internal, private theatre of experience, then observe the ways in 
which one typically expresses such emotions behaviorally, then proceed to go out into to the 
world to observe similar behaviors performed by others, and then finally analogically infer that 
others also experience such emotions on the basis of observed similarities between their 
behaviors and one’s own. What we said earlier concerning how we come to know minds in 
general applies with the same force to how we come to know emotions or affects: if originally 
we could only know that we have them introspectively and if, therefore, we could only ever 
know that others have them inductively, then we would never know what they are or perceive 
them in others – indeed, we would never “have” them – at all.  
 Emotions and affects are always modes of a living body’s responsiveness to meaning, 
and as such they are perceptible directly in and through the conduct of a living body, that is, in 
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and through the manner in which a living body responds to situations in which it finds itself, 
situations that are, of course, social or intersubjective from the start:       
…What is the meaning of an act that I produce by applying an electrical current to an organism? The 
current is not the cause of the gesture. It is the body’s functional totality which is capable of smiling, and 
not the facial nerve. Full expression only appears with the total behavior of an organism. A living body is 
always behaving: it is a phenomenal body. Emotions are not provoked by stimuli but by situations, 
totalities that are meaningful only for a life.313  
 
As Merleau-Ponty argues here (and as he also suggests in the previous passage), emotions are 
not reducible to physiological states or sensations. This is not to say, of course, that emotions do 
not require some sort of physiological substratum or a certain set of biological conditions in 
order to be realized, which would be absurd to deny. Merleau-Ponty’s point, rather, is simply 
that a physiological stimulus or sensation is not alone sufficient to engender an emotion, for 
emotions must be endemic to certain ways of engaging others and the world. That is to say, the 
physiological processes through which emotions arise would not, in fact, give rise to such 
emotions at all – they would not give rise to what we call, say, sadness qua sadness, or anger qua 
anger, and so on – outside of a prior intersubjective context of conduct and meaning that elicits 
them. As Merleau-Ponty argues here, if I did not have a body capable of smiling and if smiling 
were not an expression I learned to perform in response to others or to certain already value-
laden social situations, no “stimuli” would ever provoke me to smile, and as smiling is one 
salient way in which I respond to meaning in the world – in particular, since it is one way in 
which I enact “happiness,”314 or one way in which I receive the world as pleasurable or 
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especially true of emotion and behavior. And as we have seen, there is an inexpugnable ambiguity that attends all 
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congenial – if such a mode of behavioral responsiveness were unavailable to me I would surely, 
at the very least, experience the phenomena or meanings associated with it differently.315      
																																																																																																																																																																																		
“mental” phenomena: we have direct access to them as such, but that does not mean they are ever transparent (and in 
principle they never are).  
 Moreover, the behaviors through which we enact certain emotions are not always or necessarily culturally-
invariant, and Merleau-Ponty acknowledges this. For example, Merleau-Ponty mentions that in Japanese culture it is 
common to smile as a way to indicate anger in certain contexts (see Phenomenology of Perception, p. 189). 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of the relationship between emotion and behavior does not necessarily 
“naturalize” or “universalize” the particular ways in which certain emotions are behaviorally expressed. Emotion 
(like subjectivity in general) is inextricably entwined with behavior, yet the ways in which specific emotions are 
behaviorally expressed tend to be habits of comportment that, as such, are always culturally shaped and reinforced. 
For Merleau-Ponty, the embodiment of subjectivity (hence the direct expression of “mental states” and qualities 
through behavior) is an ontologically necessary truth, yet this does not mean that the specific ways in which specific 
“mental states” or qualities are embodied or enacted through behavior are culturally-invariant, and Merleau-Ponty 
explicitly denies that they are.      
315 It noteworthy here that an empirical condition that Merleau-Ponty does not discuss but that lends support to his 
account of emotion is “Moebius syndrome.” Moebius syndrome is a palsy of certain facial nerves that prevents those 
who suffer from it from using their faces to express various emotions in socially common and expected ways (e.g., 
they often cannot smile to express happiness or frown to express sadness), and those with the condition commonly 
report that such an inability to express their emotions in such ways has a profound effect on how they feel those 
emotions themselves. A wonderful and comprehensive study of Moebius syndrome – one that is centered on first-
person accounts of those who have the condition and that is therefore, I think, an important companion to any 
phenomenology of emotion – is Jonathan Cole’s and Henrietta Spalding’s The Invisible Smile: Living Without 
Facial Expression (Oxford University Press, 2009). Many with Moebius syndrome claim that they feel only a 
dampened or reduced form of certain emotions, and some even claim that they never felt such emotions at all until 
they later learned how to use their bodies in other ways to express them.  
 One person with Moebius (“Lydia”) quoted in The Invisible Smile was raised in England, whose culture 
generally does not encourage overly animated, energetic, or ostentatious displays of emotion. Though she learned 
various ways to mirror or imitate the emotional expressions of others at home, it was not until she later studied 
abroad in Spain, whose culture precisely tends to encourage expressions of emotion through more dramatic, effusive 
behaviors or gesticulations, that she truly learned “how to feel.” Lydia claims not only that learning how to express 
her emotions using her whole body in such dramatic ways helped put her in better touch with her emotions, she even 
suggests that she did not have emotions at all when she was young and that, prior to learning this new body 
language through which to express emotions as an adult, it had been very difficult for her to feel them. As Lydia 
reports:  
 
I do not think I had emotion when I was a child but now I have it. How did I get it? It was in Spain…they are so 
theatrical in their emotional expression. The body language I had learnt and used at university could be exaggerated 
in Spain, using the whole body to express one’s feelings. Over here in England it would be over the top, but there it 
was fine and because of this I learnt how to feel within me. At Oxford I had learnt a lot of imitating and mirroring 
and copying but had not, to a very profound depth, had the feeling…But in Spain everyone is so dramatic…Because 
of the cultural ‘up-regulation’ of feeling into gesture I learnt to feel…I could feel really ecstatic, happy, for the first 
time ever. Before, without expression, I had found feeling difficult…Before, my thought was frigid or cold. I needed 
the continuation of a thought into real-time expression within the body. – The Invisible Smile, p. 154. 
 
As Merleau-Ponty suggests, all “language” is fundamentally “body-language,” and all meaning (linguistic or 
otherwise) has to be embodied in some manner. Thus, in much the same way that we often do not know what we 
“think” before find the words with which to express it, so too is it the case, analogously, that we often do know what 
we “feel” before we find the means to express it with our bodies. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty repeatedly argues that 
thought is to language as mind is to body, and it seems that Moebius syndrome is but one powerful empirical 
confirmation of this analogy.			
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 Thus, emotions are simply unintelligible apart from our relations with others and apart 
from the ways in which we comport ourselves in the world. Only intersubjective situations can 
elicit emotional experiences and responses, or rather emotional experiences and responses must 
involve a living body’s global, holistic orientation to an already meaningful context of 
experience. Indeed, it is worth noting here that Merleau-Ponty argues that the same is the case 
even with respect to so-called “reflexes.” Throughout most of The Structure of Behavior, 
Merleau-Ponty devotes his efforts to refuting popular reductionistic (or mechanistic) accounts of 
behavior, in particular those that reduce behavior to “reflex arcs.” His argument is not simply 
that behavior cannot be reduced to “mere” reflexes but that even what we call “reflexes” are 
never “mere” reflexes, that is, that reflexes themselves are unintelligible if abstracted entirely 
from a living body’s global, holistic orientation toward a world. In other words, Merleau-Ponty’s 
point concerning “reflexes” is analogous to the one he later makes concerning supposed “sense-
data,” namely that they are abstractions derived from a situated Gestalt – a prior contextual 
configuration of meaning toward which one is already intentionally directed, and in which one is 
already ensconced, through one’s body – that later come to be reified as autonomous and 
ontologically primitive elements, processes, or phenomena; they are elements of a situation that 
presuppose such a situation for their existence or intelligibility yet later come to be selectively 
isolated from that situation and reflectively inflected as prior to and constitutive of it. The point 
is not that there are no such things as “reflexes” any more than the point is that there is no such 
thing as an experience of the “redness” of an apple; rather, the point is that both require a prior 
orientation to meaning – an intentional, whole-bodied involvement with the world – that cannot 
be reduced to any such “simpler” elements or phenomena, for such “simpler” elements or 
phenomena would not function as they do or even occur at all were it not for precisely this larger 
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context of meaning in which they function or occur as such. For example, even the Patellar 
(“knee-jerk”) reflex – the quintessential example of a “reflex” – can only be realized if the living 
body intentionally orients itself toward the world in a very specific (we might even say rather 
“artificial”) way, which naturally we all know quite well from our annual physical exams: in 
order for one’s doctor to elicit such a reflex using a reflex hammer, one has to sit upright, relax 
one’s lower body, let one’s legs dangle loosely, and in general position one’s body “just so.” As 
we have seen, Merleau-Ponty makes a similar point about emotions, namely that in order to be 
elicited or even intelligible as such they must be elicited and understood as an embodied 
response to worldly, socially embedded meaning, and thus they must (at least in principle) be 
expressible and directly perceptible through styles of comportment; indeed, they themselves 
must already be modes of bodily comportment and expression.  
 So, for Merleau-Ponty emotions are unintelligible if they are not already implicated in 
our being-in-the-world, if they do not refer to ways in which we perceptually receive, hence also 
behaviorally negotiate, the situations in which we find ourselves; they are intrinsically enlaced 
with bodily conduct or expressivity, and I would never know what they are in myself – 
moreover, I even quite literally would not “feel” them – if I did not learn what they are in and 
through the bodily conduct or expressions of others in intersubjective situations, since only 
intersubjective situations can lend them their meaning as such. Thus, “I perceive the grief or 
anger of the other in his conduct, in his face or his hands, without recourse to any ‘inner’ 
experience of suffering or anger…because grief and anger are variations of belonging to the 
world…”.316 Since emotions are not meaningful as such – hence are not, in fact, “emotions” – 
independently of an intersubjective context, it follows that they must be encountered directly 
																																																								
316 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 356. 
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through the living bodies or behaviors of others, for if that were not so, one would originally and 
only ever know what they are by recourse to one’s own privileged, private interiority, yet that is 
precisely the sort of solipsism that makes any experience or understanding of emotion – or any 
experience or understanding of oneself and of others in general – impossible. Of course, this 
point is simply a particular application and implication of Merleau-Ponty’s larger point that 
dualism renders not only intersubjectivity but also, a fortiori, subjectivity impossible, that all 
forms of subjectivity must be entwined with an “outside,” that interiority must be blended into 
exteriority, that every “within” must be, in some way, perceptible directly from “without” if 
there is to be such a thing as subjectivity, interiority, or any “within” in the first place.  
 Emotions, however, are especially clear cases of “mental” phenomena that would be 
ontologically impossible if they were truly withdrawn entirely into some supposedly 
impregnable internal citadel of solitude, or if they were “purely” subjective rather than also 
already vectors and valences of corporeal intentionality, habituated manners of responding to 
meaning and value in the world:   
We must reject the prejudice which makes “inner realities” out of love, hate, or anger, leaving them 
accessible to one single witness: the person who feels them. Anger, shame, hate, and love are not psychic 
facts hidden at the bottom of another’s consciousness: they are types of behavior or styles of conduct 
which are visible from the outside. They exist on this face or in those gestures, not hidden behind them.317  
 
Merleau-Ponty, then, repudiates two common, entrenched yet false ways of conceptualizing 
emotions, two ways of conceptualizing emotions that, regardless of how common or entrenched 
indeed they are, nonetheless contradict our lived experiences of them: first, that they are 
reducible to physiological sensations, and second, that they are entirely private or internal 
feelings. Like any “mental” phenomena, emotions must be perceptible directly in and through 
the living body and must derive their meaning from the living body’s rapport with others and 
																																																								
317 Merleau-Ponty, “The Film and the New Psychology,” in Sense and Non-Sense, p. 52-53. 
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with a world; they cannot be purely private or internal, and thus the ways in which they are 
expressed through the conduct of a living body cannot be categorically divorced from what they 
themselves are. Those behaviors through which emotions are conveyed cannot be “signs [that] 
are…given to me separately from what they signify.”318 So, to be clear, Merleau-Ponty’s claim is 
not just that emotions are commonly polarized toward behavioral expression or that behavior is a 
mere means through which emotions are naturally communicated, for this would be to suppose 
that emotions are fundamentally separate from their means of bodily expression, that behaviors 
are “mere signs” that are separate from the emotions they “signify.” In general, Merleau-Ponty 
repudiates any such opposition between “signifier” and “signified,” and in particular the notion 
that behavior is an external signifier of a purely internal, already preformed thought or mental 
state. If we reject dualism, we cannot accept any such opposition between “the internal” and “the 
external,” and so it is potentially misleading even to speak of a behavioral expression of emotion, 
as if a supposedly “internal” emotion were sharply distinguishable from its external behavioral 
manifestation. We cannot take the behavioral expression of emotion and the emotion itself to be 
radically separable from one another, for such a notion would reinstate dualism and would make 
the direct perception of emotions in others impossible. Merleau-Ponty, then, does not argue that 
emotions simply collapse into behaviors or that, in general, consciousness and behavior are 
strictly identical, but he does argue that emotion (or, in general, consciousness) and behavior are 
interdependent, that the behavioral expression of an emotion is in fact an aspect of the emotion 
itself, or that emotions are partially constituted by the ways in which they are expressed through 
the living body.  
																																																								
318 Merleau-Ponty, “The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences.” Trans. James. M. Edie, in The 
Primacy of Perception, p. 15. I have slightly amended the wording here for grammatical reasons.  
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Thus, we see that the direct presentation or perception of emotion in behavior is an 
exemplary instance of the direct presentation or perception of another’s consciousness in general:  
Faced with an angry or threatening gesture, I have no need, in order to understand it, to recall the feelings 
which I myself experienced when I used these gestures on my own account. I know very little, from 
inside, of the mime of anger so that a decisive factor is missing for any association by resemblance or 
reasoning by analogy, and what is more, I do not see anger or a threatening attitude as a psychic fact 
hidden behind the gesture, I read anger in it. The gesture does not make me think of anger, it is anger 
itself.319  
 
It is important to underscore here the point I just mentioned: Merleau-Ponty does not deny that 
emotions and affects have interiority, yet (like everything “mental” or “interior”) their interiority 
is not wholly interior but is indissociably entangled with exteriority, thoroughly constituted 
through their behavioral expression or through the ways in which they are embodied as responses 
to worldly values, meanings, and intersubjective affordances. So, Merleau-Ponty’s claim that a 
gesture through which anger is expressed “is anger itself” should not be interpreted as a 
reductive equation of anger (or of emotion in general) with behavior, which such a claim might 
suggest in isolation. Of course, Merleau-Ponty perhaps does not articulate his claim here as 
carefully as he otherwise could or should articulate it, and only within the context of his broader 
philosophical commitments – that is, only within the context of his general conception of the 
relationship between subjectivity and behavior, and also only within the context of other specific 
remarks he makes elsewhere concerning the nature of emotion – is it clear that he does not mean 
to reduce emotions to forms of behavior.  
As I discussed in the previous chapter and as I will further discuss below, Merleau-Ponty 
is emphatically opposed to “behaviorism” in any conventional senses of the term. Merleau-Ponty 
consistently affirms the irreducible qualitative and first-personal givenness (that is, the 
interiority) of experience. Thus, “the grief and the anger of another,” Merleau-Ponty writes, 
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“never have quite the same significance for him as they have for me. For him these situations are 
lived through, for me they are displayed.”320 Merleau-Ponty never denies that there is a 
significant difference between the “subjective,” lived-through character of, say, grief or anger 
and outward, public, “objective” expressions of grief or anger; however, he does deny that such a 
difference amounts to a dualistic opposition between the two. Dualism must be false, yet any 
view that would simply regard subjectivity as equivalent to bodily behavior would equally fail to 
cohere with lived experience or with any adequate account of subjectivity, and, as we have seen, 
it would also extinguish alterity. In general, any kind of reductionism is just as inconsistent with 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy as any kind of dualism, for the former is in fact the conceptual 
offspring the latter, and so Merleau-Ponty is always committed to demonstrating and describing 
the intertwining of mind and behavior, interiority and exteriority, subjectivity and world, which 
is a kind of relationship that is indeed difficult to demonstrate or describe because reflective 
thought so easily deforms it into either a dualism or a reductive identity. In any case, Merleau-
Ponty’s claim in the above passage that a gesture through which anger is expressed “is anger 
itself” is simply meant to convey (in a dramatic way) the point that when I perceive emotion in 
an Other I do not fundamentally infer it from the Other’s conduct. For all of the reasons we have 
already discussed, Merleau-Ponty’s point here is that I do not first observe someone’s behavior 
and then tack on some sort of emotion to it afterward; I do not witness someone’s conduct and 
then analogically posit or “project” some emotion into it that I would thus presumably only know 
directly in my own case (via introspection): I immediately see the emotion in the Other’s 
behavior; the Other’s emotionally expressive behavior is (at least in part) the emotion. The 
other’s behavior immediately, directly means a particular emotion, and I no more first infer the 
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presence of it than I first infer the thought conveyed by a written sentence or first infer anything 
concerning the “inner” lives of others at all, which of course is to say that I do not first “infer” 
such things. As Husserl would put it, emotions are immediately appresented by an Other’s 
conduct, irreducibly co-given with the manner in which a living body expresses itself and copes 
with its world.  
 The strange or complex relationship between emotion and behavior – that is, the manner 
in which they intrinsically co-constitute one another without one reducing to the other – is one 
example of what Merleau-Ponty calls the “paradox of expression.”321 Now, “expression” is a 
specific technical and complex concept in Merleau-Ponty, one that (perhaps like Derrida’s 
concept of “the trace,” to name just one example) is not strictly equivalent to its everyday, 
exoteric senses (which I myself have deployed throughout this discussion up this point) yet is 
also not entirely unrelated to them. I cannot fully exposit Merleau-Ponty’s concept of expression 
here, as to do so would require an extensive treatment of his philosophy of language (which is 
beyond the purview of the present discussion), yet it is integral not only to his account of 
language but also to his account of the relationship between subjectivity and the living 
body/behavior, and thus in particular it helps clarify how he conceptualizes the relationship 
between emotion and behavior.  
 What, then, does Merleau-Ponty mean by “expression” in his own technical sense of the 
term, and why does he regard it as paradoxical? We are all familiar with the cliché “chicken-and-
egg” pseudo-paradox, and though surely it is an oversimplification to compare it to what 
																																																								
321 Merleau-Ponty refers to “the paradox of expression” in The Visible and the Invisible (p. 144), though he does not 
fully develop the idea there, and in order to understand it one has to study the way in which it is developed across 
many of his writings, especially his writings on language and art. In what follows, I will attempt to provide as brief 
and clear of an exposition of this concept as I can without drawing upon all of the texts that would be necessary in a 
more extensive consideration of it. My goal here is only to elucidate Merleau-Ponty’s account of the non-reductive 
relationship between emotion (and, more broadly, subjectivity) and behavior. 
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Merleau-Ponty has in mind here, there is something instructive in such a comparison. Why is the 
“chicken-and-egg” relationship (at least superficially) paradoxical? It seems paradoxical because 
we all know that something cannot originally begin to exist ex nihilo, yet here we have two 
things (a chicken and an egg) that seem to presuppose one another in order to exist. A chicken 
cannot come from nothing: it must be hatched from egg. Likewise, an egg cannot come from 
nothing: it must be laid by chicken. And the problem lies in this causal circularity. In other terms, 
what we have here is a particular “bootstrapping” problem. The problem is that neither a chicken 
nor an egg can originate from nothing and that each precisely seems to be the origin of the other; 
it seems that one must come first, yet it also seems that neither can come first, (and surely it 
cannot be the case that they both come first at the same time). This double-bind is, in a way, 
similar to the one that characterizes what Merleau-Ponty’s calls “expression,” for the 
phenomenon of expression, in Merleau-Ponty, designates a generative process through which 
two “things” that may appear to precede or succeed one another, or that may seem to stand in 
some sort of asymmetrical relationship to one another (as, say, a condition in relationship to the 
thing it conditions), in fact originally come into being only together; indeed, they bring one 
another into being, for they mutually presuppose one another.322 The double-bind is that each 
seems to be prior to the other in some way, yet this discloses the fact that neither really is prior to 
the other and that the process through they come into being thus cannot be a process through 
																																																								
322 If the relationship I am describing here seems like it describes the relationship between “self and Other,” that is 
not an accident. What Merleau-Ponty will describe as the lateral, chiasmatic relationship between self and Other (or 
what Husserl describes as the primordial pairing of self and Other) is also an example of this “logic” or relationality 
of “expression” (though typically Merleau-Ponty does not use the term to describe intersubjectivity or 
intercorporeity). After this discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of expression, we should be able to better 
understand what it would really mean to say that the self is an “expression of others” or an “expression” of the webs 
of intersubjective relationships that constitute it. It will also allow us to develop a more rigorous understanding of 
what it would mean to say that “humanity” is an “expression” of “animality.” I will return to Merleau-Ponty’s 
concept of the lateral, chiasmatic relationship between self and Other (and also between humanity and animality) in 
chapter five.   
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which one linearly causes or asymmetrically grounds the other; it must, therefore, be a quite 
strange or “paradoxical” process through which they come into being, since they reciprocally 
bring each other into being, or since they (like the proverbial “chicken and egg”) reciprocally 
depend upon one another in order to exist.  
 The reason this sort of paradoxical relationship is integral to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy 
of language is because, for Merleau-Ponty, it describes the necessary relationship between 
thought and language. On the one hand, and contrary to most conventional accounts of the 
relationship between the two, Merleau-Ponty argues (throughout many works) that thought 
cannot radically precede language, that there is no such thing as a “ready-made,” internally 
translucent “thought” that words would simply transmit outwardly, as if language were merely 
“an external accompaniment of thought.”323 Merleau-Ponty rejects the notion that language is 
simply “a means or a code for thought,”324 that words are simply “empty container[s]”325 or 
“passive shell[s]”326 of completely preformed, autonomously conceived meanings. Now, I cannot 
elaborate all of Merleau-Ponty’s arguments for this claim here (as my focus here is not his 
philosophy of language), but here it will suffice to observe that this claim is an extension of his 
repudiation of any sort of dualism: if (according to conventional understanding) “thoughts” are 
“internal” and language (whether written or spoken) is the manner in which thoughts are 
“externalized,” and if dualism is false, then there cannot be any radical divide between the order 
of thought and the order of language, and that means that the former could never have been 
originally isolated from the latter. In short, just as “the body” cannot be understood as a mere 
																																																								
323 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 177. 
324 Signs, “Introduction,” p. 17. 
325 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 177. 
326 Ibid., p. 177. 
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“container” for “the mind,” so too is it the case that “language” cannot be understood as a mere 
“container” for “thoughts,” “ideas,” or “meanings.”  
Moreover, as we have seen, Merleau-Ponty proves that thought can never be transparent 
to itself, yet the notion that thought radically precedes language presupposes precisely the notion 
that there is such a thing as thought in communion with itself, or such a thing as a subject with 
transparent access to its own ideas, before thought or subjectivity is externalized (or “othered”) 
in the world. Thus, “speech does not translate a ready-made thought, but accomplishes it.”327 For 
Merleau-Ponty, the relationship between thought and language is analogous to the relationship 
between mind and body/behavior because, indeed, every instance of language is already a 
behavior, and conversely every behavior, or every form of bodily life and comportment, is 
already, in a sense, a “language” inasmuch as it is communicative, or inasmuch as it is a 
particular style of responding to meaning. This is why Merleau-Ponty claims that every living 
body (human or otherwise) is already a creative, symbolic power or agency, and that “by saying 
that the body is symbolism, we mean that without a preliminary Auffassung of the signifier and 
signified supposed as separated, the body would pass in the world and the world in the body.”328 
This is why Merleau-Ponty claims that even the simplest act of perception is “already a language 
because it is an interrogation (movement) and a response….”329 In short, logos simply does not 
have its seat in the self-presence of a subject in total, perfect possession of itself, and thus we see 
(as we have already seen in several other ways) that Merleau-Ponty consistently and powerfully 
undermines the core tenet of traditional logocentric metaphysics; and insofar as such 
logocentrism is also the core, tacit tenet of every anthropocentric or human supremacist 
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worldview – that is, insofar as the possession “logos” (conceived as a purely transparent, 
unmediated, and spiritual access to truth and meaning) is traditionally posited as the wedge that 
separates human from non-human life – we also already see the extent to which Merleau-Ponty 
challenges not only traditional Western metaphysics but also the anthropocentrism or human 
supremacism with which it has always been complicit. We already see the great extent to which 
Merleau-Ponty destabilizes one of the traditional barriers between human and non-human life, 
namely the abstraction or imaginary of a faculty whose supposed access to perfectly luminous, 
eternal truths and meanings would entail that it can be nothing but fleshless.       
 Of course, none of this is to say either that thought collapses into language or that 
language collapses into thought: rather, Merleau-Ponty will argue (as he always does) that they 
are intertwined (or “reversible”) and that ordinary conceptual frameworks cannot capture such a 
relationship. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty will elaborate language as fundamentally embodied and 
gestural, as enlaced with our intercorporeal relationships with others and with a world, and will 
even suggest that all relationships between living bodies and between living bodies and their 
milieus (whether such bodies are “human” or “animal”) are inherently semiotic (or 
“interrogative”), that insofar as all forms of life are modes of responding to the world “it is not a 
positive being, but an interrogative being which defines life.”330 So, the intertwining of thought 
and language is one form or aspect of the general, more basic intertwining of subjectivity and 
corporeality. As I mentioned above, Merleau-Ponty will frequently draw an analogy between the 
relationship between mind and body and the relationship between thought and language. For 
Merleau-Ponty “we must…say the same thing about language in relation to meaning that Simone 
de Beauvoir says about the body in relation mind: it is neither primary nor secondary…There is 
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no subordination between them. Here no one commands and no one obeys.”331 Merleau-Ponty’s 
claim that “language does not duplicate externally a solitary thought”332 also explains and 
comports with many ordinary experiences that we have of thinking and speaking, namely those 
in which we find that we do not really know what we think until we are able to express or speak 
it in some way. As Merleau-Ponty argues, “if speech presupposed thought, if talking were 
primarily a matter of meeting the object through a cognitive intention or through a 
representation, we could not understand why thought tends towards expression as towards its 
completion, why the most familiar thing appears indeterminate as long as we have not recalled 
its name, why the thinking subject is in a kind of ignorance of his thoughts so long as he has not 
formulated them for himself, or even spoken or written them….”333 The experience Merleau-
Ponty is describing here is one with which are all familiar; it is that experience of something 
“being on the tip of one’s tongue,” so to speak, or that experience in which we have the inchoate 
notion of something that can only be fully or truly thought or understood once we have found the 
right words with which to say it. Such an experience is quite paradoxical indeed, and it begins to 
disclose the equally paradoxical – yet directly lived – relationship between thought and language.  
 Why, moreover, is this relationship between thought and language “paradoxical”? So far, 
I have only described this relationship from one side, yet for Merleau-Ponty, as I just mentioned, 
they are intertwined, or reciprocally constitutive. So, it is not just the case that thought 
presupposes language; it is not just the case that there is no such thing as a purely internal 
thought that language would only later externally translate; rather, it is also the case that 
language presupposes thought. Though, on the one hand, thought presupposes language, on the 
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other hand we would never speak or write if we did not already, at least in some nascent form, 
“have something to say.” That is, though Merleau-Ponty denies that thought radically precedes 
and determines language, it is nevertheless the case that linguistic expression would never arise 
if there were not already certain latent thoughts or meanings to be expressed. So, for Merleau-
Ponty, expression partially constitutes what it expresses, yet at the same time no expression 
would happen at all if there were not already something to be expressed – something latent or 
nascent that solicits or elicits it – in the first place. This, then, is why Merleau-Ponty considers all 
expressive relationships or processes to be “paradoxical.” Expression is a movement through 
which something is brought into being (that is, expressed), yet the movement of expression itself 
and the thing that comes into being through that very movement mutually presuppose or 
constitute one another: nothing expressed would exist if it were not for the movement of 
expression through which it comes to be as such, yet there would be no such movement of 
expression if the thing that comes to be expressed through that movement did not already, in 
some form, exist to motivate it. Thus, we have two “things” or phenomena that mutually 
presuppose one another; neither can exist without the other, and each somehow seems to precede 
the other. The relationship between thought and language is a primary example of this 
paradoxical relationship since, again, thought presupposes language, yet language also 
presupposes thought; there is, then, only ever the ceaseless “irruption of one into the other, 
or…interception of one by the other.”334  
Such a relationship between thought and language seems to be aporetic (and in a sense it 
certainly is), yet Merleau-Ponty argues that such a relationship (or aporia) constitutes not only 
thought and language but indeed Being as such. The “logic” of what Merleau-Ponty calls 
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“expression” is the logic of what he will also call “reversibility” or “the chiasm,” for it always 
designates a genesis of things that are radically interdependent, a coming-into-being of 
phenomena that reciprocally constitute or ground one another or that are, as Merleau-Ponty often 
puts it (and as we will further discuss in chapter five), laterally related to one another, hence 
always co-given and determined by a limit between them that, though real, is always in principle 
undecidable. As we will see, this logic of intertwining (which is also the logic of what Merleau-
Ponty calls “expression” at other registers) – this kind of (bi)laterality that characterizes all 
ontologically fundamental relationships – is perhaps best exemplified by the relationship 
between self and Other(s), yet we see here that Merleau-Ponty also identifies it at the level 
language and thought. Thus, “language is not meaning’s servant, and yet it does not govern 
meaning.”335 This constitutive lateral relationality between language and thought/meaning is the 
same kind of relationality that, for Merleau-Ponty, constitutes all beings and phenomena at the 
fundamental level of reality. At the fundamental level of reality, all things are intertwined in 
precisely the same way that language and thought are intertwined (so, although there are many 
different intertwinings or “chiasms” in the world, we might say that “intertwining” is nonetheless 
univocal). It is precisely this logic of “intertwining” or of “expression” – this strange yet 
fundamental relational process – that brings everything into being and meaning before 
conventional logic steps in to demand that such things be categorized as either identical or 
opposed, or as either anterior or posterior, to one another. We already see, then, that Being for 
Merleau-Ponty is never an oppositional duality, never a subsumptive or syncretic unity, and 
never a hierarchy: dualisms, reductive unities or identities, and “naturalized” hierarchies are 
always false abstractions. 
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 So, “expression” happens when two things or phenomena, though irreducibly different, 
mutually presuppose one another and therefore only come into being all at once (as an “event”), 
even though (reflectively) one might appear to be anterior or posterior to the other. In other 
words, and to be yet more precise, “expression” designates any generative, creative process in 
which the thing or phenomenon that is generated or created and the generative, creative process 
itself are reciprocally constitutive; that is, it refers to a process of genesis in which the thing that 
is generated and the process of genesis itself mutually presuppose and ground one another. 
Expressive accomplishments are “beings in which the expression is indistinguishable from the 
thing expressed….”336 “Expression,” then, is a movement of coming into being or presence that 
is not one of linear, sequential determination or entailment between a condition and its 
consequence but is rather one in which the thing that emerges into presence and the very 
movement of its emergence into presence itself are two inseparable, co-constitutive moments of 
in fact one and the same phenomenon or movement, a movement in which the distinction 
between “condition” and “consequence” is thus blurred, for each of its moments is 
simultaneously the condition and the consequence of the other; it is a movement, then, in which 
terms ordinarily categorized as “condition” and “consequence” surge up in the world together in 
one fell swoop and endlessly slide into one another, a movement, again, in which the expression 
and the thing expressed, the creative act and the creation, mutually inform and condition one 
another. Expressive phenomena are those that explode into the world as wholes all at once and 
therefore truly are, we might say, events. So, expression, again, is a generative process in which 
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the thing that is generated and the form of its genesis itself are two equiprimordial moments, or 
in which it is the case that the thing that is generated is just as constitutive of its own process of 
genesis as its own process of genesis is constitutive of it. Thus, it is more accurate to say not that 
such a process of genesis is the genesis of a phenomenon but rather that it and the thing it 
generates are two moments one phenomenon: the phenomenon Merleau-Ponty calls 
“expression.”  
 On the one hand, since thought cannot radically precede “speech,” yet, on the other hand, 
since we would never “speak” if we did not already have something (some thought or meaning) 
to verbalize, what we call “speech” or “speaking” is an exemplary instance of expression. So too, 
of course, is artistic creation (or “inspiration”), in which, say, a blank canvas becomes a 
surrealistic landscape that does not reproduce an already fully-formed image in one’s mind but 
that one had to first put hand to brush and brush to canvas in order to discover or “birth” (often 
through many errant strokes or failed attempts); it is not determined in advance by an already 
transparent or fully possessed “eidos” or “telos,” yet it is not utterly directionless or chaotic. As I 
mentioned earlier, though he does tend to focus on speech and art (especially painting), Merleau-
Ponty acknowledges that there are many other expressive phenomena or processes in the world: 
“It is impossible to draw up an inventory of this irrational power which creates meanings and 
conveys them. Speech is merely one particular case of it.”337 Though he tends to focus on speech 
and art in those contexts in which he explicitly discusses “expression,” Merleau-Ponty also 
clearly argues that emotions (and that indeed all mental phenomena) are expressive phenomena.   
 So, we have seen that the phenomenon of expression is a movement of emergence in 
which the thing that emerges into presence is inseparable from its manner of emergence into 
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presence, or in which the thing that comes into being and the process through which it does so 
are neither posterior nor anterior to one another but are rather reciprocally constitutive of one 
another, are two aspects or moments of a single, eventful irruption of meaning into being and of 
being into meaning; here, there is a confusion of condition and conditioned, of origin and 
consequence, or anteriority and posteriority, of form and matter. In Merleau-Ponty’s sense of the 
term, expression is always a particular intertwining of form and matter/content, for it is always a 
mode of expression that determines and is also reciprocally determined by whatever it is that it 
expresses. The content of expression cannot be disentangled from the manner or form of its 
expression, and vice versa. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, there is always a “pregnancy of form in 
content prior to the subsumption of content under form.”338 In expression, the expressive act or 
process is constitutive of what it expresses, yet at the same that expressive act or process is 
shaped, motivated, or informed by the very thing it brings to expression. Expression, then, is 
never simply the transmission of some sort of content or meaning that is absolutely prior to it, 
but rather it itself partially constitutes (or partially is) the very content or meaning it expresses; 
and yet, that content cannot only come after, or cannot be completely constituted by, the 
movement through which it is expressed, for if it did not precede that movement in some way 
nothing would have ever motivated such a movement in the first place. That is the aporia of 
expression.  
 As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “expression is everywhere creative, and what is expressed is 
always inseparable from it.”339 Every expressive act must express something: in order for an act 
of expression to take place, there must be something already available to be expressed. However, 
it is also true that any available stock of things to be expressed could only have been already 
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acquired through previous expressive acts. Thus, there is indeed something aporetic about what 
Merleau-Ponty calls any expressive relationship or movement. In the expressive relations and 
processes that define vital, carnal existence, the limit between expression and expressed, between 
signifier and signified, between ground and grounded, between condition and consequence, 
between originarity and secondarity, is never effaced but is ambiguous or undecidable. Such 
expressivity especially characterizes not only art but also the general relationship between 
thought and language, between consciousness and the (living, acting) body, between 
intentionality/perception and behavior, and between affectivity and behavior.     
 The point I wish to emphasize, then, is that the relationship between emotion and 
behavior also precisely instantiates this paradoxical relationship that Merleau-Ponty designates 
as “expression.” In other words, emotion is, in exactly Merleau-Ponty’s technical sense of the 
term, an expressive phenomenon, because no emotion could exist if it were not embodied, 
performed, or “externalized” through behavior, yet also the behaviors through which emotions 
are externalized would never be performed if such emotions did not in some way already 
internally, latently exist in order to motivate them. Emotions surely motivate those comportments 
through which they are expressed, yet they are also partially constituted by such comportments 
themselves. In general, form and content are inseparable, and form is to body as content is to 
mind: they do not collapse into each other, but they do, as we have seen, co-constitute one 
another. This is precisely why Merleau-Ponty even claims that “the body is to be compared, not 
to a physical object, but to a work of art,”340 for it is a site or movement of meaning-disclosure, 
yet what it discloses is always inseparable from the manner in which it discloses it; it precisely 
discloses subjectivity because subjectivity is how a living body dwells in the world amidst 
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others. In other words, the meanings that a living body discloses are precisely its own styles of 
responding to worldly meaning, and these it discloses simply by being a living body, that is, 
simply in and through its incessant, creative responses to worldly meaning. In responding to 
meaning, the living body always discloses itself as precisely a responsiveness to meaning. A 
living body is nothing apart from the manner in which it responds to meaning, and therefore, like 
a work of art, when it expresses itself (which it always does) – when it expresses its subjectivity 
or agency – it precisely expresses something that is inseparable from the manner in which it is 
thereby expressed.  
 In short, the manner in which the body expresses “a mind” is inseparable from the mind 
or mental content it expresses. In particular, the bodily expression of an emotion partially 
constitutes, or is itself already, the emotion it expresses. This is why the behavioral expression of 
an emotion is a specific instance of what Merleau-Ponty calls “expression.” The bodily 
expression of an emotion, like the bodily expression of any mental state, is constitutive of the 
emotion itself, and yet there would be no such act of bodily expression if there were not already 
the latent emotion to prompt or solicit it, if there were not already the emotion I “feel” inwardly 
to motivate it. So, what is true concerning the relationship between interiority and exteriority in 
general is especially true concerning the interiority and exteriority of an emotion (or of any 
mental phenomenon). The interiority and exteriority of an emotion – the emotion I “feel” and the 
manner in which I express how I feel it – are co-constitutive. This is why, for Merleau-Ponty, it 
is just as incorrect to say that behavior is merely an external sign of an internal experience or 
“feeling” as it is incorrect to say that a word is merely an external sign of an internal, transparent 
thought or meaning. It is also why I often do not know what or how I feel until I find the right 
way to express it, in just the same way that I often do not know what I think until I am able to 
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articulate it. It is also why it is possible to say that I directly access others’ emotions through 
their behaviors – or why it is possible to say that to see others’ emotionally expressive behaviors 
is to see, not infer, their emotions themselves – while also acknowledging the difference or 
distance between emotion and behavior. In general, as we have seen, nothing “in” my mind is 
ever transparent: certainly not to others, but also not to me; and this is the case because 
everything “in” the mind is also incarnate or entwined with some manner of corporeal presence: 
never wholly external, but also never wholly internal. The body is “essentially an expressive 
space,”341 and it expresses (in Merleau-Ponty’s specific sense of that term) what we call 
“subjectivity.” We can now understand that subjectivity itself is an expressive movement or 
accomplishment in exactly Merleau-Ponty’s technical sense of the term. To say that subjectivity 
is an “expressive” phenomenon is simply another way to say that it is embodied. Since 
subjectivity is embodied, everything “subjective” or mental is destined to, or already enveloped 
within, bodily expression. 
 So, there is a distinction between the “subjective” or “felt” quality of an emotion and the 
way in which it is behaviorally enacted, for if there were no such distinction, not only would 
there be nothing “that it is like” to experience an emotion but it would also be impossible to feign 
an emotion. Nonetheless, emotions cannot be purely internal or private phenomena: their 
meanings as such are constituted intersubjectively and enactively; they only ever arise through a 
living body’s encounter with others and with a world, and they must, therefore, be directly 
perceptible “from the outside.” A happiness, sadness, or anger that cannot be enacted through 
certain behaviors is, at the very least, a quite different and perhaps considerably diminished form 
of happiness, sadness, or anger, and perhaps is not truly happiness, sadness, or anger at all. There 
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is no such thing as a joy that cannot be expressed at all (through the living body) or that is not 
inherently polarized toward some manner of behavioral expression, nor is there such a thing as a 
genuine expression of joy that would be devoid of interiority. An emotion that could not be 
expressed behaviorally is like a word whose meaning cannot be communicated to others: as the 
latter would not have any meaning at all, neither would the former. I only know what my 
emotions are – and thus I only really “have” emotions – because others show them to me, 
because I may show them to others, and because others teach me how to show them, because I 
already exist in a world in which such emotions (and the values to which they are responsive) are 
already at play, a world already saturated with value and passion. In short, there is no such thing 
as a private language, and so too is there no such thing as a private emotion. This is not, again, to 
deprive emotion of interiority. The point here is not to deprive emotion of interiority but rather 
not to deprive it of exteriority, which is just as much of a mistake. Emotions, like words, have no 
being or meaning apart from their expression within an intersubjective context or situation, but 
this fact no more denies emotions any interiority than it denies language (or thought in general) 
any interiority. Similarly, in just the same way that I often do not know what I think until I 
verbalize it, so too is it the case that I do not know what I feel until I discover (always with and 
through others) the apt way to express or enact it. 
 All of the things we have observed up this point are not just empirical facts; they are 
empirical facts, but more than that they indicate, and are grounded in, fundamental ontological 
facts concerning the constitution of subjectivity: they indicate that subjectivity is possible and 
realizable as such only as intersubjectivity or, more accurately, only as intercorporeity, which is 
to say only through reciprocal, lateral exchanges of meaning between living bodies. All “mental” 
phenomena – all thoughts, ideas, concepts, words, perceptions, intentions, feelings, and so on – 
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are incarnate and, through their incarnation, already entangled in skeins of relationships with 
other carnal beings and with a carnal world; they are, then, always “dialectical” in the original 
sense of the term, that is, they only ever emerge in response to – or only ever emerge as - “some 
pulsation of interpersonal life.”342  
I simply do not know what it is to love if I do not know what it is to be loved, and 
likewise all conceivable emotions presuppose a milieu in which such emotions are already at 
play, a context in which others already address, solicit, motivate, support, obstruct, respond to or 
even ignore me in my pursuits of various ends, for without such a context – that is to say, 
without a community – there would be no such things as “ends,” for there would be no 
individuals in the first place to perceive or pursue them: only the drama of coexistence imparts 
meaning or value to the world with which one is consciously engaged, and therefore so too does 
it alone impart emotion and affectivity to our conscious engagements with the world, for emotion 
and affectivity are essentially – no matter how unreflective or “rudimentary” – responses to 
worldly meaning and value. Emotions and affects are always already intersubjectively embedded 
modes of engaging and perceiving the world, and every mode of engaging and perceiving the 
world – every manner in which a living body is connected to its milieu – is always already 
permeated by affectivity, always already emotionally-laden, always already value-directed and 
passionate.343  
Moreover, as we have seen, emotions simply cannot be understood as interior states that 
precede and are radically distinguishable from the outward, behavioral manner in which they are 
typically expressed, but are rather indissociable from habituated modes of bodily expression and 
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comportment. If to be a living body is to be continually open to, hence affected by, a world, then 
every way in which a living body encounters its world is already value-laden, already 
emotionally freighted. The “intentional threads”344 of the lived/living body that tie me to the 
world are precisely, as Heidegger felicitously puts it, modes of attunement to it, ways in which 
things show up for me as meaningful or important but which we have for far too long 
inadequately called “feelings” and, consequently, falsely regarded as purely internal phenomena; 
on the contrary, they are interactive and fundamentally intersubjective phenomena; they are 
chords struck by the world, and moreover they are chords whose tunes and resonances, whose 
harmonies and even dissonances naturally reverberate through and upon those that radiate from, 
and that bind to the same world, other living bodies; therefore, they are chords that already 
connect all living bodies to one another, that already constitute every living body or every 
supposedly “inner life” as an “instrument that another plays,”345 that already situate every living 
body in a common chorus that “sings the world.”346 
  In general, then, to perceive is already to behave; even a living body at rest is a behaving 
body. Yet every perceiving, behaving body – every mode of perceptual and cognitive access to 
the world, every mode of behavioral comportment toward the world – is affectively, emotionally 
charged. Emotion and affectivity are essential structures of consciousness, and so too, we are 
already seeing, is community, for emotions or affects are intelligible as such only in virtue of 
others who express and enact them through projects and experiences that intersect with and 
evoke my own, others whose orientations toward the world always already envelop, interpellate, 
and make possible my own, others with whom I inhabit and co-constitute a lifeworld, others with 
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whom I navigate that context of being outside of which there can be no meaning, that setting 
outside of which consciousness, identity, and value would be extinguished like oxygen in the 
vacuum of space. It is only because others mirror and model certain emotions and affects in their 
modes of dwelling in the world that I know what those emotions and affects are when they arise 
for me as modes or characteristics of my own dwelling in the world. In general, subjectivity is 
possible only because it is precisely not self-enclosed, only because it is fundamentally “flesh 
applied to a flesh,”347 which is to say a body in contact with itself through its ecstatic contact 
with a world and with other bodies. Subjectivity is necessarily a “coiling over”348 of flesh upon 
itself in virtue of those other forms of flesh that enfold it, including especially the flesh of others 
whose sensibilities and passions thus resound within it, whose capacities and incapacities, 
powers and vulnerabilities are ineffaceably inscribed into it. My own flesh is always already 
entangled with the flesh of others, and it is the flesh of others that crucially shapes and teaches 
me about my own, that transfers sense to my own, that not only opens me to “landscapes besides 
my own”349 but that also, in doing so, decenters my own and dispels “the solipsist illusion that 
consists of thinking that every going beyond is a surpassing accomplished by oneself,”350 or that, 
in other words, reveals to me the basic truth that I have no self of which to speak or be aware, 
and therefore no “internal” states, qualities, or capacities to project outward into others, if others 
have not already drawn me outside myself, if the interiorities of other living bodies have not 
already introduced me to my own interiority, if others have not already presented what it is to be 
“minded” through behaviors that inherently signify or perform mindedness. The behaviors of 
others inherently express lived, embodied experiences that, as such, irremediably transcend yet, 
																																																								
347 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and The Invisible, p. 138. 
348 Ibid., p. 140. 
349 Ibid., 141. 
350 Ibid., 143. 
	 258	
in virtue of their embodiment, also overlap my own and that, in precisely overlapping my own, 
motivate and impart intelligibility to them; moreover, this overlapping of bodily experiences and 
agencies – this foundational intercorporeity – “brings to birth a ray of light that illuminates all 
flesh and not only my own.”351  
 I have taken time to discuss Merleau-Ponty’s account of emotion not simply because it is 
important for its own sake but also because it reinforces and further elaborates his anti-Cartesian 
account of “the mental” and therefore his thesis that everything we might esteem as “purely” 
internal is already enfleshed, already shaped by other flesh, already constituted intercorporeally. 
And when we consider the fact (as we will in the following chapter) that it is always, in the end, 
a Cartesian account of “the mental” that motivates us to doubt or deny the presence of various 
mental states or capacities (especially emotional ones) in other beings, such an anti-Cartesian 
account has profound (ethical and not just epistemological or ontological) consequences.  
 A basic truth which is far too often overlooked is that if there is simply no subjectivity 
without intersubjectivity, so too is it the case that nothing that may be predicated of subjectivity 
– no emotions or affects, no mental states or characteristics at all – can exist in isolation, but can 
only exist communally. Though it is true that only I can experience, say, my own pleasures and 
pains, or that there is a basic qualitative difference between my own pleasures and pains and the 
pleasures and pains of others (inasmuch as I live through the former but never, in principle, the 
latter), to experience pleasure and pain at all is to be flesh in touch with itself through what 
Merleau-Ponty often calls “the flesh of the world”352: that fundamental tissue of relations or 
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shared carnality that enables and constitutes one’s contact with others and with a world and, 
through such contact with others and a world, contact with oneself. It is tempting to consider 
phenomena like pleasure and pain to be completely private states of mind or “qualia,” yet if the 
mind is not disembodied, then it is never completely private, and thus no mental state – neither 
pleasure nor pain nor anything else – is completely private either; such “internal” states or 
phenomena are never purely internal, never uncontaminated with exteriority, never withdrawn 
entirely from publicity. Thus, “insofar as I have sensory functions, a visual, auditory, and tactile 
field, I am already in communication with others.”353 Every emotion or affect, every feeling or 
perception is already “the propagation of my own most secret life in another.”354 To experience, 
say, pleasure and pain (indeed to experience anything at all) is to be a body radically, incessantly 
exposed and vulnerable to a world and thus in principle and in fact exposed and vulnerable to the 
pleasures and pains of other living bodies that are, as such, likewise exposed and vulnerable to – 
likewise extended into, or embedded within – that same world, that same field of incarnate 
experience and being. To be capable of feeling pleasure and pain is already, through the very 
same bodily reflexivity through which pleasure and pain themselves are possible in the first place 
and of which they are particular instances, to be capable of sensing reflexively – which is to say, 
to be capable of sensing immediately or directly, not merely of inferring analogically – the 
pleasures and pains of others, and indeed to feel pleasure or pain at all is already to sense, 
directly albeit allusively, the pleasures or pains of others. Every feeling or affect is already drawn 
from an intersubjective, intercorporeal reservoir of affectivity, a “primary universality of 
sensation.”355 The very moment I feel anything at all I already feel, already aspirate the 
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percussive echoes and reverberations of other feelings and passions, the senses and ambient 
rhythms of other bodies “already at work in the world.”356 If there is no such thing as an isolated 
consciousness, and if consciousness is inherently embodied – if to be conscious just is to be a 
living body – then it follows that there is no such thing as an isolated living body, either, and if 
there are no isolated living bodies, it follows that neither are there any truly isolated, purely 
private lived, bodily experiences: perception and affectivity – all conceivable modes and 
characteristics of meaningful, active and passive engagement with the world – are inherently 
intercorporeal. Every affect through which I am in contact with myself and my environs, every 
manner in which I am affected by the world in virtue of my living body as a “general medium for 
having a world”357 – every affect through which the medium of the world itself “ceaselessly 
assails and beleaguers subjectivity as waves wash round a wreck on the shore”358 – bears the 
traces of all other affects, including those of others: including those of other lives being lived 
amidst and at the horizons of my own, including those of other bodies and experiences that 
predate my own, including especially those of others who have already helped shape my flesh 
into the form that lets it exist and be affirmed as “a self,” others who have already taught me 
what it is to be alive, to suffer and to thrive.  
Though indeed I experience, for example, my own headache differently from the manner 
in which I experience another’s, we have seen that there is in fact a manner in which I may 
directly experience or perceive – not merely “infer” – another’s headache, and this is not 
fundamentally different from the manner in which I may directly, empathically experience or 
perceive anything concerning the minds of others at all (as indeed I must be able to do if I am 
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ever in a position to make inferences about them). To experience, say, another’s headache is 
surely a different mode of experiencing a headache than the one in which I experience a 
headache of my own, but it is nonetheless a mode of genuinely, directly experiencing a 
headache: it is at the very least simply a direct experience of a particular kind of absence (as 
indeed all experiences are). As Merleau-Ponty writes, “from the moment one is joined with 
someone else, one suffers from her suffering. If physical pain is involved, in which one can 
participate only metaphorically, one strongly feels this inadequacy.”359 Yet, I think it follows 
from Merleau-Ponty’s other arguments and commitments that to feel the absence of another’s 
pain is not merely to feel it “metaphorically” (though I suppose much depends upon what 
precisely is meant here by “metaphorically,” which is not entirely clear; such a term may simply 
serve to indicate the undeniable difference between first-personal and second-personal modes of 
experiential givenness): it is different way of really feeling it. When I cannot feel another’s pain 
as I feel my own, I “strongly feel this inadequacy,” and this inadequacy is precisely the way in 
which another’s pain is present to me: it is the way in which another’s pain is present to me as 
absent. So, if I cannot feel another’s pain exactly as I feel my own, it is nonetheless precisely 
that lack, precisely that incapacity on my part, precisely that very absence that I feel, and perhaps 
indeed it is that very absence – that otherness of a pain that can never be my own – that haunts 
me, that deprives me of absolute solitude, that, yes, “pains” me and, in doing so, teaches me 
something about my own pain I would not be able to know in any other way, namely that what I 
just referred to as “my pain” is in fact never purely mine, that I would have no pain that I could 
experience or refer to as “mine” if I were not already acquainted with pains that are other than 
mine, pains that appear in the mode of “not being mine.” To appear in the mode of “not being 
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mine” is eidetically just as real and basic, just as immediate and direct a way for pain to appear to 
me, for indeed absence is, in general, not only a way in which many kinds of things and 
phenomena are present in everyday experience, but is a condition of the possibility of presence 
as such. Thus, the experience of one’s own pain is qualitatively different from the experience of 
another’s, but it does not follow that there is an ontological or epistemic gulf between them, and 
if there were such a gulf I would never be aware of my own existence and experiences as distinct 
from others (as precisely “mine”) in the first place. In general, though I cannot inhabit another’s 
mental states, it does not follow logically, from that fact alone, that I can only at best infer them; 
such a conclusion follows logically only if one assumes the dualistic exclusion of interiority 
(consciousness or alterity) from exteriority (the body) and only if one assumes that one may posit 
an “I” prior to, or fundamentally isolated from, others in the first place. We have already seen 
that both of these (often enthymematically suppressed) assumptions are false. Again, we directly 
perceive absence as well presence, and we do so because absence is always already the condition 
of presence, because absence and presence are not opposed but are always already mutually 
constitutive modes of being. And as absence is to presence, so is interiority 
(consciousness/alterity) to exteriority (the living, behaving body), for interiority and exteriority 
are necessarily intertwined, yet it is only exteriority – only my body or the body of an Other – 
that is “present” in the world. Of course, my consciousness and the consciousnesses of others are 
present in the world (for again, interiority and exteriority are inseparable), yet they are present in 
a different manner, which is to say they are present precisely as certain kinds of absences. No, I 
cannot feel another’s pain exactly as I feel my own, but it is nonetheless, at the very least, this 
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absence of the other’s pain that I can feel, and the absence of the other’s pain is a mode of its 
presence; it is “an absence [that] counts in the world.”360  
It is often inferred that to deny the absolute privacy of the Other’s (or of my own) 
interiority is to render it transparent from the outside. However, such an inference is invalid. To 
deny that interiority is completely private is not to say that it is fully on display in the world; 
rather, it is to acknowledge, as we all know quite well from ordinary experience, that we directly 
yet non-exhaustively encounter the minds of others through their bodies/behaviors, that while 
consciousness is always self-othering or self-externalizing – or always inseparable from its 
bodily comportments – it is nevertheless withheld from exhaustive, translucent publicity. In a 
word, there is an ambiguity inherent to subjectivity, an ambiguity that, as we have seen, 
designates its simultaneous immanence and transcendence, which is to say its embodiment: its 
embeddedness in, yet irreducibility to or excess beyond, bodily behavior. This, again, is simply 
what makes alterity possible: it is what resolves the supposed “paradox of the alter ego,” the 
“accessibility of the inaccessible,” the “presentation of the unpresentable”361; it precisely makes 
the “inaccessible” strangely accessible. If the interiority of an Other were wholly interior or 
divorced from his/her exteriority, it would never appear to me at all. However, if the Other’s 
interiority were reducible to his/her exteriority, it would not in fact be interiority. Behaviorism, 
then, effaces alterity just as surely as Cartesian dualism/solipsism: whereas the latter withholds 
the Other entirely from any possible manner of direct outward presentation, the former renders 
the Other’s otherness transparent from the outside or puts the Other on full display, and otherness 
is equally effaced in both cases.  
																																																								
360 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 228. 
361 Ibid., p. 203. 
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To conclude this discussion, we have seen that there is no self-reflexivity at all without 
other selves, no mind at all without other minds, and thus all pleasures and pains, all joys and 
sorrows, all memories and imaginings, all ideas and cognitions, all lived experiences – even 
those withdrawn into the most secret, most tenebrous and apparently unbreachable recesses of 
subjectivity – are, at the most basic level, shared. It is only because I am already thinking with 
and amid others that I am able to think at all; it is only because my consciousness is already 
embedded with other consciousnesses that I am able to be conscious (and especially conscious of 
my own consciousness) at all, and thus it is only with and through others that I am even able to 
begin to conceptualize what thought or consciousness itself is and later ascribe it to others and 
worry about the epistemic status of such an ascription. The very qualities or capacities I 
reflectively acknowledge in myself and proceed to analogically recognize in or attribute to others 
are, then, in fact qualities and capacities I have necessarily learned from others in the first place, 
mental qualities and capacities I have already developed in reciprocal relations with other minds, 
phenomena whose meanings others have taught me in and through our mutual exchanges with 
one another. If I am ever able to “transfer” a particular mental attribute from my own case to that 
of another, it is only because I first derived a notion of such an attribute from others or only 
because others first transferred such an attribute to me; it is only because I have already acquired 
some sense of the meaning of a certain mental attribute, and indeed it is only because I have 
acquired such an attribute itself in and through mutual transferences of meaning between myself 
and others, or in and through the coupling of my living body’s modes of comportment and 
intentionality with those of other living bodies, that I am ever in a position to recognize and 
affirm that attribute in either myself or in others at all.  
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Thus, “the communication or comprehension of gestures comes about through the 
reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others, of my gestures and intentions discernible 
in the conduct of other people. It is as if the other person’s intention inhabited my body and mine 
his.”362 Any inferences and reflective judgments I may formulate concerning the characteristics 
or even the very existence of other minds must be founded upon direct, immediate, pre-reflective 
intentional relations and exchanges with others, transferences of meaning between self and 
other(s) that subtend and inform not only all propositional beliefs and doubts about others but 
even one’s own reflective conceptualization of oneself as an individual distinct from others – 
hence the very standpoint from which any analogies between self and Other(s) may be drawn – 
in the first place. Since minds are necessarily incarnate, and since there is no such thing as a 
mind that could ever know itself, hence exist as such, in complete isolation, it is only through 
what Merleau-Ponty calls intercorporeity – only through a primordial, irreducible coupling or 
“intentional encroachment”363 of my living body and other living bodies – that I may know not 
only the minds of others but also my own. I may only know the experiences of others, and thus 
may only know others as such, through our shared ecstasy of embodiment, through that common 
carnality in which all of my possible and actual experiences are already embedded, through that 
“flesh of the world” that enables all forms of affectivity and of which every affect – every 
sensation, perception, or feeling – is the dissilient, incandescent expression.  
 
 
 
 
																																																								
362 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 185. 
363 Merleau-Ponty, “The Philosopher and His Shadow, in Signs., p. 169. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Other Others 
Merleau-Ponty and the Problem of Animal Minds 
 
“Since so long ago, can we say that the animal has been looking at us?...I often ask myself, just to see, who 
I am – and who I am (following) at the moment when, caught naked, in silence, by the gaze of the animal, 
for example, the eyes of a cat, I have trouble, yes, a bad time overcoming embarrassment. Whence this 
malaise?” 
 
– Derrida364 
 
In September of 1996, my family and I welcomed a six-month old Silky Terrier (named 
“Sammy”) into our family. When I would leave for school in the morning, Sammy would climb 
up to the top of our couch in the living room and peak his head between the bars of the railing 
that ran beside it; he would fix his gaze on me as I prepared my things, furrow his brow, and 
begin to whimper; his eyes seemed sullen, his face forlorn. He certainly seemed sad to see me 
leave. When I would arrive home from school, Sammy would race around the living room and 
dining room, leap beside me on the couch, and climb on top of me. He often licked my face so 
furiously that his tongue would burn my cheeks, and he would tighten his grip on my shoulders 
as I struggled to pry him away and settle him down. He certainly seemed happy to see me arrive 
home; indeed, he regularly greeted me with what I can only describe as ecstatic, unalloyed joy. 
When I took Sammy for walks, he would usually trot contentedly and stop only to relieve 
himself, but when he would catch sight of another person or dog in the distance (perhaps even 
blocks away), he would halt dead in his tracks and take special notice; he would usually (much to 
my frustration) stay fixed in his place and hold his gaze on the person or dog until they passed us 
by or receded entirely from view. There was a peculiar attentiveness, an intensity of 
																																																								
364 The Animal That Therefore I am, p.3-4. 
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concentration – perhaps even a kind of curiosity or recognition – in his gaze and in the bearing of 
his body.  
Sammy never enjoyed baths, and one time, when my mother prepared a bath for him in 
the kitchen (we bathed him in the sink), he hid behind a floor-to-ceiling curtain in an out-of-reach 
corner behind one of our couches (which, to our knowledge, was a place he had never before 
chosen to reside). We found Sammy behind the curtain only after ten minutes of frantic searching, 
and while normally Sammy would respond to his name immediately, this time all of our calls 
went unanswered. When we peered behind the curtain, Sammy lowered and turned his head in 
order to avoid eye contact and began to tremble mildly. It seemed clear to us that Sammy 
attempted to evade or stall his bath, and we should pause to appreciate the implications of such 
behavior: first, he had to have recognized, from observing my mother’s behavior, that a bath was 
imminent; this means that he had to have perceived – indeed, inferred – a particular intention or 
project on my mother’s part, and it does not seem to be the case that such a perception or 
inference could have been based upon mere “conditioning,” for he would frequently witness my 
mother perform other various tasks in the kitchen and near the sink that would not perturb him at 
all. Moreover, my mother did not always announce to him that he was about to have a bath (for he 
seemed to understand the term and would run away accordingly), and on this occasion she 
purposely did not do so for that very reason. It appears to be the case, then, that Sammy’s 
behavior in this instance was an example of the phenomenon psychologists call “novel” behavior. 
Second, Sammy had to have anticipated the unpleasantness of the bath on the basis of previous 
unpleasant bath-experiences, and it hardly needs to be mentioned that this implies that Sammy 
was not merely receptive to pleasure and pain but that he was also comported toward time, 
intentionally directed toward a future on the basis of a past. He did not merely register the stimuli 
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of the moment. He was not, as Nietzsche says of “the animal,” merely “fettered to the moment 
and its pleasure or displeasure”365 or “contained in the present, like a number without any 
awkward fraction left over,”366 but rather he was open to a past and a future. He was not merely 
absorbed in the “stimuli” of a supposedly discrete present, but was rather involved in, and 
oriented toward, a meaningful, temporally ordered context: bent backward upon a past and 
oriented forward in anxious anticipation of a possible experience to come. Sammy inhabited and 
negotiated a temporally emergent situation (or Gestalt), a space of practical possibilities, 
meanings, and values that comes to presence as such only within a pre-given horizon of unfolding 
retentions and protentions, traces and expectations. Third, not only did Sammy decide to avoid 
this unpleasant experience, but he decided to do so by engaging in a certain kind of artifice: rather 
than make us chase him around the house as he usually did, this time he chose to find a place 
where he would not be visible; he sought to find a place where he would be suitably concealed 
from us. Thus, contrary once again to the manner in which Nietzsche characterizes “the animal,” 
it was not the case that Sammy did not “know how to dissimulate” and could “therefore never be 
anything but honest.”367 And the fact that Sammy engaged in such artifice implies that he was not 
simply aware of us, but that he was aware of his own exposure – his own presence - to us. That is 
to say, he was aware of his own visibility. He was aware of himself as open and vulnerable to the 
																																																								
365“On Uses and Advantages of History for Life,” in Untimely Meditations. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), §9, p. 60. 
366 Ibid., p. 61. 
367 Ibid., p. 61. It is also worth mentioning here that a number of other animals – most notably corvid birds, such as 
ravens, rooks, and crows – have been known to engage in even more sophisticated deceptive behaviors. Corvids 
demonstrate a wide range of impressive capacities and behaviors, but above all they are very clever thieves, and 
have been known to anticipate the behaviors of their conspecific competitors and set up “decoy” caches of food in 
order to mislead them. For more on corvid lying and cache-raiding, and for more on all of the other fascinating 
things that corvids do, see Bernd Heinrich, The Mind of the Raven: Investigations with Wolf-Birds (Harper Collins, 
2006) esp. p.167, 300-301.  
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perceptions and interventions of others: not only was he aware of my parents and I as others,368 
but he was reciprocally, reflexively aware of himself as an other for us. If to be a self is to be an 
other for an other, then Sammy was indeed a “self.”  
We should recall that on this occasion Sammy did not respond to frequent calls of his 
name even though he would ordinarily do so without hesitation. It thus appears to be the case that 
Sammy knew that he had a name. Sammy knew himself as a named – which is to say, recognized 
– individual: he understood that he was uniquely denoted by the term “Sammy,” for while in most 
other circumstances shouts of his name would have prompted him to come running and present 
himself, in this instance he did not reply in such a manner, and he did not do so presumably 
because he wished to conceal himself; his failure to reply to our calls suggests a conscious 
resistance to the self-disclosure that they solicited. Why else would he not have replied to them on 
this particular occasion? If it is indeed the case here that outward appearances reflect inward 
reality – that is, if Sammy’s behavior really was consciously evasive or deceptive – then we must 
admit that, contrary to certain common assumptions, the vaunted “mirror test” (which dogs so far 
have not been known to pass) may provide a sufficient but not necessary criterion for “self-
awareness” (and therefore a sufficient but nevertheless not necessary criterion for selfhood as 
																																																								
368 It thus seems to be the case that such deceptive behavior implies what psychologists and philosophers refer to as 
a “theory of mind,” which is to say a capacity to ascribe particular “mental states” to others, or simply a capacity to 
recognize another being as minded. However, a “theory of mind” is often taken to mean a reflective or conceptual 
(perhaps inductive) apprehension of another’s mental states or of an Other qua Other, which is indeed suggested by 
referring to such a capacity as a “theory” of mind. And it is for this reason that I find the term to be misleading or 
unhelpful, for intersubjectivity (or a genuine and constitutive openness to alterity) does not (as I hope to have 
already made clear in the previous chapters and to clarify further in this one) imply or require a “theory of mind” in 
that sense (that is, intersubjectivity is neither necessarily nor primarily a matter of metacognitive representation and 
inference). Perhaps Sammy did have such a “theory of mind” in this more restrictive and “robust” sense (which 
certainly seems to be suggested by the kind of deceptive behavior he exhibited), but I maintain that one can, without 
contradiction, deny him this and yet claim that he was genuinely aware of us (and of many other people and 
animals) as others, and that this intersubjectivity motivated his behavior and indeed constituted his very manner of 
being.    
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such).369 Sammy was, of course, conscious, but moreover he was self-conscious (indeed, all 
forms of consciousness are, to some extent, self-reflexive). Sammy was a “mind” or a “self”; he 
was an “Other.”   
There are many other examples of apparently “intelligent” behavior – many other evident 
indications of “mindedness” – that I could enumerate here. As a further example, when it was 
time to bring Sammy into the veterinarian’s examination room, he would invariably become rigid 
and refuse to walk, and I would be forced to carry him or to drag him across the floor of the 
waiting room; and if I carried him, his body would become tense and his legs would clench my 
arms. It thus appears to be the case that under such circumstances Sammy was apprehensive or 
afraid; there was not only anticipation but also something like dread discernible in his body. And 
as yet another example, when my mother and I would watch television together in the den in the 
evening, Sammy (who was usually confined to another level of our house) would sometimes bark 
incessantly until we allowed him to come downstairs; after I would allow him to come 
downstairs, he often sat at the foot of the couch and would clearly begin to “beg” until I picked 
him up and placed him between my mother and I. It seems to be the case, then, that he desired our 
company and deliberately conveyed this desire to us.  
On the basis of all of the experiences I have enumerated (as well as countless others that I 
cannot mention here), it certainly appears to be the case that Sammy was in fact an Other with 
whom my parents and I happily shared our lives, as well as an Other who happily shared his life 
with ours. It appears to be the case that Sammy had the interiority and indeed the personality – 
the singular ensemble of thoughts, feelings, tastes, desires, aversions, interests, habits, 
temperaments, talents, dispositions, and unnamable idiosyncrasies – that we recognized and 
																																																								
369 I critique the mirror test in the next chapter. 
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affirmed in him; in short, he seems to have been the genuine member of our family that we took 
him to be. But do the outward appearances in this case really reflect the inward reality – the 
particular (non-human) mindedness or otherness – that they irresistibly suggested to us? Do they 
reflect any “inward” reality – any true subjectivity – at all? Do they ever? Or do they merely 
reflect the “inward reality” of we, the human spectators, to whom they appear? Did this entity that 
we named “Sammy” bear merely a counterfeit visage? Was he just a body through which we 
ventriloquized our own familiar sentiments and manner of being? Can we ever know whether or 
not this is so? As obvious as it may be that the world is filled with a diversity of subjectivities – 
as obvious as it may seem that the world is rich in minds and in forms of mindedness – these are 
questions that have vexed philosophy for generations, and even a cursory acquaintance with the 
ways in which we continue to regard and (mis)treat most non-human beings in the world shows 
that there is much at stake in them.  
 Just as surely as we take for granted our coexistence with other human subjects, so too 
do we usually, if we are honest with ourselves, take for granted our coexistence with non-human 
subjects. Just as strongly as we experience and believe in the presence of human Others, so too 
do we experience and believe in the presence of other (non-human or “animal”) Others. If we are 
honest with ourselves, we know that we constantly intuit and affirm other animals as genuine 
Others, as living beings with their own “inner” lives and experiences – that is to say, as entities 
with “minds” – variably akin to yet different from our own. Indeed, what could be more real or 
certain than the kinds of experiences and interactions I have described above? What could be less 
doubtful or more obvious than this mien of sadness, this ecstasy of happiness, this glance (or 
perhaps wag) of recognition and love, this howl of longing or desire, this clench of apprehension 
and fear, this slump of shame, this bark that addresses me? In general, what could be more 
	 272	
obvious than the dynamic orientations toward a world – the manifold affectivities and 
intentionalities – that animal bodies and behaviors constantly express to us in everyday 
experience? And yet, such claims or intuitions – ascriptions of anything more than “mechanical” 
instincts, reflexes, or physiological processes (whether innate or conditioned) to non-human 
animals, which is to say ascriptions of minds “worthy of the name” to animals, and in particular 
ascriptions of emotions to animals – are frequently either dismissed as naïve or censured as 
irrational.  
That my dog is ever “happy” when I arrive home or “sad” when I leave, that he is ever 
“afraid” to go to the vet, that he ever “plans” to “evade” or “stall” a bath, that he ever “desires” 
my company or that he “loves” my family, that he ever feels genuine “shame” when, having 
been caught urinating in the house, he lowers his head and avoids eye contact, that he ever “tells” 
me to throw his ball or to give him a treat or to take him for a walk: these, it is often said, are 
only so many sentimental flights of fancy or anthropomorphic “projections”: I merely represent 
my dog to myself in my own image. I transfer my own thoughts and emotions to my dog so that 
his behavior might be more intelligible to me, and perhaps so that my own sentimental 
attachments to him might be reciprocated, but what my dog really “thinks” and “feels” (if indeed 
he thinks and feels anything at all) I can never “know” because I can never leap inside his head 
or his flesh to find out. We therefore confront the following two alternatives: either my dog has 
no real “interiority” – no real beliefs, desires, preferences, emotions, memories, conscious 
anticipations or intentions, no sense-of-self or sense-of-otherness – at all, or his interiority is so 
“interior” or so alien, so far beyond the horizons of human intelligibility, that it is absolutely 
inaccessible to me, and anything that I might say about it would be untethered speculation. Either 
an animal has no genuine subjectivity at all, or its subjectivity must be passed over in silence. 
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However, it is clear to me that this not the case. It is clear to me that these two alternatives are 
neither sound nor jointly exhaustive and that therefore no acceptable account of either 
knowledge or subjectivity may entail otherwise.  
Thus, I agree with Hume’s claim that “no truth appears…more evident, than that beasts 
are endow’d with thought and reason as well as men. The arguments are in this case so obvious, 
that they never escape the most stupid and ignorant.”370 Of course, what is humorous about 
Hume’s remark here is that while the evidence for animal mindedness is so clear that even “the 
most stupid and ignorant” recognize it, those who have typically – and ironically – failed to do so 
have been erudite philosophers (most exemplarily, Descartes), so-called rationalists and 
empiricists alike who, at least in this respect, fail to adhere consistently to reason and empirical 
evidence. I also agree with Hume’s remark (which immediately precedes the one I have just 
quoted) that “next to the ridicule of denying an evident truth, is that of taking much pains to 
defend it.”371 The early Modern (and especially Cartesian372) notion that “a crying dog is no 
																																																								
370 A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 
118 (1.3.16). Perhaps Hume’s remark suggests that the categories of intelligence and ignorance, hence also those of 
“the human” and “the animal,” need to be reconceived or problematized.  
371 Hume does, however, offer a brief argument for animal mindedness in this section of the Treatise, according to 
which the account of human psychology and practical reasoning that he has already established applies equally well 
to non-human animals. The basis of this claim is that animals seem to engage in causal reasoning to the extent that 
they skillfully adapt means to ends, and that their practical activities are thus analogous to our own:  
 
We are conscious, that we ourselves, in adapting means to ends, are guided by reason and design, and that ‘tis not 
ignorantly nor casually we perform those actions, which tend to self-preservation, to the obtaining pleasure, and 
avoiding pain. When therefore we see other creatures, in millions of instances, perform like actions, and direct them 
to like ends, all our principles of reason and probability carry us with an invincible force to believe the existence of a 
like cause…The resemblance betwixt the actions of animals and those of men is so entire in this respect, that the 
very first action of the very first animal we shall please to pitch on, will afford us an incontestable argument for the 
present doctrine.  
 
While I am sympathetic to Hume’s argument here, in this passage Hume’s justification for attributions of 
mindedness to animals seems to be a classic argument from analogy, and as I will elaborate below (following 
Merleau-Ponty), I take such arguments to be seriously flawed (provided they are intended to account for our primary 
knowledge or experiences of others).  
372 It should be acknowledged here that Descartes’ particular conception of animal life remains a topic of scholarly 
debate. It is not debatable that Descartes did, indeed, consider non-human animals to be mere “automata” or 
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machines, so the main question is whether or not Descartes nevertheless denied sentience – a basic receptivity to 
sensations and certain emotions – to animals. At first glance, it certainly seems that Descartes’ conception of 
animals as “machines” would entail that they do not have any feelings, for it seems strange indeed – or even 
inherently contradictory according to the ordinary sense of the term – to conceive of a mere machine capable of 
sensations and emotions (i.e., if animals are truly no different from clocks, it would seem to be just as strange to 
conceive of an animal experiencing pleasure or pain – or having any experiences at all – as it would be to conceive 
of a clock having such experiences). However, while all scholars grant that Descartes considers animals to be 
automata, some have urged that Descartes’ view nevertheless does not necessarily entail – and that Descartes 
himself did not maintain – that animals do not have sensations or passions. A good example of this interpretation is 
advanced by John Cottingham (see “A Brute to the Brutes?: Descartes’ Treatment of Animals.” Philosophy, Vol. 53, 
No. 206: 551-559, Oct., 1978), who denies that Descartes advances the “monstrous thesis” that animals have no real 
feelings or perceptual consciousness. Cottingham argues that Descartes’ claim that animals are “machines” only 
means for him that they do not have “thought” (or reflective consciousness), not that they do not have affects 
(unreflective sensations and passions), and he cites the letter to Henry More (of 5 February 1649) in which Descartes 
writes “I should like to stress that I am talking of thought, not of…sensation; for…I deny sensation to no animal, in 
so far as it depends on a bodily organ.”  Cottingham also mentions Descartes’ denial of language to animals, 
according to which animal “speech” consists merely of sounds by which they communicate “their impulses of anger, 
fear, hunger, and so on” (1978, p. 556). Thus, while Descartes does deny reflective consciousness, reasoning, and 
language to animals, he is quite happy to attribute feelings to them.  
However, I agree with Daisie and Michael Radner’s assessment that Cottingham does not successfully 
rescue Descartes from the “monstrous thesis” (see Animal Consciousness. Prometheus Books, 1996, p. 60-64). The 
essential problem with Cottingham’s account is that he does not adequately acknowledge Descartes’ view that 
sensations and feelings are “mixed phenomena,” which is to say phenomena that emerge only by virtue of the union 
of mind and body. As Descartes states in his Principles of Philosophy:  
 
We…experience within ourselves certain other things which must not be referred either to the mind alone or to the 
body alone. These arise…from the close and intimate union of our mind with the body. This list includes, first, 
appetites like hunger and thirst; secondly, the emotions or passions of the mind which do not consist of pure 
thoughts alone, such as the emotions of anger, joy, sadness and love; and finally all the sensations, such as those of 
pain, pleasure, light, colours, sounds, smells, tastes, heat, hardness and other tactile qualities. – The Philosophical 
Writings of Descartes, Volume I. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), p. 209.  
 
Since for Descartes sensations and passions depend upon the union of mind and body, the central question now is 
whether or not Descartes attributes genuine minds (or immaterial souls) to animals, but he clearly does not do so. In 
his Replies to the Fifth Set of Objections, Descartes states that he does not think that the “souls of brutes are 
incorporeal” and that he considers the (by definition incorporeal) mind “not as part of the soul but as the thinking 
soul in its entirety” (see The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II, p. 246). Daisie and Michael Radner 
mention that Descartes wrote to one of his correspondents that blood constitutes the “soul” of animal life, but 
nevertheless “the blood is not “soul” in the literal Cartesian sense, for it is corporeal and does not think” (Animal 
Consciousness, p. 63). Descartes does maintain that both human and animal bodies are machines, but for Descartes 
what precisely distinguishes the human person from the animal is the fact that the human person is a “substantial 
union” of mind (res cogitans) and body (res extensa), while animals are only bodies. Thus, since for Descartes 
sensations and feelings can arise only from the union of a mind and body, and since Descartes denies that animals 
have minds (“incorporeal souls”), he cannot consistently attribute sensations and feelings to animals. Thus, at best 
Descartes’ position on animal sentience is inconsistent. Descartes’ own premises do indeed entail the “monstrous 
thesis” that animals are not sentient, even though at times he does not recognize this consequence and asserts that 
the opposite is the case.        
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different from a whining gear that needs oil”373 hardly merits criticism. And yet, lest I be accused 
of taking pains to defend the obvious, it is clear that skeptical and anti-realist attitudes 
concerning animal minds – hence a number of anthropocentric and tacitly Cartesian 
epistemological and metaphysical commitments – persist today, and indeed we should remind 
ourselves, as Merleau-Ponty insists, that “nothing is more difficult than to know precisely what 
we see.”374 Of course, today we have fortunately moved beyond Descartes’ view that all non-
human animals are mere automata,375 but nevertheless I do not believe that we have moved far 
enough, for not only do attributions of certain “mental states” or modes of subjectivity to animals 
remain controversial where they often seem to be obviously correct, but (as I will argue below) 
																																																								
373 Quoted in Gary L. Francione, Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation, Columbia 
University Press, 2008. P. 29. Francione refers here to the fact that “Descartes and his followers performed 
experiments in which they nailed animals by their paws to boards and cut them open to reveal their beating hearts.” 
Indeed, in a letter to Plempius (15 February 1638), Descartes mentions an experiment in which he opened the chest 
and removed the ribs of a live rabbit in order to investigate its aorta. See The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 
Vol. III: The Correspondence. Trans. and ed. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothof, Dugald Murdoch, Anthony Kenny. 
Cambridge University Press, 1991. P. 81. 
374 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 58 
375 Particularly within the scientific community, the consensus seems to be quite contrary to the classical Cartesian 
view. Contemporary studies of animal behavior and cognition have yielded (and constantly continue to yield) 
prodigious evidence of rich mental capacities in animals (many of which were once considered to be exclusively 
human). This research is so complex and extensive that it is not possible for me to provide an account of it here, but 
suffice it to say that the views of Descartes and his contemporaries are repudiated by most of the scientists who 
conduct this research; given the overwhelming evidence on the matter, doubts concerning the mindedness of most 
animals enjoy the same status as doubts concerning the basic facts of evolution and anthropogenic global warming. 
For example, it has been accepted for quite some time that elephants mourn, that rats exhibit empathy, that corvid 
birds engage in complex deceptive and problem-solving behaviors, that dogs and certain farm animals can suffer 
from post-traumatic stress and other emotional disturbances, that many birds and primates not only use tools but also 
make them, that many different animals in captivity can manifest boredom, sadness, and even attempt suicide, and 
that dolphins and whales have distinct intergenerational cultural practices and display what can only be credited as 
genuine language (indeed, those who study marine bioacoustics have recently suggested that dolphins may have 
proper names with which they refer to one another), and this is to name only a very small portion of all of the things 
we have learned about animals. Indeed, today scientists no longer wonder whether animals have minds so much as 
they simply wonder what kinds of minds they do have.  
At the same time, however, we need to acknowledge that these progressive attitudes toward non-human 
animals are in tension with a certain strain of methodological skepticism that also persists in the scientific 
community. As I will further discuss below, such skepticism seems to be largely rooted in a misdirected anxiety 
over anthropomorphism, which is itself rooted in a subject-object epistemological framework that excludes 
(inter)subjectivity from knowledge and “objectivity.” Moreover, we also should be careful not to regard non-human 
subjectivities as worthy of appreciation and respect only insofar as they are similar to human subjectivity, for that 
assumes the very anthropocentrism that we here wish to critique. Nevertheless, studies of the social and linguistic 
behaviors of cetaceans, elephants, canines, felines, pigs, bears, birds, rodents, other primates, and so on, continue to 
reveal to us the presence of “other others” in the world, and thus continue to decenter our place in it. 
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even those who are happy to ascribe a wide range of mental states and capacities to non-human 
animals (such as the majority of scientists today who study animal cognition) tend to justify such 
attributions in ways that presuppose or reinstate classical (and false) philosophical assumptions 
and abstractions.376  
My thesis is that Merleau-Ponty offers us precisely the way to move further. Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenological alternative to these conventional positions on the issue is, in fact, the 
one that is best able to solve it. Merleau-Ponty argues – and his ontology simply entails – not 
only that all non-human animals are “minded” but also that we know that they are minded for 
reasons that many people (even those who readily accept such a claim) overlook. It is only after 
we attempt to translate our lived experiences with animals into propositions that these 
experiences become susceptible to specious doubts and justifications alike. So, in order to undo 
such doubts and set our confidence in animal mindedness on a proper footing it is necessary to 
return to lived experience, for lived experience (or what Merleau-Ponty otherwise calls 
perception) is the foundation not only of our true claims to knowledge but also of the very 
conceptual frameworks and abstractions that may repress or distort such knowledge, frameworks 
and abstractions that lead us to overlook what we genuinely, always already know by direct 
acquaintance; it is, in short, necessary for us to “learn what we see.” In service to the questions I 
have posed above – questions concerning the existence of non-human minds and the basis of our 
knowledge of them – Merleau-Ponty precisely returns us to the soil of lived experience from 
which they arise, and in doing so I believe that he offers the most cogent answer to them. 
As we have seen (and as we will further discuss), for Merleau-Ponty we are always 
already involved with others: to be in the world is always already to be entangled with other 
																																																								
376 See, for example, my criticisms of Searle and Allen and Bekoff, below, and my criticisms of Nagel in the next 
chapter.  
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“minds” or with what we must come to understand, fundamentally, as other living, behaving 
bodies, other corporeal schemata. For Merleau-Ponty, a “corporeal schema,” again, refers to the 
agency or intentionality performed and immediately expressed in and through a living body’s pre-
reflective openness to, and skillful absorption within, a world that it, as such, simultaneously 
constitutes and receives as meaningful; it is neither a purely internal space of reflective, 
subjective consciousness nor is it merely an external, objective thing or phenomenon that could 
be completely accounted for reductively in ordinary causal or mechanistic terms; rather, it is a 
manner of being – a particular directedness toward, and dynamic involvement within, a milieu or 
sense-laden context – that every living/lived body inherently and enactively is, that conditions in 
advance the possibility of any representation or perception of “things” or “objects,” and that 
therefore antecedes and founds the very distinction between “internal” and “external,” 
“subject(ive)” and “object(ive),” “mind” and “body” in the first place. Now, these other living 
bodies with whom I coexist – these other exploratory and expressive motor-intentional agencies, 
these other styles of being that diverge from but also, by virtue of their carnality, implicate and 
fold into my own – are not only those of other human beings but surely those of non-human 
beings as well, for non-human beings are, of course, living bodies – corporeal schemata, or 
intentionalities and therefore “minds” in the broadest, most non-chauvinistic sense of the term – 
as well. If this is correct, it follows that our knowledge of non-human (“animal”) others – that is 
to say, our knowledge of non-human animals as others (not as mere machines or “brutes” on the 
other side of a cognitive-ontological chasm) – is as basic, pervasive, and well-established as our 
knowledge of human others; indeed, countless instances of human-animal interactions and 
relationships attest to this fact, but we are often pressured to think otherwise. 
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Thus, my argument here is that Merleau-Ponty’s account of our lived relations with 
human others extends to and illuminates our lived relations with other (non-human) others. In 
short, Merleau-Ponty’s solution to the traditional “problem of other minds” is also a solution to 
what is perhaps the last vestige of Cartesianism: the “problem of animal minds” (or what Colin 
Allen and Marc Bekoff call the “other-species-of-mind problem”377). If the classical problem of 
other minds is one of the great “scandals” of philosophy (and indeed it is), then so too is the 
problem of animal minds. It is true that the problem of animal minds seems to be far more 
intractable (and far less patently counterintuitive) than the old problem of other minds due to 
many of the apparently deep differences between human beings and various non-human animals. 
Here, my ultimate point is not to challenge the fact that many non-human animals often differ in 
significant ways from human beings (though surely it is the case, as we continually learn, that 
many animals are far more similar to us than we have traditionally supposed or admitted). 
However, following Merleau-Ponty, I maintain that such differences never cleave the world into 
two sharply delineated, mutually exclusive ontological categories or orders of being, nor do they 
ever justify skepticism concerning animal mindedness in general, which could only be based 
upon such a supposed human/non-human divide in the first place and which is, logically, just as 
solipsistic as classical skepticism concerning human minds.  
So, provided we repudiate classical dualism (along with all of the other binaries it has 
engendered), we must admit that the basis of our awareness and putative knowledge of the 
existence of other human minds is also the basis of our awareness and knowledge of the existence 
of other-than-human minds. If that is right, then logical consistency demands we admit that any 
reasons we may have to doubt the existence of non-human minds are also reasons to doubt the 
																																																								
377 Below, I discuss Allen’s and Bekoff’s response to this issue in their book Species of Mind.  
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existence of other human minds; conversely, any reasons we may have to affirm the existence of 
human minds are also reasons to affirm the existence of non-human minds. If, for example, I 
doubt that a non-human animal is “minded” when I observe its behavior, it is probably because I 
implicitly accept a dualistic conception of the relationship between mind and body according to 
which mindedness can never be exhibited or encountered directly in and through behavior but can 
only be (say, analogically) inferred from it, and of course such inferences are always dubious.378 
At any rate, dualism not only entails such skepticism but is the only commitment that logically 
warrants it. However, for the same reason, this dualism also plunges our supposed knowledge of 
other human minds into doubt. If subjectivity is the kind of thing that can be present only to itself 
– or if subjectivity is ontologically divorced from the external, material, perceptible world – then, 
by definition, it can never be perceived “from the outside,” and therefore the only subjectivity 
whose existence I can know for sure is my own.  
Thus, if a Cartesian account of subjectivity is correct, I can no better claim to know that 
other human subjectivities exist than I can claim to know that other non-human subjectivities 
exist, and of course such an account of subjectivity entails that I can have no such knowledge of 
either at all. As Merleau-Ponty remarks, “there is…no behavior which certifies a pure 
consciousness behind it, and the other person is never given to me as the exact equivalent of 
myself thinking. In this sense it is not only to animals that consciousness must be denied.”379 So, 
if we do not think that skepticism concerning the existence of human others is tenable, then 
neither are we permitted to accept skepticism concerning the existence of non-human others. It is 
																																																								
378 As I discussed in chapter one, the notion that knowledge of otherness is primarily based upon analogical 
inference is inherently fallacious, as it may only ever be supported by inconsistent or circular reasoning. Merleau-
Ponty’s criticisms of such arguments from analogy for other minds are similar to his criticisms of the concept of 
anthropomorphic “projection,” which I discuss below. 
379 The Structure of Behavior, p. 126. Of course, Merleau-Ponty’s remark here is made in the context of criticizing 
the kind of skepticism or solipsism in question. 
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often remarked that it is difficult enough to know what is going on in the mind of another human 
being, so we can hardly hope to know very much about what is going on in the minds of other 
animals, such as dogs, cats, rats, rabbits, deer, bears, lions, giraffes, elephants, parrots, snakes, 
whales, and so on. While I think that such a remark, like most forms of skepticism, assumes an 
overly pessimistic or unreasonably narrow account of what we can be said to “know,” there is 
something right about it. The point, though, is that we hardly ever think to doubt or outright deny 
the fact that our fellow human beings simply are “minded” (however elusive the specific 
“contents” of their minds or lived experiences may be), and yet typically we are not quite this 
charitable when it comes to those other living beings we lazily, thoughtlessly categorize as 
“animals.” Moreover, we never think that the distances between ourselves and human others 
support a priori skepticism regarding even specific “ascriptions” of mental “states,” attitudes, and 
capacities to human others. In the final analysis, this is simply an unacceptable double-standard. 
The logical problem here – the one that Merleau-Ponty suggests in the passage cited above – is 
that either we admit that the reasons that support skepticism concerning non-human minds are 
also reasons that support skepticism concerning other human minds, or we end up arbitrarily 
raising the bar or continually, and question-beggingly, shifting the goal posts for what it takes to 
count as evidence of either “mindedness” in general or of the presence of some mental quality in 
particular so that we may happily continue to entertain doubts about “animal” minds while never 
having to be perturbed by similar doubts about human minds. Indeed, this ad hoc reasoning 
clearly characterizes the entire history of efforts to isolate some single characteristic that only 
human beings would be able to claim to have so that we may, if not deny non-human mindedness 
altogether, at least secure for ourselves a superior, exceptional station in the order of animate 
existence.   
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This, then, is the upshot of Merleau-Ponty’s account of (inter)subjectivity: if we do not 
think that there are cogent reasons to deny the existence of other human minds, then we cannot 
think that there are any cogent reasons to deny the existence of other other (“animal”) minds. 
Anthropocentrism is surely an overdetermined and polyvalent term, but if here we take it to 
designate the thesis that only human beings are “minded” or that only human minds are minds 
“worthy of the name,” or that we can only rationally suppose that the world is populated by one 
“species of mind” (namely, our own), or that, at best, our knowledge of non-human minds is 
derivative with respect to our knowledge of our own human minds in the first instance, then it is 
the last remaining form of solipsism to be accorded any modicum of legitimacy today (and is 
perhaps the only form of solipsism that has ever been taken seriously).380 But all forms of 
solipsism are essentially the same and are therefore equally unacceptable. There is a traditional 
kind of solipsism that affirms that only my own conscious existence is real or certain, but there is 
also a solipsism that affirms that only the existence of human consciousness is real or certain; 
and, as Merleau-Ponty shows us, this latter point of view deserves to be called a kind of solipsism 
because it is motivated by the same erroneous ontological commitments as the former view. 
Moreover, we will also see that the very concept of anthropomorphism that informs skeptical 
attitudes toward specific attributions of mental qualities and capacities to non-humans – that is, 
the very notion we might simply be “projecting” human qualities into non-humans, or hastily 
drawing analogies between our own minds and the minds of non-humans, whenever we attribute 
certain mental qualities or capacities to non-humans – is just as solipsistic, or just as rooted in 
Cartesian epistemological and metaphysical commitments, as skepticism regarding non-human 
mindedness in general. So, as I hope to clarify in what follows, if, as we must agree, the classical 
																																																								
380 I elaborate this analogy between anthropocentrism (along with the notion of anthropomorphism) and solipsism in 
the next chapter. 
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problem of other minds is “scandalous,” then the problem of animal minds is a fortiori 
scandalous as well. It is still not adequately recognized that to address and solve the first problem 
is also to address and solve the second. The “problem of other minds” and the “problem of animal 
minds” logically implicate one another, and Merleau-Ponty offers a decisive solution – indeed, 
the only solution – to both in one stroke. 
Sammy was a very friendly, sociable, and sweet dog, yet he often preferred to play in a 
rather solitary manner; he often preferred to prance proudly around the house on his own with a 
toy rather than, say, play fetch or tug-of-war. This is not at all the case with Dexter, the Havanese 
we welcomed into our family after Sammy passed away. I could write as much about Dexter as I 
have about Sammy, but I think the manner in which Dexter communicates with us (especially 
when he plays) merits special attention. Dexter indefatigably loves to play fetch. When he wants 
to play, Dexter will drop a particular toy in front of me and will then back away a few feet and 
perform what is usually referred to as a “play bow.” Now, sometimes I am too busy or simply 
not in the mood to play with him, so I do not always respond to Dexter’s invitation (or demand) 
immediately. If I take too long to throw the toy Dexter has placed before me, he will invariably 
bark or growl at me and resume his ready, crouched position. If I continue to ignore him and 
remove myself from the area, he usually follows me into the other room, sits across from me, and 
stares at me until I acknowledge him with my gaze; and upon meeting my gaze, he will direct a 
single bark at me and then wait several seconds for my response. If no response on my part 
seems forthcoming, he will then issue another bark. If he eventually grows frustrated enough, he 
will retrieve his toy and push it to me once again. There in his eyes, in his bark, in his posture is 
not only obviously intentionality but also, I will venture to say, language. Dexter, again, will 
push his toy to me and issue a single bark and, if I take too long to respond or if I ignore a 
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sufficient number of his barks, he will issue a low, guttural growl, a kind of growl, it is worth 
noting, that is different from any of his other vocalizations, a growl that seems to have the unique 
function of expressing a frustrated demand for someone to throw his toy for him to retrieve. How 
is this not an instance of communication? Could a cogent theory of language deny that we have 
here an exchange of meaning, a chain of gestures and utterances that signify an intention, desire, 
or object? Do we not have here a deliberate and verbalized effort to direct my attention to 
something or to influence my behavior in a desired way? Does Dexter not genuinely speak to 
me? Is it not the case that Dexter deploys distinctive phonations not only simply to express to 
certain emotions (such as frustration and maybe even anger) but also to impress a conscious 
demand upon me, to tell me to do something for him, to signify his desire for engagement, to 
send me a message? How is this not “language”?  
My parents and many others frequently report engaging in genuine conversations with the 
animals with whom they live. Do I perfectly understand what Dexter means every time he barks 
at me? Are his barks transparent in their meaning, perfectly translatable into my own human 
language? No. But no instance of communication, no linguistic exchange even between humans 
ever involves such transparency, either, and many human languages – perhaps no two human 
languages at all – are ever perfectly translatable into one another, yet this never stops us from 
understanding one another and from seeking to understand one another, or at any rate it never 
stops us from affirming that others – others who do not speak to us in own tongues – 
nevertheless have something to say. Indeed, when it comes to other humans, we usually have 
quite an expansive and charitable conception of what it means “to speak” (as we should): we 
readily acknowledge (as Merleau-Ponty himself argues) that most forms of “speech” are gestural 
and bodily rather than purely “verbal.” I have no doubt that Dexter’s barks denote, but most 
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philosophers of language, within both the “analytic” and “Continental” philosophical traditions, 
realize that there is so much more to language than mere denotation, that there is an irreducibly 
performative element to all uses of language. We readily acknowledge that the larger part of 
what we call “language” is “body language,” and of course all language is, like everything 
“mental” or “cognitive,” fundamentally performed with and through the body. Thus, we 
acknowledge all kinds of languages in the world. We acknowledge that sign language is a 
genuine language. We acknowledge that Chinese and German, for example, are both equally 
languages despite how radically different they are in many respects. We acknowledge that the 
languages of certain Native American peoples have just as much of a right to be called 
“languages” as, say, English and French even though, as Sapir and Whorf famously observed, 
they may be structured by categories, grammars, or even metaphysical schemas that are radically 
different from, and thus never totally commensurable with, the latter (and of course to regard 
them otherwise would simply be racist or ethnocentric). We also acknowledge that the “click” 
languages of the Khoisan and !Kung peoples of Africa are “real” languages even though they, 
too, are radically different from standard Western, subject-predicate languages. Why, then, do 
we persist in withholding such charitability (to say the least) when it comes to “animals”? If in 
the end denying “language” to certain Native American or African peoples would simply be 
racist or ethnocentric, it seems that in many (if not most or all) cases denying language to 
animals is rooted in yet another prejudice: speciesism.  
Of course, it is not entirely true that we deny that animals have language. In much the 
same way that we have fortunately moved beyond the racism or ethnocentrism that would have 
once denied attributing language to, say, the Khoisan peoples, many scientists today have begun 
to advance beyond the reflexive speciesism that often motivates us to deny language to various 
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animals. Research into animal languages is currently expansive and flourishing, and it is 
impossible for me to canvas it here. Scientists do not only study the language of dog barks: they 
also study the rich expressivity of cats’ tails, they also study the sophisticated sign languages of 
elephants, they also study the semiotics of bird and whale songs, they also study the languages of 
dolphins (who are widely believed to use proper nouns), they also study the dance language of 
bees, they even study the ear twitching language of gazelles (which is, indeed, usually referred to 
as a “language” in the scientific literature). Yet, anthropocentrism continues to infiltrate how we 
investigate and talk about non-human languages, and in general we find a rather deep-seated 
cognitive dissonance in our attitudes toward ascriptions of various qualities and capacities to 
animals, one that perhaps reflects precisely a discrepancy between our lived experiences with 
animals and internalized conceptual and ideological frameworks that lead us to doubt those lived 
experiences upon reflection. So, despite the vast research into animal languages, it is 
nevertheless still common to find people (including those linguists and ethologists who research 
the matter) who wish to define language in such a restrictive or narrow manner that “genuine” 
language – that language “worthy of the name” – may still be reserved for humans.  
A couple of years ago, for example, I saw several displays in an exhibit on animal 
language at the Museum of Natural History in New York that suggested that animals, even 
though they deploy vocalizations or phonations that clearly designate objects and aim to 
communicate some sort of intention or meaning, do not “really” have language because they lack 
recursive syntax, as if recursive syntax ought to define what it essentially means to “have” or to 
use language, which seems to be no different from stipulating that a subject-predicate grammar 
ought to define what it essentially means to have or to use language. Perhaps it is also no 
different from saying that “real” poems are written in iambic pentameter. Perhaps it is also no 
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different from saying that atonal music is not “real” music, or that avant-garde art (like 
Duchamp’s urinal) is not “real” art. When I think of language, I think of sending a message, one 
intelligible enough at least in principle to be received by some audience. So, if Dexter’s barks 
and behaviors send me a message that I can understand, they constitute an instance of language. 
Say you and I are having a face-to-face conversation, and you raise an objection to one of the 
arguments I have presented here. In response, I punch you in the face simply for raising the 
objection. I surely have sent you message, and it is likely one that you will understand. But what 
is the “subject-predicate grammar” of a punch to the face? I suppose we could extract a subject-
predicate proposition from it (such as “I do not take kindly to having my arguments criticized” or 
“your objection is offensive to me” or “you have no right to question my reasoning and ought to 
be punished with bodily harm for doing so,” and so on), but why should we want or feel the need 
to do that? I sent you a message, and you received it. Why is that not enough to consider the 
phenomenon in question “language”? Naturally, the reply will be that such a definition is “too 
broad.” Now, if we must remain preoccupied with definitions, I agree that definitions can be too 
broad (for example, it will not do to define a human as just a mammal or to define a game as 
simply something that is done for amusement). However, it seems to me that definitions should 
be as broad as reasonably possible, as broad as they can be while still usefully conveying some 
phenomenon. What other reasons would we have to demand that definitions be narrower than 
this? We could stipulate that “real” language – that language “worthy of the name” – requires 
recursive syntax. But why should we say that recursion is a necessary condition for “true” 
language? What is the point of this narrower restriction? What do we gain by it, or conversely 
what would we lose for rejecting it? If we were to reject such a condition, would we thus be 
failing to capture some “essence” of language (and are we still even looking for “essences” in 
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philosophy anymore anyway)? It seems to me that there are no essential ontological reasons that 
support such a narrow definition. Nothing is really lost by considering any instance of 
“communication,” or any semiotic phenomenon, to be “language.” Some forms of language have 
recursive syntax, some do not. Likewise, some games are played with a ball, some are not; some 
works of art use paint, some do not. So, my basic point is that it seems that the only motivation 
to insist upon a narrower definition of language – that the motivation that is really tacitly 
operative behind the scenes of such a definition – is not to represent correctly some objective 
essence of language but rather to elevate certain language-using beings to a position of 
superiority over other beings. And my other basic point, then, is that most (if not all) definitions 
are value-laden, ethical and political constructs, and we should not pretend otherwise.  
My point here, at the outset of this chapter, has not so much been to engage with 
philosophy of language for its own sake but rather to use the question of language as an example 
to illustrate the ethical and political stakes that are always at play in questions that might seem to 
be purely “ontological” or “scientific,” and to challenge a pattern of reasoning we typically find 
wherever questions concerning attributions of various mental characteristics or capacities to non-
human animals are considered, for in most (if not all) cases we find that there is always an 
anthropocentric agenda that motivates the manner in which such characteristics or capacities are 
defined (or even selected for investigation in the first place); indeed, we often find that the 
characteristics or capacities typically taken to indicate human exceptionalism are defined in 
narrow ways in order to bootstrap that exceptionalism in the first place, that the presence of such 
characteristics or capacities are taken to “prove” a thesis that was in fact already determined to 
be true in advance of narrowly defining them and that they were only defined narrowly in order 
to ratify. We also especially find that anthropocentrism tends to motivate most skeptical or 
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negative appraisals of attributions of such characteristics or capacities to animals as mere 
“anthropomorphisms,” and for this reason, following certain arguments Merleau-Ponty develops 
on the issue, I wish to suggest that we have good reason to abandon the very concept of 
“anthropomorphism,” good reason indeed to abandon the very notion of an “anthropomorphism 
fallacy.”    
The pattern of thinking I have just mentioned is one that we find to be pervasive 
throughout studies of animal cognition. Not only do anthropocentric biases inform what we study 
in the first place, they also inform the manner in which we define the phenomena we study, and 
this is clearly evident in the often ad hoc manner in which we shift the goal posts for what it 
means to “really” have a particular quality or capacity: nearly every time it is discovered that 
certain non-humans exhibit some quality or capacity typically considered to be exclusively 
human, there are many who then define such a quality or capacity in an arbitrarily narrow way so 
as to preserve its exclusively or exceptionally “human” status. Thus, for example, many will say 
that animals “communicate” but do not really “have language,” yet there does not seem to be a 
better basis for making such a judgment with regard to non-humans than there is with regard to 
many other humans who speak in ways that are quite different from how we do: in the latter case 
it is simply racism, ethnocentrism, or colonialism that motivates us to deny “genuine” language 
to humans whose “tongues” are quite alien to our own, and in the former case, similarly, it is 
nothing but anthropocentrism or speciesism – nothing but the prejudice and mystification of 
human specialness – that motivates us to deny “genuine” language to animals. A point to which I 
will return is that none of these “isms” or exclusionary, supremacist frameworks are relevantly 
different from one another, for in all cases they involve the notion that some characteristic is 
super important or “special” – thus something that ought be the essential, supreme, default 
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standard relative to which other phenomena or forms of subjectivity ought to be compared and 
evaluated – merely because it is a characteristic “we” (supposedly) uniquely possess (and indeed, 
to refer to this as a “notion” at all might already be to accord it more dignity than it merits, for it 
is often not a commitment that derives from any actual conscious reflection or reasoning but is 
simply a brute prejudice we internalize from certain systems of power and institutions in which 
we are implicated); that we nearly always do not, as an empirical matter of fact, uniquely possess 
such a characteristic is often a strategically important thing to indicate and appreciate but is also 
beside the point, for “the point” concerns the underlying “logic” or framework that leads us to 
think such a putatively unique characteristic is a mark (if not the mark) of ontological or 
axiological supremacy.  
So, it appears to me that Dexter and I converse with each other (despite the supposed 
species barriers between us) just as genuinely as I converse with any human, and that there are 
no sound, rational grounds to deny such appearances. If we are honest with ourselves, we know 
that animal others “speak” to us in lived experience just as much or just as genuinely as human 
others do, albeit in ways that may be quite different from certain familiar human ways of 
“speaking.” Often when we play, Dexter will bark impatiently at me if I hold his toy and refuse 
to throw it, and in order to discipline him not to bark I will continue to hold his toy in suspense 
until he ceases barking; as I do so, Dexter stares at me and, yes, he does so intently; he sees me, 
but he did not just see me: he looks at me, he looks to me; he also, with his barks and his growls, 
speaks to me. So too do many other non-human beings speak to us. So too would many other 
non-humans speak to us if we were to extend to them the same hermeneutic charity we extend to 
other humans; so too would many other non-humans speak to us if we no longer violently 
silenced them or assumed from the start that they have nothing to say; so too would many non-
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humans speak to us if we suspended our own speech or voice and the assumptions according to 
which we often define what it means to speak or to have a voice in the first place; so too would 
many other non-humans speak to us if only we would, to put it bluntly, shut up and listen. We 
inhabit a world that is already teeming with non-human “voices,” a world that is already 
semiotically, dialect-ically so much more than human, and it is sad to contemplate how much of 
it we might be missing out on because of our refusal (or enculturated inability) to listen. But 
perhaps this is also why we deny genuine “voices” or “languages worthy of the name” to 
animals. When Dexter barks at another dog, I often wonder to myself what they might be saying, 
what conversation I might be missing out on. Perhaps this is really why we deny language to 
animals. Perhaps we deny language to animals because we are afraid of what they might be 
saying behind our backs. 
Is it really reasonable to doubt that Dexter’s barks and gestures mean something like 
“pick up and throw the ball!” – is it reasonable to think I am merely “anthropomorphizing” 
Dexter when I take him to be saying this – or is it perhaps more reasonable to take such a thing at 
face value, as we are indeed wont to do in everyday, pre-philosophical or pre-scientific 
experience? I have been suggesting that surely the latter is the case. We never hesitate to take 
such appearances at face value when it is a human face or body that addresses us, but if it is a 
canine face or body – or if it is, in general, a non-human face or body – that addresses us, then a 
moment’s reflection may loosen our hold on what we unreflectively grasped as certain or 
obvious. If a human baby smiles and coos at us, we typically delight in how “happy” he or she is 
without a second thought, but if a dog furrows its brow, diverts its glance, lowers its ears, tucks 
its tail between its legs and begins to whimper, we might feel pressured to suspect others or 
ourselves of mere “anthropomorphism” should they or we claim that the dog is “ashamed.” It is 
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precisely the kind of exceptionalism I described above that is so often at play in the skeptical 
attitudes we take toward attributions of various qualities or capacities to animals, a skepticism 
that usually takes the form of a concern that we might merely be “anthropomorphizing” animals 
whenever we make such attributions. The logical or epistemic merit of such a concern – even the 
logical or epistemic merit of the very concept of anthropomorphic “projection” or of an 
“anthropomorphism fallacy” as such – is what I now wish to examine more closely (as Merleau-
Ponty himself does in a number of his works). Merleau-Ponty explicitly argues that the notion of 
anthropomorphic “projection” is in fact incoherent, and he implies in several of his works that 
perhaps the very concept of “anthropomorphism” ought to be jettisoned altogether given that it 
seems inherently tied to Cartesian epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions or, more 
broadly, to an Enlightenment conception of knowledge that suppresses or marginalizes 
(inter)subjectivity and affectivity and that phenomenology thus reveals to be utterly untenable 
(and that, notably, later feminist philosophers rightly reveal to be utterly androcentric or 
patriarchal). Following Merleau-Ponty, I will argue that such a concern about 
“anthropomorphism” is, indeed, without grounds, and that in fact the concept of an 
“anthropomorphism fallacy” is itself a fallacy, namely a fallacy one commits whenever one 
dismisses the veracity of an ascription of a “human” quality or capacity to a non-human as an 
“anthropomorphism fallacy” (or even whenever one simply skeptically doubts such an ascription 
under the suspicion that it might just be an “anthropomorphic projection”): a fallacy that I 
therefore name the “anthropomorphism fallacy fallacy.”  
As we have seen, since the living body (or corporeal schema) “blurs the distinction 
between subject and object,”381 it functions as the “hinge of the for itself and the for the 
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	 292	
other.”382 The lived/living or behaving body is precisely an enmeshment of interiority and 
exteriority, of immanence and transcendence, of subjectivity and flesh from which we only later 
abstract those terms and regard them as opposed, mutually exclusive indices of reality. 
Subjectivity is necessarily incarnate, and that means it is not simply expressed “through” but is 
itself the expression of a living body, that the form of expressivity we call “life” or “behavior” is 
subjectivity. Thus, one perceives others immediately (pre-reflectively) and directly in their bodily 
bearing in the world. Consciousness burgeons forth in the world through the conduct of a living, 
behaving body. Others can only be encountered in the flesh, and it is because I am flesh that 
others are always already present to me, that others (who are likewise enfleshed) are always 
already intermingled with my own flesh and its vital intentions. Others are already implicated in 
my reflexive relationship to myself because they, as enfleshed beings themselves, are implicated 
in the flesh I thus share with them and in the world to which our shared flesh is exposed as the 
condition of its own reflexivity or sentience. Others, then, are from the start inscribed in my own 
bodily affects and potencies, projects and efforts, passions and vulnerabilities. The crucial point 
here, and the one with which the previous chapter concluded, is that once dualism has been 
discarded the classical problem of other minds reduces to the problem “other living, behaving 
bodies,” yet clearly to articulate the problem this way is at once to dissolve it. As Dillon 
explains: 
The transfer of corporeal schema, the immediate (that is, reflexive-but-unreflected) perceptual linkage 
through which we recognize other beings as like unto ourselves, is the phenomenal ground 
of…intersubjectivity. A better word would be ‘intercorporeality’ because the problem of other minds is 
really a problem of other animate organisms: as the most basic levels, human communion is a communion 
of flesh and not a relation between isolated subjects.383 
 
																																																								
382 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 189. 
383 M.C. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, p. 122. 
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To affirm that subjectivity is embodied is to affirm that it is enacted by the living body and that 
we therefore directly perceive subjectivity whenever and wherever we, through our own living 
bodies, directly perceive other bodies living or behaving in the world. To be a "subject" is to be a 
living body, and to be a living body is to be a “subject.”  
This clearly has profound implications, and not just concerning our “knowledge” of 
human others. If dualism is false, it follows that all living bodies are “subjectivities” or “minds”; 
it follows that to perceive any body as “living” or “behaving” is at once to perceive it as 
“minded.” This is why, as I suggested earlier, the classical problem of other minds and what is 
often called the “problem of animal minds” are implicated in one another or are, in fact, one and 
the same problem. If the classical problem of other minds collapses into the “problem of other 
living, behaving bodies,” then so too does the “problem of animal minds.” One would have to 
divorce subjectivity from the living, behaving body in order to acknowledge that animal bodies 
are “alive” and “behave” yet do not possess or exhibit "subjectivity." That is to say, skepticism 
concerning “animal mindedness” can only rest upon the very same dualism as traditional 
skepticism concerning human mindedness. If subjectivity is immediately “appresented” by a 
living body simply in virtue of the fact that it is a living body, one has to affirm all living bodies 
– human and non-human alike – as particular expressions (or appresentations) of subjectivity, 
and Husserl himself knew and acknowledged this:  
I see a cat playing and I regard it now as something of nature, just as is done in zoology. I see it as a 
physical organism but also as a sensing and animated Body, i.e., I see it precisely as a cat. I “see” it in the 
general sense ordinarily meant when speaking of seeing…the cat is present there in the flesh – 
specifically, as a physical thing with sensing surfaces, sense organs, etc. The stratum of sensation is not 
there as something beside the physical thing; what is there is a Body, a Body which has physical and 
aesthesiological qualities as one. Likewise, the Body is also experienced as Body of a soul, and the word 
“soul” indicates again a founded stratum of qualities, and of course one that is still higher…The soul is 
not there as extended over the Body in the manner of being “localized” in the proper sense…the psychic 
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is, in experience, one – that is, in realiter one – with the Body.384  
We see here that Husserl already rejects any strict anthropocentric or speciesist delimitation of 
attributions of “mindedness” because he recognizes (as does Merleau-Ponty) that any acceptable 
account of intersubjectivity – that any phenomenological explanation of our experiences and 
knowledge of others, or that any explanation of how otherness in general arises in sense and 
presence in the world – logically applies to animals just as well as it applies to humans. Husserl 
attributes subjectivity to a cat just as readily as he attributes subjectivity to a human because he 
knows that one cannot consistently affirm that the living body of a human appresents subjectivity 
and at the same time deny that the living body of cat does as well. Either one admits that all 
living bodes (ap)present subjectivity, in which case it would be logically contradictory to claim 
that some do not, or one has to explain what makes certain living bodies so special that only they 
(ap)present subjectivity while certain other living bodies do not. As for the latter alternative, not 
only do I have no idea how anyone could plausibly, in a way that is not blatantly chauvinistic, 
establish that only some living, behaving bodies are “subjectivities,” but again, to do so would be 
impossible without recourse to dualism, for one would have to separate subjectivity from 
animate embodiment: if only some (not all) animate bodies exhibit “subjectivity,” then those that 
do must do so in virtue of something beyond the fact of their animate embodiment alone, but to 
reject dualism is to affirm that animate embodiment alone (ap)presents subjectivity; there is 
simply no way around that conclusion.  
If one says that only some kinds of living, behaving bodies may express subjectivity, the 
question, naturally, should be “why?” Unless one advances some peculiar sort of morphological 
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essentialism (i.e., some notion that subjectivities can only be presenced by bipedal bodies, by 
bodies without wings, by bodies with two eyes, two ears, a nose, and a mouth arranged just so, 
and so on), then one will have to appeal to some quality or capacity that certain living bodies 
have independently of being living bodies, that is, one would have to appeal to some sort of 
disembodied quality or capacity. The reply here might be that one can consistently recognize a 
particular quality or capacity as embodied yet also recognize that it is exhibited only by certain 
living bodies. Perhaps such a capacity one might propose would be “reason.” Setting aside the 
difficult and fraught issue of defining “reason” (which anyone who makes such a proposal would 
bear the burden of doing), and also setting aside the fact that most thinkers have had a lot of 
trouble conceptualizing “reason” as a truly embodied faculty and that to do so would likely 
require a radical new understanding of it that would prevent us from restricting it to only a select 
few forms of embodied life, the issue for now is the issue concerning ascribing mindedness in 
general to bodies, and if we accept that all mental qualities or capacities (whether “reason” or 
anything else) are thoroughly embodied, then we accept that all living, behaving bodies directly 
express (or appresent) mental qualities or capacities of some sort, such that “reason” might be 
one way of existing in the world in a “minded” way – that is, one way of existing in the world as 
a living body – yet it would not be the only way of thus existing in the world. As Merleau-Ponty 
remarks, “before being reason, humanity is another corporeity.”385 Perhaps “reason” is one way 
of being a living body – perhaps it is distinctively if not uniquely a way of being a living human 
body – but it is not the only way of being a living body. “Humanity” is one “corporeity” in the 
world among others, and unless we embrace or assume a dualistic conception of the relationship 
between subjectivity and corporeity, we must affirm that all corporeities – all living bodies – are 
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ways of being “subjectivity,” or that any way of “being subjectivity” is also a way of being a 
body. “Humanity” is “first another way of being a body”386 (that is, first a way of being a living 
body), and non-human bodies are living bodies, too. Human beings and non-human beings are 
all ways of being living bodies, and so too are they all ways being “minds.”  
So again, it is not logically permissible to affirm that subjectivity is embodied and not 
also affirm that to be “a subject” is to be a living body, for embodied subjectivity just is living, 
sentient flesh. To reject dualism is necessarily to accept the notion that a living, behaving body 
expresses “subjectivity” simply in virtue of being a living, behaving body. This is the only 
conclusion that follows from rejecting dualism, and it is also the only conclusion one may accept 
if one wishes to overcome the classical problem of other minds. Otherness (or mindedness) can 
only be, and always already is, co-given with the behaviors or expressions of a living body, and 
of course animals are living, behaving bodies just as well as humans are; thus, it would be 
logically inconsistent and indeed simply arbitrary to ascribe “mindedness” or “ensouled-ness” to 
the latter yet not to the former, and this is why Husserl’s account of perceiving a cat is exactly 
the same as his account of perceiving a human being. Regardless of the kind of living body one 
perceives, to perceive a living body is immediately to (ap)perceive a “mind” or “soul.” As 
Husserl insists in the above passage (and as we saw in the previous chapter), a “mind” or “soul” 
isn’t something we “add” to a living body after the fact of perceiving it; it is not something that 
is, as Husserl puts it, “beside the physical thing” we perceive: to perceive a living body is 
already, immediately, directly to perceive it as minded or “ensouled.” Of course, none of this 
should be taken to imply a monolithic definition of “subjectivity”: on the contrary, it is to affirm 
that there are as many different kinds of subjectivities in the world as there are living bodies, but 
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subjectivities they all are nonetheless. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty affirms that even just in the case of 
human beings “there are several ways for the body to be a body, several ways for consciousness 
to be consciousness.”387As Deleuze teaches us, “univocity” is not contrary to pluralism.388 The 
carnality and universal “flesh of the world” that makes mindedness possible also refutes the 
notion that mindedness admits of any monolithic – especially any speciesist – definition. In the 
language of analytic philosophy, minds are multiply realizable and multiply realized. Since to be 
a living body is to be a mind and since the “…mind is incredibly penetrated by its corporal 
structure...,”389 there are as many kinds of minds as there are kinds of living bodies. 
So, like Husserl, Merleau-Ponty affirms that we perceive “animals” as expressions of 
subjectivity just as immediately as we perceive humans as expressions of subjectivity, for 
humans and animals alike are living bodies, and given that dualism is false – or given that 
subjectivity is inherently suffused throughout the living, behaving body – living bodies are 
intrinsically, immediately expressions of subjectivity. To perceive any body as a living body is at 
once to perceive it as a form of subjectivity, and this is something we all know quite well 
through lived experience:  
The animal, to an extent which varies according to the integration its behavior, is certainly another 
existence; this existence is perceived by everyone…Spinoza would not have spent so much time 
considering a drowning fly if this behavior had not offered to the eye something other than a fragment of 
extension; the theory of animal machines is a “resistance” to the phenomenon of behavior.390  
 
																																																								
387 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 124. Italics are Merleau-Ponty’s. 
388 I surely have in mind here Deleuze’s discussion of the “univocity” of Being in Difference and Repetition, in 
which he articulates Being itself as differentiation, an account of Being that Merleau-Ponty himself will articulate in 
his later writings. Yet, I also have in mind here Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “the magic 
formula…PLURALISM=MONISM” (see A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Brian 
Massumi. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 20). Though Merleau-Ponty distances his own 
later ontology from “monism” due to its association with certain reductionistic substance ontologies (i.e., classical 
materialism), I do think his later ontology is “monistic” in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense of the term, for it is a 
thoroughly anti-dualistic, anti-supernaturalist ontology; it is thoroughly a philosophy of what Deleuze calls (non-
transcendental) “immanence.”    
389 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 268. 
390 Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, p. 126-127. 
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A point that Merleau-Ponty makes here, and one to which I will return, is that reductionistic 
attitudes toward animals – in particular, those that regard them merely as “machines” and thus 
deprive them of any genuine interiority – willfully suppress our lived experiences of them, that 
is, our direct experiences of them not as “machines” but as living bodies; they involve the willful 
suppression of our experience of the phenomenon of behavior, for behavior is a form of 
movement in the world that is importantly different from those that are merely mechanistic or 
causal in nature (as I mentioned in the previous chapter, there is an important difference between 
observing an animatronic tiger and observing a living one). Even to perceive a living fly is not to 
perceive a “mere thing” or something that is meaningfully comparable to an assemblage of, say, 
levers, gears, wheels, and pullies. As we have seen, to perceive any other living body – 
including, naturally, the body of a living fly – is, for one thing, to sense through a direct, 
reflexive corporeal transference with it, or to sense through one’s own corporeal intentionality or 
affectivity, that other body’s intentionality or affectivity as such. Descartes might have been able 
to convince himself that animals were just “automata” or “fragments of extension,” but it takes 
quite a sophisticated, deliberate, concerted effort to view them (or any living being) in such a 
manner (in much the same way that it takes a concerted effort to view perceptual objects as 
collections of “sense-data”), and it is also simply impossible to do so – indeed, it is simply 
impossible to view living beings in any reductionistic way – without assuming or reinstating the 
very metaphysics that Descartes himself helped entrench in Western culture. Thus, Merleau-
Ponty criticizes the hypocritical, “bad faith” Cartesian conception of animal bodies as 
“automata,” remarking (rather sarcastically) that “Malebranche would not have beaten a stone as 
he beat his dog, saying that the dog didn’t suffer.”391  
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To be clear, reductionism is the logical offspring and counterpart of dualism. Any 
reductionistic conception of a living body (whether human or non-human) is rooted in Cartesian 
metaphysics, for ultimately it reinscribes Descartes’ distinction between the body as a mere 
“machine” and the mind as an immaterial substance. Of course, Merleau-Ponty not only does not 
deny the relevance of physiology to consciousness and behavior but emphatically affirms and 
devotes rigorous attention to it; he does, however, for obvious reasons deny reductionistic 
accounts of consciousness and behavior. Merleau-Ponty is opposed to any kind of 
supernaturalism, yet reductive materialism – any conception of a living body in purely 
mechanistic or micro-causal terms – is just as much of a concession to Cartesianism as the very 
supernaturalism it opposes. The living body is a “system of motor powers that crisscross in order 
to produce a behavior,”392 yet “machinism exists only to the extent that behavior had been 
prepared from within and aroused.”393 As we saw in the previous chapter, even reflexes (like the 
Patellar reflex) require a living body’s global orientation toward a situation or horizon of 
meanings and possibilities: I must arrange my body in a certain position and adjust my body to 
the world in just the right way in order for such a reflex to be elicited or even abstractly 
conceptualized in the first place. The motor powers of the living body are unintelligible apart 
from their global, holistic embeddedness within, and orientation toward, a situation or lifeworld 
(Umwelt) that solicits their expression in the form of a behavior, a context or Gestalt with which 
they are always in dialectical participation. Responsiveness to meaning, or the co-constitution of 
an organism and its milieu, always comes before anything like a mechanistic “reaction” to 
stimuli; the latter is an abstraction from the former in the same way that the very notion of the 
body as a “machine” or object is an abstraction from the reality of the lived body. Thus, even 
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“apparently simpler animals present us with something wholly different from mechanical 
activity.”394 Behavior is no more reducible to mechanistic causal processes than perception is 
reducible to aggregates of sense-data, and such an analogy is not accidental, since to behave is to 
perceive and to perceive is already to behave; behavior is a perceptual engagement with the 
world and every perceptual engagement with the world is necessarily expressed through a form 
of behavior. Again, behavior and perception participate in a Gestalt: a pregiven situation or field 
of meaning constituted by the incessant, bilateral interaction between the behaving body and the 
world, between perceiver and perceived: 
The animal must be considered as a field; that is, it is both physical being and a meaning…only a field 
has properties such that it is always distinguished from things partes extra partes, because it always 
includes a relation between the parts and the whole…Behavior is not an ensemble of facts whose 
functioning would be ordered by architectonic connections realized within the organism. The functioning 
in its mechanistic forms appears second; it is not anterior but posterior to the organism. That’s why the 
notion of behavior constitutes a problem for anatomists. The interest in a notion like behavior is that it 
allows us to come back to this side of the frozen structure that anatomy reveals.395 
 
Every living, behaving body and its milieu reciprocally constitute one another: the former could 
not exist as such with the latter, nor would latter exist as such without the former; the behavior of 
a body is its responsiveness to meaning in the world, yet a behaving body’s world (its milieu) is 
partially constituted as meaningful – as the milieu of that distinct body – through that body’s 
behaviors, affects, and powers, that is, by all of the ways in which that body “makes sense” of its 
world. Such a co-production of sense or relationship of meaning between a living body and its 
world comes before we conceptualize any relationships of “efficient causation” that may subtend 
and help realize it. There are, of course, causal conditions or mechanisms that are necessary in 
order to realize anything that a behaving body does (e.g., there are obviously all kinds of muscles 
and nerves and chemical/neural pathways necessary for me to raise my hand to ask a question in 
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a class), but in order for such causal conditions or mechanisms to be mobilized in the form of a 
behavior – that is, in order for a body to be not just an ordinary body but a behaving body – an 
already meaning-laden context must present itself to it and elicit it to respond to it as such. For 
example, without the setting of a classroom and all of the social meanings and values built into it 
from the start, a behavior such as “raising one’s hand to ask a question” would never come to 
pass; and thus it is a fallacy to observe the behavior of raising one’s hand in class, rip that bodily 
movement from the context that makes it not merely a bodily “movement” but a behavior, 
analyze that movement in terms of decontextualized causes, and then infer that those causes are 
prior to, and exhaustively constitutive of, the phenomenon of “raising one’s hand in class” with 
which one began. This is why, for Merleau-Ponty, “the notion of Umwelt no longer allows us to 
consider the organism in its relation to the exterior world, as an effect of the exterior world, or as 
a cause.”396  
Thus, a mechanistic conception the living body is a derivative abstraction; in the same 
way that sense-atomism selectively isolates discrete sensory qualities and tears them away from 
the perceptual wholes – not just the whole perceptual objects but also the context within which 
such objects appear – that lets such qualities even be sensed in the first place and then 
fallaciously regards such “sense data” as prior to, and constitutive of, those perceptual wholes, a 
reductive or mechanistic conception of a living body isolates certain physiological processes or 
phenomena or even the living body itself and tears them away from the complex, synergistic 
interactions between the living body and its milieu (and between the living body and other living 
bodies) in virtue of which such a body is a living, behaving body in the first place. Reductionism 
forgets that behaviors are not just bodily movements: they are forms of intentionality or 
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responses to meaning. If this were not so, then there would no difference between, say, raising 
one’s hand to ask a question and any random paroxysm. One can no better understand the 
behavior of an organism and its relationship with the world in a purely reductive or mechanistic 
way than one can understand a verbal linguistic exchange between people purely in terms of, 
say, the physiological structures that enable them to speak and the physics of sound waves that 
lets them hear one another. In any case, we simply have to recall that behavior (or the 
phenomenon of a living body) precisely precedes and founds the classical antithesis between 
spirit and matter, pure consciousness and mechanism, the disembodied subject and the body as a 
thoughtless, de-subjectified object. To conceive the living body as a mere mechanism or object is 
to revive the Cartesian opposition between body and soul, yet the phenomenon of the living, 
behaving body is prior to, and the foundation of, that supposed opposition.  
It is not difficult to see how dualism informs anthropocentrism (and how 
anthropocentrism so often depends upon dualism): the mind is divorced from the body; since the 
mind is disembodied, bodily movement is inherently “mindless” and thus can be nothing more 
than merely mechanical in nature. This separation of mind and body then leads to the separation 
of human and animal, as the human comes to be identified with mindedness or logos and the 
animal is equated with embodiment or mechanicity. If anything is not a mind, then it can only be 
a mere thing or machine, and while we surely know that we humans are minds, animals are 
“just” bodies. Of course, the only way to conceptualize a living body (whether or not it is the 
living body of a non-human) as a mechanism or brute object or as “just” a body is through a 
process of abstraction that sunders subjectivity from flesh and behavior. Only by separating 
consciousness from the body can we regard a behaving body as a mindless mechanism and 
restrict mindedness to our own case. Again, in order to deny that animals are “minds” one has to 
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remove the mind from the living body; this is the only way one can look at a body, acknowledge 
that that body is alive or that it behaves in various ways, and yet deny that it “has” or expresses a 
mind. So, no living body is ever “just” a body; that is, no living body is ever devoid of 
subjectivity because to be a living body is to be a form of subjectivity or to “[belong] to a 
dynamic of behavior.”397 If consciousness is intertwined with behavior and if “behavior is sunk 
into corporeity,”398 then every living body or form of behavior is an enactment or form of 
“consciousness,” and thus, to repeat a point I made in the previous chapters, it makes as little 
sense to ask whether a particular behavior or living body expresses or “contains” a mind as it 
does to ask whether the previous sentence expresses or “contains” a thought. For Merleau-Ponty, 
subjectivity is to behavior as thought or meaning is to language. We have seen this analogy 
before, and it is one that Merleau-Ponty consistently emphasizes. Every gesture or instance of 
behavior inherently has a meaning in precisely the same way that every word in a language does, 
and to anticipate a point we will later see Merleau-Ponty make, one can no more understand the 
meaning of a gesture or instance of behavior solely in terms of any of its supposed mechanistic 
antecedents than one can understand the meaning of a word or sentence by only understanding, 
say, the efficient causation through which it was inscribed or the physiology of the vocal chords 
that allowed it to be spoken. Thus, “…the body’s gesture toward the world introduces it into an 
order of relations that pure physiology and biology do not have the slightest idea of.”399 
We see, then, that the living body itself may only be conceived as “mindless” – as a mere 
machine devoid of interiority – if the mind is first conceived as disembodied. Moreover, a 
reductive, mechanistic conception of the living body that would deny animals subjectivity would 
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also, as a simple matter of logical consistency, deny other humans (that is, humans other than 
oneself) subjectivity as well. If one regards all living bodies as nothing more than mindless 
machines, then it is arbitrary (or mere theology) to regard only one kind of mindless mechanism 
as home to a “mind” or “soul.” In any case, the unavoidable truth is that a reductionistic 
conception of the body and that a supernaturalist, Cartesian understanding of subjectivity 
mutually entail one another (and so we may very well say that dualism is rooted just as much in a 
false understanding of “the body” as it is in a false understanding of subjectivity). In short, if we 
give up the notion of consciousness as a “ghost in the machine,” so too must we give up the 
notion of the (living) body as a mere “machine”: these two concepts are utterly ensnared in one 
another; the living, behaving body is only a mere machine if the mind is a pure spirit. As we 
have seen, however, a living body is never “just” an ordinary object, and thus any conception of 
it as such is a false abstraction. A dead or dissected body – a body such as one might view it on 
an operating table, or a body such as a scientist might objectify it – is simply not a lived/living 
body.  
The irony, of course, is that though most scientists would likely proclaim themselves to 
be anti-Cartesian in their worldview, their typical reductionistic approaches to understanding 
animal (and often even human) subjectivity and behavior is thoroughly Cartesian historically and 
conceptually. Many scientists, of course, resist reductionism, yet reductionistic attitudes toward 
non-human beings nevertheless remain prevalent. All of the common forms of skepticism 
concerning attributions of mental characteristics to animals that I have been critiquing here are 
rooted in reductionism if not simply abject chauvinism. Whenever someone (especially a 
scientist) bemoans “anthropomorphism” and suggests that we are committing some sort of crime 
against reason or “objectivity” by imparting interior lives – personalities, emotions, affects, 
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thoughts, and so on – to animals, he/she is assuming that objectivity must be divested of 
subjectivity, that “objective” knowledge can only be knowledge of objects and that, therefore, if 
we are to make any rational or “scientific” (and many scientists conflate “rationality” with 
science) claims about an animal we may do so only from a position that regards that animal as an 
object. Many people – including scientists – continue to regard animals as little more than 
objects (perhaps in order to make it easier to consume, torture, and exploit them), and we find 
that most forms of skepticism toward ascriptions of various mental qualities to animals are 
grounded in a prior decision to objectify them, a prior decision to regard them from a perspective 
that is as detached from them as possible. Later I will critique the whole epistemological 
framework that advances precisely the notion of “objectivity” I just mentioned. For now, though, 
the basic point is that any objectification (or de-subjectification) of a living body is Cartesian 
metaphysics in disguise. The notion of the body as “thoughtless” is the counterpart of the notion 
of thought as disembodied; one can only “de-mind” the body if one also dis-embodies the mind. 
This is why it is impossible to deny subjectivity to animals without assuming an essentially 
Cartesian metaphysical (and epistemological) framework. To deny subjectivity to animals is to 
regard them, as Descartes did, as mere machines; regardless of how complex we admit such 
“machines” to be, to regard them as such is nonetheless to regard them as mere objects, as 
entities deprived of true subjectivity. But to regard any living body as entirely devoid of 
interiority is precisely to separate interiority from the living body (and thus is not really even to 
regard the living body as a living body). In this way, all forms of reductionism – all claims that a 
living body is not “minded” but is rather just a mechanism – reinstate dualism. As Merleau-
Ponty concludes, “the notion of the animal-machine…is at the heart of Cartesianism.”400 
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I began this chapter with some reflections on the dogs with whom I have shared most of 
my life, Sammy and Dexter. Most humans who have lived with dogs know what it is like to 
enjoy deep bonds of intimacy and affection with a non-human being; they know what it is like to 
be recognized and affirmed in the eyes – or in the bark, or in the wag of a tail – of an other 
Other. Only a phenomenological account of subjectivity can make sense of this, as only a 
phenomenological account of subjectivity can make sense of how subjectivity or alterity in 
general emerges in experience, and a phenomenological account of subjectivity seems logically 
inconsistent with any essentialist or speciesist circumscription of subjectivity. So, if (following 
Merleau-Ponty) we have rediscovered subjectivity in behavior or in the living body, then in order 
to deny subjectivity to animals we must also deny behavior or living bodies to them, which is 
plainly absurd. It seems, however, that there is one last rearguard option available to the inclined 
skeptic, and it is the one I mentioned above: is it not perhaps the case that Sammy and Dexter 
were merely “anthropomorphic” constructions of my own making? Is it not perhaps the case that 
the qualities I affirmed in them were merely anthropomorphic projections of my own qualities? 
Given the apparent differences between humans and many animals, one might say that 
“attributions” of most particular mental “states,” characteristics, or capacities to animals – 
especially those that we presumably know for sure are ones that we humans distinctly possess – 
are mere “anthropomorphic projections.” To impart any “human” or “human-like” characteristic 
to an animal is to “anthropomorphize” that animal; it is to “project” into the behavior of the 
animal human faculties and characteristics.  
So, were my experiences of Sammy and Dexter merely infested with sentimental, 
anthropomorphic “projections”? Had I let my “emotions” or “feelings” get the better of me and 
lead me to commit an egregious error in induction, a deeply flawed analogical inference, that sin 
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against reason we call an “anthropomorphism fallacy”? As Merleau-Ponty argues, such an 
interpretation or dismissal of such experiences overlooks (and indeed begs) the very question 
that needs to be answered: what is it that prompts such a supposed projection in the first place? 
How are we to account for why this body – or for why any-body – emerges for us as an Other? 
Not only are such charges of “anthropomorphism” or “projection” usually ad hoc, but Merleau-
Ponty also argues that they are explanatorily incoherent. Charges of projection do not (and 
cannot) explain how such supposed “projections” are possible (or why they happen in the first 
place), yet to provide such an explanation is in fact to neutralize the skepticism that the a notion 
of an “anthropomorphism fallacy” is intended to legitimate. As Merleau-Ponty puts it: 
Nothing would be served by saying that it is we, the spectators, who mentally unite the elements of the situation to 
which behavior is addressed in order to make them meaningful, that it is we who project into the exterior the 
intentions of our thinking, since we would still have to discover what it is, what kind of phenomenon is involved 
upon which this Einfuhlung rests, what is the sign that invites us to anthropomorphism.401  
 
In short, what we might call “projectionism” cannot explain why we experience animals (or any 
living beings, including humans) to have the mental characteristics that we take them to have 
without begging the question or plummeting into the abyss of an explanatory infinite regress. 
“Every theory of projection,” Merleau-Ponty later reiterates, “…presupposes what it tries to  
explain, since we could not project our feelings into the visible behavior of an animal if 
something in this behavior itself did not suggest the inference.”402 If a skeptic alleges that an 
interpretation of a form of animal behavior is a kind of “projection,” we are right to pose the 
following question: what occasioned this projection in the first place? If the skeptic’s claim is 
not groundless, he/she must explain the possibility (or ground) of such a “projection,” but the 
possibility of such a projection actually renders the skeptic’s position incoherent, for we cannot 
explain what prompts such a projection in the first place by appealing to prior projections 
																																																								
401 The Structure of Behavior, p. 125. 
402 Ibid., p. 156. 
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without reasoning in a circle or lapsing into an explanatory infinite regress. We see, then, that 
Merleau-Ponty’s criticisms of “projectionism” – that is, his criticisms of a general skepticism 
toward what is usually called “anthropomorphism” – parallels his criticisms of analogical 
accounts of our knowledge of other minds in general, for indeed such supposed 
“anthropomorphic projections” are typically conceptualized as particular kinds of (faulty) 
analogies.  
Merleau-Ponty’s argument here, then, is this: if it is possible for us to “project” ourselves 
into animals, we must have certain experiences with animals that motivate such projections in 
the first place, but these experiences cannot themselves be explained – or explained away – as 
mere “projections,” for such an explanation begs the question or issues in an infinite regress. In 
other words, the skeptical charge that any attribution of mindedness to animals is a mere 
projection invites the question: what occasioned such a “projection” in the first place? How is it 
possible for us to “project” ourselves into animals? Such a “projection” of human features into 
animal behavior (if it does not spring out one’s head utterly randomly or ex nihilo) could only be 
occasioned by an experience that precisely “invites us to anthropomorphism.” Thus, the 
possibility or phenomenal ground of such a projection actually renders the skeptic’s position 
incoherent, for a “projection” of human features into animal behavior can only be occasioned by 
an experience that evokes the presence of these features in the first place, but then such a 
“projection” cannot be understood fundamentally as a mere “projection” at all without lapsing 
either into logical circularity or an explanatory infinite regress. “Projectionism” begs the 
question, for it presupposes the very experiences that it is supposed to explain (or explain away): 
an experience of animal behavior is explained (or explained away) as an instance of 
“anthropomorphic projection,” but this anthropomorphic projection is itself only possible on the 
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basis of an experience of behavior that, again, “invites us to anthropomorphism,” that is, an 
experience of a form of behavior that is precisely ‘anthropo-morphic’ in certain ways, which is 
precisely what “projectionism” is supposed to explain in the first place. Thus, skeptical 
“projectionism” is circular (and self-defeating) insofar as the experiences or ascriptions it wishes 
to dismiss as mere “projections” are only possible on the basis of the very kinds of experiences it 
is supposed to explain (away) as such. The projectionist thesis is that any time I take Sammy or 
Dexter to have certain mental characteristics or personality traits I might only be projecting my 
own mental characteristics or personality traits into them, but what supports this explanatory 
thesis concerning why I regard Sammy or Dexter in such ways? It surely must be demonstrated 
rather than merely asserted. Yet, one cannot explain the experiential or motivational genesis of 
such projections by simply saying they are grounded in some tendency we have to project 
ourselves into others, for that is patently circular: one thus asserts that we project ourselves into 
others because we are prompted to do so as a result of some tendency to project ourselves into 
others, which is quite like saying, as Nietzsche observes, that opium causes sleep “‘by virtue of a 
faculty,’ namely the virtus dorimitiva,” an answer that “belong[s] in comedy.”403 
On the other hand, if we attempt to rescue projectionism from circularity, we confront an 
infinite regress. Suppose I say that my dog is “sad,” and a skeptic replies that this apparent 
sadness is (or might merely be) a projection on my part. What, then, prompted this projection of 
sadness on my part? Such a “projection” of sadness can only follow upon an experience of my 
dog that suggests “sadness,” but this experience that “suggests sadness” must ex hypothesi be 
another projection on my part, and this projection will have to follow from a prior experience 
that suggests it, and this prior experience will also have to be a projection, and so on ad 
																																																								
403 Beyond Good and Evil. Eds., Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman. Trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), § 11, p. 13. 
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infinitum. Thus, in order to account for why we “project” familiar human features into non-
human animals we cannot appeal to prior experiences that would be reducible to mere 
projections, and so there must be some primary layer of lived experience that informs them, a 
relatedness with non-human others as others that is prior to, and the foundation of, veridical and 
erroneous perceptions or interpretations of behavior alike. This infinite regress directs us to a 
primary experience that cannot be explained away as a “projection”; it shows us what Merleau-
Ponty argues time and again: lived experience is the ultimate foundation of what we call truth 
and knowledge.  
Now, there is a different reply to skepticism concerning “other species of mind” that 
ought to be considered, one that I think is tempting to many contemporary philosophers and 
scientists. We might maintain that ascriptions of subjectivity (or of particular mental 
characteristics) to animals are justified as “inferences to the best explanation,” or as the best 
explanatory accounts of various forms of observed behaviors. This view is well represented by 
Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff in their book Species of Mind. Allen and Bekoff argue that we are 
right to think that many animals have rich conscious/cognitive lives, or that many animals have 
the mental characteristics and capacities we attribute to them in everyday experience, for our 
attributions of such characteristics and capacities – in particular, our attributions of “higher-order 
mental states” (e.g. emotions, conscious intentionalities, capacities for certain forms of reasoning 
or self-directed activity, perhaps even languages, and so on) – to animals are, in principle, no 
different from other explanatory, scientific hypotheses or posits: they are justified as inferences 
to the best explanation of observed phenomena. Thus, Allen and Bekoff write that “…mental-
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state attributions, when justified, are justified by inference to the best explanation,”404 and it 
seems that their view is one that is shared by many contemporary ethologists and philosophers of 
science.405  
However, I think it is clear that this view falls prey to the same problems we have just 
addressed, and even to problems we already discussed in the previous chapter. That is, this view 
actually concedes and reproduces the very premises of the kind of skepticism it is supposed to 
answer. On this view, our primary knowledge of “animal minds” – our access to the conscious 
lives of non-human others – is always only inferential, but we have already seen that this kind of 
view is deeply flawed. Indeed, this view is really just a version (or an inversion) of the skeptical 
“projection” thesis, and thus it falls prey to the same basic problem: the “inference to the best 
explanation” explanation of how we may claim to “know” that non-humans are “minded” in 
various ways begs the question concerning our fundamental access to non-human minds. That is, 
Merleau-Ponty’s main objection to the skeptical charge that attributions of various mental 
qualities to animals are mere “projections” also applies to Allen and Bekoff’s view: if we have 
reason to ask the skeptic “what invites us to anthropomorphism?,” then we also have reason to 
ask Allen and Bekoff “what invites us to infer intentionality?” One can only “infer” 
intentionality from apparently intentional behavior, and this means that one never first “infers” 
intentionality (or any other mental state) at all. An inference to intentionality can only follow 
from a prior experience that suggests intentionality. Allen and Bekoff’s view lapses into 
																																																								
404 Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 
56. 
405 It is worth noting that Allen and Bekoff are influenced by Daniel Dennett’s view that attributions of intentionality 
to animals are “intentional stances” that we take toward them: hypotheses we formulate about them in order to 
predict their behavior. For Dennett, ascriptions of intentionality to animals are only tools for scientific explanation. 
Allen and Bekoff’s view is quite similar to Dennett’s, and I think that both views are therefore susceptible to the 
same objections. Neither Allen and Bekoff nor Dennett, for instance, realize that the primary “intentional stances” 
we take toward animals are not propositional, third-personal ascriptions. For Allen and Bekoff’s discussion of 
Dennett, see Species of Mind, chapter 6. 
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circularity because one must implicitly presuppose intentional behavior in order to draw an 
inference to intentional behavior. Indeed, “inferences to the best explanation” are really just 
rationally justified “projections.” Thus, Allen and Bekoff accept the skeptic’s basic idea of 
“projection” but contend that certain “projections” are warranted; they agree that we often 
“anthropomorphize” animals yet simply contend that such “anthropomorphisms” are often 
inductively cogent.  
Allen and Bekoff are surely correct that many so-called anthropomorphic ascriptions are 
inductively warranted. The problem, however, is that such a notion of anthropomorphic 
projection cannot account for how or why we originally take non-humans to have various mental 
qualities. We have already seen why we cannot regard analogical or inductive inference to be the 
source of our knowledge of human minds, yet logically there is no reason to suppose that matters 
are any different with respect to our knowledge non-human minds; indeed, it is only an arbitrary 
double standard that supports the notion that we may admit direct access to human minds yet 
must only regard our access to non-human minds as indirect. Allen and Bekoff’s view that we 
are justified in claiming that, say, a dog is “happy” or “ashamed” because it provides the best 
explanation of the dog’s behavior is no different from the sort of view (advocated by A.J. Ayer 
and others) that we are justified in claiming that a human being is, say, in pain because we infer 
it analogically or because the hypothesis of such a pain-state is the best explanation for why this 
human being is crying, screaming, moaning, writhing, clutching some part of his/her body, 
begging for the torture to stop, and so on. We have already seen the problems with such an 
account, so I will not entirely rehearse them here. The point, then, is to ask why, if we do not 
accept such an account of our primary knowledge of human “mental states,” we ought to accept 
such an account of our primary knowledge of non-human mental states. In general, if we admit 
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that we have direct access to the subjectivities of human others because their subjectivities are 
already enmeshed with their living bodies or behaviors, then we must also admit that the 
subjectivities of non-humans are likewise accessible directly (that is, non-inferentially) through 
their living bodies or behaviors. I hasten to underscore here that I do not wish to deny that there 
are often important differences between humans and non-humans any more than I wish to deny 
that there are often important differences between different kinds of non-humans, differences 
that indeed contribute to the inexpugnable ambiguity of intersubjective existence, an ambiguity 
that means that mistaken judgments of non-human others are always possible just as much as it 
means that mistaken judgments of human others are always possible. My point, however, is that 
there is no difference in the essential ontological or phenomenological structures that make our 
“knowledge” of human and non-human subjectivities possible, that the structures that make our 
experiences of human Others and of other Others (qua “Other”) possible are the same structures.  
We might say, then, that “intersubjectivity” is “univocal,” since intersubjectivity is 
intercorporeity and since, no matter how different many living bodies in the world may be from 
one another, being a living body is nonetheless univocal. There is nothing “totalizing” about such 
a notion, for as I alluded above (and as I hope to further clarify in the following chapters), 
“univocity” is far from inconsistent with radical difference or pluralism, and indeed any truly 
non-dualistic ontology is one that affirms both at the same time, or rather one that recognizes that 
they are already one and the same. If being a living body is univocal despite the often significant 
differences between living bodies, then being a “mind” or a “subject” is univocal as well, such 
that, though there are minds quite different from our own, it cannot be the case that how we 
access other human minds is  fundamentally different from how we access other-than-human 
minds. This is a point to which I will return toward the end of this chapter, but I think it is 
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relevant to mention it here. There may be significant difference between living bodies, hence 
significant differences between minds, yet nonetheless such differences cannot be cleaved into 
oppositions lest we retreat to dualism. This means that we cannot regard our intersubjective 
relations with fellow humans to be essentially, structurally different from our intersubjective 
relations with non-humans, such that our supposed knowledge of non-human minds would be 
either enabled by categorically different conditions or processes or beset by categorically 
different problems. In short, any human/animal dualism is a repetition of mind/body dualism, 
and we assume human/animal dualism whenever we assume that our lived experience or 
“knowledge” of another human mind is fundamentally different from our lived experience or 
knowledge of a non-human mind. As I mentioned earlier, Merleau-Ponty’s (and Husserl’s) 
general account of intersubjectivity logically must apply to non-humans just as much as it applies 
to humans. Merleau-Ponty (and Husserl) recognized this, and what remains to be done is to 
extrapolate and heed the consequences of this truth rigorously.  
So, we see that Allen and Bekoff’s proposed solution to the “other species of mind 
problem” presupposes the thesis that generates this very problem (as well as the classical 
problem of other minds) in the first place: what we might call the privacy of consciousness 
thesis. That is, their inference to the best explanation solution to the “problem of animal minds” 
is (like any inductive solution to the problem) only cogent if we assume that the conscious lives 
of (animal) others are utterly “private,” for only if the conscious lives of (animal) others are 
utterly private are they only accessible inductively or inferentially. Allen and Bekoff recognize 
that the “privacy of consciousness thesis” poses an unavoidable challenge to all beliefs or 
knowledge claims about the conscious lives of animals, and they offer a clever reply to this 
challenge:  
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…If all “private” means is “not directly sensible,” quarks are private phenomena too. Scientific 
understanding of quarks is based on what philosophers call inference to the best explanation: the selection  
of the most plausible hypothesis among competing alternatives for the best explanation of observable  
phenomena.406 
 
In other words, if “privacy” just means “not knowable by direct acquaintance,” then the 
“privacy” of an entity or phenomenon does not justify skepticism because “knowledge” does not 
necessarily entail “knowledge by direct acquaintance.” Epistemic justification does not require 
verification by direct acquaintance. If “privacy” only means “not directly sensible,” then the 
skeptic’s definition of privacy covers quarks as well as other consciousnesses. Thus, if we are 
not skeptics about subatomic particles, then neither should we be skeptics about other (non-
human) consciousnesses. This reply to skepticism, however, is only tenable if we accept what we 
already know to be the very untenable premise that consciousness is entirely private or self-
enclosed. Allen and Bekoff do not explicitly argue that consciousness is private or completely 
divorced from phenomenal, material presence, but they either knowingly concede this premise or 
inadvertently sneak it in through the back door, so to speak. Allen and Bekoff’s clever reply to 
the “privacy of consciousness thesis” actually leaves it intact; they only dispute the conclusion 
one should draw from it. In other words, Allen and Bekoff’s view concedes the point that the 
conscious lives of others are as radically inaccessible as the quarks inside protons and neutrons, 
and though we have already seen how Merleau-Ponty’s reply to this claim goes, such a claim is 
almost too counterintuitive to warrant a reply. Allen and Bekoff might be correct to insist that 
there are certain things we can know without having direct perceptual access to them, but they 
are wrong to assume we cannot have direct perceptual access to other minds (whether human or 
non-human, for again, logical consistency demands that they be committed to explaining our 
access to the former in the same manner that they explain our access to the latter). On this score, 
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even though Allen and Bekoff reject behaviorism, their whole argument is consistent with, and 
even seems to concede, the behavioristic notion that interiority is a “black box” hidden behind 
observable behavior; while the behaviorist argues that we should restrict ourselves only to 
exteriority (observable behavior), Allen and Bekoff argue that we can legitimately infer 
interiority “behind” exteriority. As we have seen, however, it is necessary that we have direct 
access to other minds if we are to have any access to them at all. It is, in fact, necessary that we 
fundamentally know others by direct acquaintance.  
To be clear, when ascriptions of mental characteristics to non-humans are dismissed as 
“anthropomorphic projections” they are being dismissed as particular kinds of bad analogies or 
hasty inductions: the charge is that we hastily impute certain qualities to animals because of 
similarities we perceive between them and ourselves. As we have seen, however, our immediate, 
lived experiences of others are not based on induction; our primary knowledge of others is not 
inferential or mediated by analogical reasoning. Thus, Allen and Bekoff attempt to refute such 
skepticism in a misguided way by arguing that many of the claims about animals that get 
dismissed as “projections” are in fact warranted inferences. This is misguided because such 
“claims” are fundamentally neither projections nor inferences at all. If “ascriptions” of mental 
characteristics to animals are not fundamentally analogical (or, broadly speaking, inductive) 
inferences, then it is misdirected to critique them as such: it is misdirected to regard them as “bad 
analogies” or “weak inductions”; however, this means that it is likewise misdirected to defend 
them as good analogies or strong inductions as well (as Allen and Bekoff do). An attempt to refute 
skepticism in a such a way concedes too much to it; it buys into the skeptic’s flawed 
understanding of interiority or intersubjectivity, for it assumes, as does the skeptic, that our access 
	 317	
to other interiorities is fundamentally inferential or that our “knowledge” of others can only be 
justified inductively, which is the very assumption that Merleau-Ponty shows to be false.  
The failure of Allen and Bekoff’s supposed solution to what they call the “other species 
of mind problem,” along with the inherent logical incoherence of the skepticism their view is 
supposed to solve, throws into relief what Merleau-Ponty has already shown us: we do not “know” 
other minds (human and non-human alike) inferentially. The inferential stance of a scientist is an 
abstraction, a later-order posture of detachment that one adopts toward the phenomena of non-
human life. We primarily “know” others pre-reflectively through our living, behaving bodies. We 
know others through the antepredicative (pre-inferential) encroachment of our perceptual 
capacities, corporeal schemas, motor projects, and bodily affects. We do not, for example, 
primarily “ascribe” intentionality to behavior if by “ascribe” we mean formulating a reflective, 
predicative, perhaps analogical judgment that it is intentional: we immediately, directly see 
behavior as intentional; “behavior” as such is always already, irreducibly intentional, and this why 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of our experiences of animal behavior is no different from his basic 
account of our experiences of human behavior:  
The gestures of behavior, the intentions which it traces in the space around the animal, are not directed to 
the true world or pure being, but to being-for-the-animal, that is, to a certain milieu characteristic of the 
species; they do not allow the showing through of a consciousness, that is, a being whose whole essence is 
to know, but rather a certain manner of treating the world, of “being-in-the-world” or of “existing.”407 
 
To “behave” is to perform some sort of style of being-in-the-world, some form of subjectivity; it is  
to “sing the world”408 through a “kinetic melody”409 of gestures and passions; it is to be polarized 
toward a milieu, an intersubjective field of practical tasks, exigencies, and possibilities. 
Knowledge of “other minds” (whether human or otherwise) is grounded in the lived imbrications 
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409 Merleau-Ponty, Structure of Behavior, p. 155. 
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and synergies of corporeal schemata, in the primordial “system Self-others-things.”410 No matter 
how distantly or radically “Other” another mind may be, other minds are always encountered “in” 
the flesh. Other minds are always already forms of flesh, always already “the flesh of my flesh.”411  
So, I return again to my childhood dog, Sammy: did he really love any of us? He cried 
and yelped every time I left for school in the morning, and when I arrived home from school in the 
afternoon he usually raced in a figure-eight circuit around the living room and dining room, 
climbed on top of me, licked my face furiously, and resisted my efforts to pry him away and settle 
him down. He shared our company nearly every hour of the day and would often protest being 
sequestered from us in another part of the house. So, did he love my parents and I? I am sure that 
he did, but is my certitude warranted? Do the exterior appearances in this case really indicate the 
interiority we could not help but perceive “in” them? I am sure that they do, and I am sure about 
this for same reasons I am sure about pretty much anything. I will return specifically to the topic 
of love toward the end of this chapter, but as Merleau-Ponty suggests, my confidence in (or 
putative knowledge of) the loving regards of others is grounded in my pre-reflective engagements 
with them, in the manifold envelopments of our bodily intentionalities and affects through which 
we learn what love is and through which subjectivity in general is constituted, enacted, and known 
as such prior to reflective predication. The expressive intentions or gestures that others address to 
me are immediately, irreducibly intelligible as such. Behavior is simply an irreducible modality of 
meaning in the world; it is the very vehicle of selfhood and otherness. Thus, “other persons...are 
not there as minds, or even as “psychisms”, but such for example as we face them in anger or love 
– faces, gestures, spoken words to which our own respond without thoughts intervening…”412  
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John Searle413 seems to argue for much the same phenomenological and even refreshingly 
“commonsensical” point in his paper “Animal Minds,”414 yet while I agree with his conclusion, I 
think the argument he provides in favor of it is considerably flawed, and so it may serve as another 
good example of how even anti-skeptical arguments often reproduce the premises of those 
skeptics or anthropocentrists they critique. Searle begins this paper as follows: 
I have said that many species of animals have consciousness, intentionality, and thought processes. Now 
why am I so confident about that? Why, for example, am I so confident that my dog, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
is conscious? Well, why is he so confident that I am conscious? I think part of the correct answer, in the 
case of both Ludwig and me, is that any other possibility is out of the question. We have, for example, 
known each other for quite a while so there is not really any possibility of doubt. Philosophically speaking 
the interesting question is why in philosophy and science we have so much trouble seeing that such sorts of 
answers are the correct ones?...Why have so many thinkers denied what would appear to be obvious points, 
that many species of animals other than our own have consciousness, intentionality, and thought processes? 
Think for a moment how counterintuitive such denials are: I get home from work and Ludwig rushes out to 
meet me. He jumps up and down and wags his tail. I am certain that (a) he is conscious; (b) he is aware of 
my presence (intentionality); and (c) that awareness produces in him a state of pleasure (thought process). 
How could anyone deny either a, b, or c? As his namesake might have said, “This is how we play the 
language game with ‘certain.’”415  
 
I do, of course, agree with Searle here, but I should mention that there are a number of points that 
he makes in this article with which I do not agree. It would be beyond the scope of this chapter for 
me to articulate and critique all of the details of his argument, but in the end, I do not think that 
Searle soundly explains the basis of our confidence in the existence of animal minds (which I 
think Merleau-Ponty does soundly explain). So, I agree with Searle’s conclusion. I especially 
agree (as Searle suggests here) that the burden of proof should be shifted away from those who 
attribute minds to non-humans and onto the shoulders of skeptics. However, I find significant 
flaws in the argument Searle presents in support of this conclusion. Perhaps the most significant 
																																																								
413 Notably, Searle’s famous “Chinese room” thought experiment appropriately refutes behaviorist and functionalist 
accounts of consciousness at the apparent cost of reinstating a dichotomy between interiority and exteriority, or 
between first-personal and third-personal modes of givenness, and so an examination of the flaws in that argument 
would also be germane to the present discussion, but here I am choosing to focus my attention on an essay in which 
he specifically addresses “the problem of animal minds.” 
414 Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XIX, 1994. 
415 Ibid., p. 206-207. 
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point from which I depart is his claim that behavior is “simply irrelevant” 416 to our confidence in, 
or putative knowledge of, animal mindedness. By now it ought to be obvious why this claim is 
wrong. As Merleau-Ponty demonstrates, behavior is the foundation of our knowledge of animal 
minds, though not for reasons that others have traditionally supposed. That is, our knowledge of 
animal minds is not primarily based upon inferring mindedness from behavior. Searle rejects this 
view as well, but concludes that behavior is therefore irrelevant to such knowledge. This 
conclusion does not follow, but Searle seems to think that it does because he fails to appreciate the 
phenomenological foundation of our “knowledge” of human and non-human otherness and thus 
the necessary, constitutive role of the body in such knowledge. That is to say, Searle rejects the 
relevance of behavior to our knowledge of non-human subjectivities because he assumes (as do 
Cartesians and behaviorists alike, though he claims to be neither) a divorce between subjectivity 
and behavior. As we have seen, if we reject Cartesian dualism and its reductive counterparts (as 
Searle himself explicitly does), then consciousness must be understood neither as something 
“housed” or hidden “within” a body (like a pilot in a ship) nor as something reductively equivalent 
to the body (as logical behaviorism maintains), but rather as something that is itself thoroughly 
embodied such that it cannot be understood as belonging entirely to either side of the classical 
subject/object divide; it is and must be the living, behaving body (which is neither a pure subject 
nor a brute object) – or rather it must be an involution or “pairing” of behaviors or corporeal 
intentionalities prior to reflection and predicative inference – that founds our knowledge of other 
minds (human and non-human alike) and that enables us to make particular reflective inferences 
about the minds of others.  
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Searle does not think that our confidence in animal mindedness is based upon analogical 
induction from behavior, but while he ought to realize that no form of inductive inference can 
ground our basic knowledge of the existence of other minds (for such inductive inferences tacitly 
presuppose a lived, carnal, pre-inferential exposure to others), he opts instead for a different 
argument from analogy, according to which we know that animals are minded because “if the 
animal has a causally relevant structure similar to our own, then it is likely to produce similar 
mental states in response to similar stimuli.” Thus, Searle concludes that “the grounds on which 
we found our certainty that animals are conscious is not that intelligent behavior which is the same 
or similar to ours is proof of consciousness, but rather that causal structures which are the same or 
similar causal structures to ours produce the same or similar effects.”417 Like all arguments from 
analogy, however, Searle’s gets things precisely backwards; he “puts the cart before the horse,” so 
to speak, for we would have no basis for even supposing a “causal structure” to be a relevant 
indication of subjectivity if we were not already, prior to such an objective identification and 
analysis of such a structure, acquainted with subjectivity or otherness as such: it is not, for 
example, my objective knowledge that another being has a nervous system akin to my own that 
founds my knowledge of that being as a genuine other, for the relevance of a nervous system (or 
of any other causal structure) can register for me as such only after I am acquainted with what 
subjectivity is, or only after I am perceptually exposed to alterity, or only on the condition of my 
lived relations with others (relations that enable me to engage in any manner of reflection at all). 
We first come to know that certain entities are “other minds” only through lived experience, and it 
is only later that we perhaps investigate the causal, physiological substrata that might play a role in 
realizing them as such. Indeed, why should I recognize, say, a nervous system and not a circuit 
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board or a piece of wood as “causally relevant” to subjectivity? To claim that we know that a 
particular being is minded because it has a nervous system, and then to claim that we know that a 
nervous system is causally relevant to “having” or being a mind (but that, say, a circuit board or 
piece of wood is not) because most of the minded beings we encounter in the world have nervous 
systems, is to argue in a circle. The only way to break out of such a vicious circle – that is, the 
only way to make sense of the fact that a “causal structure” (like a nervous system) can even show 
up as a “relevant” objective indication of subjectivity in the first place – is to suppose that we are 
already, prior to the objective identification of such a structure, acquainted with subjectivity or 
alterity as such. Only once we are exposed to the presence of others, or only on the condition that 
we are already embedded in relations with others, may we subsequently investigate what the 
physical, causal underpinnings of subjectivity might be, but this means that such an investigation 
and the facts it yields are secondary or derivative accomplishments, accomplishments that are 
founded upon, rather than the originary foundation of, our “knowledge” of others. Our primary 
knowledge of others must therefore be a knowledge that is grounded not by inference or reflective 
analysis but rather by lived experience, by the webs of relationships with others within which we 
always already find ourselves.  
Finally, another problem for Searle’s account that ought to be mentioned is that it cannot 
explain how we could legitimately attribute – or why indeed we would even be motivated to 
attribute – some kind of mindedness to a being whose physiological or “causal” makeup is 
considerably different from our own. This is a serious problem because presumably an octopus 
and certain other invertebrates, for example, demonstrate forms of mindedness or intentionality 
(octopi, for example, have been observed to engage in tool usage and fabrication and other 
complex forms of problem solving, and generally seem to be responsive to their environments in 
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many sophisticated and dynamic ways), and yet there is very little about their physiological or 
“causal” constitution that is analogous to our own. And if we are not comfortable enough with 
examples of invertebrates, the much-employed hypothetical example of a fully sentient 
extraterrestrial being with a makeup entirely different from anything with which are familiar here 
on Earth will do just as well to illustrate this problem. In short, Searle’s account seems to have 
what in analytic philosophy of mind is termed a “multiple realizability” problem, since it seems 
untenable to restrict consciousness a priori to any specific physical makeup, yet here Searle only 
seems willing to permit attributions of consciousness to beings whose physical makeups are akin 
to ours. Thus, Searle’s reply to the “problem of animal minds” would seem to introduce a kind of 
chauvinism according to which the only beings that we may ever confidently or legitimately 
recognize as others are those whose “causal structures” are analogous to our own. Like all forms 
of chauvinism, this arbitrarily assumes one’s own standpoint as the sole measure according to 
which something can be said to have a “standpoint” at all.  
So, we see that skepticism concerning non-human minds depends upon the same (false) 
ontological commitments as ordinary skepticism concerning other human minds: in both cases the 
claim that we can never know whether a body is “minded” depends upon the assumption that 
mindedness is essentially disembodied. In order to dismantle such skepticism, it is necessary and 
sufficient to dismantle the dualistic commitments upon which it is based. If subjectivity is 
necessarily embodied, then the living, behaving body of the Other is not an impregnable barrier to 
his or her subjectivity or otherness; it is not something I need to “get beyond” or “behind” – 
indeed, not something into which I must analogically transport myself – in order to apprehend the 
Other qua Other; it is not an exterior that somehow contains or conceals an entirely separable and 
private interior, for the living body is neither a pure subject nor a brute object but is rather both 
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subject and object, which is to say something that is prior to, and the foundation of, the very 
distinction between the two. The lived body is precisely that from out which the poles of subject 
and object, interiority and exteriority, inward consciousness and outward behavior are abstracted 
and later reified as opposed. If we begin from an opposition between subject and object, we will 
never be able to explain how I (as a subject) can ever know or even perceive that a body (whether 
human or non-human) is minded. If consciousness is pure interiority, then it is by definition 
inaccessible from the outside. Again, if interiority and exteriority belonged to mutually exclusive 
orders of reality, the “inter” in “intersubjectivity” would be inconceivable.  
As we saw in the previous chapters, Merleau-Ponty’s solution is not to begin from a 
dualistic subject/object standpoint in the first place, but rather to begin with what is actually 
primary: the lived body and its constitutive involvements with other living bodies. If we “reject 
the age-old assumptions that put the body in the world and the seer in the body, or, conversely, the 
world and the body in the seer as in a box,”418 then we must realize that “interiority” is not quite as 
“interior” as it has traditionally been conceived, and that we do not need to infer the presence of an 
Other “behind” behavior or a living body any more than we need to infer the presence of an 
animating thought “behind” an instance of language: subjectivity and behavior – just like thought 
and language – are inseparable yet not superposable. To recall a point discussed in the previous 
chapter, “language bears the meaning of thought as a footprint signifies the movement and effort 
of a body,”419 and of course Merleau-Ponty also means, or argues elsewhere, that the movement 
and effort of a body “signifies” or “bears” subjectivity in precisely the same way that language (or 
art) signifies or bears meaning: there surely is a difference between subjectivity and behavior just 
as there is surely a difference between language (signifier) and meaning (signified), yet they are 
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419 Merleau-Ponty, “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence,” in Signs, p. 44. 
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nevertheless intrinsically compresent and co-constitutive. The reflexivity or auto-affection that 
defines a living body – that is, the self-differentiating or self-signifying sense that a living body 
has of itself precisely by virtue of its exposure to, or contact with, what is other than itself – just is 
perception, intentionality, or “interiority” at the foundational level.  
It may be replied that this definition of subjectivity is too broad, for while one may grant 
that every subject must be an embodied subject or a living body, one may yet doubt the converse 
claim that every living body must be a “subject,” for this would entail that we accord 
“subjecthood” to a number of forms of life that may not seem to count as such, like termites, 
clams, sea sponges, amoebas, paramecia, and even plants. My first reply to this concern is one that 
I made earlier, namely that were we to agree that not all living bodies are “subjects,” we would 
need to develop a set of a criteria to differentiate those living bodies that are subjects from those 
that are not, and I think that any attempt to do so would be beset by a number of philosophical 
problems that would be just as difficult and worrisome, and perhaps even more so, than the one 
that such a set of criteria is supposed to solve in the first place. It is difficult – and I think, in the 
end, impossible – to conceive of how one could mark such a distinction in a non-question-begging 
or non-chauvinistic way.  
The most important answer to this objection, however, is that Merleau-Ponty shows us 
that we must give up any framework that takes subjectivity to be disjunct from a manner of bodily 
being-in-the-world, and for him this means (as we will further see in chapter five) that the typical 
human manner of being-in-the-world can no longer be privileged as the locus of all meaning and 
value in existence. If we truly reject Cartesian dualism (along with its reductionistic counterparts), 
then we must accept that consciousness is essentially incarnate: it is not “in” a body but is a 
manner of animate, responsive bodily existence itself. Subjectivity is, at the most basic level, 
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corporeal reflexivity or bodily intentionality. Incarnate consciousness just is a living body, which 
is to say, again, that all living bodies are by definition “consciousnesses,” and that there are as 
many different consciousnesses in the world as there are living bodies. A lived/living body is an 
embodied mind. If “being a subject” simply means “having subjectivity,” then we cannot conceive 
of a living body that is not in some sense “a subject” unless we somehow separate subjectivity 
from animate, bodily being-in-the-world. So yes, from the premise that mind and body are 
necessarily intertwined it follows that all minds are embodied but not that all bodies are minded. 
However, it does follow that all living bodies are “minded,” for a living body just is an “embodied 
mind.” Is, then, a paramecium “a subject”? Yes, because it is a living body and because all living 
bodies are by definition modes or expressions of subjectivity, but it should be emphasized once 
again that “subjectivity” is precisely not a monolithic phenomenon, or that there are as many 
different subjectivities as there are different forms of embodied life. Though speaking of beings as 
“subjects” remains far too caught up in the very conceptual frameworks that Merleau-Ponty labors 
so much to dismantle and perhaps already abstracts such beings far too much from the webs of 
carnal interdependencies that constitute them, if we must use the term, then paramecia are 
“subjects” and so too are clams and sea sponges, so too are termites and worms, so too are 
amoebas and bacteria, so too are trees and slime molds. Being a “subjectivity” or an “Other” is 
simply coterminous with being a living body, and it is for that reason that it may be at once 
“univocal” and “plural.” If subjectivity is embodied life, then every living body is a form of 
subjectivity and we thus cannot deny subjectivity to, say, a paramecium without denying it a living 
body. This is the only conclusion one may consistently draw if one rejects a Cartesian opposition 
between mind (subject) and body (object). We cannot conceive of a living body that is not in some 
sense “a subject” unless we were somehow to decouple subjectivity from animate, bodily being-in-
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the-world, and that is precisely what Merleau-Ponty proves we cannot do. A living body that is 
not, at least in some respect, a “subject” or a “mind” is a contradiction in terms.  
So far, we have seen not only that a kind of general or “global” skepticism concerning 
animal mindedness is unjustified but also that skepticism toward attributions of particular mental 
states, characteristics, or capacities to animals – a skepticism that typically take the form of 
suggesting that such attributions are merely “anthropomorphic projections,” and which is the most 
prevalent form of skepticism concerning animal minds that we encounter in our post-Cartesian 
(yet not nearly post-Cartesian enough) world – is likewise untenable. Of course, as I mentioned 
earlier, interpretations of behavior may be mistaken, but (as Merleau-Ponty argues) this does not 
cast doubt on the primary evidence we have of existing with others, the primary evidence we have 
of being seen and touched by others, of being loved or hated or simply recognized or even ignored 
by others; indeed, such mistakes presuppose this evidence. Some of these others greet us with a 
handshake and a smile, and others do so with paws and a tongue. Only a Cartesian conception of 
“subjectivity” – that is, only the notion that subjectivity is ontologically divorced from, or 
“hidden” within, the living, behaving body – could motivate or license me to doubt a priori that a 
dog can express or evidence love and affection just as much as a human Other can, or that I can 
simply share my life with a canine or non-human Other just as genuinely as I share my life with 
human Others; in all cases, it is behavior – it is a living body – that immediately, inherently means 
the love and affection or, in general, the otherness.  
However, after everything I have argued thus far, one might yet reasonably wonder in 
what way or sense we may ever be “mistaken” about the meanings that behaviors (ap)present to us 
in the world. “But can’t we be wrong?!,” someone might shout. Have I not insulated all 
conceivable ascriptions of subjectivity (or of specific mental characteristics) to animals from 
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critique or refutation? We have already broached the answer to this objection in the previous 
chapters, but I now wish to address it more explicitly and in greater depth. The answer to it will 
require us to reconceptualize how we understand “truth” and falsehood,” “knowledge” and 
“justification”; that is, it will require us to develop (or recall) a phenomenological (re-)conception 
of these concepts; it will require us to ground such concepts in “our contact with the perceived 
world which is simply there before us, beneath the level of the verified true and false.”420 We can 
be wrong, but the sense or explanation of how we can be wrong might not be as simple, 
straightforward, or comforting as one might like; it will surely not be as simple, straightforward, 
or comforting as the notions of “truth” and “falsehood” to which classical Western epistemology 
has accustomed us, for we will have to see such things not as static properties of propositions but 
rather as moments in the infinite perceptual unfolding of the world from which all propositions are 
derived, and thus as refusing us the sort of epistemic security or closure we might ever hope to 
attain through our progressive, ever refined efforts to know others or the world.  
As we have seen, if ascriptions of subjectivity or of particular mental qualities and 
capacities to animals are not fundamentally analogical inferences, then it is fundamentally 
misdirected to critique or dismiss them as flawed or hasty analogies (i.e., as “mere projections”). If 
analogical inference cannot be regarded as the basis of our knowledge of other minds (whether 
human or non-human), and if therefore we cannot appeal to analogical reasoning (or to any form 
of inductive reasoning) in order to explain or justify our fundamental knowledge of others, it 
follows that we also cannot appeal to analogical or inductive reasoning in order refute or criticize 
the “knowledge-claims”421 we make about others as well. If we do not fundamentally know the 
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“inner” lives of others inductively – if we do not fundamentally even know things about the inner 
lives of others inductively – then we cannot criticize “knowledge-claims” concerning the inner 
lives of others on the basis of inductive reasoning, but this is precisely what skeptics who reject or 
doubt ascriptions of subjectivity or of specific mental characteristics to non-human entities do 
when they reject or doubt such ascriptions under the suspicion that they might be “mere 
anthropomorphisms,” since such skeptics take “anthropomorphism” to involve either an a priori 
illicit or inductively dubious analogical transference of one’s own subjectivity or mental 
characteristics to a non-human entity. Moreover, as we have also seen, anti-skeptical inductive 
justifications of such ascriptions or transferences (such as the approach advocated by Allen and 
Bekoff) are just as fallacious as skeptical repudiations of them, for they too take them to be 
reducible to inferences. Contrary to what the words “ascription” or “attribution” might connote 
here, our “ascriptions” or “attributions” of mental qualities to others (whether human or non-
human) are never fundamentally propositions, representations, or inferences, but are rather direct, 
in-the-flesh perceptions, and it is inappropriate either to critique or defend them in a way that 
conceptualizes them otherwise. Is it, then, possible to critique or defend them at all? As I will 
elaborate below, the answer is yes, but doing so requires a phenomenological reorientation of what 
“truth” and “falsehood” and “justification” mean: the kind of “knowledge” we acquire of the 
world through everyday lived experience, and especially the manner in which we know others, 
demands that we reformulate what we mean when we say our “beliefs” about reality are “true” (or 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
through an experience or act of consciousness in which one immediately lives or takes oneself to “know” that the 
being in question possesses subjectivity or a certain mental quality. The sense in which it is a “claim” is the sense in 
which my consciousness “makes a claim” to, say, the figure I now see in a store window being a mannequin; of 
course, this figure could turn out to be a real person, but I do not “infer” that the figure in the display window is a 
mannequin: I perceive a mannequin, and this perception inherently impresses a certain kind of non-propositional, 
pre-inferential claim on something in the world. In this sense, by “knowledge-claim” – and also by “ascription” or 
“attribution” – I mean what Husserl has in mind when he speaks of “fulfilled” or “unfilled” intentional acts of 
consciousness, which are terms I use below. 
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“false”) or “justified”; it demands that we understand “truth” and “justification” in terms of an 
ever-open process of what Husserl calls “verification” through our continual perceptual 
engagements with things and others.  
So, the issue I have just posed is this: what are we to make of the strong intuition that we 
can be wrong about the inner lives of others (and especially about the inner lives of non-human 
others)? Do not my (and Merleau-Ponty’s) arguments imply that we can never be wrong? Of 
course, it is possible to be mistaken about the mental lives of others, both human and non-human. 
It would be absurd to deny this given ordinary lived experience, and indeed to deny it would be 
inconsistent with any commitment to the existence of true alterity, for if I may never be wrong 
about the minds of others, then either others would be nothing more than mere constructs of my 
own mind or their subjectivities would be exhaustively, transparently on display in the world, and 
we have already seen that the solipsism of the former notion and that the reductive behaviorism of 
the latter notion are equally unacceptable (and are indeed two sides of the same erroneous 
ontological framework); neither alternative is consistent with an experience of alterity. So, does it 
not appear here to be the case that I am trying to “have my cake and eat it too,” that is, on the one 
hand to allow for the obvious fact that we may be (and often are) wrong about the minds of others 
yet, on the other hand, to refute any conceivable demonstration that we are ever wrong and, in 
particular, to insulate any ascriptions of “human” mental qualities or capacities to non-humans 
from criticism? Indeed, in what sense at all can we be “wrong” about the mental lives of others if 
our beliefs about them are not to be regarded as false, or perhaps as hastily drawn, inferences? For 
that matter, how can we ever be “right” about the mental lives of others if we cannot be wrong 
about them in the sense just described?  
	 331	
As I have suggested, to answer this problem or objection we have to turn to (or recall) the 
general phenomenological account of truth and falsehood (and justification). What I have just 
articulated only appears to be a problem, or the objections I have just posed to myself only have 
weight, if one’s basic, paradigmatic model of falsehood is a failure of propositional 
correspondence, yet phenomenology shows that the correspondence (or failure of correspondence) 
between a proposition and a mind-independent state of affairs is not in fact the primary form or 
valence of “truth” (or of “falsehood”), for below the level of propositional correspondence is the 
movement through which things and others emerge into presence and meaning in the world, and 
below the level of propositional knowledge is “knowledge by acquaintance,” or knowing things 
and others through the unfolding of immediate, lived experience, and these have their own modes 
of “truth” and “falsehood” and “justification.” On this account, or at this level, “truth” refers to the 
harmony between our immediate intentional (not “inductive”) expectations and the world’s 
affordances, and “falsehood” refers to the disappointment or disruption of such expectations. 
Husserl often refers to the former as “fulfilled” intentions and to the latter as “nullified” intentions; 
such intentions only come to be either “fulfilled” or “nullified” in the course of lived experience, 
and our classical definitions of “truth” and “falsehood” are precisely parasitic upon this (never-
finished) process of fulfillment or nullification. As Husserl puts it:  
…It is of the essence of the physical world that no perception, however perfect, presents anything absolute 
in that realm; and essentially connected with this is the fact that any experience, however extensive, leaves 
open the possibility that what is given does not exist in spite of the continual consciousness of its own 
presence “in person”…It can always be that the further course of experience necessitates giving up what 
has already been posited with a legitimacy derived from experience. Afterwards one says it was a mere 
illusion, a hallucination, merely a coherent dream, or the like.422 
 
																																																								
422 Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, § 46, p. 102. 
	
	 332	
An intentional attitude is “fulfilled” when the world’s appearances harmonize with it, and it is 
“unfulfilled” or “empty” if what is intended is not (yet) presently present but is only presently 
absent. If what is intended in an unfulfilled intention comes to be fulfilled through the further 
course of experience – if something that is absent yet intended as present later comes to be present 
– then Husserl often says that the original intention has become “verified”; that is, it has come to 
be revealed as “true.” On the other hand, if the world turns out not to cohere with what is intended 
in an unfulfilled intention – if something that is absent yet intended as present turns out not to be 
present after all – then the original unfulfilled intention has become “nullified”; that is, it has come 
to be revealed as “false.” We will recall, for example, that whenever I perceive the front of a 
building I immediately (non-inferentially) apperceive the (non-flat) back of it: the front of the 
building is “presently present,” yet just as directly or immediately is the back of the building 
“presently absent”: never once do I wonder whether what I take be a “real” building might just be 
a two-dimensional movie prop. Thus, I am intentionally directed toward the front of the building 
and at the same time I am intentionally directed toward the back of the building, and yet, since the 
former is present whereas the latter is absent, the intention through which I “posit” the former is 
“fulfilled” whereas the intention through I “posit” the latter is “unfulfilled,” “empty,” or 
“unverified”; in order for me to transform my unfulfilled or empty intentional attitude toward the 
back of the building into one that is precisely “fulfilled,” I must move around the building so as to 
perceive its back, so as to make what was once absent now present, so as to verify that the building 
is indeed a three-dimensional building and not merely a movie prop. If the (non-flat) back of the 
building comes to be disclosed through my perceptual explorations of the building – if my once 
unfulfilled or empty intention comes to be fulfilled or verified – then I know my original 
intentional attitude toward it, that my original attitude through which I affirmed the presence of a 
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“real” building before me, was “true.” On the other hand, if I walk around the building and am 
shocked to discover that it was just a convincing movie prop after all, then my original intentional 
attitude toward it, my original attitude through which I affirmed the presence of a “real,” three-
dimensional building before me, has turned out to be “false”; it is “nullified” by a new 
presentation of the world and thus supplanted by a new fulfilled intention on my part. On this 
account, “falsehood” is a moment in the world’s appearance to me in which the world has upset or 
failed to cohere with my immediately intended expectations of it.  
It is in this way that Husserl (and that phenomenologists in general, including Merleau-
Ponty) conceptualize “truth” and “error”: “truth” and “error” are fulfilled and unfilled, “verified” 
and “nullified” immediate intentions of consciousness, or moments of a continual process of 
phenomenal unfolding, before they are ever properties of propositions; indeed, to conceptualize 
truth and falsehood as properties of propositions is already to have abstracted them from the 
unfolding of lived experience, from the ways in which we come to “know” the world in and 
through our ceaseless dialectical exchanges with it, from the ways we come to know what is or is 
not real through riskily committing ourselves to reality – riskily “plunging ourselves into the 
world”423 – and letting reality, or rather letting the further unfolding of lived experience, either 
reward or rebuff the risk. To use another example, when I think I see my friend across the street, I 
am immediately intentionally directed toward my friend; something in the world appears to me in 
such a way that I come to affirm it as my friend, that I “intend” it as “my friend over there,” that I 
am directed toward it in the mode of “that-is-my-friend-over-there.” Yet, the person I take to be 
my friend is quite some distance from me, and his body is not directly turned toward me, so it 
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occurs to me that perhaps this person is not my friend after all. I wish to greet him if he is indeed 
my friend, yet I also fear the embarrassment of turning out to be mistaken. So, I take a risk: I run 
across the street, approach this person who appears to be my friend, and greet him as if he is my 
friend: in one possible scenario, he turns toward me and is revealed to be my friend, and thus my 
original unfilled intention comes to be fulfilled, my original intention is revealed to have been 
“true”; yet in the other possible scenario, he turns around and is revealed not to be my friend, and 
thus new appearances upset the intentional attitude I originally had toward him, an aspect of the 
world reveals that my prior mode of intentional directedness toward it – that my mode of 
directedness toward the world wherein I affirmed “that-is-my-friend-over-there” – was “false,” 
and the risk I took is not rewarded. But fundamentally every mode of conscious engagement with 
the world – especially knowledge – is precisely this sort of risk. Consciousness commits itself to 
the presence or absence of certain things, and its commitments are either “verified” or disrupted 
through the successive, ordered flow of appearances. Thus, “truth” or veridical perception is “an 
open series of concordant explorations”424 and, as Merleau-Ponty further observes, “we know 
neither what exactly is this order and the concordance of the world to which we thus entrust 
ourselves, nor therefore what the enterprise will result in…,”425 yet that is precisely the drama – 
precisely the risk – through which “truth” and “falsehood” are first encountered, and through 
which “knowledge” is first achieved, before they are ever raised to the level propositional 
adequation or “S knows that P” knowledge and justification.  
As Merleau-Ponty often puts it, embodied subjectivity constantly “interrogates” the 
world – constantly puts certain “questions” to it through its practical engagements with it – and the 
world constantly responds in kind (either positively or negatively) and solicits its further 
																																																								
424 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 5. 
425 Ibid., p. 39. 
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engagement or interrogation. I am constantly putting questions to the world that the unfolding of 
the world’s appearances will answer in one way or another, yet these questions also always come 
from the world itself. This ceaseless dialogue between self and world is the primordial crucible of 
every “truth” or instance of knowledge. As I will discuss further in the following chapter, 
phenomenology rejects the classical distinction between (“mere”) appearance and reality. This 
does not, of course, collapse reality into “mere” appearances because to repudiate the notion that 
“objective” reality is absolutely beyond all appearances is also to repudiate the correlative notion 
of “mere” appearances, that is, of appearances that would ever be radically cut off from reality. 
Thus, “the real is perhaps not obtained by pressing appearances; it perhaps is appearance.”426 
Indeed, “the real” is appearance, and that means that knowing “the real” is the endless task of 
letting reality appear in all of the ways it can appear, that what we call “truth” is a moment in the 
unfolding of appearances, or rather the delimitation of a horizon of possible appearances.  
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty both frequently refer to things as horizons for an important 
reason. Once we reject the classical distinction between being and appearance, the being of a thing 
does not collapse into “mere” appearances, yet it is also not something absolutely independent of 
appearances. So, to say that things are constituted as “horizons” is to say that they are ensembles 
of overlapping possible manners of appearance; it is to say that the being of a thing consists of all 
of the ways in which it can appear. It is for this reason that, at the fundamental, phenomenological 
level, “truth” and “falsehood,” “reality” and “illusion” designate horizons of possible appearances, 
or rather moments in the perceptual unfolding of a thing. Merleau-Ponty articulates this 
phenomenological account of truth and falsehood, reality and illusion as follows:  
…when an illusion dissipates, when an appearance suddenly breaks up, it is always for the profit of a new 
appearance which takes up again for its own account the ontological function of the first. I thought I saw on 
																																																								
426 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 157. 
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the sands a piece of wood polished by the sea, and it was a clayey rock. The breakup and destruction of the 
first appearance do not authorize me to define henceforth the “real” as a simple probable, since they are 
only another name for the new apparition, which must therefore figure in our analysis of the dis-illusion. 
The dis-illusion is the loss of one evidence only because it is the acquisition of another evidence. If, out of 
prudence, I decide to say that this new evidence is “in itself” doubtful or only probable…the fact remains 
that at the moment I speak it incontestably gives itself as “real” and not as “very possible” or probable; and 
if subsequently it breaks up in its turn, it will do so only under the pressure of a new “reality.” What I can 
conclude from these disillusions or deceptions, therefore, is that perhaps “reality” does not belong 
definitively to any particular perception, that in this sense it lies always further on…427  
 
In order to illustrate this concept of truth (reality)/falsehood (illusion) as phenomenal horizonality, 
Husserl often likes to employ the example of mistaking a mannequin in a store for a person.428 I 
see something that I take to be a person but it is actually a mannequin. My initial intentional 
attitude toward this object of perception is “false” or later nullified upon the further unfolding of 
experience: I approach what I take to be a person and realize that it is, in fact, a mannequin. 
However, the fact that a mannequin may, under certain circumstances, appear (falsely) to be a 
“real” person is nonetheless constitutive of what it is to be a mannequin: the possibility of 
appearing as a person is part of a mannequin’s horizon of possible appearances. Likewise, in 
mistaking a mannequin for a person I also implicitly learn something about what it is to be a 
person, for presumably persons may also appear to be mannequins as well (as anyone who has 
ever experienced a skilled mime can attest): the fact that a person may, under certain 
circumstances, appear to be a mannequin is also part of a person’s horizon of possible 
appearances, hence part of what it is to be a “person.” The horizons of mannequins and persons, 
then, overlap (which is why it is possible to mistake one for the other), yet they obviously do not 
coincide (since they are not one and the same kind of thing, and if they were, we would not be able 
to “mistake” one for the other in the first place). Knowing what something is, then, is a matter of 
																																																								
427 The Visible and the Invisible, p. 40-41. Italics are Merleau-Ponty’s. 
428 See e.g., Experience and Judgment. Ed. Ludwig Landgrebe, trans. James S. Churchill & Karl Ameriks (Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), §71. 
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fleshing out its horizon of possible appearances; it is a matter of attempting to disclose it in as 
many ways or from as many perspectives as possible, a matter of continually engaging with it in 
order to “verify” those possible manners of its appearance that are “true” and differentiate them 
from those that are dissimulative. And since, in principle, one can never truly exhaust all of the 
ways in which something may appear – since the phenomenal horizon of a thing is, like any literal 
horizon, infinite429 – it follows that one can never know anything strictly exhaustively; it follows 
that the more one knows a thing, the more of it there will be to know. So, the main point here is 
that, before we talk about propositions and “truth-values,” about “inferences” and epistemic 
justification, “truth” in, say, the case of taking something to be a mannequin is the revelation of 
the mannequin in experience upon closer inspection, that is, a moment in the unfolding of one’s 
perceptual engagement with the world, or part of a horizon of possible appearances. Truth, then, is 
fundamentally not a property or static relation but a moment of a process, a moment of that 
movement of phenomenality without which nothing would have any being or intelligibility in the 
first place. “Truth” is the continual harmonization of consciousness with worldly appearances 
before it comes to be fossilized as a correspondence between a statement and a “state of affairs” or 
as a relation of “adequation” between “thought” and an “object.” “Truth” is precisely what the 
continual unfolding of appearances verifies (whereas “falsehood” is what the continual unfolding 
																																																								
429 Though the horizon of a perceptual object is “infinite” it is nevertheless a bounded or finite infinity. That is to 
say, if a perceptual object can be experienced in a coherent way at all, it cannot appear as just anything (e.g., 
presumably a mannequin cannot appear as a teacup or an elephant). Thus, like every horizon, an object’s horizon of 
possible appearances is infinite insofar as one can never exhaustively disclose all of the ways in which it can appear, 
yet the range of ways in which can appear nonetheless has limits (even if these are blurry). The concept of a 
“bounded” or “finite” infinity may seem paradoxical, yet notably it is a staple notion in mathematics, and given that 
Husserl was originally trained as a mathematician, it is not unreasonable to suppose that he was influenced in part by 
the concept that infinite geometric series have sums and by Georg Cantor’s proof that there are such things as 
infinities of different sizes. Similarly, a limit in calculus is, like a horizon, a distinct or finite “thing” even though it 
designates an asymptote, something can only ever be approached yet never reached.      
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of appearances nullifies), and since the unfolding of appearances is infinite, so too is the task of 
knowing the world.  
What exactly, then, does this have to do with the problem I previously posed? We have 
already seen that our primary relationships with others – ontologically, perceptually, epistemically 
– do not consist of reflective, propositional attitudes and inferences; such attitudes and inferences 
are derivative. “Anthropomorphism” is typically understood as precisely a particular kind 
reflective stance we might take toward a non-human entity, namely one in which we transpose 
(i.e., “project”) human characteristics into it. Such a “projection” is really just an analogical 
inference by another name: I observe a non-human animal behave in a certain manner, I compare 
its movements with my own and recognize them as similar to my own in a number of salient ways, 
and consequently I impute to it those mental characteristics or capacities connected to that similar 
form of behavior in my own case. For a long time, there has been the prevailing suspicion that 
most such instances of anthropomorphism are fallacious, that anthropomorphism is usually some 
kind of faulty or hasty analogy. This is why we find that most forms of skepticism concerning 
attributions of human qualities to non-humans regard such attributions as “anthropomorphic 
projections,” for the expression “anthropomorphic projection” is, in nearly all such cases, 
deployed pejoratively to mean “flawed analogy.” We have already seen Merleau-Ponty’s 
arguments against this notion of anthropomorphic projection, and later I am going to have even 
more to say about why it is untenable, such that I am not simply going to argue (as, for example, 
Allen and Bekoff and Frans de Waal do) that “anthropomorphism” is often rationally justified but 
that, in fact, the very concept of anthropomorphism itself is rationally unjustified, for it is 
inherently rooted in false, Cartesian philosophical commitments; that will not mean that 
“ascriptions” of “human” qualities to non-humans are never “correct” or “warranted” (indeed, 
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clearly I think they often are), but it will mean that we will have to rethink and change how we 
talk about them, that we will have to rethink, in ways we have already seen and are now further 
seeing, what it means to “ascribe” a human quality to a non-human being, what it means for such 
an “ascription” to be “correct,” and ultimately how we even come to regard a quality as “human” – 
or how we even know that a certain quality is one that we humans possess – in the first place. For 
now, the point I wish to emphasize is that to regard attributions of human qualities to non-humans 
as particular types of bad inferences (as skeptics who dismiss such attributions as 
“anthropomorphic projections” do) is to assume that they are fundamentally inferences in the first 
place, but they are not, for none of our fundamental attitudes toward or modes of knowing others 
are inferential. My ascriptions of subjectivity to non-human bodies in lived experience are no 
more inferential than are my ascriptions of subjectivity to human bodies: they are, again, direct 
perceptions.  
In chapter one I discussed Merleau-Ponty’s arguments for why it is fundamentally 
fallacious to attempt to establish our knowledge of human others on the basis of analogical 
reasoning. The same point applies here concerning our knowledge of non-human others: we do not 
primarily know other subjectivities (whether human or non-human), nor do we primarily even 
know anything about other subjectivities (whether human or non-human), through analogical 
inference, and our primary “ascriptions” of subjectivity or of particular mental qualities to others 
(whether human or non-human) are not inferences; they are not internally formulated 
representations that I impart to a living body after that living body has presented itself to me, but 
are rather meanings (ap)perceived directly in that living body itself. So again, the question is this: 
if ascriptions of subjectivity or of specific mental characteristics to others (whether human or non-
human) are not fundamentally inferences, in what sense can they ever be incorrect (or correct)? If 
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we assume that truth and falsehood are fundamentally matters of propositional correspondence, 
and if we maintain that our fundamental “beliefs” about others are not in fact propositional (or 
inferential) at all, then it would follow that such “beliefs” can never be wrong (or right); it would 
follow that such beliefs would be utterly beyond the pale of truth and falsehood or epistemic 
justification. Such “beliefs” (if we can call them that) would have to be “non-cognitive,”430 which 
is to say they would not admit of any truth-value at all; they would never be false, but also never 
true. However, we know that the initial assumption just mentioned is false: rather than accept 
propositional correspondence as the only possible concept or mode of truth, we can (and should) 
also accept a phenomenological one, namely as the fulfillment of an intention through the 
continual unfolding of appearances, or as verification through the ever-open acquisition of 
relevant experiences. As I will argue below, all forms of knowledge are ultimately grounded in 
“knowledge by acquaintance,” but, even if one were to deny this, it is nonetheless obvious that 
knowing others is primarily knowing by acquaintance, not propositional or representational 
knowing or knowing by inference, and the former has its own irreducible standards.  
Again, at this level “truth” is the “fulfillment” and “error” is the “nullification” or 
“disappointment” of an intentional act of immediate consciousness in and through the flow of 
immediate, direct conscious experience before they are abstracted as a “correspondence” and 
“non-correspondence” between a statement or representation and a state of affairs: this dynamic, 
																																																								
430 It is notable that one of the prevailing forms of anti-realism in metaethics is non-cognitivism, according to which 
moral statements are reducible to expressions of “non-cognitive” – i.e., merely emotional – attitudes, and as such are 
neither true nor false; they simply do not admit of a truth-value at all, because only propositions admit of truth-
values, and mere exclamations of, say, attraction and revulsion are not propositions. I hope it will be clear that I am 
not arguing that our attitudes toward or about other minds are merely “non-cognitive” because they are not 
propositional or inferential; rather, I am suggesting that phenomenology rejects the opposition between “the 
cognitive” and the “non-cognitive” (in the senses in which those terms are used in analytic philosophy) in the first 
place, and that such an opposition must not be interpreted as strictly coextensive with the distinction between the 
“reflective” and the “pre-reflective,” for there is a sense in which our pre-reflective attitudes toward (or “beliefs” 
about) others may be said to be “true” or “false,” or rather (to the put the point another way) propositions and 
inferences do not have a monopoly on “truth” (or “falsehood”). 
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endless process of “verification” – this endless process of either the fulfillment or disruption of our 
immediate intentional attitudes toward the world – is a “rational” process (our immediate, lived, 
conscious and corporeal explorations of the world are not random or chaotic), yet it is below the 
level of propositional, representational, or inferential thought. The basic point here is that, in 
answer to the “but can’t we be wrong?” question or objection, we can indeed be wrong (and right) 
about the inner lives of others even though our primary predicative intentional attitudes toward 
them are, somewhat paradoxically, antepredicative, or even though our ascriptions of mental 
characteristics to them happen below the level of propositional, reflective thought and inference. 
The manner in which we can be perceptually (non-inferentially) wrong about others is analogous 
the manner in which we can be perceptually wrong about the non-present features of any 
perceptual object. As I discussed in the previous chapter, when I see an object from one side and 
take it to have a back, I do not “infer” that it has a back: I (ap)perceive its back just as immediately 
and directly as I perceive the side that is now frontally facing me. Of course, in most cases it is 
true that the object in question has a back, and in certain imaginable scenarios it would be false 
that it does. But only in rare cases do I draw a reflective inference concerning the rear side of an 
object I am now seeing, and even if and when do draw such an inference, I do so only after lived 
experience has “done its work,” so to speak, that is, only after the rear side has been directly 
(ap)presented to me, or only after I have immediately, pre-reflectively intended the rear side as 
“present too.” I do not first think to myself a proposition or some sort of reflective truth-claim or 
knowledge-claim (e.g., “this building has a southern-facing side”). To say that in lived experience 
I am formulating predicative judgments or inferences concerning the absent profiles of objects is 
to commit a kind of category mistake: it is to import into pre-reflective, lived experience 
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abstractions acquired through reflection that, as such, only come later and indeed presuppose pre-
reflective, lived experience for their formulation or intelligibility in the first place.  
Thus, as Merleau-Ponty writes, “it is true that the lamp has a back, that the cube has 
another side. But this formula, “It is true,” does not correspond to what is given to me in 
perception. Perception does not give me truths like geometry but presences.”431 As Merleau-Ponty 
suggests, there is indeed a sense in which perception can be veridical or erroneous even though it 
cannot be understood to be so in the manner of inferential or strictly predicative veracity or error; 
there is a sense in which “truths” and “falsehoods” are given in experience even though they 
cannot be understood as propositional truths and falsehoods. And everything that pertains here to 
our lived, perceptual orientations toward objects applies as well to our lived, perceptual 
orientations toward others, since others are also directly (ap)presented to us, or are kinds of 
absences already infused into the presence of a living body. As we have seen, I no more infer the 
back of, say, a lamp than I infer that a person is angry, sad, or happy. I no more infer that a 
building now facing me from its northern side also has a southern side than I infer that the person I 
see across the street is my friend. My perceptions of lamps and buildings can be mistaken just as 
well as my perceptions of others can be, and though (as we have also discussed) I surely cannot 
“verify” my perceptions of others in the same way that I can verify my perceptions of ordinary 
objects, my perceptions in either case are nonetheless genuinely either “true” or “false,” yet they 
are true or false below the level of propositions or inferences because perceptions themselves are 
not propositions or inferences. The basic point here, then, is that if there is an intelligible non-
propositional or pre-propositional sense or mode of “truth” and “error” – if there is a sense in 
which perception can be “correct” or “incorrect,” “apt” or “misled” prior to the reflective 
																																																								
431 “The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences,” in The Primacy of Perception, p. 14. 
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abstraction of propositions from perception – then it is possible to be non-propositionally or pre-
propositionally right or mistaken about others (whether human or non-human), and such a notion 
of truth and error is precisely a phenomenological one.  
It is thus possible to say that one can be “wrong” about the interiority of an animal 
without having to take recourse to some notion that one has “anthropomorphically projected” 
some characteristic into it, which is a notion one would never use to describe a wrong perception 
of a human other’s interiority, yet it is only a double-standard to regard such a notion as absurd in 
the latter case yet not in the former. When I perceive certain entities (regardless of whether they 
are human or non-human) as minded or as possessing certain mental qualities, I never first infer 
their minds or mental qualities, and yet such perceptions can intelligibly be “wrong.” So, if we 
should not say that my mistaken “ascriptions” of mental characteristics to other humans 
fundamentally or necessarily result from illicit or faulty analogical inferences I make about them, 
then neither should we say that my mistaken ascriptions of mental characteristics to animals 
fundamentally or necessarily result from similar illicit or faulty analogical inferences (that is, from 
some fallacy called “anthropomorphism”).  
Even setting aside Merleau-Ponty’s criticisms of the concept that I discussed earlier, 
given that we now see the patent logical inconsistency involved in regarding our ascriptions of 
mental characteristics to animals as either potentially or inherently “anthropomorphic projections” 
(that is, as flawed analogies) while not regarding our ascriptions of mental characteristic to fellow 
humans in the same light, it is beginning to become apparent that the primary function of the 
concept of “anthropomorphism” is not to ensure that our ascriptions of certain mental 
characteristics to animals are not mistaken but rather to ensure that we do not make or ever 
commit to them at all: in short, its primary function is to restrict certain characteristics to humans; 
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it has never really been about adhering to sound rules of logical reasoning and epistemic inquiry 
(since it lacks logical or epistemic merit), and still less has it been about respecting “otherness” 
(since in most cases it does more to suppress “otherness” than to help affirm it). We are beginning 
to see that the concept of an “anthropomorphic projection” or of an “anthropomorphism fallacy” 
has never really been a value-neutral, apolitical cautionary principle against making faulty 
analogies: it has always been a thoroughly ideological principle, a principle designed and deployed 
in order to reinforce an ideology we call anthropocentrism, human exceptionalism, or perhaps 
simply “humanism.” In any case, efforts to restrict certain qualities exclusively to humans, or 
rather dismissals of attributions of such qualities to non-humans as mere “projections” precisely so 
that they may be preserved as exclusively human, assumes the same analogical logic – hence the 
same Cartesian epistemological framework – as efforts to justify attributions of those qualities to 
non-humans analogically or inductively. In short, we can neither deny attributions of qualities to 
animals as bad, fallacious analogies (i.e., as “projections”) nor justify them as good analogies or 
inductions because they are not essentially analogies or inductions at all.  
Phenomenology does not abandon the distinction between reality and illusion or between 
truth and error but rather understands them as moments in the presencing of phenomena before 
they ever become conceptualized as properties of propositions. If, then, we want to “know” an 
Other, we have to try “to get to know” that Other; we have to interact with the Other, share 
experiences with the Other, and most importantly let the Other show itself and be vulnerable to the 
Other. Every time consciousness extends itself to the world, and especially every time 
consciousness extends itself to another consciousness, it takes a risk: this person I see on the street 
who appears to be my friend might be a stranger; this person who is now my friend might one day 
betray me; this person I love might not love me back, or this romantic relationship I have just 
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started might not work out; likewise, the dog who I think is my friend might not be; this cat who I 
think loves me might only tolerate me because I feed him and clean his litter box. Animals who I 
think mean certain things when they address me might mean nothing of the sort at all. Animals 
who I take to be “happy” or “sad” or to exhibit any number of emotions or mental states might 
experience things quite differently than I assume, or they might experience things in ways that 
such categories fail to capture. I can be wrong about human subjectivities, and I can be wrong 
about non-human subjectivities. One thing, however, that I cannot be wrong about is that if I ever 
wish to know other subjectivities at all I must surrender myself to this ever-present possibility that 
I might always be wrong about them, and that this possibility that I might always be wrong about 
them is nonetheless not inconsistent with the possibility of ever truly knowing them, and indeed if 
I could never be wrong about them they would not be others. Yet more importantly, there is 
nothing fundamentally or essentially different about how I know – or fail to know – human and 
non-human others.  
All living bodies are alterities. In principle, my own subjectivity may never totally 
coincide with the subjectivity of an Other. Thus, any attitudes we take toward others, or any 
qualities we directly perceive in others, can always be shown to be wrong or can always be upset 
in the ongoing drama of conscious (co)existence. Alterity is precisely the ever-present, 
ineliminable possibility that we can be wrong about others. Indeed, experience as such entails the 
ever-present possibility that we can be wrong about what we take to be “real” in and through 
experience: the person I think I see in a department store is actually a mannequin, the person who I 
think is happy is actually severely depressed, my friend is actually a traitor, my lover no longer 
loves me but puts up appearances to the contrary, the dog who seems content is actually bored or 
angry, the cat who seems to want to play is actually telling me he wants new food. I can always be 
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wrong about the “inner” life of a non-human other just as well as I can be wrong about the “inner” 
life of a human other, yet for some reason we tend to think that the former is grounds for 
skepticism or some sort of special reticence whereas the latter is not, and in the end there are no 
good reasons for such a double-standard. The upshot of all of this is that there is such a thing as 
“genuinely” knowing others even though it is not a form of propositional knowledge, and thus 
there is such a thing as having “genuinely” true beliefs about others even though these “beliefs” 
are not propositional and even though their truth is not some static correspondence between a 
mental or linguistic construct and a radically extra-mental or extra-linguistic reality. This is also to 
say that there is such a thing as knowing others, or that there is such a thing as having true 
“beliefs” about others, even though that knowledge, or even if though the truths of those “beliefs,” 
must remain ever open, which of course is what one ought to expect given the fact that others 
themselves are ever-open, always in process of becoming who they are, and also given the fact 
that alterity is inherently, by definition, inexhaustible, or given that the otherness of any Other 
whom I seek to know will always exceed me, that the otherness of any Other will always, like a 
horizon, recede from me the closer I get to it, the more I “know” it.  
Can I be wrong about human and “animal” others? Yes. Does being wrong about human 
or “animal” others primarily or essentially consist in a lack of correspondence between some 
proposition, representation, or inference I reflectively formulate in my mind and some radically 
extra-mental reality? No. When I perceive another’s subjectivity, I riskily commit myself to it; 
when I perceive some specific characteristic in an Other, I riskily commit myself to its presence. 
These perceptions or “beliefs” about others are always defeasible. Others – whether humans or 
dogs or cats or birds or monkeys or elephants or bears or mice or cockroaches or jellyfish – may 
never quite coincide with how I perceive them and may always disrupt or upset my lived 
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expectations of them. How, then, can I “know” them? In what, sense, then, may I ever be able to 
determine the extent to which my perceptions or expectations of them are correct? The answer is 
the same way I know or verify the correctness of any perceptual experience: by having and 
opening myself to more experiences, by constantly taking the risk of testing my lived attitudes or 
expectations – the intentions through the world is immediately given to me – against the world 
itself. When it comes to “knowing” others, we simply need to keep having experiences with them, 
and we simply need to keep adjusting, refining, revising, reorienting our perceptions of them in 
the light of such ongoing experiences. Most importantly, we must attempt, as best we can, to let 
others show themselves as they are, yet always with the painful awareness that the very alterity 
that allows them to appear as such at the same time prevents them from ever appearing 
transparently or “without remainder,” that the perspectival limits and distances that allow us to 
know others at all also constitute the insuperable possibility of “being wrong” about them, the 
persistent possibility of dissemblance and heartbreak, of also wonder and surprise. Whether we are 
dealing with human or non-human others, we simply must continue to “flesh out” the horizons of 
their being, to continue to have experiences with them, or rather to let them show themselves in 
every conceivable way and always with the humility of knowing that we will never know them, or 
that they will never show themselves to us, completely, that their subjectivity or selfhood will 
always recede from our reach, always deny us any kind of epistemic or ontological security, that 
overrated (and never attainable) value we otherwise call “closure.” “…The experience of dis-
illusion…,” Merleau-Ponty writes, is that “wherein precisely we learn to know the fragility of the 
real,”432 and I wish to add here that it is also that wherein we learn the “fragility” or vulnerability 
of subjectivity, for subjectivity is inseparably tied, through its body, to “the real” and to others. 
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Knowledge – especially knowledge of others – is never impossible, but it is always an infinite 
task. And, as we have just seen, this is also why knowing others is always filled with risk, but it is 
also why relationships with others are so rich and meaningful: I can know a particular Other – and 
I can know, say, a canine Other no differently from the manner in which I know a human Other – 
but there will always be more of that Other to know, and we should neither demand nor even wish 
for anything less (or more) than this.  
Thus, it is always possible for us to misinterpret animal behavior; it is always possible to 
“falsely ascribe” certain meanings – say, certain emotions or intentions – to the expressions and 
gestures of an animal. As we have seen, skepticism about other minds (whether human or 
otherwise) is implausible and incoherent for a number of reasons, but this does not mean that our 
interpretations of behavior can never be mistaken; all it means is that such mistaken interpretations 
are not mere “projections.” If every supposed “projection” follows from a prior (indeed primary) 
lived experience that elicits it, then lived experience is the bedrock ground of sound and mistaken 
interpretations of behavior alike, and it is precisely this irreducible, anterior level of lived 
experience to which we must attend. The most important point – the one that must always be 
underscored and the one to which we must always return – is that there is a differentiation and 
attendant enmeshment of living bodies that subtends and founds all predicative comparisons, 
identifications, and judgments (veridical and mistaken alike).  
We are always prone to error, but such is the lot of lived experience. We can always be 
mistaken about the meanings of animal behaviors, but such mistakes do not legitimate skepticism 
about “other species of mind.” If the failure of skepticism does not imply the impossibility of 
error, neither does the possibility of error license skepticism. We can be (and often are) wrong 
about the interior and intentional lives of animals, but so too are we frequently wrong about the 
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meanings of human behaviors: miscommunications between human beings – misperceptions of 
emotions, desires, motivations, beliefs, and intentions – are endemic to human experience. As 
Merleau-Ponty argues, ambiguity is essential to perception: so long as we are always already 
outside ourselves and in the world, we can never totally expunge or transcend perceptual 
ambiguity; and insofar as such ambiguity is essential to perception, it is also essential to our 
primary access to “truth” and “knowledge,” our primary access to a world and to others. Thus, if 
miscommunications between human beings do not license skepticism about knowledge of “human 
minds,” then neither do miscommunications between human beings and non-human beings license 
skepticism about “other species of mind.” We are involved with animal others – that is, we are 
involved with animals as others – as deeply and pervasively as we are involved with conspecific 
(human) others. Indeed, those cases in which we mistakenly impute emotions and intentions to 
animals only attest to how radically intersubjective lived experience really is, to how deeply we 
are caught up with others in the skein and flow of life. The ever-present possibility of perceptual 
error, then, only reinforces the ethical imperative of phenomenology: to attend to our experiences 
more carefully so that we may live more wakefully and responsively.  
We often demand proof for the presence of a “mental state” in a non-human animal that 
we never think to demand for the presence of the same state in another human. A demon that is 
perhaps far more insidious than the one Descartes imagines in his Meditations – one that, rather 
than tempt us to take illusion for reality, tempts us to take reality for illusion – whispers in our ear 
“beware of anthropomorphism,” and all of a sudden the world becomes far less populated than we 
originally assumed it to be. However, we have learned (and we will continue to learn) that these 
demons are one and the same. If we must speak of epistemic justification, we are just as justified 
in taking non-human beings to be “minded” as we are in taking fellow human beings to be 
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minded. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology reveals to us an important truth we already know 
through lived experience but that (like many other important truths) various abstractions tend to 
lead us to forget or doubt: that we are always already involved in the world not only with human 
others but also with other others. 
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Chapter Four 
 
“Their Own Vision of Things” 
Knowledge, Affect, Animal Alterities, and (more on) the  
Problem of Anthropomorphism 
 
“The mental image of the psychologist is one thing; what the consciousness of that thing is must still be 
understood.” 
 
– Merleau-Ponty433 
 
“The emblem of intelligence is the feeler of the snail…” 
 
– Adorno and Horkheimer434 
 
“…Any academic who doubts the depth of animal emotions ought to get a dog.”  
 
– Frans de Waal435   
 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that not only is skepticism toward “anthropomorphism” 
unfounded, so too are many well-intentioned justifications of it, for they tend to concede the same 
problematic epistemological and metaphysical commitments as the skepticism they oppose. For 
these reasons, as well as for reasons I will further elaborate, I think the concept of 
anthropomorphism has far outlived its usefulness and that we ought to eliminate it from our 
vocabulary altogether. Having said that, Derrida raises a concern about anthropomorphism that is 
ethically and not just epistemologically crucial to address. On the one hand, Derrida shares my 
criticisms of the kind of skepticism that deploys “anthropomorphism” as a sort of cudgel with 
which to silence or suppress non-human otherness or those who would affirm kinship with non-
human others. On the other hand, however, Derrida articulates a reticence concerning the 
“anthropomorphization” of animals. Derrida’s reticence here is not rooted in the worry that we 
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might be committing some sort of fallacy of induction when we anthropomorphize animals, but 
rather in the worry that such anthropomorphism may involve the imposition of a human-centered 
perspective that would suppress animal alterities just as much as any suspension or repudiation of 
anthropomorphism. Thus, in attempting to elaborate a phenomenology of encountering the gaze of 
an animal Other, and specifically in reflecting on his lived experience of feeling shame when seen 
naked by his cat, Derrida writes:  
Things would be too simple altogether, the anthropo-theomorphic reappropriation would already have 
begun, there would even be the risk that domestication has already come into effect, if I were to give in to 
my own melancholy. If, in order to hear it in myself, I were to set about overinterpreting what the cat might 
thus be saying to me, in its own way, what it might be suggesting or simply signifying in a language of 
mute traces, that is to say without words. If, in a word, I assigned to it the words it has no need of…But in 
forbidding myself thus to assign, interpret or project, must I for all that give in to the other violence or 
asinanity, that which would consist in suspending one’s compassion and in depriving the animal of every 
power of manifestation, of the desire to manifest anything to me at all, and even to manifest to me in some 
way its experience of my language, of my words and of my nudity?436 
 
Though I do think (and will continue to argue) that we should abandon the very notion of 
“anthropomorphism” and will therefore insist that we change the manner in which we articulate 
the concern that Derrida raises here, nevertheless this concern is one that I absolutely share and is 
one that must be heeded by anyone who is committed to “doing justice” to alterity. Derrida’s 
concern, of course, is to honor rather than violently suppress or erase otherness, and doing so 
requires precisely the sort of “middle ground,” “both/and” stance toward anthropomorphism that 
he suggests here: that is, on the one hand, it is necessary to reject any traditional refusal of 
anthropomorphism that would otherize animal others to such an extent that they would not even be 
able count or show up for us as “others” at all, yet on the other hand it is equally necessary to be 
critically vigilant about the fact that, in ascribing “human” features to them, we might just as well 
suppress their otherness by imposing “all-too-human” categories and prejudices upon them. Like 
any good phenomenologist, Derrida’s concern here is to negotiate the best way “to let beings show 
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themselves”; such a concern should be at the forefront of any phenomenologist’s attention. As we 
know all too well, abstractions and conceptual frameworks often get in the way of “knowing what 
we see,” and so phenomenology always involves this supremely difficult and indeed infinite effort 
to cultivate ways of thinking that let phenomena show themselves, ways of thinking that elucidate 
rather than distort the “things themselves.” Likewise, the concern here is to let animal others show 
themselves to us as they are on their own terms rather than allow antecedent, entrenched 
abstractions and humanist prejudices or even simply one’s own inescapable, situated “human” 
standpoint in the world either reductively colonize or oppositionally exile them. I will have more 
to say in the following chapter about the problems – epistemological and otherwise – that arise 
once we take seriously (as we must) the “human” standpoint from which we ineluctably 
experience and interpret the world. For now, however, I simply think it is important to appreciate 
that Derrida’s view is unquestionably correct, and I wish to add here the point that we will never 
be able to devise any kind of rational calculus or set of axioms from which to deduce appropriate 
perceptual attitudes toward animals. That is, given the irreducible ambiguities of lived experience, 
we will never be able to know for sure the extent to which a particular way of seeing or listening 
to an animal affirms and lets be seen or heard rather than distorts or suppresses in some way that 
animal’s subjectivity, and of course no subjectivity – whether that of a cat or of another human – 
will ever be able to come to full, transparent presence for us. However, justice – in every valence 
of the term – nevertheless demands our attention to otherness, and thus so too does it demand our 
critical vigilance – indeed, our anguish – regarding the perpetual danger that we may not be 
appropriately or sufficiently attentive to it; it demands that we ceaselessly seek to develop ways of 
seeing, listening, speaking, and thinking that may best let others show themselves, that may best 
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let others be seen and heard, and to that end it also demands that we ceaselessly put into question, 
or ceaselessly attempt to think anew, what seeing, listening, speaking, and thinking are.  
So, we must reject traditional skepticism concerning attributions of “human” qualities to 
non-humans, yet we must also be careful not to endorse the reactionary counter-thesis – a reckless, 
“anything-goes” license to make such attributions – that would be just as mired in anthropocentric 
biases, or that would at the very least always risk imposing a human-centered standpoint, precisely 
because it lacks any critical distance from its own biases or standpoint. We should be critically 
reticent about attributions of “human” qualities to non-humans not because we have determined in 
advance that such qualities are exclusively or exceptionally human or inherently unattributable to 
non-humans, but rather because we ought to resist an imposition of “human” schemas of 
experience and intelligibility upon non-human others that in fact does just as much violence to 
their otherness as do traditional skeptical suspensions or a priori repudiations of 
anthropomorphism. An unrestrained license to ascribe “human” qualities to animals just as surely 
silences animals by forcing them to speak to us in our voice rather than in their own; contrary to 
the fundamental epistemological (as well as ethical) principle of phenomenology, it refuses to 
allow animals to show themselves of their own accord or to “let them be.” An “anything-goes,” 
thoughtless or uncritical license to ascribe supposedly human characteristics to non-human beings 
negates or levels-down the alterities of non-human beings just as much as any fallacious skeptical 
or anti-realist refusal to make such ascriptions.  
To be clear, if and when “transferences” of “human” qualities to non-humans are 
problematic, they are not so for the traditionally accepted reason that all “transferences” of human 
qualities to non-humans are logically fallacious, for indeed such “anthropomorphisms” are not, as 
we have seen, fundamentally “transferences” or “projections” (at least not reflective or inferential 
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transferences or projections) at all (and it is that notion that is precisely fallacious); rather, they are 
problematic only inasmuch as they are implicitly motivated by the very same anthropocentric 
commitments that motivate typical critics of “anthropomorphism” (or those Frans de Waal accuses 
of “anthropodenialism,” which I will mention again soon). Both of these standpoints are motivated 
by the common anthropocentric assumption that only “human” qualities (and their derivatives) are 
meaningful or important, or that a form of life is valuable – worthy of our attention and 
appreciation – only insofar as it is analogous to human life. Many who ascribe human qualities to 
non-humans may have well-meaning, strategic reasons for doing so – they may consider 
themselves to be allies in the war against anthropocentrism or speciesism – and of course it may 
be true in many cases that such ascriptions are correct, yet we must also always be vigilant that in 
our readiness to ascribe such qualities to non-humans we do not reinscribe the very 
anthropocentrism we wish to thereby combat, namely the prejudice that a form of life is 
meaningful only to the extent that it resembles our own, or only to the extent that it may be 
represented or rendered comprehensible from within our all-too-human conceptual frameworks 
and experiential Umwelts. To impart certain qualities to animals because we tacitly assume such 
qualities constitute the only basis for respecting, appreciating, or engaging meaningfully with 
them is just as chauvinistic as the refusal to impart such qualities to them altogether because we 
assume only humans may possess those qualities. If we philosophers really do care about “the 
True” and “the Good,” we must always strive to be maximally receptive to alterity, and any 
maximal, authentic confrontation with alterity should inspire humility and wonder, not a 
revanchist humanism or reactionary retreat into the erroneous, inherently fallacious abstract 
construct of skeptical, solipsistic, or speciesist insularity.  
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If we must continue to speak of anthropomorphism, then we should say that it is 
problematic not because it may be a naïve psychological bias or some kind of inductive fallacy, 
but rather because it may presuppose or inscribe an anthropocentric standpoint that would deny 
non-human alterity just as surely and violently as ordinary skepticism. As Derrida suggests, the 
only responsible way for us to relate to our non-human cohabitants is one that does not negate 
their alterity either by assimilating them to familiar human categories and features or by denying 
them any kinship at all with our manner of being and refusing to recognize familiar human 
features in them when those features are really there to be recognized. Thus, Derrida writes of his 
“…avowed desire to escape the alternative of a projection that appropriates and an interruption 
that excludes…”437 On the one hand, it is important that we honor the alterities of animals; this 
means that we should carefully attend to the significant differences between human and non-
human forms of life and that we should not think that the conscious lives of animals are 
meaningful or “real” or “forms of consciousness worthy of the name” only insofar as they are akin 
to ours. On the other hand, if we push the alterities of animals too far, then no meaningful 
relationships with them are possible. This would be to exile them entirely from the scope of 
possible human understanding and community, and such an extreme “othering” of animals 
amounts to the very ontological ‘human/animal’ dualism – which is ultimately a repetition of 
Cartesian mind/body dualism – that Merleau-Ponty refutes. If we must speak of 
“anthropomorphism,” then we need to navigate between a kind of anthropomorphism that would 
fail to honor the alterities of animals and a wholesale repudiation of anthropomorphism that would 
encourage us refuse them alterity altogether.  
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We must take Derrida’s concerns regarding anthropomorphism to heart, yet I also think it 
is necessary to recognize that, in most cases, suspensions of “anthropomorphism” are far more 
problematic than otherwise, for it is impossible to deny that, historically, the principle that we 
ought to suspend or forgo “anthropomorphism” has been deployed mainly in order safeguard a 
human exceptionalist worldview and marginalize non-human others rather than advance a 
commitment to the “objective” consideration of empirical evidence or anything remotely 
resembling a genuine “respect for difference.” We know that not all forms of skepticism are 
rationally equal. Those who deny anthropogenic global warming, for example, are not paragons of 
critical thinking. There is an essential difference between healthy skepticism and an unhinged, a 
priori, categorical refusal to accord truth or epistemic plausibility to certain claims; the latter is 
when skepticism devolves into denialism, and what we find is that most skeptical attitudes 
concerning animal consciousness reveal exactly a denialist refusal to affirm certain qualities in 
them rather than anything like a responsible, reticent suspension of judgment or a consistent, 
“hard-nosed” commitment to empirical evidence. Most forms of skepticism concerning animal 
minds – including especially those that manifest as concerns about “merely” anthropomorphizing 
animals – are rooted not in epistemic humility but in anthropocentric hubris, not in a genuine 
respect for alterity but in a tacit determination to suppress it, not in a responsive or responsible 
appreciation of different others but in the effort to restrict certain qualities to human familiars. The 
notion of an “anthropomorphism fallacy” is itself fallacious for a number of reasons we have 
already seen, yet not the least of these is that its function is less to enjoin a respect for difference 
or alterity, less to help instill habits of thought and perception that would better let alterity show 
itself, and far more to reinforce a human-centered status quo, or far more to sustain the ways in 
which humans have detached themselves from non-human forms of life and from nature; its 
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function is to smother in the cradle the forms of empathy, love, wonder, and curiosity that would 
challenge or even threaten to overturn the hegemony of a human-centered perspective or episteme. 
This is why Frans de Waal argues that the assumptions that usually underpin and 
motivate dismissals of attributions of various qualities or capacities to animals as mere 
“anthropomorphisms” are more problematic and unfounded than such attributions themselves:  
The anthropomorphism argument is rooted in human exceptionalism. It reflects the desire to set humans 
apart from and deny our animality…I myself, however, consider the rejection of similarity between humans 
and other animals to be a greater problem than the assumption of it. I have dubbed this rejection 
anthropodenial.438  
 
In most cases, when ascriptions of certain characteristics to animals are dismissed as 
“anthropomorphic projections” it is because those characteristics have already been determined to 
be exclusively or exceptionally human. In most cases, the charge that attributions of certain mental 
states and qualities to animals are “mere” anthropomorphisms has less to do with upholding a 
commitment to the “rigorous,” “rational” assessment of evidence and more to do bulwarking our 
arbitrary, far from rational notion of our own human specialness or supremacy. Rather than help 
resist or curtail anthropocentric biases, the categorical prohibition of anthropomorphism – what de 
Waal calls “anthropodenialism” – that one finds at the basis of most skeptical attitudes toward 
attributions of human qualities to non-humans is most often, on the contrary, deployed in order to 
reinforce and further entrench anthropocentric biases.  
When we deny that animals possess certain “human” qualities, and even often when we 
well-meaningly investigate to see whether they possess them, there are always a number of 
problematic assumptions at play, a number of important questions that are decidedly not being 
asked: what, essentially, are these characteristics? How do we know what they are and how do we 
																																																								
438 Frans de Waal, Mama’s Last Hug, p. 50. 
 
	 359	
even know that we have them in the first place? Why ought we assume from the start that animals 
lack them? And why ought we assume that it is important to know whether or not animals have 
them?  
First, there is the assumption that we can claim to know – and perhaps can only claim to 
know – that humans possess such qualities or capacities. But do we? How do we know this? In 
what is this knowledge rooted? As Merleau-Ponty demonstrates, we are only able to know that we 
have a certain quality because we have first been exposed to it in others. So, perhaps any quality 
we attribute to “humanity” has already been borrowed or derived from our exposure to the 
“animality” we disavow in ourselves. This is, in fact, the view Merleau-Ponty comes to adopt, and 
I will return to it in the following chapter. For now, however, we should simply recall that the 
concept of an “anthropomorphic projection” is the concept of a particular type of analogical 
judgment or inference. The assumption that my original perception of an Other – regardless of 
whether that Other is “human” or “non-human” – involves a projection of my own qualities into 
the Other is inherently solipsistic. In this sense of the term, a “projection” is entirely 
unidirectional, for it is an attribution of a quality to an Other that I make independently of that 
Other, something I add to the appearance of an Other: an Other appears to me, I observe its 
movements, and then I impart some quality (of myself) to it on the basis of some comparison I 
draw between its movements and my own. This assumes that the subject or self who “projects” 
qualities into others does so from a standpoint not already constituted by those others, which is 
precisely the assumption Merleau-Ponty argues we must reject. The view that I, as an individual 
human self, only come to know others by inferring their existence is obviously solipsistic because 
it assumes I am originally isolated from others, that I first and directly know only my own 
interiority and only later go out into the world to discover (through empirical observation and 
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inductive reasoning) other interiorities. The notion, however, that we originally know non-human 
interiorities in such a manner (if we can be said to know any at all) is therefore equally solipsistic; 
it is, as I will suggest below, simply solipsism at a different level, for this account simply 
substitutes the individual human self for “humanity” as such (that is, rather than regard the “Self” 
as isolated from and at best only ever able to infer the existence of “Others,” this account regards 
“Humanity” as fundamentally isolated from and only able to infer the existence of “Other 
Others”), and in the end it depends upon the same dualistic commitments as classical solipsism. 
Regardless of whether or not one regards “anthropomorphic projections” as ever inductively 
justified, the notion that our perceptions of mental qualities in non-human others fundamentally 
involve “projections” of our own human qualities into them assumes that we, as human beings, are 
fundamentally isolated from non-human alterities, that our “humanity” is fundamentally separate 
from “animality,” and though we will further see Merleau-Ponty’s critique of this notion in the 
next chapter, it should already be apparent that this sort of human/animal separatism is untenable, 
or that in fact any supposed dualistic separation of human beings from non-human beings is 
ultimately a repetition of Cartesian dualism, for embodied beings can never be dualistically 
separated from one another.  
Moreover, if the only qualities I ever perceived in Others were those I first projected into 
them, not only does this assume my fundamental isolation from Others, it also means that I would 
never really be acquainted with “Others” at all: an Other that is nothing but a composite of 
qualities I project into it is an Other that is nothing more than a construct of my own making, 
which of course is not an “Other” at all. The idea that the qualities we perceive in others begin as 
“projections” thus assumes solipsism and negates the very possibility of any genuine presentation 
of alterity. If any “projections” in the traditional sense of the term are possible, they must be 
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founded by a primordial overlapping of living bodies or behaviors, imbrications of corporeal 
schemata that precede any reflective comparisons or identifications we might draw between 
ourselves and others. Now, as we have seen, we cannot deny that what is true concerning our 
original perceptual relationships with human others is also true concerning our original perceptual 
relationships with non-human others, since humans and non-humans alike are living, behaving 
bodies. Thus, before I reflectively take cognizance of qualities I possess internally and then go out 
into the world to see whether such qualities may be predicated of others on the basis of external 
evidence, I must have already directly perceived such qualities in others and derived an 
understanding of them from direct perceptions of them in others. It is thus that the idea that my 
perceptions of qualities in non-humans might just primarily be “projections” of my own qualities 
into them, and even the approach of those who wish to justify ascriptions of human qualities to 
non-humans analogically or inductively by beginning from observing certain qualities in oneself 
and then going out into the world to see whether any non-humans have them too, is already an 
abstraction. If my primary knowledge of mental qualities in other humans does not come about 
through analogical inference or any kind of egoistic projection, then neither can the same be said 
concerning my primary knowledge of mental qualities in non-humans.  
To think that we clearly possess some quality or capacity is to assume that we even 
know, transparently or unproblematically, what that quality or capacity is in the first place. But do 
we? We have already seen that we never have utterly transparent access to any “internal” qualities, 
so to proceed to either experimentally verify or reject the presence of such qualities in animals on 
the basis of the assumption that those qualities are ever absolutely clear in meaning, or on the 
basis of the assumption that we ever have unproblematic access to those qualities even in 
ourselves, is already to commit a fallacy worse than any supposedly fallacious “anthropomorphic 
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projection.” Furthermore, the assumption that we originally have transparent access to our own 
“human” qualities independently of our intercorporeal relationships with animals assumes the very 
human/animal separatism I just mentioned.  
So, when scientists, for instance, attempt to either identify or reject the presence of 
“human” qualities in non-humans, they typically do so according to the assumption that such 
qualities may be unproblematically and clearly defined, when in fact that is never the case. At any 
rate, there are always profound (and profoundly difficult) ontological questions that have to be 
answered whenever we take to define some mental quality or faculty (whether “reason” or 
“emotion,” whether “self-consciousness” or “language,” and so on), yet these are hardly ever 
asked or pursued with any rigor in the sciences that study non-human forms of consciousness and 
cognition; they are almost certainly never asked by those who easily dismiss claims about non-
human minds as mere “anthropomorphic projections.”  
Of course, this is not to suggest that we are never justified in ascribing “human” qualities 
to non-humans; rather, the point is that we should never presume to have unproblematic access to 
such qualities, and that we certainly should never presume to have in our possession any sharp 
definition of such qualities that would entitle to us affirm with certitude that we have them 
whereas animals do not. My contention here is that we should never presume to have access to 
some essence of any quality we esteem in ourselves and might proceed doubt in other beings. This 
brings me back to the point I made in the previous chapter that, if we must define things, then we 
should do so in as maximally broad a manner as possible, since to define them otherwise is to 
assume falsely that they admit of a sharp, essential, or unproblematic definition in the first place; 
to do so otherwise usually does little to sharpen our understanding of the concept or phenomenon 
in question yet does much to advance a predetermined exclusionary agenda. Thus, when it comes 
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to defining those distinctly “human” qualities we would deny to animals, in most cases we find 
that they are defined in various narrow ways not because such narrow definitions actually capture 
their “essence” or circumscribe with absolute clarity and precision their meaning (which is never 
possible) but rather solely in order to restrict those qualities to ourselves.  
This, again, is the argument that Frans de Waal makes. Skeptics of “anthropomorphism” 
– those who doubt or deny attributions of “human” qualities to non-humans – nearly always 
assume definitions of the qualities in question that are more problematic than attributions of them 
to non-humans are ever purported to be. When we ask a skeptic to define such a quality – one that 
he/she thinks can be clearly ascribed to us but that cannot as readily be ascribed to an animal – we 
typically find either that such a definition is broad enough to warrant its attribution to non-humans 
or that it is arbitrarily narrow, that it is defined narrowly only so as to exclude animals from the 
scope of its application. It thus becomes obvious that most skeptical attitudes toward attributions 
of human characteristics to non-humans are in fact motivated by an anthropocentric conceptual 
framework or episteme, one in which a priori only humans may be claimed to possess certain 
characteristics. Whenever a quality is defined broadly enough so as to include animals, a skeptic 
will argue it is too broad and provide a narrower alternative. However, whenever a reasonable 
empirical counterexample is presented, a committed skeptic will, rather than admit he/she is 
wrong, revise his/her definition to be even narrower so as to neutralize the counterexample. Of 
course, such a revision is entirely ad hoc: it is made simply to dismiss counter-evidence in order to 
preserve a thesis one never had the intention of giving up in the first place. The skeptic’s game is 
revealed as soon as we ask him/her to admit the sort of evidence he/she would countenance as 
demonstrating the presence of a certain quality in an animal, because ultimately the answer 
(whether admitted explicitly or not) is: none; ultimately, the committed skeptic will always set the 
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bar high enough so that an animal will never pass it. Whenever we observe an ad hoc shifting of 
goal posts – as we so often do when we consider discourses concerning animal consciousness and 
cognition – we must recognize that what we are dealing with is not a conclusion derived from 
empirical evidence but rather a conclusion bootstrapped in advance of empirical evidence.  
Thus, attempting to show that certain qualities typically considered exclusively human 
are also to be found in non-humans (and are therefore not exclusively human after all) has its place 
and strategic utility in certain contexts, but at the same time there is a sense in which doing so is 
agreeing to play a game one has lost as soon as one agrees to play it, for not only is it to concede 
that we even know, clearly or unproblematically, what it is for us to have such characteristics in 
the first place, but it is also to concede that it is important that animals have them, that such 
characteristics are normatively significant because they are characteristics we humans 
(supposedly) distinctly possess. To concede either of these points is already to concede too much. 
This is not to deny that there are a great many mental qualities or capacities that are important if 
certain beings do in fact have them; however, it is to deny that certain mental qualities or 
capacities are important merely because they are those that we humans distinctly have. There is a 
long list of qualities and capacities that have traditionally been supposed to be singularly human, 
yet the singularly “human” status of such qualities and capacities is nearly always empirically 
falsified: despite our best efforts to define them narrowly enough so that they may remain 
exclusively human, in most cases any quality or capacity considered to be exclusively human is 
eventually discovered be exhibited by certain non-humans. Naturally, such discoveries are 
important for undermining the construct of human “specialness.” However, lest philosophy be the 
handmaiden of science, philosophical questions are never in principle those that can be answered 
empirically. There will, perhaps, never be an uncontroversial definition of “philosophy,” but 
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nonetheless I do not think it is controversial to say that if empirical evidence can ever settle an 
issue, then that issue is not philosophical. So, it is not the business of the philosopher to 
demonstrate empirically that certain animals possess or lack certain characteristics; rather it is the 
business of the philosopher to examine critically the concepts and presuppositions that underlie 
claims that animals either possess or lack certain characteristics. It is the business of the 
philosopher to ask precisely the sorts of questions that any empirical investigation into an animal’s 
consciousness or cognition presupposes yet are seldom asked by those who actually conduct such 
investigations.  
So, to be clear, my intention here is not to refute anthropocentric delineations of 
humanity in opposition to animality – or anthropocentric efforts to restrict certain qualities to 
humans – by appealing to “empirical” counter-evidence (in the traditional sense of the term).439 
This is not unimportant, of course. It is obviously telling that most of the qualities we have ever 
tried to restrict to humans have also nearly always turned out to be possessed by certain non-
humans, and this naturally helps undermine any anthropocentric perspective that depends upon the 
identification of some exclusively human quality or set of qualities. Here, I could take an 
inventory of all of the qualities that have ever been considered exclusively human and then 
canvass all of the scientific studies that show that they are also exhibited by non-humans. Such an 
exercise is important for undermining our hubristic certitude of our own specialness and is not 
without important philosophical implications, but the exercise itself would not be an exercise in 
philosophy: it would be the scientist’s game of selecting some human quality, assuming some 
operational definition of it, and then going out into the world to see whether an animal has it. This 
																																																								
439 What I mean here is that my approach is not to demonstrate that animals possess certain mental qualities 
according to the standard methods of the empirical sciences. I do not mean to suggest that I am abandoning all 
appeals to “experience” broadly conceived. I consider my approach to be thoroughly phenomenological, and we 
know that phenomenology is not equivalent to “empiricism” (in the classical sense of the term).  
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is not the game I intend to play. My intention is not to play the game of attempting to show 
empirically that every quality we reserve for humans is also to be found in certain animals but to 
challenge, and ultimately reject, the assumptions that shape this game in the first place: again, why 
should we assume humans have such qualities in the first place? If I go out and try to see whether 
another animal has some quality that I ascribe to myself, why should I even assume that I have 
such a quality in the first place? What is it that allows me to do so? As Merleau-Ponty 
demonstrates, I can only ever know that I have a quality if I have first been acquainted with it in 
others and only if those others have affirmed it in me, so it is misdirected to begin from the 
standpoint that I have some quality and then wonder or attempt to determine whether others have 
it as well: I have it only if there are others that do too, only if I am already immersed with others 
who exhibit such qualities and who affirm them in me. Others literally teach and make me what I 
am. So why should it not be the case that non-human others teach me what my own “human” 
qualities are just as much as other humans do? As we will further see, Merleau-Ponty argues that 
this is indeed the case, that any ideas I have of my own “human” qualities are always already 
shaped by other-than-human expressions of those qualities. As I will mention below when I turn to 
consider the nature of love, it is not the case that I know, first and foremost, that I am capable of 
love and that, when I take an animal to exhibit “love,” I am simply “projecting” love into that 
animal; rather, the manner in which that animal expresses “love” is always already a formative 
component of my own sense of what “love” as such is, whether in myself or in any other being.  
Second, what are these qualities anyway, and what justifies the manner in which we 
define them? It is a fool’s errand to attempt to find some feature that absolutely separates humans 
from all other forms of life, but the decision to define “the human” in terms of any particular 
quality seems arbitrary. Some suggest that humans are the only animals aware of their own 
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mortality. This is probably false, and as Derrida and others have argued, we surely should question 
whether we humans are even “aware” of our mortality in the way that we traditionally suppose 
that we are. But why not define humans as the only animals who, say, use concrete to build shelter 
or as the only animals who wear blue jeans? Why not define humans as the only animals who have 
developed the technology capable of engineering their own extinction? Why not define humans as 
the only animals who are capable of seriously entertaining the notion that arrangements of planets 
and stars at the time of a person’s birth have a tangible causal effect on that person’s psychological 
characteristics, or that skin pigmentation is a relevant indication of moral worth? The point here is 
that when we attempt to isolate some quality that constitutes our “humanity,” we tend to like to 
select a quality to which we attach some positive value. This is why efforts to find some 
exclusively human quality are never purely ontological or empirical endeavors but are always 
loaded: they tend to ignore those qualities that have just as much, if not more, of a claim to being 
distinctively if not exclusively human either because it is known that they are bad qualities or 
because they are qualities that seem trivial, qualities that do not really seem to satisfy our more 
“existential,” melodramatic sense of “what it means to be human.” But insofar as we take any 
supposedly distinctive qualities to make us “better” than those who lack them, we are not simply 
assuming something that is probably easily falsified, we are also committing the kind of fallacy 
endemic to every sort of chauvinism: the fallacy that consists in thinking that some characteristic 
(e.g., white skin, a penis, the ability to understand Pi) is super important because it happens to be a 
characteristic that one distinctively possesses.  
It would be willfully obtuse not to recognize that the effort to find some quality that 
exclusively defines a particular group of entities is never truly value-neutral or morally innocuous; 
it is never just pure science or ontology: the primary reason one seeks such a quality is always so 
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as to use it as leverage for elevating oneself to some position of privilege and supremacy at the 
expense of others who would be correlatively denigrated, subordinated, and marginalized; in short, 
and to put the point bluntly, it is nearly always an instrument of oppression or exploitation. 
Categorization is never just a neutral ontological or scientific enterprise but is always an ethical 
and political apparatus. If someone wishes to investigate what all and only giraffes have in 
common – what “makes a giraffe a giraffe” – we hardly think anything of it. Yet if someone 
wishes to study what all and only Jews have in common – if someone wishes to find some essence 
of “Jewry” – or if someone wishes to discover what quality or set of qualities define black people 
or women, we would naturally raise an eyebrow (to say the least). If a scientist or philosopher 
declares an interest in investigating the general differences between humans and other animals, we 
typically think nothing of it. But if the same scientist or philosopher wishes to investigate 
differences between white people and people of color, we would, to say the least, be rather 
suspicious of such a project, and I am willing to wager such a person would be denounced and 
ostracized if not expelled from the academy altogether for racism (as he/she ought to be). But is 
the latter project relevantly different from the former? Are these sets of questions really relevantly 
different from one another? It seems arbitrary to regard them as such.  
The reply, naturally, will be that “race” is a socially constructed category whereas 
“species” is not. This, however, is clearly false. Of course, “human” is a biological category or 
species-concept, but it would be disingenuous to pretend that it is just that. The ways in which we 
understand “what it means to be human,” and especially efforts to define “humanness” in terms of 
certain qualities or capacities that humans exclusively possess, reflect largely culturally 
constructed, historically situated, and ethically and politically loaded assumptions and practices 
and do not merely consist of reading off empirical characteristics from some transparently, 
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objectively present-to-hand and accessible, ahistorical “human nature.” For example, ever since at 
least Aristotle, humans have classically been defined as “the rational animals,” and it hardly needs 
to be demonstrated precisely how problematic, how simultaneously underdetermined and 
overdetermined, the concept of “rationality” is, how “rationality” resists any clear or sharp 
definition and is always defined in ways that are often socially constructed and politically 
motivated. In particular, and to use just one example, feminist philosophers rightly argue that the 
traditional Western concept and veneration of “reason” cannot be disentangled from the history of 
patriarchy, that is, from its genealogy of being defined in opposition to, and privileged to the 
denigration of, emotion or affect and from the cultural alignment of emotion or affect with 
“femininity”: traditionally, as we know, reason has always been defined so as to exclude, and has 
been venerated at the expense of, emotion or affectivity (or indeed anything considered to be 
corporeal in nature), and not only is such an account of reason simply wrong descriptively or 
ontologically (since reason is never isolated from emotion or affectivity and is, like everything 
“mental,” thoroughly embodied), but it has always been about marginalizing and subjugating 
women and about perpetuating and consolidating male power and privilege; it has always been 
about denigrating or marginalizing ways of thinking, knowing, and being that are culturally coded 
as “feminine.” Even if one thinks that the concept of “rationality” is salvageable and pleads for a 
better, truer understanding of it as entwined with bodily experience, agency, and affectivity, that 
too is not going to be an ethically or politically neutral definition, nor is it going to be one that will 
twist itself free of any entanglements with culture or history (as nothing ever will).  
So, the basic point here is that the kinds of qualities that get selected in order to support 
human exceptionalism, as well as the ways in which those qualities are even understood or defined 
in the first place, are sufficient to prove that how we define “humanity” is never just about DNA 
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or evolutionary heritage. Moreover, it is even more obvious that the category of “the animal” is 
never a neutral, purely descriptive category; indeed, it is not even a “scientific” category at all. 
One may, of course, simply define an “animal” as a “living being,” and though surely the concept 
of “life” is itself not a purely descriptive or value-neutral category, such a broad definition of 
“animal” might be correct, yet it is also devoid of much meaning. Such a definition, naturally, 
applies to humans, so if one attempts to distinguish humans from “animals,” then the sense of 
“animal” one has in mind is not merely “living being.” Setting aside the metaphysical question 
concerning whether specific species are “natural kinds” or universals, the term “animal” is clearly 
far from being anything like a “natural kind.” Unless “animal” is strictly coextensive with “living 
being,” there is no such thing as “an animal.” There are only particular kinds of living beings, only 
animals. The attempt to group all non-human beings into a single homogenous (or homogenizing) 
classification, the attempt to deposit the whole, prodigious menagerie of non-human life on Earth 
(from dogs to termites, from elephants to jellyfish), into some grand, monolithic category in which 
they would all somehow meaningfully belong together and that would itself be rigorously 
distinguished from one particular species of animal called “human,” has obviously very little to do 
with any consideration of empirical facts and evidence, and is precisely what Derrida rightly 
regards as an “asinanity.”  
Thus, the term “animal” is an inherently ethical and political category; “animal” is no 
more a “natural kind” or purely descriptive concept than, say, “barbarian” or “savage,” and the 
distinction between “human” and “animal” is no more purely descriptive or empirical, and no 
more ahistorical and apolitical and non-socially constructed, than the distinction between “the 
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civilized” and “the barbaric/savage” (with which it is indeed often aligned).440 It follows that the 
analogy previously considered between, on the one hand, the distinction between “the human” and 
“the animal” and, on the other hand, the distinction between, say, “white people” and “people of 
color,” is not flawed in the ways most would object, and it is urgently necessary to heed it. Besides 
merely designating something that is “alive,” the term “animal” does not refer to anything that is 
purely “naturally” real or to anything that is merely descriptive or empirical in content any more 
so than our racial or gender categories. In short, pretending that “human” is merely a biological 
category is like pretending that “whiteness” is merely about levels of skin melanin; correlatively, 
pretending that “animality” is simply some sort of natural kind or descriptive category is like 
pretending that “blackness,” “femininity”, “woman”, “disabled,” “savage,” or “madness” are as 
well. And insofar as “the human” is defined relative to “the animal,” everything said concerning 
the latter applies equally to the former. Merleau-Ponty asserts that “our idea of Nature is 
impregnated with artifice,”441 yet surely the same can be said of our traditional ideas of 
“humanity” and “animality,” and it is crucially important never to pretend otherwise.  
The larger point I have been attempting to make here is that ultimately, or at its core, 
anthropocentrism is not an empirical claim or theory, and that is precisely why one usually finds 
that those who are committed to it defend it against empirical counterexamples in ways that render 
it unfalsifiable. Anthropocentrism is an assortment of overlapping ontological, epistemic, and 
normative commitments concerning the relationship between human and non-human beings, and 
this is why, in the end, it is misdirected to attempt to refute it empirically. Since, ultimately, an 
																																																								
440 As I will mention in the concluding chapter, the fact that every oppressive otherization of human beings 
historically coincides with efforts to “animalize” them or to code them as being closer to “animality” than to 
humanity indicates the extent to which these categories have never been purely “natural,” descriptive, or merely 
ontological but have always already been ethical and political. 
441 Nature, p. 86. 
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anthropocentric framework rests upon a certain set of ontological and axiological assumptions 
(which are, as such, irreducible to any merely empirical facts), it is not truly possible to refute such 
a framework empirically; we should be able to refute it without having to take a detour through 
“science” or empirical investigation, a detour from which we might never in fact return or which 
at least risks not getting us to where we need to go. Thus, as strategically useful as it may often be 
to demonstrate empirically that animals possess “human” qualities, in order to refute 
anthropocentrism it is necessary and sufficient to refute its underlying metaphysical and normative 
presuppositions. Indeed, any attempt to refute human exceptionalism “scientifically” (that is, 
inductively) by showing that certain animals really do have certain “human” qualities based on 
observed similarities between them and us reproduces the same Cartesian, analogical logic of the 
exceptionalist: on the one hand, the exceptionalist says there are certain qualities that are 
exclusively human because they are absolutely dissimilar to any observed or observable non-
human qualities; on the other hand, the non/anti-exceptionalist replies that these supposedly 
dissimilar or special qualities we esteem in ourselves are in fact similar to those we observe in 
certain other animals, that supposedly exclusive human qualities are similar enough to those we 
perceive in certain animals to warrant ascribing such qualities to those animals (and therefore to 
warrant not considering such qualities to be “exclusively human” after all). However, in both cases 
the operative assumption is that claims about the minds of animals rely upon their observable 
similarities (or dissimilarities) with humans. Not only does this assume the false construct of a 
central, isolated human standpoint or standard of reference,442 but it also assumes the 
epistemological commitments, or the general account of intersubjectivity, we have already seen 
we must reject.  
																																																								
442 Merleau-Ponty’s critique of this notion will be further explored in the following chapter. 
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So, in all of our considerations of non-human life, the fundamental problem is never truly 
anthropomorphism but anthropocentrism. If we “anthropomorphize” animals only because we 
assign a special importance to “anthropomorphic” characteristics, then we in fact assume and 
deploy the very same chauvinism that motivates anyone who categorically dismisses 
anthropomorphism: we assume that certain qualities are special or important simply because they 
are qualities we saliently possess, and that is the essence of all forms of chauvinism. For example, 
mathematics and literature are (often) surely wonderful things, but say we think the ability to do 
geometry or to produce poetry is important and impressive in a way that categorically ranks us as 
superior to all other forms of life or that makes us “special” in an evaluative and not merely 
descriptive sense of the term; or at any rate, say we develop tests to see whether other animals are 
able to understand abstract mathematical principles or to write sonnets and that we use such tests 
in order to gauge the “complexity” and value of their subjective and cognitive lives: in the final 
analysis (and setting aside for the moment the fact that anyone who clings to such things as among 
the highest marks of cognitive exceptionalism have surely never adequately marveled at a spider’s 
web, an ant’s colony, or a beaver’s dam), is this not to suppose that something is supremely 
important merely because it is something that we humans are able to do, or merely because it 
involves the exercise of supposedly distinctive human cognitive capacities? And is that not to 
suppose arbitrarily the supreme value of one’s own distinctive identity or of the characteristics that 
constitute one’s own specific subject-position in the world? In what way is the supposition that 
aptitudes for geometry and poetry are supremely important in the ontological and ethical order of 
things – presumably because they are things of which we are distinctly and perhaps uniquely 
capable – relevantly different from the supposition I might accept that white skin and a penis are 
similarly important because they are things that I, as a while male, happen to have? These 
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suppositions are not, in fact, relevantly different at all. We should also not overlook the implicit 
ableism and classism that motivates one to rank others according their aptitudes for mathematics 
or poetry (or for art in general): of course, one may reply that it is easy to accuse those specific 
examples of such ideological prejudices but that there are others that would not run afoul of them 
and that would indeed constitute a more “neutral” or “objective” standard of measure. However, I 
do not think that any such examples exist: any “ability” or “capacity” that we use as the standard 
according to which we evaluate another’s mental life or interiority, and the sorts of things to which 
we ascribe supreme epistemic and even aesthetic value, are unavoidably inflected through an 
ideological prism, and since, in a hierarchically ordered world, that ideological prism tends to 
reflect the interests of those in dominant social or political positions of power, it is usually one that 
serves rather than subverts the interests of whoever occupies such positions of power.  
This is not to say that we should not value mathematics or literature or any other such 
things (though of course we should not value them – or anything else – uncritically). As I have 
already remarked, these are often wonderful things indeed. My contention, rather, concerns 
employing such things as standards according to which we rank other minds or forms of life 
(whether ontologically or ethically). Why privilege the knowledge or prowess exemplified by the 
mathematician, scientist, or poet and not that of the carpenter or plumber? Why not privilege 
certain indigenous peoples’ ways of conceptualizing and coping with the world? Why not 
privilege emotional knowledge? Why not privilege the ‘know-how’ of nurturing a child or an 
elder? Why not privilege the ‘know-how’ of a “disabled” person’s survival and perseverance in an 
unaccommodating society? The obvious answers, naturally, are classism, 
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racism/ethnocentrism/colonialism, tacit sexism, and ableism, respectively.443 Moreover, why 
ought we to value supremely, or regard as marks of exceptionalism, the kind of cognitive power or 
knowledge exhibited by mathematics, literature, painting, musical composition, science, recursive 
syntax, conceptual abstraction, predicative judgment, or even philosophy and not that which is 
exhibited by, say, the nose of a dog, the discriminating eyes of an owl, the expressive movements 
of a cat’s tail, the dances of bees, the songs of whales, the construction of ant colonies, the 
weaving of a spider’s web, the architecture of a beaver’s dam, the sensitivities and exploratory, 
prehensile intentionality of an elephant’s trunk or of an octopus’ tentacles? The obvious answer is 
yet another tacit chauvinism, namely speciesism or human-exceptionalism.  
So, are we to say that there is nothing that is distinctively human? Not necessarily. But 
“distinctive” does not mean “exclusive,” nor does it (or exclusive) mean “mark of superiority” or 
“special” in any loaded, normative sense of the term. These equivocations or conceptual slippages, 
however, are the basis of all forms of human exceptionalism. All forms of human exceptionalism 
depend upon isolating some quality (or set of qualities) that supposedly distinguishes humans from 
all non-humans and then concluding from that the rightful superiority or privileged status of 
humans. Setting aside the likely falsehood of the premises here, the conclusion inferred from them 
is a non-sequitur that depends upon sliding from “distinctive” to “exclusive” (or “special”) and 
from “exclusive” (or “special”) to “ontologically or morally superior.” Every chauvinistic 
worldview – whether anthropocentric or otherwise – is rooted in this sort of fallacy of 
equivocation (if indeed one can attribute any kind of “reasoning” to the formulation of a 
chauvinistic worldview at all, which in many cases is admittedly doubtful). That is, all forms of 
																																																								
443 Of course, I am not suggesting that typically marginalized forms of knowledge, such as the ones I have just 
mentioned, should be fetishized or tokenized, for that is just as much an inscription of hegemony and bigotry as their 
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chauvinism are logically analogous: they are all based upon the supposition that some property is 
supremely important simply because it is a property that one (distinctively if not uniquely) has, or 
simply because it is one that is saliently exhibited by the group (presumably, the already arbitrarily 
privileged and dominant group) to which one belongs; and in the end, all defenses of 
anthropocentrism or human-exceptionalism come down to precisely that. In the end, despite all of 
the “nuanced” arguments and impressive mental contortions that have been provided and 
performed in its defense, an anthropocentric or human-exceptionalist worldview is foundationally, 
irredeemably chauvinistic (indeed ableist in ways that inevitably “animalize” even other humans). 
To evaluate non-human animals according to the extent to which they are able to perform 
characteristically human activities is always to impose an arbitrary, question-begging, often tacitly 
culturally constructed and hegemonic standard of interpretation and normative assessment upon 
entities and phenomena in the course of doing what one passes off as “science” or “objective” 
research. 
This brings me to an important I alluded to earlier: not only do anthropocentric prejudices 
motivate most skeptical dismissals of attributions of human qualities to animals, so too do they 
often motivate well-meaning tests aimed at determining the veracity of such attributions, or so too 
do they, in general, motivate many of the investigations into non-human subjectivity and cognition 
that scientists typically undertake. Perhaps we may wish to test whether or not a dog can grasp 
arithmetical concepts. It would surely be interesting if they could, but we ought to ask ourselves 
why this is something we think it is important to know in the first place. Often, the most poignant 
or profound philosophical question one can pose is, “so what?” That is, should we determine that 
dogs cannot grasp arithmetic, so what? Are we to conclude that they are somehow less 
“intelligent” and thus less “important” or “inferior” to us (an inference that is not only speciesist 
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but also ableist)? Not only are such value-judgments logical non-sequiturs, it is arbitrary in the 
first place to presuppose human aptitudes and skills as yardsticks by which to evaluate the 
perceptual or cognitive abilities of non-humans. As Merleau-Ponty writes: 
…In spite of what mechanistic biology might suggest, the world we live in is not made up only of things 
and space: some of these parcels of matter, which we call living beings, proceed to trace in their 
environment, by the way they act or behave, their very own vision of things. We will only see this if we 
lend our attention to the spectacle of the animal world, if we are prepared to live alongside the world of 
animals instead of rashly denying it any kind of interiority…He [Kohler] rightly observed that the 
originality of the animal world will remain hidden to us for as long as we continue (as in many classical 
experiments) to set it tasks that are not its own.444  
 
For example, in testing whether or not a dog can do simple arithmetic, is that not equivalent to a 
dog testing whether or not humans can identify their own urine by scent? There are, perhaps, many 
things humans can do that many non-humans cannot do, but by the same token there are a great 
number of things that many non-humans can do that we humans cannot do, and it is fundamentally 
fallacious – indeed, a category error – to measure or rank the mental or cognitive nature of another 
being on the basis of one’s own salient mental or cognitive qualities and capacities. Yet, even 
today so many of the experiments to which we subject animals in order to determine, say, their 
“intelligence” are inflected through anthropocentric biases or designed in ways that reflect tacitly 
human-centered schemas and values; they often aim to evaluate animals on the basis of their 
aptitudes for learning or exhibiting perceptual or cognitive capacities that humans distinctively 
possess or privilege in their own specific manner of coping with the world, and thus not only do 
they often fallaciously assume a human standpoint to be the default, universal, “objective” 
standard relative to which all other forms of existence ought to be derivatively compared and 
measured (and thus regard their own human standpoint as not a “standpoint” at all), but they also 
already begin from a position that will never be able to truly reveal the “being” of the animals 
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subjected to such experimentation, a position that will never be able to “let animals show 
themselves.” The task Merleau-Ponty calls for us to undertake here is admittedly a supremely 
difficult one. It is indeed supremely difficult for us to bracket our humanist biases in our 
considerations of non-human forms of life so that we may authentically appreciate and let those 
forms of life show us “their own visions of things.” But such a task is no more difficult than the 
task of phenomenology in general, which of course is the task of letting phenomena show 
themselves. Of course, non-human subjectivities will never be intelligible to us transparently or 
exhaustively (for nothing is ever intelligible in such a way), yet that does not mean they are not 
intelligible at all. And though we will always have to work assiduously to develop ever better 
ways of understanding and relating to non-human others – though we will always tirelessly have 
to subject our own manner of understanding and relating to non-human others to interrogation – 
that means that the task of “knowing” non-human others (like the task of knowing any others) is 
an infinite one, not an impossible one, and of course it is already false to suppose that we do not 
already “know” non-human others, for we always already know them through the entanglements 
of our flesh. 
There are many studies of animal cognition that are clearly shaped by anthropocentric 
presuppositions, yet one that perhaps best serves to illustrate this point is the vaunted “mirror test.” 
The mirror test is one of the most popular tests used to investigate animal minds, and it is also one 
that is clearly informed by anthropocentric biases, so I think it is worthwhile to examine it briefly. 
The mirror test is designed to gauge whether or not an animal is capable of self-consciousness. 
The idea is that if an animal can recognize its own image in a mirror (rather than merely regard it 
as the image of another animal), then that animal is reflectively aware of itself as a distinct being 
or “self”; the animal has some sense of itself as an “I” or a “me.” The mirror test involves painting 
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a dot somewhere on an animal’s body and then placing the animal in front of a mirror. If the 
animal proceeds to show that it notices that the dot it sees in its mirror image is indeed a dot 
painted on its own body (if, for example, the animal attempts to brush or rub the dot on its body 
away), then the animal has successfully identified itself with its image in a mirror and thus 
demonstrates thematic self-awareness.  
We should be clear about what the mirror test does and does not demonstrate. As I just 
mentioned, it demonstrates thematic or reflective self-awareness. However, it is important to note 
that self-awareness as such is necessarily gradated; it is not an “all-or-nothing” capacity or 
phenomenon, such that we can draw a sharp line between those animals that can and those that 
cannot pass the mirror test and claim that all of the animals on the former side of that line are self-
aware and that all of the others on the other side have no “self-awareness” at all. So, although 
exhibiting thematic self-awareness is surely sufficient for exhibiting “selfhood,” subjectivity, or 
interiority (that is to say, if a being passes the mirror test, it is surely the case that “someone is 
home”), it would be wrong to think that doing is necessary for exhibiting some measure of 
“selfhood,” subjectivity, or interiority. As we have seen, all forms of life or subjectivity are 
necessarily, in some manner, self-reflexive: to be perceptually oriented toward a milieu and 
toward other beings at all is already to be reflexively (even if not reflectively) aware of oneself. 
Corporeal reflexivity or auto-affection is the fundamental characteristic of a living body, and it 
just is the basic form or expression of what we call “interiority.” The point, then, is that an entity 
may be either reflectively or reflexively (that is, pre-reflectively or unreflectively) “self-aware” 
(and it may be self-aware in either of these ways to variable degrees), yet this is a distinction that 
often tends to get elided. It follows, then, that the mirror test only demonstrates that an entity 
exhibits some measure of thematic self-awareness and that, more importantly, failing the mirror 
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test does not demonstrate that an entity lacks “self-awareness” altogether (moreover, as I am about 
to suggest, failing the mirror test does not even demonstrate that an animal lacks thematic self-
awareness either, though many people seem to assume that it does). Any sentient, behaving body 
is, in some manner, “aware of itself” in virtue of the corporeal reflexivity or affectivity that makes 
it a sentient, behaving body in the first place. In short, passing the mirror test is surely sufficient to 
demonstrate “interiority,” yet it is not necessary for demonstrating interiority (or rather failing the 
mirror test is not sufficient for demonstrating an absence of interiority), since, as we have seen, all 
living, behaving bodies are necessarily “interiorities” or “subjectivities.” 
There are several species of animals that unquestionably pass the mirror test (and a 
variety of others that seem to pass it, though the studies that purport to demonstrate that they do 
remain subject to debate within the scientific community), and it is surely always quite remarkable 
to discover that an animal is aware of itself in a manner similar to human self-awareness. Though, 
as I am about to make clear, the significance of the mirror test is usually greatly overstated, I do 
not wish to deny entirely the value of learning that another being is reflectively aware of itself, for 
learning this powerfully exposes us to the presence of other others in the world and thereby helps 
decenter our place in it.  
So, which animals pass the mirror test? The great apes (chimpanzees, gorillas, bonobos, 
and orangutans), Asian elephants, bottlenose dolphins, orca whales, and magpies incontestably 
pass it. Perhaps more intriguing are those animals that appear to pass it yet require further research 
to demonstrate for sure that they do. A recent study indicates that pigeons possibly pass the mirror 
test,445 and another study may indicate that giant manta rays do as well.446 Even more remarkably 
																																																								
445 See Emiko Uchino and Shigeru Watanabe, “Self-recognition in pigeons revisited,” Journal of the Experimental 
Analysis of Behavior, Vol. 102, Issue 3, p. 327-334. 
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(given how much we reflexively tend to diminish the cognitive faculties of fish and insects), a 
recent study seems to show that the cleaner wrasse (a species of small fish) recognizes its own 
reflection,447 and another study seems to show that ants also recognize their own reflections.448 
Notably, pigs and monkeys have not yet passed the traditional mirror test, but recent studies 
indicate that they are able to use mirrors in order to locate food hidden from direct view, and so 
they, at the very least, demonstrate an understanding of how reflections work.449  
As I mentioned above, the mirror test only demonstrates one type or grade of self-
awareness. Passing the mirror test is, at least in most cases, surely sufficient to demonstrate 
thematic self-awareness, but it is not necessary for demonstrating self-awareness as such, as there 
is a sense in which all living bodies are “aware of themselves” simply in virtue of being living 
bodies. However, I wish to suggest, contrary to certain prevailing assumptions, that there are good 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
446 See Csilla Ari and Dominic P. D’Agostino, “Contingency Checking and Self-Directed Behaviors in Giant Manta 
Rays: Do Elasmobranchs have Self-Awareness?,” Journal of Ethology, May 2016, Vol. 34, Issue 2, p. 167-174. 
447 See Jake Buehler, “This tiny fish can recognize itself in a mirror. Is it self-aware?,” 
http://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/2018/09/fish-cleaner-wrasse-self-aware-mirror-test-intelligence-news/. 
448 See Marie-Claire Cammaerts and Roger Cammaerts, “Are Ants (Hymenoptera Formicidae) Capable of Self- 
Recognition?,” Journal of Science, 2015, Vol. 5, Issue 7, p. 521-532.  
It is noteworthy that the authors of this study claim that “self-recognition” is not equivalent to “self-
awareness,” and they hasten to point out that their study is limited to indicating “only” that ants might be capable of 
“self-recognition.” Of course, as I have already stated, “self-awareness” is gradated, yet this appeal to a distinction 
between “self-recognition” and “self-awareness” nevertheless strikes me as precisely the sort of ad hoc shifting of 
goal posts, or as the insistence upon an arbitrarily narrow definition of a mental quality, to which philosophers and 
scientists often resort in order to safeguard human exceptionalism. To put it bluntly, this distinction cannot help but 
strike me as phony. Science defines itself by the falsifiability of its claims, so we should hold it to the standard it sets 
for itself and pose to it the following question: “what evidence would be admitted as constituting evidence that an 
animal possesses a distinctively human mental capacity (say, “self-awareness”)? What exactly would, say, an ant 
have to do in order to prove to one’s scientific satisfaction that it is “self-aware”? What kind of evidence would one 
be prepared to admit as evidence of “self-awareness” in ants? As I mentioned earlier, the implicit answer to such a 
question usually seems to be: none at all. There is usually no such evidence that a scientist already committed to 
human exceptionalism would be prepared to admit as constituting evidence of a certain mental quality (already 
assumed to be exceptionally human) in a non-human being. This supposed distinction between “self-recognition” 
and “self-awareness” certainly seems to me to be one of those “distinctions without a difference” that – much like 
the distinction between “communicative behavior” and “language” – has little purpose other than to restrict a certain 
mental capacity to humans. Distinctions will be parsed ad infinitum, hairs will be split ever finer so as to make sure 
that human subjectivity remains “special,” and the distinction between “self-recognition” and “self-awareness” 
seems to be a clear case of one of those spurious distinctions that is invented for no other reason than to deny a 
priori that a non-human entity might possess a certain quintessentially “human” capacity. 
449 See e.g., Natalie Angier, “Pigs Prove to Be Smart, if Not Vain,” New York Times, Nov 9. 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/10/science/10angier.html. 
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reasons to suppose that passing the mirror test is also not even necessary for demonstrating 
thematic self-awareness. Most people understand that passing the mirror test proves that an animal 
is thematically aware of itself, yet it seems that many people incorrectly infer that failing to pass 
the mirror test proves that an animal is not thematically aware of itself. Of course, the latter claim 
does not directly follow logically from the former; or rather, it does so only if one already assumes 
that the capacity to recognize oneself in one’s own mirror image constitutes not merely a sufficient 
but also a necessary criterion for possessing “thematic self-awareness,” and I think this is an 
assumption many people tacitly share. Many seem to assume that if an animal fails the mirror test, 
it is not thematically self-aware or is, at any rate, only aware of itself in a way that is “less robust” 
or “less sophisticated” than the thematic self-awareness humans have. However, this assumption 
seems to be false. Naturally, there are ordinary empirical counter-examples one could provide. For 
example, cats have not passed the mirror test, yet many studies show (and every cat owner knows) 
that cats know their own names and sometimes deliberately refuse to respond to them when 
summoned. Similarly, as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, my childhood dog, Sammy, 
seemed to have quite a thorough or “robust” awareness of himself, as evidenced by his evasive 
behavior or unusual refusal to respond to calls of his name when he realized he was about to have 
a bath, yet dogs also have not passed the mirror test (indeed, one can regularly observe dogs, 
especially puppies, react to their images in a mirror as if another dog is present).  
The more important point here, however, is that the mirror test itself – the very 
construction of it and not just the commoon assumption that it provides a necessary criterion for 
determining whether an animal has thematic self-awareness – reflects a particular anthropocentric 
bias: it privileges vision over other perceptual modalities of engaging the world, and indeed those 
who venerate the mirror test – those who regard it as the “gold standard,” so to speak, of evidence 
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of thematic self-awareness in animals – hardly take cognizance of the fact that in doing so they 
implicitly and fallaciously regard as a universal, default measure of the subjectivities of other 
beings a perceptual modality and aptitude that saliently structures their own particular form of 
subjectivity. It is decidedly always a fallacy to universalize one’s own particularity, to reify as a 
universal, default standard of measure or comparative assessment one’s own specific standpoint in 
the world or to reify one’s own standpoint as, indeed, standpointless, yet this is exactly what we 
do insofar we take the “mirror test” to provide some sort of universally applicable if not necessary 
measure of thematic self-awareness in all non-human beings. The mirror test is surely one way to 
measure thematic self-awareness in certain beings who primarily rely upon vision in order to 
navigate and make sense of their world, but many beings do not rely upon vision to the extent that 
human beings do, and it is rash or simply invalid to suppose that such beings lack thematic self-
recognition simply because they lack the capacity for visual self-recognition. Why privilege 
vision? Why not, say, privilege hearing or smell? Bats, for example, primarily engage the world 
through sound, and dogs primarily engage the world through their noses, and their respective 
auditory and olfactory sensitivities are powerful in ways that we humans can hardly imagine, 
powerful in ways that are many orders of magnitude greater than our own capacities for hearing or 
smelling. So, why should we assume that auscultation and olfaction may not also provide genuine 
modes of “thematic self-awareness”? Why should we not think that bats hear themselves and that 
dogs smell themselves to a similar same extent that we see ourselves?  
Let us briefly consider dogs. Even those of us who have shared our lives with dogs tend 
to forget the fact that they primarily inhabit the world through their sense of smell, that they quite 
literally think with their noses. Scientific assessments of canine olfaction differ rather widely, but 
the general consensus is that a dog’s sense of smell is so intensely more acute than ours that we 
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can hardly begin to imagine what it must be like to inhabit the world with and through noses such 
as theirs. The following passage from an article on dogs’ sense of smell articulates the general, 
current scientific understanding of it:  
Dogs’ sense smell overpowers our own by orders of magnitude – it’s 10,000 to 100,000 times as acute, 
scientists say…they possess up to an estimated 300 million olfactory receptors in their noses, compared to 
about six million in us. And the part of a dog’s brain that is devoted to analyzing smells is, proportionally 
speaking, 40 times greater than ours.450  
 
Dogs cannot recognize themselves in a mirror, but they can certainly recognize the scent of their 
own urine. Why should that not be considered a form of self-recognition on par with identifying 
oneself with one’s image in a mirror? Why should we think that recognizing oneself in one’s own 
urine is not a genuine, “thematic” mode of self-recognition? It seems arbitrary or chauvinistic not 
to do so. We might imagine an inverted world in which dogs are the dominant sapient species and 
humans are kept as their domesticated pets. In such a world, perhaps a dog scientist might design a 
test so as to gauge whether or not a human can recognize him/herself in his/her own urine. After 
observing that humans repeatedly fail such a test, the dog scientist concludes that humans clearly 
must not be aware of themselves to the same degree that dogs are. Such a conclusion is no 
different from the one that we draw if we suppose that dogs lack our own degree of self-awareness 
simply because they cannot see themselves in a mirror. To claim that my dog, Dexter, who can 
smell himself in his own urine, is not aware of himself just as much as we are because he cannot 
see himself in a mirror is to privilege vision over olfaction simply because vision is a sense upon 
which we primarily rely; it is nothing more than an anthropocentric bias.  
Moreover, a dog’s sense of smell should, at the very least, humble us and our conception 
of knowledge. We ought to appreciate all of the phenomenal aspects of the world that are 
																																																								
450 Peter Tyson, “Dogs’ Dazzling Sense of Smell,” http://pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/dogs-sense-of-smell/.  
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foreclosed to us, all of the things about the world we will never be able to perceive or know, 
because we do not have a dog’s nose. Indeed, consider, for example, Heidegger’s apparent hubris 
in denying that dogs may be attuned to the world in the manner of “Dasein” without ever 
considering the ways in which the world might present itself or be known through their noses, or 
without ever considering the significant ways in which the world may not be disclosed to us 
because we lack a dog’s sense of smell. Heidegger notoriously argues that “apes do not hands.”451 
I am not going to examine his argument for this claim here, but suffice it to say Heidegger does 
not, of course, literally mean that apes do not have hands but rather that they (and that all animals) 
lack access to predicative, apophantic judgment or to what he calls the “as such,” that is, that they 
lack the ability to understand concepts or to apply concepts to particulars. However, perhaps a 
canine philosopher could say, with much the same justification (or perhaps even with better 
justification), that “humans do not have noses.” At any rate, if we truly consider how stunningly 
sensitive a dog’s sense of smell is – if we consider the fact that a dog’s sense of smell may be up 
to 100,000 times more sensitive than ours – we should be struck by (or perhaps catch a whiff of) 
all of the things about the world a dog might experience and know that we never will.  
And even though we will never be able to know the world in the manner of a dog, 
perhaps we should no longer exclude olfaction from our theories of knowledge. Olfaction has, of 
course, historically been quite marginalized in Western epistemology; indeed, it is hardly ever 
even acknowledged as a possible organ of knowledge. Nietzsche was perhaps the only philosopher 
to have appreciated it: 
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This nose…of which not one philosopher has yet spoken in reverence or gratitude, is nevertheless actually 
the most delicate instrument we have at our command: it can register minimal differences in movement 
which even the spectroscope fails to register.452 
 
Nietzsche raises a profound point here, one that surely warrants more attention than I can give to 
it. Though surely our noses will never be as sharp as a dog’s, they may be capable of more than we 
assume, and indeed they may already be integrated into our experience and knowledge of the 
world in ways we typically fail to appreciate, in ways that are suppressed by a philosophical 
tradition that generally valorizes disengaged contemplation and denigrates corporeality or 
affectivity. Perhaps our noses are capable of far more than we commonly suppose, and perhaps, 
therefore, we might be able to train them to be attuned to the world in ways they currently are not. 
Indeed, perhaps our noses have lost their perceptual and epistemic potency precisely because we 
have been enculturated not to use them. Cat Warren, for example, observes that, despite its rather 
poor reputation among philosophers, smell used to play an important role in medical diagnosis: 
…For most Westerners, it [smell] is a deeply underappreciated sense compared to vision. It wasn’t always 
so. Smell used to be a critical tool for physicians. Hundreds of years before we started exclaiming over the 
miracle of dogs being able to detect diabetes or lung cancer, doctors were using their noses to do the same 
thing. “Evaluating effluvia” was considered a basic diagnostic skill: Sweat on a rubella patient smelled like 
“freshly plucked feathers”; life-threatening diabetic ketoacidosis made a patient’s breath smell like “rotting 
apples”; a certain bacterial condition made the skin smell like “over-ripe Camembert.” Now we leave that 
job to lab tests and litmus paper.453 
 
Though we likely will never develop the olfactory capabilities of a dog, and though we likely will 
never rely upon our sense of smell to the same extent that we rely upon vision, Warren implicitly 
draws our attention here to the ways in which history and culture inexorably shape those things we 
are most prone to “naturalize,” including even our bodily senses and perceptual faculties. Of 
course, every form of flesh has its limits and cannot do or become just anything, but we also tend 
to forget precisely how labile it is, that it is always already shaped and inscribed by history and 
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453 Cat Warren, What the Dog Knows: Scent, Science, and the Amazing Ways Dogs Perceive the World (New York, 
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culture, and our collective loss (at least in the West) of the ability to deploy our sense of smell in 
medical diagnosis is but one particular example of this. That we no longer really use our noses to 
“know” the world reflects not simply some inherent natural limitation of our bodies but, to an 
important extent, an enculturated, historically situated attrition of knowledge. One philosophical 
lesson here, then, is that an epistemology that tacitly privileges vision and that marginalizes or 
does not even acknowledge the epistemic power or relevance of scent is not only tacitly 
anthropocentric but also tacitly culturally and historically constructed even though it may presume 
otherwise. Another philosophical lesson here is that the tacit exclusions of such an epistemology 
render it deeply impoverished, and our understanding of knowledge and experience would be far 
better or richer were we to accord as much epistemic importance to the other senses as we have 
traditionally accorded to vision. Our epistemology would certainly be better if we considered and 
appreciated, even if from a great, respectful distance, the ways in which dogs’ noses and all 
different kinds of animal bodies know the world, if we allowed other-than-human modes of 
knowing to humble, decenter, challenge, and inspire our own.  
So, to return briefly to the mirror test: bats and dogs may not pass the mirror test, but that 
is because the mirror test privileges a sensory modality that is not the one that bats and dogs 
primarily depend upon in navigating their environments. The basic point here is not that the mirror 
test is utterly useless but that it is designed in accordance with a human-centered experiential and 
epistemic schema that we often hardly notice as operative in its design, and that universalizing or 
essentializing such a schema, or that demanding that all non-human beings conform to such a 
schema in order to be considered capable of a certain perceptual or cognitive feat, is not only 
simply fallacious but is also bound to suppress and illicitly marginalize a great number of non-
human styles of knowing and being; it is certainly bound to keep us from authentically “knowing” 
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a great many animals, or is bound to prevent a great many animals from “showing themselves.” In 
short, though surely human beings are not alone in typically depending upon vision, the mirror test 
reflects an “ocular-centrism” or scopophilia that is specifically human. Human beings tend to rely 
upon vision in navigating the world, and they do so to such an extent that they often take it for 
granted and construct theories of knowledge that tacitly privilege it to the exclusion of other 
modes of perceptual engagement with the world. Yet, we ought to let these other perceptual modes 
of engagement with the world enrich and transform our understanding of “knowledge.” At any 
rate, the ocular-centrism of the mirror test, or any ocular-centric definition of “thematic self-
awareness,” is simply an anthropocentric bias, and since it is one that infects one of the most 
popular methods of investigating animal consciousness, we may reasonably wonder about the 
extent to which similar biases infect many of the other ways in which we think about and 
investigate animal consciousness. Not just philosophy – not just lucid phenomenology and (as I 
will argue) ethics – but even sound science requires a vigilance against anthropocentrism. 
We have just seen that the mirror test illustrates the extent to which anthropocentric 
biases may tacitly infiltrate our scientific and epistemic practices not only to our own detriment 
but also especially to the detriment of those non-human beings we scientifically study or seek to 
“know.” We have also seen in general the ways in which anthropocentrism insidiously shapes our 
attitudes toward non-human others in general, often encouraging us to doubt the lived experiences 
we have with them, often pressuring us to suspend our attributions of various mental 
characteristics to them, often leading us to suppose that what we take to be a real feature of a non-
human being’s interiority – or even leading us in some cases to suppose that a non-human being’s 
interiority as such – is nothing more than a construction of our own imaginations, nothing more 
than the result of a sentimental flight of fancy, or nothing more but a “projection” or faulty 
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analogy. Not only is such skepticism logically flawed, but it perpetrates profound epistemic 
violence against not only non-human others but also against ourselves as embodied knowers, for 
not only does it typically suppress rather than honor or “let appear” non-human alterities, it also 
causes us to doubt, suppress, or indeed attempt to excise from ourselves those sensibilities – those 
knowing organs and affects of our bodies – through which non-human alterities come to presence 
for us in lived experience. Though it should already be clear that the most common form of 
skepticism toward attributions of mental characteristics or capacities to animals – that even the 
very construct of an “anthropomorphic projection” or of an “anthropomorphism fallacy” itself – is 
rooted in bad epistemology (which is itself rooted in bad metaphysics), I now finally wish to 
clarify and critique the classical Western epistemological framework that tacitly motivates such 
skepticism, the epistemological framework that always tacitly motivates the suspicion that an 
attribution of a human quality to an animal – especially the attribution of a human emotion to an 
animal – is possibly just an “anthropomorphic projection”; it is the epistemological framework 
that always tacitly motivates the notion that “objectivity” demands we withhold any attributions of 
mental qualities to animals that might be informed by our lived, interpersonal, corporeal 
engagements with them and that we instead restrict our claims about them to the manner in which 
they may appear to us at “arms-length,” say under a microscope, on an operating table, or on the 
other side of a cage or pane of glass; it is the epistemological framework that is readily prepared to 
dismiss “anthropomorphism” – in particular, ascriptions of human emotions or affects to animals – 
as contrary to “rationality” or “objectivity” because it precisely defines “objectivity” as divorced 
from (inter)subjectivity and consequently restricts “knowledge” to knowledge of objects. This is, 
of course, the classical epistemological framework of the Enlightenment, and despite the fact that 
tides have certainly changed for the better (as this framework has been repudiated not only by 
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many philosophers but also by many scientists today who study animal cognition – scientists such 
as Marc Bekoff, Frans de Waal, and Bernd Heinrich – and who embrace “anthropomorphism” in 
their research), it remains deeply embedded in Western culture and certainly continues to inform 
the sciences. This framework, however, is wrong in every valence of the term, and it is important 
to take some time to expose it as such. 
Skeptical and reductionistic attitudes toward animal subjectivities clearly tend to be 
rooted in the classical epistemology of the Enlightenment, that is, in an ideal of knowledge that 
would overcome the limitations and supposed distortions of subjectivity. Such an ideal of 
knowledge presupposes a particular notion of “objectivity”: it posits objectivity in diametric 
opposition to subjectivity and thus excludes from objectivity anything that may be credited to the 
standpoint – the perspectival, lived embodied existence – of the knower. Thus, this 
epistemological framework especially excludes emotion or affectivity from its conception of 
knowledge; it is a framework that regards the knower’s possible intersubjective, “personal,” 
emotional or affective ties to the “object” of knowledge to be at best irrelevant and at worst 
impediments to knowledge precisely because it conceptualizes any genuine object of knowledge 
as, in fact, merely an object, or at any rate as a truth or reality that must be absolutely independent 
of all “subjective” appearances.  
Of course, knowledge of “objective” reality is the very crux of philosophy and science, 
but the issue is to make proper sense of what “objective” reality is or of what “objectivity” means. 
We know that every subject occupies his/her own perspective on the world and that the world 
outstrips any of the particular ways in which it might appear to any particular subject. Things may 
only present themselves to me and to others from one particular perspective at a time, and I know 
that no such single perspective or manner of presentation exhausts the reality of the thing in 
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question; I know that the “thing itself” is never reducible to any single manner in which it may 
appear to subjectivity. Now, since the “objective world” transcends any particular perspective, 
classical philosophy and science conclude that it is absolutely independent of perspective; since 
the “objective world” or the “thing itself” is beyond any particular appearance, classical 
philosophy and science conclude that it is absolutely outside all appearances; thus, in order to 
acquire knowledge or “objective truth” it is necessary – at least as a regulative ideal – to shed 
one’s subjectivity so as to penetrate beyond the veil of “mere appearances,” to extricate oneself as 
much as possible from the “encumbrances” of one’s bodily, perspectival situation in the world. 
However, such a conclusion does not follow. For example, from the fact that a table has the 
particular shape that it does independently of any particular perspective one may take on it, it does 
not follow that the table’s true, “objective” shape is wholly non-perspectival. Try to represent the 
shape of a table in a non-perspectival manner: to do so is obviously impossible, and indeed it is 
impossible because it is precisely perspective that is our very access to the shape of anything in the 
first place and is that without which the very concept of “shape” would be unintelligible; 
perspective is thus not something that we must or even can transcend in order to get at “the truth” 
of an object’s shape, and according to phenomenology this is the case with respect to any matter 
we may consider. A table certainly has an objective shape, but its objective shape is an ensemble 
(or “horizon”) of overlapping possible appearances, and it is folly to suppose that one would be 
able to “know” a table independently of all possible appearances. So, the truth or being of 
something may never be exhausted by any particular manner of appearance, but it does not follow 
that it is absolutely beyond all appearances, and a standpoint or perceptual orientation toward the 
world is, as we have seen, not at all an “obstacle” to knowledge but is rather a necessary condition 
of it. The invalid inference I have just described is at the basis of the concepts of knowledge and 
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objectivity that we inherit from the Enlightenment; it is the basis of the notion that truth or reality 
is entirely external to all perceptual, perspectival appearances and involvements. Once 
“objectivity” is projected in opposition to subjectivity, then anything that may be credited to the 
situation or perspective of the knower is excluded from the category of “objective knowledge” and 
cast into dustbin of the “merely” subjective.  
In short, Enlightenment epistemology is founded upon an antithesis of subject(ivity) and 
object(ivity) that phenomenology reveals to be a false abstraction, an abstraction that tacitly 
depends upon yet suppresses the enmeshment of the two in lived, embodied experience. However 
much the light of the Enlightenment may have revealed to us, illumination always casts something 
else into obscurity and always has its own source in obscurity, though, blinded as we often are by 
the light, this is something we are prone to overlook. It is precisely the task of phenomenology to 
remind us of the worldly, perceptual ground or horizon of truth that scientific and philosophical 
analysis presuppose but often lead us to forget; its difficult and indeed paradoxical task is to 
thematize the pre-thematic sources of thematic knowledge, to bring to light what must always 
recede into opacity, and indeed to bring reason back down to the earth that always already 
nourishes it. The point is not to deny objectivity or to reduce the objective to the subjective, but 
rather to show that the radical split between objectivity and subjectivity should never have been 
made in the first place, that the polarization of objectivity and subjectivity – and the attendant 
(false) dilemma of absolutism and relativism – is an abstraction that presupposes yet distorts lived 
experience, and that it is precisely lived experience to which we must return in order to realize 
what we might call a “grounded” objectivity or an objectivity “worthy of the name.” Traditionally, 
philosophy and science regard perception as a barrier to the “True world” and forget that it is 
precisely perception that always already gives us a world, that it is perception or pre-philosophical, 
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pre-scientific experience that always already subtends and enables every philosophical or 
scientific concept or article of knowledge. Again, such a phenomenological critique of classical 
epistemology is not a reversion to subjectivism or relativism; it is not to say that “truth is 
subjective” or that objectivity is an illusion but is to say that lived experience is our primordial 
openness to truth. Thus, lived experience is not something we need to overcome or circumvent in 
order to acquire truth, for it precisely is our immediate contact with the world that lets truth come 
to presence in the first place. Phenomenology, then, does not repudiate “objectivity” as such but 
only repudiates the misguided idea of objectivity to which philosophy and the sciences have 
traditionally been committed. Here, perception is not “presumed to be true” but is rather defined as 
our “access to the truth.”454 The point is not to invert the traditional hierarchical opposition 
between reality and appearance or between objectivity and subjectivity, but to show that lived 
experience is below this opposition, that the perceived world is, as we saw earlier, “beneath the 
level of the verified true and false”455 and is, as such, the always presupposed, pre-philosophical or 
pre-scientific source of philosophical and scientific knowledge.  
The epistemological framework and construction of “objectivity” I have just described 
remains entrenched throughout much of Western culture, philosophy, and science, and it 
especially seems to be operative behind the scenes of what Frans de Waal characterizes as 
“anthropodenialism,” that is, behind the scenes of a general skepticism toward attributions of 
“human” mental features to animals, behind the scenes even of the very concept of an 
“anthropomorphism fallacy” itself. Though scientists today are far more willing to ascribe 
emotions and personalities to animals, such ascriptions are still often received with suspicion if not 
outright hostility; they are often readily discarded as “unscientific” and thus (given an also widely 
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embraced scientistic definition of “rationality”) as “irrational,” since they tend to be rooted in a 
scientist’s merely anecdotal personal experience of an animal and since anecdotal personal 
experiences are not “replicable”; nor are the experienced mental qualities in question conceived as 
“observable” in the manner of conventional scientific, empirical evidence, that is, evidence that is 
verifiable (or falsifiable) from a third-person and not “merely” first-person or second-person 
perspective. Science – like contemporary analytic epistemology – largely remains wedded to an 
epistemological framework that privileges propositional, subject-object knowledge, a framework 
in which, again, “objectivity” is conceived as removed from subjectivity and in which proper 
epistemic relationships are therefore relationships between subjects and objects. Such a framework 
posits “S knows that P” as the fundamental, paradigmatic case of “knowledge,” where “P” is some 
proposition about an objective, mind-independent state of affairs and “S” is a knower shorn of any 
specific markers of identity or embodied existence. Since the “state of affairs” in question is 
“mind-independent,” the assumption is that surely nothing concerning “S’s” subjectivity is 
relevant to whether or not S “knows that P”; such knowledge has nothing at all to do with the sex, 
gender, race, class, personal desires or affects, culture, or historical context – in general, nothing at 
all to do with the embodiment – of the knower. Such an abstract form of knowledge, then, surely 
has nothing to do with any intersubjective relationship that might obtain between knower and 
known: how “S” feels about P, or whether or not S has some personal relationship with the content 
of P, has nothing to do with whether or not S knows that P. This is why, if one sets out to 
understand an “animal,” it is often considered “unscientific” if not downright fallacious to regard 
an animal as little more than an object. Scientific inquiry remains largely committed to the 
objectification of its object of inquiry (regardless of whether or not its object of inquiry truly is 
“just” an object). Thus, “transferring” qualities such as emotions and personalities to animals is 
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inappropriate; to do so is to regard one’s “object” of study as not indeed an object at all. 
“Objective” facts are taken to be divorced from “subjective appearances,” and since in order to 
regard something as more than merely an object it is necessary to enter into some sort of 
“personal,” experiential relationship with it, to regard an animal as anything more than just an 
object – to regard an animal otherwise than from an utterly detached, third-person perspective – is 
to let one’s subjectivity “get in the way” of the sound, rigorous acquisition and assessment of 
“objective,” quantifiable and replicable data or “facts.”  
The skeptical and reductionistic attitudes toward animals I have been critiquing here tend 
to reflect a general suspicion that to regard animals as more than “objects” is to let one’s 
subjectivity inform one’s research into them, and this itself reflects a commitment to a classical 
epistemological framework that conceptualizes subjectivity as, at best, irrelevant to knowledge 
and that therefore conceptualizes knowing as, ideally, disengaged spectatorship or contemplation. 
I have already explained Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the concept of “anthropomorphic projection” 
and of the skepticism it typically supports, but it is important to indicate that those who dismiss 
attributions of human qualities to non-humans as mere “projections” or as “anthropomorphism 
fallacies” usually do not just mean that such attributions are faulty analogies; they usually mean, 
whether explicitly or implicitly, that such attributions are faulty or “irrational” because they are 
emotionally motivated. Resistance to “anthropomorphism” tends to stem from the suspicion that 
attributions of human qualities to non-humans might be infested with “irrational,” wayward 
emotions and sentiments that stand in the way of the sober acquisition and assessment of empirical 
evidence or “hard facts.” One example that perhaps best illustrates this point is the extent to which 
Jane Goodall was criticized and even ridiculed for giving names and ascribing personalities to the 
chimpanzees she studied. As Goodall recounts it: 
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When I began my study of wild chimpanzees in 1960…it was not permissible, at least not in ethological 
circles, to talk about an animal’s mind. Only humans had minds. Nor was it quite proper to take about 
animal personality…The editorial comments on the first paper that I wrote for publication demanded that 
every “he” or “she” be replaced with “it,” and every “who” be replaced with “which.”456 
 
This resistance to attributing interiorities (“worthy of the name”) to animals, or this pressure to 
objectify or “de-personalize” animals in one’s endeavors to “know” them, clearly reflects not only 
deep-seated anthropocentrism but a commitment to an epistemological framework that considers 
emotional contact or any kind of intimacy between knower and known to be an impediment to 
genuine "knowledge," for it conceptualizes all proper epistemic relationships as subject-object 
relationships and conceptualizes "objectivity" as the negation or absolute transcendence of 
subjectivity. According to such a framework, in order to “know” something one must achieve as 
much distance from it as possible, and this is precisely the framework scientists usually assume 
when they cry foul about "anthropomorphism" or adopt reductionistic, objectifying attitudes 
toward the animals they study. As I will soon elaborate, I do not think that such a framework 
correctly describes or prescribes what knowledge of anything entails, but one might allow that it is 
appropriate when the object of knowledge in question is, indeed, an object; however, such a 
framework is utterly irrational and inappropriate – its application is in fact a category mistake – 
when it is applied to knowing not “things” or “objects” but living beings or subjectivities, the 
kinds of entities or phenomena that can only be known "by acquaintance." Knowledge of a living 
being or Other requires engagement and intimacy, not detachment and distance, yet such affective 
or relational knowing is anathema to the dominant construction of knowledge and objectivity that 
governs many scientific approaches to investigating animal consciousness as well as the general 
agenda of contemporary epistemology; it is the construction of knowledge and objectivity that is 
																																																								
456 Jane Goodall, “Learning from Chimpanzees: A Message Humans Can Understand,” in Science, 18 Dec 1998: 
Vol. 282, Issue 5397, p. 2184-2185. 
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nearly always at play when someone bemoans "anthropomorphism" or thinks that emotional 
attachments "get in the way" or "cloud" one's understanding of an animal. 
This classical Western epistemological framework is a false abstraction; it reifies the 
knower as a disembodied spectator, separates “reason” from emotion or affectivity, and denies 
intersubjective relationships as legitimate sources of knowledge. To be conscious at all is already 
to be caught up in skeins of carnal, sensuous relations with others and with a world, yet these very 
conditions of consciousness and cognition – carnality and affectivity – have precisely been 
suppressed by a long philosophical tradition that divorces them from knowledge, logos, and 
“objectivity,” a philosophical tradition whose ideals of pure ideality and universality and of 
disengaged contemplation were thus always built upon tacit, repressed exclusions that, as such, 
precisely demonstrate the impossibility and spuriousness of such ideals. Our primary relations 
with the world are thoroughly, irrecusably carnal and affective, so the notion that “knowledge,” 
“rationality,” or “objectivity” can or ought to transcend them in fact makes knowledge, rationality, 
or objectivity impossible. As Nietzsche (rhetorically) asks, “…to…turn off all the emotions 
without exception, assuming we could: well? Would that not mean to castrate the intellect.?”457 
Setting aside for now the androcentrism of Nietzsche’s castration anxiety, his basic point is an 
important one that challenges traditional philosophical constructions of knowledge. Emotional or 
affective bonds with things and with a world are not contrary to “rationality” or “knowledge” but 
constitutive of it. Our fundamental relationships with the world are simply not subject-object 
relationships, for any supposed opposition between a “subject” and an “object” is already an 
abstraction from the enmeshment of subjectivity and flesh in lived experience that makes such a 
																																																								
457 On the Genealogy of Morality, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson. Trans., Carol Diethe (Cambridge University Press, 
1994), § 12, p. 92. 
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distinction intelligible and that enables any “objectifying” stance toward the world in the first 
place.  
Moreover, without any emotional, corporeal ties to a world (and to others) nothing would 
even show up for us meaningful or “worth knowing.” For Merleau-Ponty, “…the relation between 
a thought and its object, between the cogito and the cogitatum, contains neither the whole nor even 
the essential of our commerce with the world….”458 Thus, any epistemological framework that 
privileges detachment from things and beings fails to acknowledge the affective, bodily bonds we 
always already have with them that make knowing them at all possible. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty 
affirms that any capacity we might have to represent the world to ourselves in any sort of way – 
hence even the capacity to articulate the world propositionally or in language – presupposes and is 
parasitic upon our affective, bodily, antepredicative rapport with it: 
The structures of…affectivity are constitutive with the same right as the others, for the simple reasons that 
they are already the structures of knowledge being those of language. We must no longer ask why we have 
affections in addition to “representative sensations,” since the representative sensation…is affection, being 
a presence to the world through the body and to the body through the world, being flesh, and language is 
also.459 
 
In short, affective, corporeal relations with a world and with others are prior to, and the condition 
of, any “cognitive” relations between a subject and an object, between an “internal” representation 
and an “external” thing. Before we ever take to observe or contemplate things and especially other 
living bodies at a distance from them, we are already caught up in webs of corporeal, affective 
relations with them that defy any rigid demarcation between subject and object. My living body’s 
corporeal schema is already, primordially an “Einfühlung” with things, others, and the world; as 
an “esthesiological structure,” it signifies “a relation of being and not of knowledge.”460  
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459 Ibid., p. 239. 
460 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 210. Of course, Merleau-Ponty is being somewhat hyperbolic here in saying that the 
esthesiological (affective) relationship between body and world is not a relation of “knowledge,” for it is clear from 
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In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty (following Husserl) argues for a 
distinction between “operative intentionality” and “act-intentionality”: the latter is “that of our 
judgments and of those occasions when we voluntarily take up a position,” while the former, 
which grounds the latter, is “that which produces the natural and antepredicative unity of the world 
and of our life, being apparent in our desires, our evaluations and in the landscape we see, more 
clearly than in objective knowledge, and furnishing the text which our knowledge tries to 
translate.”461 In other words, “act-intentionality” is reflective, representational, object-directed 
intentionality; it refers to our “cognitive” orientation toward things, that is, to the manner in which 
we relate to things when we consider them abstractly as “things” to be known, described, modeled, 
categorized, or manipulated. On the other hand, “operative-intentionality” is the bodily 
intentionality – the immediate, lived perceptual openness to a world – that makes “act-
intentionality” possible, the manner in which objects are presented to us before we ever take to re-
present them or to attend to them in a reflective, “cognitive,” or traditionally epistemic way; it is 
“a deeper intentionality beneath the intentionality of representations.”462 Thus, we see that 
traditional Western epistemology precisely marginalizes or suppresses the “operative,” pre-
cognitive intentionalities through which the world is first, always already given to us – the ways in 
which we “know” the world with and through our bodies and their affective attachments to things 
– and instead models “knowledge” on “act-intentionality,” that is, on our later representational, 
object-directed stances toward things. It is thus that “truth” comes to be regarded only as a 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
the larger context of his philosophy that he means it is not a relation of representational or propositional knowledge, 
but of course there is, for him, a sense in which we do indeed “know” the world through our living bodies’ affective 
relations with it. Merleau-Ponty simply means that we do not know the world through our lived bodies or affects in a 
manner in which traditional epistemology can accommodate because such lived, bodily, affective relations with the 
world are not strict subject-object relationships. 
461 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. xviii; see also ibid., p. 418. 
462 Ibid., p 121n5. In the terms of analytic philosophy, this distinction is roughly equivalent to the distinction 
between propositional knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance. 
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property of propositions, that “knowledge” comes to be defined only as knowledge that certain 
propositions are true or only as knowledge of objects, and that we begin to worry about how our 
propositions about the world, or about how our internal representations of the world, may ever be 
claimed to correspond to it. 
I may, for instance, think to myself to have a piece of cheesecake in the refrigerator; in 
that case, I formulate a representation of the cheesecake in my mind’s eye: I am directed toward 
the cheesecake as an object; I internally represent the cheesecake to myself. But the manner in 
which the cheesecake is first presented to me – how I might feel about it, all of the affective or 
emotional associations it might carry for me, how hungry I am or how much I crave it, etc. – along 
with my body’s immediate understanding of where the cheesecake is located relative to itself, or 
rather along with my body’s general familiarity with the space in which the cheesecake resides, 
and indeed along with even just my body’s pre-reflective inhabitation of space in general and my 
perceptual receptivity of things before they ever become objects of thought, is precisely my 
operative-intentional comportment toward the cheesecake. In short, for Merleau-Ponty operative-
intentionality is how I am (corporeally) situated in, and open to, the world before I ever take to 
“objectify” it or consider it in the detached manner of a scientist or epistemologist, prior therefore 
even to the very distinction between subject and object itself, and certainly prior to any questions 
concerning whether “attributions” of qualities to “objects” – or whether propositions about 
“objects” – involve any illicit “subjective” transference of qualities “in me” to them.  
Now, it is surely the case that Merleau-Ponty moves away from discussions of 
“intentionality” (operative or otherwise) as he turns to consider more rigorously the nature of 
Being as such, since for him the concept of intentionality is inherently tied to the traditional 
	 401	
““consciousness”-“object” distinction,”463 and since Being is necessarily below or beyond the 
distinction between consciousness and object. Nonetheless, even with a turn toward investigating 
the nature of Being, Merleau-Ponty never ceases to elaborate the ways in which Being is 
disclosed through what he once called our “operative-intentional” comportments toward the 
world, toward things, and toward others; in his later writings, this concept only comes to be 
replaced by that of “flesh”464 or intercorporeity.  
The lived/living body is neither an internal, mental representation of things nor itself 
merely an external thing in the world among others, and it therefore founds the very distinction 
between representation and thing, thought and object in the first place; the flesh of the living 
body – or the rather the compact between the flesh of the living body and the flesh of the world – 
antecedes and makes possible any representation or predicative knowledge of the world, or 
enables the meanings and phenomena we take for granted in all of our reflective, epistemic 
investigations of the world to come presence for us. As Ricoeur puts it, “when asked how it is 
possible for a meaning to exist without being conscious, the phenomenologist replies: its mode 
of being is that of the body, which is neither ego nor thing of the world.”465 Of course, Merleau-
Ponty never denies that I can formulate and contemplate representations of things, but this is 
only a later, derivative reflective accomplishment and is thus in no way the primary (let alone 
essential) characteristic of consciousness or of the intentional relationship between consciousness 
and object/world. In lived experience, when I intend an object, I intend the object (e.g., the 
cheesecake), not an inner, mental representation of it that would stand between myself and the 
																																																								
463 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 200. This why Merleau-Ponty criticizes his earlier 
phenomenological work, claiming that the problems he had endeavored to solve were in fact “insoluble” because he 
began from this distinction between consciousness and object. 
464 I mean here the flesh of the living body, not that of “the world,” which I discuss further in the next chapter. The 
“flesh of the world” is distinct from, though nevertheless disclosed through, the flesh of the living body. 
465 Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. Trans. Denis Savage (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1970), p. 382.  
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object itself. Lived experience is not a screen of representations interposed between subject and 
world but is rather a dialectical – a reciprocal or quite literally conversational – rapport or 
exchange of meaning between subject and world through the flesh of both before one ever marks 
a distinction between representation and object, interiority and exteriority in the first place:  
Although naïve consciousness never confuses the thing with the manner in which it has of appearing to 
us, and precisely because it does not make this confusion, it is the thing itself which naïve consciousness 
thinks it is reaching, and not some inner double, some subjective reproduction.  It does not imagine that 
the body or that mental “representations” function as a screen between itself and reality.466  
 
“Naïve” consciousness is never “naïve” in the way in which philosophers typically imagine it is 
when they pejoratively accuse it of “naïve realism,” the thesis that the objective being of a thing 
is reducible to how it appears directly to consciousness. Phenomenology rejects the opposition 
between appearance and reality, but that does not mean reality collapses into mere appearances. 
In lived experience, we know that the things we perceive are never exhausted by our perceptions 
of them, but it does not follow that such things are absolutely independent of perception or that 
our perceptions do not really reach them: things are an ensemble of overlapping manners of 
appearance. When I see something, I see the thing itself, even though the thing itself will always 
be more than what I may ever perceive of it. So, for all of the reasons just elaborated, Merleau-
Ponty argues that “the possession of a representation is not coextensive with the life of 
consciousness,” that “…representative consciousness is only one of the forms of 
consciousness….”467 Therefore, any epistemological framework that privileges representational 
or propositional knowledge or that regards subject-object relations as our primary epistemic 
relations with the world is an abstraction that presupposes yet suppresses so much concerning 
what (and how) we know; it is a framework that suppresses the corporeal, affective conditions of 
																																																								
466 Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, p. 186. 
467 Ibid., p. 173. 
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any instance of knowledge, a framework that pretends (and that can only pretend) to deny 
embodied, lived experience as the ultimate source of anything known or knowable.  
 Classical Western epistemology therefore commits a particular fallacy of reification, for 
it abstracts fundamental conditions of knowledge from its conception of knowledge and then 
privileges the resulting conception as the basic or essential, most paradigmatic form of 
knowledge: it strips away everything that has to do with “S’s” identity and bodily standpoint in 
the world and affective ties to the content of “P,” removes the larger phenomenal context in 
which “P” presents itself in the first place, and concludes that “knowledge” is reducible to the 
bare formula “S knows that P.” Of course, classical epistemology then sets as its task to analyze 
the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of such knowledge, yet since such knowledge is 
conceptualized as purely propositional and object-directed (or third-personal), anything having to 
do with lived, embodied experience – anything having to do with the identity of the knower, or 
anything having to do with the knower’s experiential acquaintance with or affective attunements 
to his/her “object” of knowledge – drops out of the picture; such factors are discarded as at best 
irrelevant, though in fact they are foundational. As I discussed in chapter one, Whitehead refers 
to this kind of fallacy as the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” and it is one that he diagnoses 
throughout the sciences (especially physics):    
…Substance and quality, as well as simple location, are the most natural ideas for the human mind…The 
only question is, How concretely are we thinking when we consider nature under these 
conceptions?...[We] shall find that they are in truth only to be justified as being elaborate logical 
constructions of a high degree of abstraction…we get at the ideas by the rough and ready method of 
suppressing what appear to be irrelevant details. But when we attempt to justify this suppression of 
irrelevance, we find that, though there are entities left corresponding to the entities we talk about, yet 
these entities are of a high degree of abstraction.468 
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To clarify what Whitehead has in mind here, it might be better to consider the ways in which 
abstractions tend to become reified in mathematics (for example, in geometry proofs). Consider 
first the concepts of “ideal” lines and points. An ideal line is a line with only length and no 
breadth, and an ideal point is a point with no magnitude at all, a location in space with no length 
or breadth; the former is purely “one-dimensional,” and the latter is purely “zero-dimensional.” 
Of course, it is impossible to perceive or draw ideal lines and points, yet mathematicians and 
scientists talk about them anyway. The point here is that “ideal” lines and points can only be 
abstracted from experienced or perceptible lines and points and that it is fallacious to think that 
such idealities in any sense “come first” or are ontologically fundamental. Ideal points and lines 
are founded upon our perceptions of things that occupy a particular position (or “point”) in space 
and that present themselves as delineated or distanced from other things. Such idealities are only 
abstractions and not primary or deeper realities. When we perform a proof in geometry, for 
example, we never think to include as part of our proof the color of the ink or chalk we use to 
draw the figure; the color does not seem to be relevant to the property we have demonstrated, 
and whenever we perform the same proof we always get the same result regardless of the color 
of the figure; thus, we abstract the color from the demonstration and conclude that we have 
accessed a truth prior to, and independent of, perception (or, more specifically, coloration). We 
conclude that color is in no way essential to the truth of the proof, but this is false. A truly 
colorless figure could never appear in the first place, and a figure that is not a possible object of 
consciousness (perceptual or otherwise) is inconceivable. It is meaningless to talk about the true 
properties of an inconceivable figure, for an utterly inconceivable figure has no conceivable 
properties at all (one might as well attempt to deduce the properties of a square circle). A figure 
that could never offer itself to perception (that is, an “ideal” figure) is in fact not a “figure” at all. 
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Likewise, an ideal line is a line without color and without breadth, but a line without color and 
without breadth would not be differentiated from anything, and so it would not be anything: as 
we have seen, a fundamental phenomenological insight is that nothing can be or appear except 
against and amid a pre-given background or horizon. Thus, a truly colorless “figure” is not 
something that could ever be figured in the first place. Likewise an ideal point is a point without 
magnitude, but a point without magnitude would not be differentiated from anything in space, 
and so it would not occupy any position in space (by definition, a point without magnitude would 
not take up any space, and so it would not have a position in space at all, which is to say it would 
not even be a “point”). Perception, then, is always already the condition of the possibility of the 
truths we acquire through mathematical or geometrical abstraction, though these abstractions, 
once acquired, bear a sense of necessity – a sense of timeless, a priori or trans-perspectival 
validity – and thus tend to conceal their perceptual, worldly conditions of possibility and 
intelligibility. 
 As I have suggested, a similar fallacy is committed by the classical epistemological 
framework that continues to inform not only epistemology but also our epistemic practices 
outside of academic philosophy, in particular our scientific approaches to understanding non-
human forms of consciousness. When I was an undergraduate, I took an upper-level 
epistemology survey course the same semester that I took my first course on phenomenology, 
and both courses were even held on the same day. I recall that at the beginning of the first 
meeting of my epistemology course, my professor asked us to provide examples of things we 
thought we “knew” and to attempt to explain why or in what sense we thought we knew them. 
This quickly led to a discussion concerning the difference between knowing, say, “that George 
W. Bush is the President of the United States” and “knowing George W. Bush,” which is to say 
	 406	
the difference between propositional knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance (a difference 
that is marked in many other languages that have different verbs to refer to them). We also 
briefly discussed the difference between propositional knowledge (“knowing-that P”) and skill-
knowledge, or “knowing-how to do P” (e.g., knowing how to ride a bicycle), which might be 
considered a form of knowledge by acquaintance. I then recall my professor drawing a big slash 
on the board separating propositional knowledge from the other two categories of knowledge and 
proclaiming that contemporary epistemology only takes an interest in the former, and that 
therefore various theories of the former were what we were going to study for the rest of the 
semester. Suffice it to say, this course contrasted quite radically with the course in 
phenomenology I had later that day, and this cemented for me the general difference between 
conventional analytic epistemology and phenomenological approaches to knowledge. 
Phenomenology interrupts our proposed conceptions or analyses of knowledge at the very 
moment my former professor drew that large slash across the blackboard separating 
propositional knowledge from knowledge by acquaintance or experiential knowledge, for it 
recognizes that the latter is the always presupposed source of the former, and moreover it simply 
draws our attention to the fact that the latter is a source of certain very special and important 
forms of knowledge in their own right that the former cannot capture or accommodate, namely 
knowing what it is like to exist in the world as a living, conscious being and knowing other 
living, conscious beings.  
 So, conventional epistemology takes “S knows that P” as its definition and paradigmatic 
case of knowledge. But why is, say, “S knows that the cat is on the mat” more important than “S 
knows the cat” (or “S knows cats”)? Indeed, having an acquaintance with cats in lived experience 
is a necessary condition for anyone ever being in a position to know any propositions about cats. 
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Moreover, the assumption in privileging “S knows that P” over “S knows P” is that subjectivity 
or affectivity is irrelevant to the sort of knowledge in question, but that is simply false. 
Subjectivity or affectivity is surely relevant to interpersonal or intersubjective knowledge, which 
is the kind of knowledge that precisely comes to be suppressed in the sort of epistemological 
framework I am critiquing here, yet we also ought not to overlook the fact that it is also relevant 
to propositional knowledge as well; indeed, as I just mentioned, propositional knowledge is 
precisely parasitic upon what we call “knowledge by acquaintance,” for object-directed 
intentionality – which is the basis for the formulation of any proposition – is parasitic upon what 
we call operative intentionality. There is always a broader context of meaning, a Gestalt, a lived 
situation, or a web of corporeal, affective relations with things and others that makes any 
instance of propositional knowledge possible. Assume that S “knows that the cat is on the mat.” 
Well, what puts S in a position to know this? Does S know the cat? How did S ever come know 
what a cat is in the first place? Did lived experience have nothing to do with that? How does S 
feel about cats? Even if S is indifferent to cats, that is itself an affective attitude toward them; 
indeed, every attitude one takes toward something is constitutively affective in some manner, 
and this already proves that affectivity is in fact essential to the acquisition of knowledge 
regardless of the extent to which we might repress it. How S feels about cats is also not utterly 
irrelevant here if we think that some standard of “reliability” and that external (e.g., 
psychological as well as environmental) factors play some role in justification. Suppose that S 
has an irrational, even psychotic paranoia about cats: he is deathly terrified of them and is 
convinced all of the cats in the world are “out to get him.” Naturally, for this reason, not only 
does he not own a cat, he has made sure to live nowhere near any cats, in an area known not to 
have many strays and in an apartment building that bans them. In his paranoia, however, he has 
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been known to look over his shoulder and glimpse a cat following him, only to realize it was just 
his imagination. So, he arrives home and sees a cat lying on his bed. Are we now prepared to say 
that S “knows” that there is a cat on the bed? Maybe there is a cat on his bed. But maybe S is 
also hallucinating a cat, as he is wont to do as a result of his paranoid, delusional fear and hatred 
of cats. Even the most “hard-nosed” analytic epistemologist will admit that the facts of this case 
surely undercut the claim that “S is justified in believing that P,” hence the claim that “S knows 
that P.” Indeed, the example I just provided is no different from often invoked examples 
involving inebriation in discussions concerning the nature of epistemic justification: under 
ordinary perceptual circumstances, we are justified in believing what we see, but inebriation 
undercuts otherwise reliable perceptual or cognitive faculties and thus undercuts any claim to 
being justified in believing (hence any claim to knowing) what is seen under the effects of it. My 
point here is that although conventional “analytic” epistemology tends to privilege propositional 
knowledge in such a way that suppresses or at least downplays our lived, affective, emotional, 
thoroughly bodily relations with the world and with supposed “objects” of knowledge, it is easily 
shown, even on traditional analytic epistemology’s own terms, that there is so much prior to or 
below the level of “propositions” – so much prior to or below our “cognitive,” reflective, 
representational, object-directed stances toward the world – that structure knowledge and 
knowing, and to regard such things in any other way is, at the very least, to commit a reification 
fallacy.  
Subtracting (or abstracting) S’s embodiment and lived experience from his/her 
knowledge and concluding that knowledge is independent of embodied, lived experience is 
analogous to the example of reification I discussed above in which one abstracts the perceptual 
qualities of a geometric figure from geometric truth or knowledge. A necessary condition of any 
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kind of knowledge is that the knower be a living – hence embodied – being and therefore have 
some sort of conscious and affective relationship with the world and with whatever it is that he 
or she may come to know. Thus, what is necessary for knowledge – what is necessary even for 
propositional knowledge – is also everything that comes along with embodiment or lived 
experience. Yet traditional, Enlightenment epistemology abstracts all of this from its conception 
of knowledge; it presents the knower as some sort of spirit freely floating in an abstract space of 
existence, or in some abstract internal space of representation, at a distance from its “object” of 
knowledge. The focus is always on “S knows that P” in such a way that “S” and “P” come to be 
shorn entirely of flesh or any context of lived experience; nothing about S’s personal history, 
identity, social situation, or body is considered to be relevant. S is thus conceptualized as utterly 
disembodied: S has no race, no sex, no gender, no class, no history, no culture, no affective 
dispositions or attachments, no species, no particular body at all. And whatever “P” references is 
completely divorced from the broader experiential context or situation in which it presents itself 
to S, as if anything can have meaning outside of a specific context of presentation.  
If something else may be said to be “scandalous” in the history of philosophy, it is that 
such a “bloodless abstraction”469 – that the schema “S knows that P” divested entirely of 
subjectivity and context – ever ascended to become the paradigm case of knowledge and to set 
the agenda for much of epistemology. It has certainly set the agenda for the sciences as well, 
including the ways in which the sciences proceed to “know” animals; and it is also always the 
agenda that tacitly informs skepticism toward “anthropomorphism,” since skeptical attitudes 
toward anthropomorphism clearly tend to be rooted in the worry that one may have been “led 
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Cambridge University Press, 1997), §105, p.61; see also Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, 
trans. Marianne Cowan (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing Inc., 1998), §9, p.69.   
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astray” by one’s emotional or affective attachments to an animal, that human emotions or 
subjectivity may have “gotten in the way” of “objective,” “rational” observation and judgment. 
Not only are ascriptions of human characteristics to animals suspected of being merely hasty 
analogical inferences (when in fact they are not fundamentally analogical inferences at all), there 
is usually the assumption that such hasty inferences are emotionally motivated. 
Anthropomorphic “projections” are nearly always conceptualized as emotionally motivated 
projections or impositions; this is why regarding an animal Other as a genuine Other – as a 
“Thou” rather than as an “It,” to use Martin Buber’s way of putting it – is so often considered 
anathema to sound “science”; it is considered to be so because the epistemological assumptions I 
have just described continue to hold sway in the sciences, because the sciences typically do not 
regard emotional or affective, intersubjective attachments as relevant to scientific knowledge and 
even regard such attachments as obstacles to it. The only possible objects of scientific 
knowledge are brute objects, so surely subjectivity cannot (or ought not to) have anything to do 
with the acquisition of such knowledge. As we have already seen, however, this whole 
epistemological framework is philosophically bankrupt, and indeed it has pernicious 
consequences in the world, both for science itself and for those living beings about whom 
science presumes to produce knowledge: it prevents science from knowing all kinds of important 
and wonderful things indeed, it leads science to mistake its own highly abstract models of reality 
for reality as such, and in reducing living beings and even nature as a whole to mere objects for 
human contemplation, manipulation, and mastery, it traffics in and reinforces toxic and 
oppressive attitudes that are at the basis of so much terrible and unwarranted suffering in the 
world.  
	 411	
Concerns that emotions or affects may cloud rational judgment, obfuscate objective truth 
and reality, or obstruct our access to genuine knowledge are clearly tied to false, abstract 
concepts of rationality, objectivity, and knowledge. The assumption that access to truth or 
knowledge requires an ideal, disengaged, God’s eye “view from nowhere” is one that, ironically 
and self-defeatingly, does not itself reflect such a viewpoint at all. The ideal of a standpoint-less 
standpoint is inherently absurd on logical and phenomenological grounds and has therefore 
always itself been far from standpoint-less. Moreover, such an ideal cannot accommodate our 
knowledge of others precisely because its paradigmatic, definitional case of knowledge is 
propositional knowledge or knowledge of objects (“S knows that P” knowledge). This 
epistemological framework reifies the third-person perspective as the primary mode of 
knowledge and thereby marginalizes or excludes knowledge by acquaintance, including 
knowledge that can only be acquired through a second-person perspective (that is, knowledge of 
others); even if it recognizes the latter as a form or source of knowledge, it does not take much 
(if any) interest in it and privileges propositional or subject-object knowledge, and in doing so it 
wrongly assumes that propositional knowledge can be divorced or abstracted from our lived, 
embodied experiences of things and others prior reflective, predicative thought and inference. 
The second-person perspective or, more broadly, knowledge by acquaintance is precisely how 
we come to know others. Though, as I have argued, no forms of knowledge ever truly transcend 
embodied, lived experience, knowing others is thoroughly corporeal, affective, and relational, 
and such knowledge is precisely what traditional epistemology suppresses or marginalizes. In 
traditional epistemology, emotions and interpersonal experiences and relationships are at best 
irrelevant, and at worst obstacles, to acquiring “objective” knowledge. Traditional epistemology 
begins with a dualistic opposition between subject and object and proceeds to define knowledge 
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as a subject’s knowledge of an object. Thus, it is committed to a conception of objectivity that 
leaves us with the rather absurd notion that the best or only way to know something is to be as 
removed from it as possible; of course, such detachment is not only a fictive abstraction but also 
an exclusion of other ways of knowing; in particular, it is an exclusion of intersubjectivity as a 
source or domain of knowledge in its own right.  
So, I hope to have shown that what can most charitably be described as an anxiety over 
anthropomorphism is rooted in this classical, Western epistemological framework that represses 
our affective ties to others and to the world, that represses embodied, intersubjective experience, 
which is the always presupposed condition of “seeing,” reasoning, believing, and knowing; it is 
rooted in a false understanding of knowledge, reason, and objectivity (which we inherit mainly 
from the Enlightenment) according to which knowledge, reason, and objectivity are divorced 
from subjectivity, or according to which genuine knowledge is always knowledge of objects, 
always knowledge of “things” set over and against a disinterested knower. Once such a 
definition of knowledge is in place, it follows that proper knowledge requires that everything 
“subjective” – everything belonging to the subjectivity of the knower – be suspended or stripped 
away: emotions, affects, personal relations, sex, gender, race, culture, history, species, and so on. 
Not only is such a concept of knowledge a false abstraction, it also excludes many important 
forms of knowledge or ways of knowing, especially knowledge of others (or intersubjective 
knowledge).  
Even if it were possible to know certain things by suppressing one’s own subjectivity or 
emotions and adopting a detached stance toward them, such a stance would be utterly 
inappropriate – it would be irrational or, again, a category mistake - if it were taken toward 
things that are not mere “things,” that is, toward living beings or others. Merleau-Ponty explicitly 
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acknowledges the connection between this classical epistemological construction of objectivity 
and common reductionistic or skeptical attitudes toward animal minds, and he argues that if the 
sciences are truly to understand animals at all they will have to relinquish their commitment to 
such a construction of “objectivity”: 
…To become truly scientific, psychology must not reject wholesale our human experience of the animal 
on the grounds that such experience is anthropomorphic, nor should it, in order to become truly scientific, 
restrict its questions about the animal to those physics asks about an atom or an acid. Measurable 
relationships, we find, have no monopoly on truth, and our notion of what is objective must be completely 
redefined.470  
 
As Merleau-Ponty suggests, the general resistance to “anthropomorphism” in the sciences is 
grounded in a notion of “objectivity” that is inconsistent with genuinely knowing a living being. 
The sciences tend to take reductionistic attitudes toward animals, or tend to take skeptical 
attitudes toward ascriptions of “human” mental characteristics to animals, because they privilege 
or regard as “objective” only “data” or “facts” that may be strictly quantifiable or replicable and 
consequently exclude phenomena that can only be known through direct, affective, interpersonal 
engagement with a being. One cannot truly “know” a living being from a disengaged, 
disinterested or emotionally flattened perspective toward it. Such an objectifying stance toward a 
being is simply wrong when the being in question is not indeed an object, and since animals are 
precisely not objects it is irrational to suppose that one would truly be able to “know” them by 
objectifying them. Thus, Jane Goodall was not guilty of some sort of irrational indulgence when 
she named and sought to enter into personal relationships with her chimps; it was those who 
demanded she do otherwise – those who demanded she observe her chimps from a detached 
point of view and only refer to them using impersonal pronouns – who were precisely imposing 
an irrational position upon her investigations of chimp subjectivity and society.  
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Even if scientific standards of knowledge were not inherently problematic abstractions 
(and they often are), the application of such standards of knowledge to intersubjective experience 
is a category error, and it is one that we commit every time we decide to “study” an animal from 
the vantage point of a disengaged spectator and think that such a vantage point actually discloses 
anything about the true being or interiority of the animal. It is the category mistake we commit 
every time we criticize a researcher for “anthropomorphizing” his or her animal subjects of 
study, for the implication here, of course, is that the researcher in question has illicitly let his/her 
emotions motivate his/her judgments, that the researcher has formed scientifically illegitimate 
personal relationships with his/her animals of study, as if emotional, personal ties to a living, 
thinking and feeling Other have no place in knowing that Other, or as if intersubjectivity has 
nothing to do with one subject knowing another subject. Whenever someone is charged with 
committing an “anthropomorphism fallacy,” such a charge usually means that someone has 
committed an unscientific and irrational indulgence, that there is something fundamentally 
unscientific and thus (given a scientistic account of rationality, which is often uncritically 
presupposed) rationally illicit or objectionable about being emotionally invested in the animal 
one is studying, that there is something wrong with letting such an emotional investment inform 
one’s beliefs and knowledge-claims concerning the animal. The assumption at play here is that 
one has allowed oneself to get “too close” to the animal one is studying, as if the best way to 
know a living entity is to be as far removed from it as possible.  
Of course, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, the notion than any living body is a 
mere machine – a husk devoid of interiority – is a vestige and necessary consequence of 
Cartesian dualism. Yet, the notion that animals are “just bodies” and therefore “just machines” is 
a vestige not only of Cartesian dualism but also of the epistemological framework that has 
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implicitly governed science since the Enlightenment, the framework according to which 
subjectivity has no legitimate role to play in the acquisition of knowledge. If an object of 
knowledge is taken to be anything more than an object, it must be because the subject of 
knowledge (the knower) imparted such a status to it (or “projected” such a status into it); indeed, 
it can only be because the knower let his/her subjectivity interfere with “rigorous observation,” it 
can only be because the knower let emotion obstruct “objectivity” or “soften hard judgment.”471 I 
think it is clear, then, that anxiety over anthropomorphism is rooted in an epistemological 
framework that divests objectivity of subjectivity and that therefore takes knowledge of mere 
objects – third-personal, propositional knowledge, “S knows that P” knowledge – to be the 
essential, paradigmatic case of knowledge as such. This anxiety over anthropomorphism is part 
of a more general anxiety, inherited from Enlightenment epistemology, concerning the 
interference of subjectivity or affectivity in the production of knowledge.  
																																																								
471	If this concern about “hard” things becoming “softened” conjures up associations beyond those having purely to 
do with the functioning of one’s intellectual faculties, this is no accident, for the suppression of emotion, affect, or in 
general (inter)subjectivity in traditional epistemology has always reflected tacit masculinist biases, or a privilege 
accorded to attitudes and ways of thinking conventionally constructed or coded (at least in the West) as male or 
masculine. Thus, I wish acknowledge that my critique of traditional epistemology here is indebted to the work of 
many feminist philosophers, not just to phenomenology. As feminist epistemologists, philosophers of science, and 
ethicists have argued, the notion that knowledge and objectivity require the divestment of subjectivity or emotion, or 
the notion that all epistemic relations are subject-object relations, is in fact little more than a masculinist prejudice 
that has been reified as a necessary, universal, impartial, and above all genderless definition of knowledge and 
objectivity. Traditionally, for example, reason is separated from and valorized at the expense emotion, yet reason 
comes to be implicitly aligned with “masculinity” whereas emotion comes to be stereotyped as “feminine.” The 
reason/emotion binary and hierarchy has always coincided with the male/female, man/woman binary and hierarchy 
(and moreover, it has also clearly always coincided with the “human/animal” binary and hierarchy). This is why 
Derrida, for example, often characterizes traditional Western metaphysics and epistemology as not simply 
“logocentric” but also as “phallogocentric”; it is also why there is much at stake in dismantling phallogocentric 
metaphysics and all of the binaries and hierarchies it engenders. Restricting legitimate forms of knowledge or 
knowing to practices, attitudes, ways of thinking, or orientations toward the world typically coded as masculine has 
had very little to do with the actual desire to acquire of knowledge and very much to do with the desire to exclude 
women from the acquisition or possession of knowledge, or very much to do with denigrating practices, attitudes, 
ways of thinking, or orientations toward the world culturally coded as feminine. Thus, the framework of classical 
epistemology is not simply a wrong description of knowledge, nor is it deployed solely in order to advance or 
reinforce an anthropocentric worldview (as I am suggesting here), but has also always been a patriarchal and 
misogynistic construct.     
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Emotions and intercorporeal relationships are integral to all forms of knowledge of the 
world, but there are certain things that truly can only be known through lived, embodied and 
emotional engagement; in particular, it is only possible to know others through emotional 
engagements with them. Emotions are essential to any lucid (or “rational”) connection to the 
world, but they are especially essential to our connections with others. It is absurd to think that 
the way to truly, optimally, or most “rationally” know an Other is to be as emotionally 
disengaged from that Other as possible, for in fact one cannot possibly have any epistemic 
relationship with an Other (qua Other) at all without any emotional, affective contact with that 
Other. To think that our emotions are irrelevant to knowing animals is to determine in advance 
that animals are mere objects. To think that the proper way to know an entity is to be as 
emotionally removed from it as possible is already to decide that such an entity is not an “Other” 
at all. Thus, the idea that one has “gotten too close” to an animal if one imparts certain human 
characteristics to it, or the idea that one has let one’s emotions “get in the way” whenever one 
attributes certain mental states or capacities (especially emotional ones) to an animal, is an idea 
that decides in advance that an animal is not an entity that one can properly “know” through 
emotional intimacy or engagement, and thus decides in advance that an animal is not a genuine 
Other or is just as object. And as we saw earlier, it is impossible to view an animal in such a way 
without reinscribing Cartesian metaphysics, for such a view necessarily separates subjectivity 
from behavior or the living body. If an animal is a genuine Other, not only is it appropriate to 
seek to know it emotionally or personally, but doing so is in fact necessary for really knowing it 
at all. And if one does not regard an animal as a genuine Other, then one reinstates the very 
Cartesian dualism one otherwise would likely reject, for such an attitude entails the willful 
suppression of the subjectivity or alterity that is inherent to being a living body. To think that we 
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cannot know animals emotionally, or at any rate to think that knowing animals emotionally is 
epistemically or logically inferior to knowing them as one would know a mere object, is to 
decide in advance that animals really are mere objects and is, moreover, to assume an 
epistemology that wrongly privileges knowledge of objects over other forms of knowledge and 
that wrongly divorces subjectivity from knowledge or “objectivity”; it is to assume an 
epistemology that accepts and reifies a false, abstract opposition between “the subjective” and 
the “objective,” between emotion/affect and logos, and that impoverishes or excises our power to 
know others.  
One of most important lessons of phenomenology is that there is so much more to 
knowing than knowing objects, so much more to knowledge than propositional knowledge. 
Oppositional subject-object relations are at best derivative abstractions, not primary conditions of 
existence and knowledge. As Martin Buber puts it, “the life of human beings is not passed in the 
sphere of transitive verbs alone. It does not exist in virtue of activities alone which have some 
thing for their object.”472 The living body’s operative-intentional relationships with others and its 
milieu may not always be what Buber describes as “I-Thou” relationships, but they are certainly 
not mere “I-It” relationships, for they precede and make possible any sort of detached, 
objectifying standpoint. In any case, it is impossible to know an Other if one does not, in fact, 
regard an Other as an Other (or as a “Thou”). As we have seen, classical epistemology and the 
sciences privilege “I-It” relations at the expense of “I-Thou” relations, though the latter are 
indeed, as Buber argues, the foundation of the former, and though the latter are the only kinds of 
epistemic relationships wherein alterity may present itself. Husserl notably marks a similar 
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distinction between what he refers to as “the naturalistic attitude” and the “personalistic 
attitude”:   
All men and animals we consider in this [the naturalistic attitude] are, if we pursue theoretical interests, 
anthropological or, more generally, zoological Objects…But it is quite otherwise as regards the 
personalistic attitude, the attitude we are always in when we live with one another, talk to one another, 
shake hands with one another in greeting, or are related to one another in love or aversion, in disposition 
and action, in discourse and discussion. Likewise we are in this attitude when we consider the things 
surrounding us not as “Objective” nature, the way it is for natural science. We thus have to do here with 
an entirely natural and not an artificial attitude, which would have to be achieved and preserved only by 
special means. In the natural life of the Ego we do not always – indeed not even predominately – consider 
the world in a naturalistic way, as if we were doing physics or zoology…”473  
 
Husserl’s distinction here between the “naturalistic attitude” and the “personalistic attitude” 
corresponds to Buber’s distinction between “I-It” and “I-Thou” relations, respectively, for the 
naturalistic attitude is that wherein we regard the world or others from a detached, objectifying 
standpoint, whereas the personalistic attitude is that wherein we are directly, corporeally and 
indeed, as Husserl mentions here, emotionally engaged others and with a world in everyday, 
prescientific experience. Husserl also clarifies that he, like Buber (and Merleau-Ponty), does not 
consider these two different attitudes to be on an equal footing, but maintains that the 
“personalistic” attitude is in fact prior to, and the condition of, any objectifying, “naturalistic” 
attitudes we might adopt toward things. Thus, “upon closer scrutiny,” Husserl writes, “it will 
even appear that there are not here two attitudes with equal rights and of the same order…but 
that the naturalistic attitude is in fact subordinated to the personalistic, and that the former only 
acquires by means of an abstraction or, rather, by means of a kind of self-forgetfulness of the 
personal Ego, a certain autonomy….”474 Husserl, then, simply provides an alternative vocabulary 
for articulating the points I have just discussed, namely that any epistemology that privileges 
propositional, subject-object knowledge over knowledge by acquaintance commits a fallacy of 
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reification and also marginalizes or excludes from its scope any genuine knowledge of living 
beings or others.  
If animals are “others,” then the “I-It” perspective we take toward them in the sciences is 
utterly inappropriate for really knowing them or for letting them show themselves. The only way 
to know that an Other has certain feelings or mental characteristics – indeed, the only way to 
know that an Other is an “Other” at all – is to be engaged with that other. Our emotions or 
embodied affects are integral to all forms of knowledge, but a detached, impartial stance toward 
an “object” of knowledge is especially wrong – indeed, not just ethically wrong, but logically 
wrong – when that “object” of knowledge is in fact not an object at all, but is a living being or an 
Other. The only way to know an Other is through emotional intimacy and vulnerability, not 
disengaged observation. To excise emotion or intimate, intersubjective relatedness from 
“rationality” or “knowledge” is to reduce all knowledge to knowledge of objects, even when the 
“objects” of knowledge are not in fact merely “objects” at all. This excision of emotion from 
knowledge or “objectivity” is a decision to adopt a detached, objectifying standpoint toward 
knowable, perceptible reality, and it is thus often a decision to objectify others (whether they be 
human or non-human); this is also, then, a decision to excise self from Other, knower from 
known; it is to excise subjectivity or genuine otherness from any body of knowledge because 
within such a schema the only bodies conceptualized as knowable are inert, vivisected, dead, or 
nonliving bodies.  
To excise subjectivity from knowing is at once to excise intersubjectivity from knowing; 
it is not only to deny the role that intersubjectivity plays in the production of knowledge and (as I 
will discuss in the following chapter) in the constitution of objectivity as such, but also to deny 
intersubjectivity – concrete relations with others – as a domain of knowledge in its own right 
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irreducible (and in no way inferior) to that which is classically understood as the domain of 
“objective,” “scientific” knowledge. The objectifying gaze with which we regard an animal is 
one that we choose to adopt; it is neither an immediate or necessary given nor an axiomatic 
condition or default standard of “knowledge” or “objectivity.” The objectifying gaze of a 
scientist is a specific attitude that he/she adopts toward the world, but it is not the only one that is 
possible, nor is it even one that is epistemically fundamental, and therefore it far from merits the 
privilege we typically, uncritically accord it. Whatever articles of knowledge are derived from 
viewing animals in such a manner – or, as Adorno and Horkheimer put it, whatever “formulae 
and results…[behaviorists] wring without restraint from defenseless animals in their abominable 
physiological laboratories”475 – do not purely consist of value-neutral, ready-made “facts” or 
“data” read off of animal bodies but consist of features that largely (if not entirely) derive from 
an antecedently adopted (and ideologically motivated) imposition of a particular epistemological 
schema, one in which the only “things” that are knowable are “things,” one in which the only 
phenomena that present themselves are those that do so at “arms-length,” distanced as much as 
possible from the subjectivity or affectivity of the knower. Such “facts” or articles of knowledge 
are not complete fictions or illusions, but they also ought never to be “naturalized” as ready-
made, value-neutral or apolitical truths, and still less ought they to be regarded as ideal or 
exhaustive insights into the being of an animal; they are also constructs, and violent ones. The 
basic point here, then, is that we will never truly “know” a living body if all we do is “dissect” it 
either literally with a scalpel or figuratively with abstract, reductionistic schemas of knowledge. 
Scientists and philosophers who approach animals with the epistemological abstractions I have 
described here kill or dissect those animals – destroy or dissemble the phenomena those animals 
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really present – from the first moment they subject them to their scrutiny. One simply cannot 
know an “Other” in the ways in which one knows an object. One cannot know “an Other” qua 
Other if one decides in advances to regard that other as a “thing” or as an “it.” In order to know 
an Other, one must first decide to regard that Other as an Other. One must extend to an Other a 
certain hermeneutic charitability, or what James Hart calls a “gracious act of attention,”476 
wherein one affirms that Other’s otherness in order for that Other’s otherness to show itself at 
all.  
Though Husserl affirms that the personalistic attitude is the primary, default attitude 
according to which we relate to the world that logically founds any “naturalistic” (i.e., scientific, 
reductive, or objectifying) attitudes toward things, he acknowledges that scientists accustomed to 
the latter wear “the blinders of habit” whose “restrictions…[they] can no longer break 
through.”477 For Husserl (as for Merleau-Ponty), scientific objectification or reductionism is, 
again, a particular reification fallacy, or the inflection of a derivative model or representation as 
fundamental, primally present reality. Fundamental, primally present reality is the reality we live 
before we ever take to model or re-present it, before we project it as an object over and against 
our gaze, and certainly before we ever take to dissect it under a microscope (whether literally or 
figuratively) and explain it partes extra partes. This is especially true when it comes to how we 
regard animals: the notion that an animal is reducible to whatever we may forcibly extract from it 
within a laboratory setting and from the perspective of a disengaged spectator is the very same 
reification fallacy that leads to us to think of any living entity as an “object” or as a mere 
“mechanism.” As Merleau-Ponty argues (following Husserl and echoing Buber), when we 
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encounter a living entity in the world, we can choose to adopt one of two perspectives toward it: 
we can either disengage ourselves from it and position it in opposition to ourselves, or we can let 
ourselves encounter it as an Other; we can distance ourselves from it and regard it as just a husk 
of matter, or we can let ourselves enter into affective relations with it; we can suppress its 
interiority and consider it as just a “fragment of extension,”478 or we make ourselves receptive 
and thus vulnerable to it as another interiority, as another living, feeling, vulnerable, sense-
making being that, as such, necessarily exceeds our full understanding or resists our mastery of 
it; we can objectify it or regard it as a mere thing (say, as a “machine”), or we can actually regard 
it as living entity, as a body dynamically oriented toward and involved in the world, as a style of 
being or as an agency of meaning:    
If for the endocrinologist, “the crest of the cock is not other than the manometer of hormones,” as if the 
cock were made to be seen by an endocrinologist, it is because the endocrinologist does not consider it 
according to the truth proper to it. There are two ways to consider the animal, as there are two ways to 
consider an inscription on an old stone: we can wonder how this inscription was traced, but we can also 
seek to know what it means. Likewise we can either analyze the processes of the animal under a 
microscope, or see a totality in the animal.479 
 
Here, Merleau-Ponty succinctly articulates the critique of reductionism that he develops across 
many of his writings and that I discussed in the previous chapter. One cannot understand an 
animal reductively any more than one can understand the meaning of a sentence in terms of the 
physics or physiology responsible for its inscription on a page. A vivisected body is never a 
lived/living body, and animals in cages and laboratories or under microscopes are likewise, 
whether literally or figuratively, living bodies that have been vivisected, that is, objectified and 
shorn from any context that would permit one to encounter them, or that would permit them to 
show themselves, as they truly are, or that would open up possibilities for achieving authentic, 
intersubjective knowledge of them. In just the same way that a human being is not reducible the 
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manner in which he/she may appear to the gaze of a surgeon, medical examiner, behaviorist, or 
neoliberal economist, so too is it the case that no animal is reducible to the manner in which it 
may appear to a scientist or zoologist (under typical experimental circumstances or according to 
a reductionistic epistemic or explanatory framework). To think otherwise is, like every fallacy of 
reification, to “mistake the map for the terrain,” that is, to substitute our lived experiences of 
another life with some model or representation or artificial containment of that life; it is to drain 
the life out of our lived experiences of a living being as a living being and out of the living being 
in question (sometimes literally). “The organism is not just a telephone switchboard,”480 and thus 
“…we must not confuse the Bauplan that the scientist elaborates with Wirklichkeit…”481  
As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty consistently critiques approaching animals with 
antecedent scientific and philosophical abstractions. Scientists often “take the plan of the animal 
into consideration only when the structure of the animal is assimilated to the structure of a 
machine,”482 but to do so is to approach animal behavior with an epistemically (as well as 
metaphysically) unsound and phenomenologically irresponsible prejudice. I wish to indicate here 
that, in the passage cited above, Merleau-Ponty does not only criticize scientific reductionism but 
also implicitly challenges what we might call the scientific or anthropocentric “gaze,” the typical 
standpoint according to which we observe animals and the sort of privilege we arbitrarily assume 
for ourselves in adopting such a standpoint. Such a standpoint precisely levels-down or 
forecloses any presentation of alterity. As Merleau-Ponty remarks, in taking a reductive attitude 
toward, say, the “crest of a cock,” one often uncritically regards it “as if it were made to be seen 
by an endocrinologist.” I think Merleau-Ponty’s point here applies to many of the ways in which 
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we typically regard animals (especially in the sciences). We typically regard animals as if they 
were made to be observed by us and for our own purposes, as if the particular epistemic 
framework through which we usually explain, conceptualize, and observe them is not in fact a 
particular framework at all – not a framework grounded in a specific standpoint, constituted by a 
specific (and usually problematic) set of assumptions and values – but a default, necessary, 
universal, utterly neutral and “objective” transmitter and arbiter of meaning and truth. However, 
the human gaze of a scientist is no more neutral or “objective” than the male gaze, the white 
gaze, or any otherwise privileged gaze or standpoint one might uncritically assume in one’s 
epistemic practices or in one’s relations with others; yet like all privileged gazes, the human gaze 
is one whose privilege (or even one whose status as a particular “gaze” at all) is precisely what is 
most invisible to it, such that it comes regard itself as a default, universal measure of meaning, 
truth, value, and knowledge. Thus, as I suggested earlier, the classical epistemological 
framework through which we commonly “observe,” study, and conceptualize animals is also 
inherently ideological; insofar as it reduces animals to objects, casts doubt upon our ascriptions 
of rich interiorities to animals, or in general discourages us from forming intersubjective, 
affective bonds with animals, it is a framework designed and deployed in order to entrench 
anthropocentrism or human privilege.  
As we have seen, a mechanistic or merely physiological explanation of animal behavior 
does not reveal the true meaning or being of the animal. And as we have also seen, the 
conception of the animal as a mere machine is hardly ever a conclusion drawn on the basis of 
observable evidence but is rather usually a conclusion bootstrapped on the basis of metaphysical 
commitments and abstractions that we bring to animals in advance of observable evidence. We 
can (as I have been doing here, and as Merleau-Ponty does) logically critique the epistemological 
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and metaphysical assumptions that motivate reductive and skeptical attitudes toward animals, 
but, as I have been suggesting throughout this chapter, we also need to recognize that 
anthropocentrism in all of its various guises is not so much a reasoned position as it is an 
ideology and apparatus of privilege and domination (analogous to white supremacy or 
patriarchy); we rationalize it as a natural or metaphysical truth when it is in fact nothing more 
than a framework constructed and imposed in order to legitimate and maximize a contingent set 
of interests at the expense of the interests of certain others. The decision to define an animal 
solely in terms of whatever is revealed about it under a microscope or in a laboratory, and the 
assumed privilege with which that decision is made, are unwarranted and violent (both 
conceptually and ethically), and we must ceaselessly critique them as such; they obscure rather 
than elucidate the phenomena of animal life and rationalize (rather than genuinely justify) our 
continued exploitation and consumption of animal bodies. The objectifying gaze of the scientist 
or epistemologist is indeed – like the white gaze or the male gaze – a form violence. 
Anthropocentrism or human privilege is circular in a way that is vicious both logically and 
otherwise: we approach or regard the animal only as an object for a human gaze, and 
consequently we see the animal as nothing but another kind of object or piece of furniture in the 
world in opposition to ourselves as the very subjects of such a gaze. Animal bodies are regarded 
as objects or machines in opposition to minded human bodies because they are regarded as such 
by a human mind that takes for granted rather than justifies the Archimedean centrality of its 
own manner of being and cognitive/epistemic standpoint. In short, if and when non-human 
animals do not appear to us as “subjects” in their own right, they do not do so not because they 
really are not “subjects” but because we have decided to view them from an objectifying 
standpoint; it is because we assume (falsely) that the fundamental kind of relation is a cognitive, 
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subject-object relation and because, moreover, we royally assume the subject-position of every 
such subject-object relation. If all we set out to discover about an animal is what we can observe 
and analyze at the other end of a microscope or glass enclosure – that is, if we only ever seek to 
understand an animal as an object or mechanism – then that is all that an animal will ever be for 
us. It is in this way that human beings bootstrap and perpetuate their epistemic as well as 
material authority over the rest of the natural world. I hope it is clear that such an anthropocentric 
standpoint is as arbitrary as the once supposed divine right of kings, and this is no accident 
because, ultimately, the former is just as “theological in its infrastructure”483 as the latter. 
Before I proceed to offer my concluding remarks for this discussion concerning the 
“problem of animal minds,” I wish to address briefly Thomas Nagel’s famous essay, “What Is It 
Like to Be a Bat?”484 Though I am reserving my full response to Nagel for the next chapter, his 
consideration of bat-consciousness is obviously relevant to everything I have argued up to this 
point; indeed, Nagel’s argument in this essay poses a serious challenge to much of what I have 
been arguing here. Fortunately, however, I think that phenomenology in general, and that 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy in particular, are able to answer this challenge. 
The provocative title of Nagel’s essay is somewhat misleading, as his primary concern is 
not the nature of bat consciousness but the nature of consciousness in general. Nagel appeals to 
bat consciousness in order to contribute to the debate that primarily occupies analytic philosophy 
of mind, namely the debate concerning the reducibility (or irreducibility) of consciousness to 
physical or causal explanation and description. Nagel’s position is that experience is essentially 
																																																								
483 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 88. In context, Merleau-Ponty is referring to various reductionistic conceptions of 
nature as “theological” constructs, but I think the same can be said of equally reductionistic conceptions of animals 
and of the conception of “humanity” that accompanies them. 
484 Published in Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012). All 
subsequent references to this essay will be to its publication in this volume. 
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defined by its qualitative or subjective character, and that the qualitative or subjective character 
of experience resists reductionistic or materialistic explanation and analysis. Now, I am not 
going to articulate Nagel’s entire argument for the latter claim, for what is most germane to the 
topic at hand is his position concerning the radical inaccessibility of an animal’s mind or 
interiority.  
For Nagel, experience is defined by what analytic philosophers often call “qualia,” which 
refer to the directly felt or “lived-through,” qualitative (sensory or perceptual) aspects of 
experience, that is, to “what it is like” to have a particular experience or to be in a particular 
mental state (i.e., the painfulness of feeling pain, the bitterness of tasting something bitter, the 
blueness of seeing blue, and so on). The idea is that in order to have experience at all, it is 
necessary that there be something that it is like to have that experience (that in order to 
experience pain or to be in a “pain-state,” for example, it is necessary that such an experience or 
state feel a certain way, that such an experience or state be painful). In general, then, if an entity 
is conscious or “minded” in any way, there must be something that it is like to be such an entity, 
something that it is like to experience the world as that entity. As Nagel puts it, “fundamentally 
an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that 
organism – something it is like for the organism.”485 Importantly, for Nagel this qualitative or 
subjective dimension of experience is only available internally to the being who has it, or is only 
given from the first-person point of view. This is essentially why Nagel argues that 
consciousness cannot be reducible to materialistic description or explanation, since to describe or 
explain consciousness in such a way is to do so from an “objective,” external, third-personal 
perspective, and such a perspective will never capture those first-personal, internal, “felt” 
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qualities of experience without which there would, in fact, be no such thing as “experience” at all 
(for example, one may state all of the causal mechanisms that produce pain in the body, but none 
of these will actually explain or capture its “painfulness”; likewise, one will never be able to 
derive the “redness” of red from causes and effects that are not themselves “red”).   
Given the skepticism that traditionally prevails in discussions concerning non-human 
minds, Nagel remarkably begins from the assumption that there is, indeed, something that it is 
like to be a bat:   
I assume we all believe that bats have experience. After all, they are mammals, and there is no more doubt 
that they have experience than that mice or pigeons or whales have experience…Even without the benefit 
of philosophical reflection, anyone who has spent some time in an enclosed space with an excited bat 
knows what it is to encounter a fundamentally alien form of life.486 
 
Nagel simply posits that it is obvious that bats have subjectivity and thus does not take it to be 
necessary to demonstrate argumentatively that they do so. However, Nagel also posits that it is 
impossible for us to know what it is like to be a bat, that a bat’s interiority is absolutely 
inaccessible to us: whenever I attempt to imagine what it is like to be a bat, I inexorably only 
imagine what it would be like for me to be a bat, but of course that is not what it is like to be a 
bat at all; it is not what it is like “for a bat to be a bat.”487 
 It should already be clear how Merleau-Ponty would critique Nagel here; indeed, in each 
of the previous chapters I have shown how Merleau-Ponty dismantles the dualism that implicitly 
informs and frames Nagel’s argument in this essay, so I am not going to recapitulate those 
arguments here. In short, the damning problem for Nagel’s account is that the opposition he 
assumes between the “subjective” and “objective” points of view is not only, as Merleau-Ponty 
proves, a false abstraction, but is also one that would make not only knowledge of a bat’s mind 
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impossible but also knowledge of any mind impossible. Nagel does not consider himself be a 
strict Cartesian (since he does not conceive the mind as an immaterial substance), yet the 
opposition he assumes between interiority and exteriority is thoroughly Cartesian and, like any 
form of Cartesianism, it ultimately leaves us with solipsism. Nagel broaches this problem but 
does not acknowledge or address it adequately. He does acknowledge the logical connection 
between the classical mind/body problem and the classical problem of other minds,488 yet in the 
end he maintains the radical inaccessibility of a bat’s interiority. Nagel’s case for the radical 
inaccessibility of a bat’s interiority, however, depends upon a dichotomy between “the 
subjective” and “the objective” that renders any interiority inaccessible. There is a rather 
surprising moment in this essay, however, in which Nagel seems to recognize that his ontological 
commitments result in solipsism and suggests that, in order to account for the possibility of 
knowing other minds (whether human or non-human), one would have to rethink or transform 
radically the categories according to which philosophers traditionally understand reality:     
This question also lies at the heart of the problem of other minds, whose close connection with the mind-
body problem is often overlooked. If one understood how subjective experience could have an objective 
nature, one would understand the existence of subjects other than oneself…If our idea of the physical ever 
expands to include mental phenomena, it will have to assign them an objective character – whether or not 
this is done by analyzing them in terms of other phenomena already regarded as physical. It seems to me 
more likely, however, that mental-physical relations will eventually be expressed in a theory whose 
fundamental terms cannot be placed clearly in either category.489 
 
We see here that Nagel glimpses the necessity of exactly the sort of ontology that Merleau-Ponty 
provides, yet unfortunately it is one that Nagel himself is unable to provide. As we have seen, 
Merleau-Ponty precisely develops an ontology beyond the traditional categories of “the mental” 
and “the physical,” hence beyond the traditional alternatives of dualism and reductive 
materialism. Nagel, however, remains impaled upon the horns of this (false) dilemma; in the end, 
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he is unable to abandon the dichotomy between interiority and exteriority, and this dichotomy 
derails his argument into solipsism.  
Not only is such solipsism unacceptable on its own terms, it is also inconsistent with the 
very point of departure of Nagel’s argument in this essay. Nagel assumes that there is something 
that it is like to be a bat, yet he also claims that what it is like to be a bat – that a bat’s 
subjectivity – is absolutely inaccessible to us. If we examine these two claims closely, however, 
we find that they are inconsistent. After all, why is Nagel so sure that bats are conscious? I 
clearly agree with him that they are, but what accounts for this intuition? It is surely the case that 
I can never fully know “what it is like” to be a bat, but if I am able to intuit that there is 
something that it is like to be a bat in the first place, then it cannot be the utterly inscrutable 
mystery or undisclosable secret that Nagel makes it out to be. As we have seen, such an intuition 
cannot be founded on inductive inference, and if there truly were a divorce between “the 
objective” and “the subjective” we would neither have such an intuition nor ever be prompted to 
draw such an inference in the first place. As Merleau-Ponty demonstrates, the opposition Nagel 
assumes between “the subjective” and “the objective” – between interiority and exteriority, or 
between first-personal and third-personal modes of presentation – and which frames his entire 
discussion of the problem of knowing “what it is like to be a bat” is a product of reflection – a 
derivative abstraction – and is thus not at all an epistemically or ontologically basic given. Nagel 
recognizes that the supposedly irreconcilable opposition between “subjective” and “objective” 
points of view or phenomena poses not only the problem of how it is possible to know a bat’s 
mind but also the problem of how it is possible to know any mind, yet he never once pauses to 
wonder, then, why he is so sure that other humans (let alone bats) are conscious. As we have 
seen, however, these problems remain insoluble, and the intuitions that motivate Nagel’s entire 
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argument in this essay remain inexplicable, so long as one begins from a dichotomy between the 
subjective and the objective.  
However, I do wish to appreciate the refreshing epistemic humility – the hermeneutic 
charity and even the lack of anthropocentrism – that Nagel exhibits in his consideration of bat 
consciousness: he takes it for granted that we know that bats have subjectivity yet, at the same 
time, acknowledges the alterity of bat-subjectivity in insisting that we cannot know what it is like 
to be a bat. As I just mentioned, I think Nagel pushes this alterity too far, for he pushes it to the 
pitch of dualism (which is always a potential pitfall in any philosophical treatment of alterity); he 
pushes the alterity of a bat so far, and in general drives such a deep wedge between subjectivity 
and the extra-subjective world, that he makes any perceptual intimation (or appresentation) of a 
bat’s subjectivity impossible. Nevertheless, not only does he assert that bats are conscious, he 
also urges that the radical otherness of a bat or of any other “alien” kind of being should never 
entitle us to assume that they are devoid of inner lives as complex or valuable as our own. As 
Nagel writes, “the fact that we cannot expect ever to accommodate in our language a detailed 
description of Martian or bat phenomenology should not lead us to dismiss as meaningless the 
claim that bats and Martians have experiences fully comparable in richness of detail to our 
own.”490 Nagel’s resistance to common skeptical, anti-realist, and anthropocentric attitudes 
toward other forms of life certainly goes against the grain of much of philosophy (it certainly 
goes against the grain of the views I have been critiquing in this chapter), and for that I think he 
ought to be applauded.  
Lastly, I have another reply (for now) to the view Nagel articulates in this essay. Nagel 
asserts that we cannot know what it is like to be bat, and of course there is something right about 
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that. I certainly cannot know completely (from inside a bat’s own perspective) what it is like to 
be a bat. Indeed, I cannot know what it is like to be any other kind of mind exhaustively or 
without remainder: that is simply what alterity entails, and we must always take alterity 
seriously. Not only is it logically impossible to inhabit entirely a bat’s subjectivity, but any 
presumption that one could do so would simply fail to acknowledge or respect a bat’s otherness. 
The presumption that one can fully inhabit any other being’s subjectivity fails to respect that 
being’s otherness. However, we also know that, at the same time, another being’s subjectivity 
cannot be so alien that it is utterly inaccessible, for in that case it would never even show up for 
us at all. Again, though we do need to honor the transcendence of any other being’s subjectivity, 
we also cannot conceptualize that transcendence in such a manner that reinstates dualism or 
some kind of supernaturalist conception of subjectivity. As we have seen, the aporia of alterity is 
that an Other’s otherness must be inaccessible yet also accessible, that an Other’s subjectivity 
can never be known without remainder yet must also be, at least to some extent, perceptible and 
knowable. In general, one of the most important lessons phenomenology teaches us is that lived 
experience provides, and demands to be understood according to, a “both/and” logic rather than a 
strictly dualistic or disjunctive “either/or” logic (we will recall that the former is what Merleau-
Ponty means when he speaks of “ambiguity”). That is, rather than think that an Other’s 
interiority is either accessible or inaccessible, it must be the case that an Other’s interiority is 
both accessible and inaccessible. The latter is not a strict, formal contradiction, for of course it 
really means that an Other’s interiority is neither absolutely (or exhaustively) accessible nor 
absolutely inaccessible. An Other’s subjectivity must be accessible to me yet must also 
irremediably exceed me.  
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So, I surely cannot know completely what it is like to be a bat, but I also cannot know 
completely what it like to be another human being. Moreover, not only cannot I not know 
completely what it is like to be any fellow human being, I especially cannot know what it is like 
to be a human being who lacks my various social privileges. Privilege inherently imposes 
experiential and epistemic limitations. As a white, cisheterosexual man, I cannot know what it is 
like to be a person of color in a white supremacist society, I cannot know what it is like be queer 
in a cisheteronormative society, and I cannot know what it is like to woman in a patriarchal 
society. That is to say, I cannot know any of these things completely or from “the inside out,” but 
surely it does not follow – and no one actually thinks – that I cannot know such things at all, that 
I am so utterly cut off from such perspectives or standpoints that they must be incomprehensible 
to me and that I can never hope to enter into bonds of empathy or solidarity with them; of course, 
that is not true at all, and though justice demands that I always take great caution in seeking to 
understand the perspectives of marginalized others – that I always register the epistemic 
limitations imposed upon me by my own privileged identity or standpoint in the world – so too 
does it demand that I seek to understand them, so too does it demand that I do not, in defeatist or 
quietist resignation, retreat ever further inward into my own identity or circle of privilege. And 
as I will further discuss in the following chapter, no standpoint or form of subjectivity in the 
world is every utterly isolated from or opposed to any other. Any opposition between terms – or 
any atomistic isolation of terms – is their mutual exclusion from one another (and vice versa), yet 
different forms of life are never opposed to (or isolated from) one another, for all forms of life 
are also forms of flesh. There are differences – often quite deep, significant differences – 
between different forms of embodied life, but in virtue of their embodiment such differences are 
never oppositional or strictly exclusionary. However radically different certain others may be, 
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genuine difference – difference “worthy of the name” – is never contrary to community, but is its 
realization.  
 So, on the one hand, I am compelled to admit that there is much about a bat’s experience 
of the world that will forever elude me. Yet, on the other hand, when Nagel claims that I cannot 
“know” what it is like to be a bat, my impulse is to say “well, hold on a minute, not so fast; let 
me try.” In other words, does not Nagel, or do no we, assume too hastily that we cannot know 
what it is like to be bat? Of course, one cannot know completely what it is like to be a bat, but if 
that is one’s standard for being able to know another’s subjectivity at all, then one would never 
be able to know any subjectivity except one’s own. So, though on the one hand we do need to 
respect a bat’s alterity, on the other hand I wish to ask the question: how much of an effort have 
we really made to know how a bat might experience its world? Have any of us truly attempted to 
get to know a bat? Is not the assumption that we cannot know in any conceivable way what-it-is-
like to be a bat rather lazy or thoughtless? Flesh, of course, has limits, but it also creative and 
malleable; it is what Nietzsche calls a “plastic power.”491 I cannot flap my arms and expect to 
take flight, but we also know that blind people, for example, can develop the use of a kind of 
echolocation. And as I discussed earlier, though we may never be able to smell the world like a 
dog, perhaps we can hone our noses to be more attuned to the world than we assume, and thus 
perhaps, in a way, we can participate in a canine style of existence.  
So, can I know what it is like to be a bat? Can I know what it is like to use echolocation 
as a bat? No, not completely. But maybe I can know more than I might initially be inclined to 
assume. After all, how much of an effort have I really made? I have in mind here Deleuze’s 
argument (which he derives from his reading of Spinoza) that what matters is not what a body is 
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Breazeale, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), §1, p. 62. 
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but only what a body can do and that, moreover, we do not even really know what our bodies 
can do:  
Spinoza offers philosophers a new model: the body…“we do not know what the body can do…” This 
declaration of ignorance is a provocation. We speak of consciousness and its decrees, of the will and its 
effects, of the thousand ways of moving the body, of dominating the body and the passions – but we do 
not even know what a body can do. Lacking this knowledge, we engage in idle talk.492  
 
My suggestion is that when we reflexively claim that we cannot know what it is like to be a bat 
(or any other kind of embodied subjectivity), we are engaging in precisely the sort of idle talk 
Deleuze mentions here. A living body is what a living can do, and no living body can ever know 
what it can do (hence what it is) if it does not test its limits, if it does explore the further 
potencies or affects of which it may be capable, the further horizons of experience that may lie 
open before it, the perceptual, agential, or creative possibilities that may be latent in its flesh, 
simply waiting to be awakened by new relations with the world and with other forms of flesh. As 
Deleuze puts it, “we do not even know of what affections we are capable, nor the extent of our 
power…And we will certainly never know this, if we do not concretely try to become active.”493  
I think that Deleuze’s conception of the body here is absolutely compatible with Merleau-
Ponty’s. Indeed, when Deleuze suggests that a living body is nothing else but what it can do and 
insists upon its inherent creativity and lability, or when Deleuze claims that the power of a body 
consists in the “affections, passive as well as active” of which it may be capable and that it is 
only in knowing the power of the body that we know “the power of which the soul is in itself 
capable,”494 this recalls Merleau-Ponty’s famous claim that “consciousness is in the first place 
not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I can,’”495 a claim that, as we saw in chapter two, informs the 
one he later makes that “the body is to be compared, not to a physical object, but to a work of 
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art.”496 Like Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty considers the living body to be an inherently ecstatic and 
expressive, fluid and creative agency; it is surely not a blank canvas, yet at the same time we 
should never rashly assume that we know the expressive forms it may (or may not) be able to 
take, the styles of being it may (or may not) be able to enact, the affective bonds it may yet (or 
may not) be able to actualize in composition with the world and with other bodies, the ways it 
may yet (or may not) be able to transform itself, the ways in which it may yet (or may not) be 
able to “sing the world’s praises,”497 the things it can (or cannot) do, the things it can (or cannot) 
know. And following Merleau-Ponty, the only point I wish to add here is that, given the profound 
extent to which our living bodies are already entangled with other living bodies in complex webs 
of intercorporeal interdependencies – given the fact that all forms of flesh are fundamentally 
intertwined, given the fact that our human bodies are already caught up in skeins of relations 
with non-human as well as with other human bodies and that it is only through such relations that 
we know our own human bodies or selves at all – there is good reason to think that we, or that 
our bodies, are capable of being and knowing so much more than we might uncritically think, so 
much more than certain conceptual frameworks and abstractions would have us think, so much 
more than what we conventionally think of as “human”; indeed, as we will soon see, there is 
good reason to think that, paradoxically, what is “human” is itself already more-than-human. 
Let us finally consider the affective, intercorporeal relations with other living bodies 
(non-human as well as human) of which we are always already capable and in which we are 
always already implicated, the relations with other living bodies that always already inform our 
very concepts of the mental characteristics we often (fallaciously) worry about “projecting” into 
others, the intersubjective relations and phenomena that in fact come before any questions or 
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worries about “anthropomorphism.” The lizard who warms its flesh in the radiant sun, the worm 
who writhes in mud recently moistened by rainwater, the dog who eagerly awaits and excitedly 
greets her human companion, the dogs who repeatedly return to and often refuse to leave the 
graves of their deceased “masters,” the cat who sits and meows by his empty food dish and water 
bowl, the cat who sits on my chest and purrs when I’m depressed or sick in the afternoon yet 
hunts and taunts its prey in the evening, the elephants who hover around a deceased member of 
their herd and shed tears, the birds who sing and dance and adopt elaborate ornamentations to 
attract potential mates, the raven who hides its cache of food from others who would pilfer it, the 
crows who remember and warn their fellow crows of the humans who have slighted or wronged 
them, the deer wailing in pain on the side of a highway, the rats who, in numerous experiments, 
prioritize liberating their captive companions in order to share treats with them rather than hoard 
those treats for themselves, the honey badger who repeatedly invents new ways to escape its 
cage, the parrot who incessantly plucks out its hairs because it cannot escape its cage, the mother 
whale who cries – and who can hardly stop crying – for her child who has been kidnapped from 
her and who lashes out against her human captors…do these not echo my own joys and 
delectations, my own anticipations and excitements, my own hungers and thirsts, my own griefs 
and loyalties, my own pains and pleasures, my own vanities and attractions, my own subterfuges 
and self-interested motives, my own grudges and precautions, my own oppressive (psychological 
or social if not physical) confinements and desires for rebellion and liberation, my own 
boredoms and anxieties, my own capacities for love and rage, for solidarity and selfishness, for 
tenderness and cruelty, for sublime happiness and inconsolable sadness? Do they not speak to me 
of the various raptures and passions to which my flesh daily submits, the manifold ecstasies or 
overtures of which it is capable – along with all of the vulnerabilities to which it is exposed – and 
	 438	
precisely in virtue of which it has a world? To accept that this is the case is not to embrace 
uncritically “anthropomorphism” but to repudiate solipsism, that is, to reject the very notion that 
there has ever been anything like an isolated, autonomous, internally translucent, rigidly 
demarcated  “human” standpoint relative to which I may compare or contrast and presume to 
judge the rest of the living universe, a notion that is logically the same as the equally false notion 
that I, as an individual (human) subject, have ever occupied a standpoint in the world that was 
not already inscribed in and by the standpoints of (human) others; it is to repudiate the notion 
that any “standpoint” in the world is ever not already infested and entwined with other 
standpoints, for every standpoint is the standpoint of a living body, and no living body exists – no 
living body even knows itself as such – apart from other bodies who help mold its fleshy agency, 
other bodies who must continually teach it its powers and limitations.  
Indeed, anything we conceptualize as “mental” is already enfleshed, or rather already 
abstracted from the flesh we share with others insofar as we “conceptualize” it. My 
understanding of what it is to “have” a mind or even to be at all – my understanding of colors 
and sounds, of tastes and smells, of pains and pleasures, of hungers and thirsts, of joys and 
sorrows, of virtues and vices, of beliefs and intentions, of space and time, of anything “mental” 
or phenomenal whatsoever – is already embedded within, or carved out of, a carnality I share 
with every living being, a carnal world with which all living beings are engaged in skeins within 
skeins of bodily, affective relations. Thus, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, “the ontic, the “Erlebnisse” 
[lived experiences], “sensations,” “judgements”…all the bric-a-brac of those positive psychic so-
called realities…is in reality abstractly carved out from the ontological tissue, from the “body of 
the mind”….”498 Thus, other bodies’ schemas of navigating, exploring, responding to, and 
																																																								
498 The Visible and the Invisible, p. 253. 
	 439	
making sense of the world – regardless of whether or not they are “human” – already synergize 
with my own and with one another because all corporeal schemas are “made of the same 
stuff.”499 These other bodies already “haunt me at a distance” just as I “haunt them at a 
distance”500; their gestures already mirror my own, their interiorities already “echo”501 my own, 
their voices already resound within the chords of my own phonations, their intentional 
orientations toward a world already surge through my own limbs, muscles, and joints, their 
sensations and passions already tremble and scintillate through my flesh.  
All living bodies are bodies that, no matter how different from my own they may be (and 
such differences should never be overlooked), are, simply in virtue of being bodies, “living 
similars”502 that will “insert themselves in the circuit of my hand to my hand,”503 bodies that will 
have already inserted themselves into my body’s relation to itself. Only through this 
“polymorphism”504 or “promiscuity,”505 only through this sort of “coition”506 or “one sole 
Einfühlung”507 between human and even non-human bodies – or only through what Alphonso 
Lingis thus suggests we call “bestiality”508 – do I ever know what I am, what my body is, what 
my body can and cannot do, the full measure of my body’s affectivity, expressivity, and 
plasticity. For example, do I not learn from petting a dog or a cat that my hands are a means for 
caressing and not just for grasping, for giving and sharing in pleasure and not just for taking or 
manipulating, for abandoning myself to another and not just for egoistic possession? And this is 
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reciprocal: animal bodies also know me as an Other or “living similar”; they exchange their 
corporeal schemas with me, they sometimes make emotional overtures to me, they recognize my 
living body as like unto their own, and in this exchange and recognition they too learn more 
about what they are as living bodies, more about even how to comport themselves appropriately 
in the world. As Alphonso Lingis beautifully writes (in the essay to which I just referred):  
The curled fingers of an infant ease into tenderness from holding the kitten but not tight, and rumble into 
contentment from stroking its fur with pressure and periodicity that are responded to with purring. In 
contact with the cockatoo – who, though he can clutch with a vice-grip around a perch while sleeping and 
chews up his oak perch  in the course of a month, relaxes his claws on the arm of an infant and never bites 
the ear he affectionately nibbles at, and who extends his neck and spreads his wings to be caressed in all 
the softness of his down feathers – the infant discovers that her hand are not just retractile hooks for 
grabbing, but organs to give pleasure. In contact with the puppy mouthing and licking his legs and fingers 
and face, the infant discovers his lips are not just fleshy traps to hold in food and his tongue not just a 
lever to shift it into the throat, but organs that give, give pleasure, give the pleasure of being kissed.509 
 
My partner’s cat (“Mr. Bojangles,” or “Bo” for short) – who spends so much time prowling 
around the apartment in pursuit of imaginary prey, who often tears vigorously at his scratching 
post and also at furniture he is not supposed to tear, who pounces upon his toys with predatorial 
aplomb and ferocity – arches his back and gently leans against my leg, then stretches himself 
vertically across my standing body; with his claws retracted and paws pointed toward my torso, 
he meows softly; I understand he is entreating me to hold him, I cradle him in my arms, and he 
begins to purr; after some time, he is ready to leave my arms, and so he mouths one of my arms 
or hands: he bites down on my flesh, yes, but in such a way that is adjusted to a body he knows, 
a body that gives him comfort and pleasure, a body he loves and whose affection he understands 
in the same ways it understands his, a body with whom he wishes to communicate rather than 
one upon which he wishes to prey or test his fangs. So, he “bites” my arm or my hand, but never 
in the way he would bite a toy or prey. And at night, once my partner has gone to bed, when we 
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are alone in my partner’s living room together and I am sitting by myself on the couch with all 
the lights off (while engrossed in a television show or video game), he will often suddenly spring 
himself upon my lap or shoulder from out of the darkness and announce himself to me, yet never 
in the manner in which he pounces upon his toys or imaginary prey. It is thus that he learns more 
about himself, more about the body that he is. It is thus that he learns his claws are not just for 
killing and trapping prey, that his mouth is for more than just eating and drinking, that his legs 
are for more than just walking, running, and pouncing (upon prey), that his vocal chords are for 
more than what they were for when he was a kitten and used them primarily to solicit food or 
warmth from his mother, more now than for hissing in fear or anger or for yowling in pain; and 
yet again, reciprocally, I learn more about my own being through its composition with his, 
through the ways in which our affects and bodily intentionalities interlace: I learn more about 
tenderness from his purrs and from the ways he sweetly rubs himself against me, I learn more 
about communication, more about desire, more about affection and love, more about fear and 
pain from his meows, his hisses, and his yowls; I learn more about the “boundaries” of all of 
these things, and therefore I learn more about these things themselves.  
These transferences of sense between Bo and I, between our bodies, are hardly different 
in nature from Merleau-Ponty’s description of an infant who, clearly without making inferences 
or intellectual judgments, clearly without the need to “reason by analogy,” responds in an 
appropriately playful manner to the gesture of an adult who playfully pretends to bite one of his 
fingers:    
A baby of fifteen months opens its mouth if I playfully take one of its fingers between my teeth and 
pretend to bite it. And yet it has scarcely looked at its face in a glass, and its teeth are not in any case like 
mine. The fact is that its own mouth and teeth, as it feels them from the inside, are immediately, for it, an 
apparatus to bite with, and my jaw as the baby sees it from the outside, is immediately, for it, capable of 
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the same intentions. ‘Biting’ has immediately, for it, an intersubjective significance. It perceives its 
intentions in its body, and my body with its own, and thereby my intentions in its own body.510  
 
This is, of course, a great example of the fact that we couple with other bodies – that we 
immediately sense another’s bodily intentions and also learn about our own bodies through that 
sensing – before we ever make inferences about others or worry about falsely “projecting” 
qualities into them (indeed, this passage occurs in the context of Merleau-Ponty’s refutation of 
the idea that we fundamentally know others through analogical reasoning). However, I wish to 
use this example to underscore certain points beyond those Merleau-Ponty explicitly makes here. 
This example nicely illustrates the intercorporeity that founds any sense-of-self and any abstract 
concepts of mental qualities, and it also reinforces the mutuality of intercorporeal relationships, 
for the playfulness of the situation here is co-constituted. Surely the adult must comport 
him/herself in a playful manner, yet the infant, too, must do so likewise at the very same time, 
for otherwise the exchange of meaning in question – the play – would fail; the exchange of 
meaning in question would miscarry, or the situation would not be what it is, would not be an 
exchange of pretense or a situation of play. The adult makes the playful pretense of biting the 
infant’s fingers, the infant perceives the significance of the adult’s smiles and laughter – lives the 
adult’s intended pretense – and thus does not cry or wail or struggle to flee in fear or in 
anticipation of pain but opens his mouth in mimicry of his adult partner’s mouth and laughs 
along, and the adult, in turn, responds to the infant’s perception of pretense appropriately, and he 
does so without having to reason analogically about whether or not he is distressing or 
frightening the infant. For this interaction to be what it is, the adult and the infant must be equal, 
reciprocal participants in it. The exchange of sense that happens here is strictly bilateral, and 
moreover it is through such a bilateral exchange (or what Husserl called “pairing”) that the infant 
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comes to learn more about his body, namely that his mouth can be used for play or pretense and 
not just for eating or for real biting, and he is thus also initiated into an understanding of the very 
meaning of “play.”  
What is true concerning this infant, however, is true concerning all of us, and not just 
when we are infants: we never stop “pairing” with other bodies because we never stop being 
bodies, and this also precisely means we never stop becoming bodies, that we never cease to 
develop our sense of ourselves as carnal beings in and through our carnal relationships with 
others, and these carnal relationships are never, in principle and in fact, just between humans. I 
learn just as much about myself or my embodiment from my interactions with Bo – from the 
overlapping of our bodily schemas and affects – as I do from any interactions I have with other 
humans, and reciprocally Bo learns about, or rather activates, aspects of his own being he would 
not learn about or activate, or aspects he would at least not learn about or activate in the same 
way, in interactions only with other cats or only with prey. I wish to clarify that I do not mean to 
equate Merleau-Ponty’s example of play between a human infant and a human adult with the 
examples of my interactions with Bo. I do not think the exchanges I have with Bo are exactly 
like those I might have with a human infant, and still less am I equating Bo himself with a human 
infant. For one thing, I know that Bo is not “human” (his hunting behaviors are certainly 
sufficient to tell me that, though of course it would be wrong to pretend that we humans are not 
predatorial in our own ways, even in worse ways), but the point I continually wish to insist upon, 
and one to which I will return, is that this does not mean that there is nothing of “me” in Bo or 
nothing of “Bo” in me, that there is no “humanity” in a cat or no “felinity” in a human: if the 
intercorporeity through which we become – and are always becoming – what we are attests to 
anything, it is that there are no boundaries, hence no categories, that are not fluid and porous, 
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that there are no boundaries that are not already constituted as such in and through exposure to, 
and composition with, other boundaries, that there are no “categories” that are not already 
implicated in other categories (or that are not already what Merleau-Ponty calls “ambiguous”), 
no “selves” or forms of life that are not constituted by ever shifting, ever expanding and 
contracting distances from others. Moreover, I think many of my exchanges with Bo, such as the 
ones I have mentioned, are more sophisticated than those I would have with a young infant. His 
efforts to communicate with me in the manner in which he gently bites my arm (as well as in all 
of the other ways he talks to me in ways he never would with another cat), and his affirmations 
of me as an affectionate Other in all of his other interactions with me, are, I think, more than 
“just” reflexive or mimetic in the way that the infant perceives the pretense of the adult and feels 
the powers of his mouth. Nevertheless, my intercorporeal exchanges with Bo – and my 
intercorporeal exchanges with non-humans in general – are not different in kind from those I 
have with other humans, and they are just as deeply and pervasively constitutive of who or what 
I am, just as constitutive of my understanding of what it is to be the body that I am.  
Merleau-Ponty writes that “between my consciousness and my body as I experience it, 
between this phenomenal body of mine and that of another as I see it from the outside, there 
exists an internal relation which causes the other to appear as the completion of the system.”511 
We valorize the “mirror test” as the most important test of “self-awareness” or “selfhood,” and I 
have already criticized the importance we typically attach to it. But as intercorporeity attests, all 
of us – humans and non-humans alike, including even those non-humans who do not pass the 
conventional mirror test – have always already “passed” a sort of “mirror test,” so to speak, 
because they have always already “passed through” one another’s corporeity in order to be even 
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minimally conscious at all, because we were already “mirrors” for one another before we ever 
looked at ourselves in literal mirrors or attempted to “project” reflections of ourselves into one 
another, because we have always already developed, and because we never cease developing, our 
sense of ourselves as distinct, bodily beings by being together with one another’s bodies and with 
yet other bodies. My corporeality is made up of other corporealities. “My corporal schema is a 
normal means for knowing other bodies and these know my body,”512 and at the foundational 
level of embodied life is what Merleau-Ponty calls “the Universal-lateral of the co-perception of 
the world”513: the world I perceive is (as I will further elaborate in the next chapter) always one I 
co-perceive with others, and these others are necessarily not only human. When Merleau-Ponty 
capitalizes the ‘U’ in “Universal” here, he really means it: he means it to include human and non-
human perceivers. This is not a reductive or totalizing gesture on Merleau-Ponty’s part, but is on 
the contrary his recognition of the fact that all meaning and experience is constituted by radical 
difference, that there is nothing I may ever sense or perceive or understand that is not already 
comprised of the perspectives of all other possible perceivers, that is not already inflated to 
presence and intelligibility for me by relations with other perceiving bodies, and unless we 
regress to dualism – unless we deny perception to non-human bodies – these include relations 
with non-human bodies as well as with human ones. So, as Merleau-Ponty argues, the (body of 
the) Other is necessary to mediate (“complete the system of”) my relationship with myself and 
with my own body, and later, as we will see, Merleau-Ponty further argues that it cannot only be 
human others that do so: not only do non-humans, as living bodies, also naturally insinuate 
themselves into my carnal being, but I would not be the carnal being that I am – I would not be 
“human” – if they had not already done so and were not always already doing so: “humanity” is 
																																																								
512 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 218. 
513 Ibid., p. 218. 
	 446	
constituted through its relations with non-human others just as much as an individual human 
being is constituted through his/her relations with human others. Indeed, what we call a “human” 
being, or what we affirm as any distinctive kind of carnal being, is but a particular expression of 
the carnal world in which all other living, carnal beings are embedded, other carnal beings that 
therefore are tacitly and inexorably swept up in whatever sense comes to be reflectively attached 
to any particular one (whether “human” or otherwise). As I will further discuss in the following 
chapter, “humanity” is constituted as such in its pairings with “animality” in just the same way 
that, in traditional phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity, a (human) “self” is 
constituted as such in its pairings with (human) “Others.” Merleau-Ponty will argue that “the 
animal” is “the other side” of “the human” in exactly the same sense in which “the body” is the 
“the other side” of “the mind.” 
Throughout this chapter and the previous one I have brought up the topic of love, and it is 
a supremely important one, for few things are as deeply constitutive of human flourishing as 
love; indeed, I think few things are as deeply constitutive of the flourishing of any living being as 
love. I wholeheartedly agree with M.C. Dillon’s credo: “No good love, no good life.”514 It is 
unfortunate, then, that love is still widely neglected in philosophy. There are surely many 
philosophers who write about the nature of love, but my intuition is that, were we to do the 
painstaking analysis of gathering such data, we would find far more references to, say, “death” 
and “anxiety” in our canon than to love. Though I think Merleau-Ponty surely overstates the case 
when he proclaims that “if we consult nothing but suffering and death when we are defining 
subjectivity, subjective life with others and in the world will become logically impossible,”515 I 
think this is precisely the philosophical tradition to which he is responding, a tradition that tends 
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to suppress or marginalize love, pleasure, and desire in its conception of subjectivity. Merleau-
Ponty’s remark here seems to be a response to the fact that this same philosophical tradition also 
(falsely) understands suffering and “being-toward-death” as private or radically inward and 
individuating experiences. Though ultimately I am sure Merleau-Ponty would reject such 
understandings of suffering and “being-toward-death” rather than concede them (since, for him, 
all experiences – especially experiences of suffering and of one’s own mortality – are corporeal, 
and since everything corporeal is also already intercorporeal), his implicit point here, I think, is 
that love and desire (which he increasingly emphasizes in his later writings) are intercorporeal 
phenomena par excellence, phenomena that are most clearly unintelligible apart from (bodily) 
relationships with others. It is simply impossible to conceptualize love or desire in the way that 
Heidegger conceptualizes being-toward-death, namely as a radically individuating experience, as 
a “pure understanding of that ownmost possibility which is non-relational.”516 I have no doubt 
that Merleau-Ponty has Heidegger (and likely also Sartre) in mind here when he claims that 
restricting one’s attention to suffering and death makes “subjective life with others and in the 
world logically impossible,” because existing with others or in the world at all means being 
caught up in webs of intercorporeal relationships, because subjectivity is necessarily 
intercorporeality. Love and desire are quintessentially intercorporeal phenomena, and that is 
why Merleau-Ponty comes to take such a special interest in them; it is also why he suggests that 
all sentient flesh is defined by the ecstasy of desire and perhaps even, therefore, by “love,” too; it 
is why, as I am about to suggest, we might say, following Merleau-Ponty, that all living bodies – 
whether those of humans, dogs, cats, lizards, or earthworms – are already loving bodies, that 
embodied being-in-the-world is already, in a sense, “being-in-love.”  
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Love is a complex phenomenon and it would take me too far afield to analyze it 
adequately, but as I have already suggested, an attention to it may help illustrate and reinforce a 
number of the broader philosophical claims I wish to support. To start, it is clear that love takes 
many forms: there is romantic/erotic love, there is familial love (which, for example, can be 
subdivided in a number of ways, such as love for one’s parents, love for one’s siblings, love for 
one’s children, etc.), there is love among friends, there is love for a mentor (which I think is 
distinct from love for a friend, though it may certainly develop into that), there is the kind of love 
that is directed toward more “abstract” moral and political goods and ideals (such as equality, 
liberation, and justice), there is aesthetic love (whether concerning a beautiful painting, a lovely 
sunset, a moving poem or sonata, a brilliant film or television show, a well-written and thought-
provoking novel, an engaging game, or a pleasurable meal), there is love for activities or 
occupations that give one a sense of “meaning” (which, I think, is not reducible to mere 
“pleasure”), there is perhaps a love of place – a feeling-at-home-in-the-world – that is not 
reducible to aesthetic love, there is love for a community (which may or may not be tied to a 
specific place), there is even (healthy) love for oneself, and there are perhaps yet more I have not 
named. I love my partner, Byler, I love my parents, I loved my dog Sammy just as I now love 
Byler’s cat, Bo, I love my friends, I have loved many of my students, I have loved many of my 
professors, I love social equality and justice, I love teaching, I love philosophy, I love video 
games and horror films, I love Debussy’s “Claire de Luna,” I love Joseph Heller’s Catch-22, I 
love expressionism and post-impressionism, I love Chicago (for the most part), I love cinnamon 
buns fresh out of the oven: we understand that there are different shades of meaning that 
distinguish each of these examples of love, and that some may indeed by quite drastically 
different from one another (for example, my love for cinnamon buns is very, very different from 
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my love for Byler, as one would expect and hope); and yet, we have no trouble understanding 
that these are all examples of love, and it is not necessary to project an eternal, Platonic eidos of 
(capital ‘L’) Love in which they would all participate: it is sufficient that, to borrow a very useful 
concept from Wittgenstein, they bear a “family resemblance” to one another; it is sufficient that 
the term “love” designates an ensemble of different yet overlapping phenomena, each of which 
seem to have something to do with positive affective, passionate, desiderative attachments to 
things, others, and a world. Aristotle speaks of the “multivocity” of Being, and we can just as 
well speak of the multivocity of love. Love is a broad and complex phenomenon, but it is clearly 
real and intelligible; it has boundaries (not just any affective attachment or relationship can count 
as love), but like the boundaries of anything in reality – like indeed, the boundaries of our very 
love/desire-polarized bodies themselves – they are open and fluid.     
My parents and I are certain that Sammy loved us, but Sammy was a dog, and so the 
skeptic may yet reply that we surely do not see the living body of, say, a lizard or an earthworm 
as suggestive of love quite so readily, nor do we have the same grounds to do so. But why not? It 
seems that the problem here has less to do with lizards and earthworms and more to do with us 
and our notion of love. Perhaps we need to rethink our notion of love so that we can see it 
already at work in all forms of embodied life. Perhaps we need to open ourselves more to other-
than-human modes and manifestations of love. I admit that it is easy to see love in dogs because 
they express it in ways that are similar to how we humans tend to express it. However, as I have 
just elaborated, there are many different forms of love in the world. Does the fleshy cold-blooded 
lizard not enjoy the fact that his body is warming against a hot rock in the sun? Because he is a 
body, does his fleshy-being not include the fact that he is passionately connected to the world, 
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entwined with other subjects and objects in complex webs of affects and desires? This is indeed 
just what it means to be a living body.  
Heidegger defined Dasein as “care” (Sorge), and he denied that non-human animals 
could instantiate Dasein; he no doubt would deny that non-human animals “care” about things 
the way we humans do. Leaving aside for the moment all there is to say concerning the untenable 
anthropocentrism of Heidegger’s distinction between Dasein and non-Dasein, it has been widely 
recognized that discussions of “the body” are conspicuously sparse across his writings (which is 
not to suggest that the body is absent from them entirely, but the debate concerning the role that 
embodiment plays in Heidegger’s philosophy is not one into which I intend to wade here). 
Perhaps this conspicuous sparseness of considerations of embodiment in Heidegger is explained 
by the fact that, once we admit the radical embodiment of subjectivity, we are no longer able to 
admit any divisions (which is not to say differences) between subjectivities, such as the division 
(or “abyss”) Heidegger thinks obtains between Dasein and non-Dasein. Perhaps the lack of 
attention he pays to embodiment helps explain why Heidegger is one of those thinkers in our 
“canon” who seems to have very little to say about love (yet a whole lot to say about being-
toward-death, boredom, and anxiety, though of course these too are possible attunements only 
for bodily beings, and there is good evidence to suggest various non-humans are capable of 
them). The point I wish to make, here, though is this: is not “care” inherent to all forms of lived 
embodiment? Heidegger surely denies that lizards care about things in the same way that human 
beings do, but I cannot see how it is tenable to maintain any radical, ontological rift between 
human and non-human modes of care once we admit that all modes of care, like all modes of 
subjectivity in general, are inherently enfleshed, inherently implicated in relations between one’s 
own flesh and the flesh of others and that of the world, because all forms of flesh – no matter 
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how different they are from one another – are continuous, and because once we realize that our 
flesh already couples with other forms of flesh, so too do we realize, as Merleau-Ponty does, that 
our flesh already bears the traces and inscriptions of non-human as well as human flesh, that any 
extension of our flesh – whether it be “care” or love or the anxiety concerning death with which 
Heidegger was preoccupied – is also already an extension of the flesh of others, already an 
extension into the flesh of others, already an extension of and into the flesh of other humans, yes, 
but also an extension of and into the flesh of any living, fleshy being, including that of a lizard or 
an earthworm.  
So, is not all sentient flesh “care-full”? Is not all sentient flesh desirously oriented toward 
others and a world? As I will mention in the next chapter, Merleau-Ponty was critical of 
teleology in the classical (or conventional) sense of the term, but I think it is reasonable to say 
that all living beings express a telos in a broad sense of the term, that is, a directedness toward a 
Good (or set of goods). A “telos” need not be some antecedent immaterial “form” or essence 
somehow stamped onto/into matter or that determines the development of an organism from on 
high; it need only refer to the fact that as soon as a living, bodily being exists there is something 
for that being to flourish (or to fail to flourish), that to be embodied is already to be affectively 
connected to the world and, of course, immersed in affective relations with other bodies, hence 
immersed in a world of shared pleasures and pains, benefits and harms, excellences and 
deficiencies, goods and bads. Perhaps this is all Aristotle really meant by “telos.” In any case, 
then, is not to be enfleshed already to be embedded in relations of care? Is not to be enfleshed 
already, in a sense, to be in love? When we see earthworms squirming in mud, does it not make 
the most sense to see in their squirming a form of joy, a love of the earth, a kind of passion? To 
do so would not be to impose a “projection” on them; or if it is to “project” something into them, 
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it is something that we, as Merleau-Ponty argues, have already taken (“introjected”) from them – 
something we have already developed a sense of in and through our carnal relations with 
heterogenous carnalities – in the first place. Such ascriptions of love would not be the addition of 
something to their behavior. To see love in a lizard basking in the sun or in the frenzied, ecstatic 
squirming of a worm in mud would not be to see the comportment of the lizard or the squirming 
of the worm and then think that there must also be a component of love there, but rather it would 
be to see former’s submission to the sun and the latter’s squirming in the mud as love; it would 
be to see that what it means to be a living body is to be invested in parts of the world and in 
various activities with love. This is what Merleau-Ponty means when he claims that behavior is 
not a mere sign or indication of mindedness – not the external signifier of an internal (and 
internally translucent), preformed signified (i.e., a “mental state”) – but rather its immediate, 
direct expression as such. As I discussed in the previous chapters, Merleau-Ponty never denies 
the distinction between consciousness (interiority) and behavior (exteriority) but nevertheless 
argues that they are necessarily, intrinsically blended into one another: consciousness cannot be 
divorced from the living body and its behaviors, yet it certainly cannot be reduced to it (as 
behaviorism, for example, maintains); they are inseparable yet distinct or non-coincident, and 
thus as a whole demonstrate what Merleau-Ponty often calls “ambiguity.” This ambiguity is 
inherent to every form of consciousness and behavior, and it is precisely this ambiguity that, as 
we have seen, ensures we have direct access to others while also ensuring others will always be 
truly other, never completely accessible, never on display in the world without remainder. This 
ambiguity also ensures the possibility that we may be mistaken about the inner lives of others 
just as much as it ensures the possibility of knowing and participating in their inner lives. Thus, 
“gestures are expressive in the manner of a language, but this does not signify that they would 
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only be identical with lived experience.”517 Consciousness must be given directly through 
behavior, yet it is never identical with it.  
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the relationship between subjectivity and the 
body extends to his entire philosophy of language. Though I cannot further pursue his 
philosophy of language here (as that would require its own very extensive treatment), it is 
relevant to mention that, for Merleau-Ponty, the relation between signifier and signified is 
exactly the same as the relation between behavior (exteriority) and mind (interiority). As 
Merleau-Ponty writes, “the meaning is not on the phrase like the butter on the bread, like a 
second layer of “psychic reality” spread over the sound….”518 So, as we have seen, Merleau-
Ponty argues that I no more need to infer consciousness from behavior than I need to infer 
meaning from some material signifier: behavior is to consciousness as signifier is to signified, 
and this is not simply an accidental parallel or analogy, because for Merleau-Ponty not only is 
language already behavior, but behavior – even the “simplest” kind – is also already language (or 
is, at any rate, already a “tacit language”): “An organ of the mobile senses (the eye, the hand) is 
already a language because it is an interrogation (movement) and response (perception as 
Erfühlung [fulfillment, realization] of a project…it is a tacit language.”519 Even “an eye that 
inspects the landscape”520 is inherently a semiotic phenomenon – a sense-laden and sense-
making act – because it is an “interrogation and response.”521 Any manner in which a body is 
perceptually oriented toward and engaged with a world is a responsiveness to meaning – an 
exploratory and creative comportment toward a situation (Gestalt) – that is, as such, itself 
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inherently communicative or semiotic. And so Merleau-Ponty will even say that “the study of the 
appearance of animals takes on interest when we understand this appearance as a language.”522  
The point here, again, is that when I perceive a “mental” characteristic in a form of 
behavior (whether human or otherwise), my perception is not necessarily veridical, yet that does 
not mean that I am “inferring” the mental characteristic in question; it does not mean that I am 
adding something to the behavior. As we discussed concerning the nature of emotion, when I 
give Byler a gift for Valentine’s Day and she smiles and I perceive that she is happy, it may of 
course be the case that she hates the gift and is only pretending otherwise in order to protect my 
feelings. Yet, I do not perceive the smile (in combination with any other relevant aspects of her 
behavior, such as perhaps her tone of voice in reaction to the gift, or her using her hands to 
express surprise or excitement, etc.), then mentally draw an association between smiling and 
happiness, and then tack happiness on to her behavior: her happiness is immediately co-given 
with her behavior (similar to the manner in which the north-facing side of a building is 
immediately co-given with its south-facing side). I do not see her smile and then think she is 
happy: I see her happiness (through her smile). Naturally, Byler might be dissembling (and 
perhaps the building I am now viewing is in fact a two-dimensional movie-prop), but that does 
not negate the fact that thought or consciousness is always incarnate, thus always directly 
presenced with behavior as an irreducible whole, and if things are not as they appear – if Byler is 
indeed concealing her true feelings from me – then the truth of the matter may only reveal itself 
(if it ever does) through the further unfolding of lived experience, through yet another form of 
behavior with which it will be co-given (in the same way that the two-dimensionality of a movie 
prop would have to present itself to me directly through my further engagements with it). And 
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why should things be any different concerning Byler’s cat, Bo, or concerning lizards or 
earthworms? Surely my access to Bo’s interiority is at best very partial and in some cases I might 
be wrong about his thoughts, feelings, or intentions, but when I come into the apartment after 
having been away for nearly a week and he meows at me, approaches me, arches his back and 
rubs his body against my legs, then stretches his paws toward me so that I will lift him up and 
cradle him in my arms, and then when, once I do so, he begins to purr gutturally as I stroke his 
fur, I perceive him to be greeting me with warmth and love just as much, just as immediately and 
directly, as I perceive Byler to be doing the same when, following close behind him, she throws 
her arms around me, kisses me, and tells me she missed me. And when I see a lizard sunbathing 
or a worm writhing in recently moistened earth (apparently heading nowhere in particular), I see 
pleasure and joy there. Behavior is always ambiguous (in Merleau-Ponty’s technical sense of the 
term), yet it is always a direct – never intermediary – expression of mindedness. All gestures, 
behaviors, or meaningful phenomena come to us with their meanings already infused into them, 
and though it is typically objected that this would render their meanings transparent from the 
outside, it is in fact for that very reason that their meanings can never be transparent (either to us 
who receive them from without, or even to those who live or formulate them “from within” and 
communicate them to us). Subjectivity or forms of meaning can never be transparent because 
they are intrinsically enmeshed with corporeality, and this of lack transparency is indeed the 
price we pay for being able to know or communicate with others at all.   
We can never be absolutely sure about the interior lives of other human beings, so of 
course we also can never be absolutely sure about the interior lives of non-human beings. My 
contention, though, is that there is no good reason for a double-standard to inform how we regard 
or frame interpretations of human and non-human bodily comportments and expressions (such 
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that, for example, we worry about “anthropomorphizing” the latter while never harboring 
logically analogous worries concerning our perceptual orientations toward the former). We 
surely should not homogenize human and non-human ways of, say, caring about/for or loving 
things, which would be just as reductive as supposing that non-human bodies cannot care 
about/for or love things at all (or in ways that are at least worthy of those labels). Lizards and 
earthworms may care about or love different things from those that humans do, and they may 
care about or love things differently from the ways that humans do, but I think they nevertheless 
care – even love – things all the same. Why do I think this? Better put: why do I see this? 
Perhaps the better question would be: why do some people not think or see this? As I mentioned 
above and as anyone would agree, love is a complex phenomenon with diverse, often quite 
drastically different, forms and manifestations. Love is multivocal. So why should not 
indefinitely many – human as well as non-human – voices speak of it? Why should not 
indefinitely many bodies or bodily comportments express it? Just the examples of human love I 
provided earlier force us to realize that "love" is a category broad enough to include many 
different types of love and thus, in principle, many different types of loving-beings, or many 
different types of bodies capable of loving. So again, why should there not be as many ways to 
love as there are to be a body? Why should there not be indefinitely many ways to express love, 
even indefinitely many ways to say “I love you”? Unless one draws a line between human and 
all non-human bodies and reserves the name of “love” only for certain expressions of pleasure, 
affection, and desire on the former side of that line, this is the claim we are compelled to accept.  
Moreover (and as I also suggested earlier), I think we are compelled to accept this claim 
because we are compelled to realize that love and desire, in at least certain legitimate senses of 
those words, are already operative in all forms of life. Merleau-Ponty makes precisely this point 
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late in his career when he begins to emphasize (in ways that seem to adumbrate what would have 
been a serious and surely fascinating engagement with Freud) the inherently desirous or 
libidinous nature of the living body: 
…The body as corporal schema, the esthesiological body, the flesh, have already given us the  
Einfühlung [empathy] of the body with perceived being and with other bodies. That is, the body as the 
power of Einfühlung is already desire, libido, projection-introjection…523   
 
It is important to note that Merleau-Ponty does not use the term “projection” here in the sense in 
which he criticizes the concept elsewhere (as we have seen, in the contexts in which he criticizes 
the concept it refers to an intellectual judgment or analogical inference). Here, rather, it refers to 
a pre-reflective (reflexive) corporeal transference of sense to another body, and it is always to be 
taken together with “introjection,” or a pre-reflective (reflexive) corporeal receptivity of sense 
from another body. Thus, “my corporal schema is projected in the others and is also 
introjected…,”524 and “the psychological mechanisms of introjection and projection, instead of 
appearing as spiritual operations, must be comprised as modalities of the body’s activity.”525 In 
other words, “projection-introjection” just means intercorporeity, or the immediate, reciprocal 
exchange of meanings that unfolds between living bodies in their encounters with one another 
and that founds any “projection” of qualities from one embodied being to another in the more 
common sense of the term.  
Thus, “projection-introjection” is Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation of Husserl’s concept of 
“pairing” (and it exhibits at the level of embodied life the kind of relationality he will find 
operative at all levels of reality, which he calls “the chiasm”). So, for Merleau-Ponty it is 
obvious that there is a dimension of desire intrinsic to all intercorporeal relationships and, 
therefore, intrinsic to all forms of life as such (for indeed, no living body exists in isolation). In 
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many of the contexts in which Merleau-Ponty discusses the libidinous dimension of 
embodiment, it is true that he mainly has in mind human embodiment. Yet restricting desire, 
pleasure, and love only to human bodies would clearly be inconsistent with everything he argues, 
so throughout his late course on Nature not only does he explicitly affirm that many animal 
behaviors cannot be interpreted narrowly in an “adaptationist” or “utilitarian” way (as directed 
toward the mere satisfaction of niche needs) but must often be understood as things done simply 
for the sake of pleasure,526 he also makes it a point to clarify that the (inherently affective, desire-
laden) intertwining that happens between human bodies must be affirmed between human and 
non-human bodies as well:  
Projection-introjection, relation of the Ineinander [intertwining]…unveils a libidinal dimension of the 
corporal schema…recuperate all that he [Freud] said on this endoperception of others (and of 
animals)…Pleasure is open like sensing is open onto the things.527   
 
To be a living body is already to be ecstatically open to and immersed in a world, already to be 
embedded in webs of affective relationships: so, of course living bodies are going to be polarized 
toward pleasures and sources of comfort and joy, and of course they are going to seek pleasure, 
comfort, and joy in other living bodies; of course they are going to be stretched toward the world 
in desire, and of course they are going to come to “love” or to “care for” those things or bodies 
that reciprocate or fulfill their desires, the flesh that comes together with theirs in shared passion. 
After all, all flesh is “esthesiological,” or a surface and conduit of affective sensitivities and 
flows of intensity. Thus, as Merleau-Ponty says here, pleasure is just as open as other sensory 
modes of engagement with the world (such as touch or vision), just as open as the ecstatic flesh 
itself that “feels” it, and as we know perfectly well from ordinary experience, we are able to 
participate in the pleasures of non-human bodies just as readily as we are able to see or to touch 
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them at all. Being-together in flesh and thus also in mind means already being-together in desire, 
and this is why “desire considered from the transcendental point of view” designates the 
“common framework of my world as carnal and of the world of the other.”528 At the most basic 
level of being, I never “project” anything into other beings that I have not first, always already 
“introjected” from them, and it is thus that any of my “ascriptions” of qualities to others (whether 
human or non-human) arise from the intercorporeal life I share with them, from the webs of 
desires and affects in which we are all already entangled and upon which all of our concepts of 
mental qualities – all of our concepts of desires, affects, emotions, dispositions, cognitive 
capacities, and so on – ultimately rest; it is thus that I, in fact, do not know what I am apart from 
my bodily – especially affective or desirous – relations with others or with all embodied 
othernesses; indeed, it is thus that, as Merleau-Ponty affirms, “human desire emerges from 
animal desire.”529 
Merleau-Ponty’s later focus on the affective (“esthesiological”) and libidinous nature of 
the living body is simply an extension of his earlier account of the primacy of “operative 
intentionality.” Indeed, as we saw earlier, Merleau-Ponty remarks that operative intentionality is 
“apparent in our desires.”530 We see, then, that Merleau-Ponty never ceases to underscore our 
fundamental operative-intentional, esthesiological, intercorporeal entanglements with others and 
with a world that precede and found any reflective or representational, “objectifying” stances 
toward them, and affectivity and desire are modes of operative intentionality par excellence. Not 
only does Merleau-Ponty remark that operative-intentionality is clearly apparent in our desires, 
but we might say that desire – even, in a sense, love – is the fundamental mode of a living body’s 
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engagements with others and the world, the fundamental “operative-intentional” overture of flesh 
to flesh. To be a (living) body is to be vulnerable. Embodiment is vulnerability. Vulnerability is 
essential to “feeling” or “sensing” anything at all; vulnerability is feeling or sensing. And is it not 
the case that we are the most vulnerable when we give ourselves over to others in love? For us as 
human beings, it is surely the case that we are never more vulnerable than we first tell a 
prospective romantic partner “I love you.” As Lingis puts it, “how rarely do humans find the 
courage to say those fearful words I love you – fearful, because we are never so vulnerable, never 
open to being so easily and deeply hurt, as when we give ourselves over in love to someone.”531 
It is surely the case that we are never more vulnerable than when we choose to commit ourselves 
to a beloved other. Of course, this kind of radical vulnerability need not be restricted to romantic 
love. We may also be just as vulnerable when we commit ourselves with love or passion to ideals 
or causes or projects that we find to be worthwhile, even urgently important, to advance, 
especially when we are not guaranteed – as we never are – to see such ideals, causes, or projects 
fulfilled. For example, I am surely very vulnerable indeed in choosing to pursue a career as a 
professional philosopher. This, too, is a risk taken out of love: not the love that goes by the name 
of eros, but the one that goes by the name of philo. Nevertheless, I know I was never more 
vulnerable than when I first told Byler that I loved her, and when I told her that, she was not yet 
ready to say it back to me. Fortunately, I was confident that one day she would be ready, and so, 
since I meant those words, I continued joyfully to take the risk of further intimacy – to make 
myself even that much more vulnerable in furthering our relationship with each other – and 
when, a couple of months later, she finally did say those words back to me, never had I felt more 
overjoyed, never had I felt more actualized and affirmed, and I think this sort of actualization or 
																																																								
531 “Bestiality,” in Animal Others, p. 52. 
	 461	
affirmation is ontological and not just “psychological” or “subjective,” something that strikes the 
chords of our being and not just the nerves that contingently make up our objective brains and 
bodies. As I just mentioned, it is undeniable that to be an embodied being is to be vulnerable, and 
never are we more vulnerable than when we offer ourselves to others (or to the world) in love. It 
follows, then, that we are never more the kinds of beings that we are than when we are in love, 
that we are never more living bodies than when we love. To define bodily-being as vulnerability 
is just as well to define it as being-in-love. If to exist as a body is to be vulnerable – if it is to be 
immersed in affect-laden, desire-rich relationships with others and with a world – and if to love 
is to surrender oneself to others or to projects in the world vulnerably, then we cannot fail but to 
affirm that bodily ‘being-in-the-world’ is ‘being-in-love.’  
So why are we often so reluctant to ascribe love to “animal” bodies? Maybe this 
reluctance says more about our own incapacities to love, or more about our own lack of 
receptivity to forms of love that are always already all around us, hardened as we have become 
by our own human narcissism (or rather by the narcissism that is humanism). Within the sphere 
of human existence, we know that romantic love, for example, profoundly shapes and informs 
one’s understanding of love as such. We know that without (good, healthy) romantic love 
(whether monogamous or polyamorous, whether heterosexual or queer), one’s life and 
understanding of love are profoundly impoverished. But this means that a relationship with love 
is deeply constitutive of who/what we are; it means that being loveless is still a relationship with 
love, just as loneliness is a relationship with others. We know in our own case that to be in the 
world (with others) truly is already to be “in love,” that to be connected to the world and with 
others is already to be connected to them affectively or desirously. To be a living body is already 
to love (with and through one’s body). So, why should “love” be conceptualized as shared or 
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expressed only between just certain kinds of bodies? Why should not other bodies love? Why 
should humans reserve all the love in the world (or indeed all of anything in the world) for 
themselves? Why should not non-human bodies be able to show me love, even to love me? Why 
should my concept of love only be informed by the love of other humans? Love, again, takes 
many forms, so why should it take the form of only, say, the tender caresses and kisses of my 
partner, Byler, and not also the ecstatic greeting of my childhood dog, Sammy, or not also the 
cheek-rubs, cuddles, and deep purrs of Byler’s cat, Bo? Again, love (in its primary or most 
salient valences) concerns how we vulnerably give ourselves over to others. Does Bo not do this 
just as much as Byler herself does? Sometimes, when we are alone together at night, Bo will fall 
asleep in my lap or arms (and sometimes he will even do so mostly on his back, with his stomach 
pointing toward the ceiling). Cats are also natural predators and, as Byler once observed, 
predators like cats are never more vulnerable than when they are asleep. Cats are also fiercely 
territorial and do not easily cede their familiar environments to others. So, is it not the case that 
Bo gives himself to me vulnerably when he sleeps on my lap? As I just mentioned, not only is 
Bo vulnerable when he sleeps, but he is the most vulnerable when he sleeps. We should pause to 
appreciate, then, the profound depth of vulnerability and trust that Bo expresses every time he 
sleeps in my arms or lap, the kind of risk he takes even in simply sharing his company and home 
with me. What more could we possibly want out of “love”? Does Bo not say he loves me every 
time he falls asleep in my lap just as surely as I do when I tell Byler that I love her as I kiss her 
goodnight? It seems to me that only bad, deep-seated prejudices – not logic – can explain why 
anyone would ever think otherwise, and perhaps all of us harbor such prejudices; if so, then we 
must unlearn such prejudices if we are truly to learn how to love, or if we are to learn as much as 
possible what love is. To be is to be a body; I am my body. And that means I am also constituted 
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by my affective, desirous relations with other bodies; and that means I am also constituted by my 
affective, desirous relations with non-human bodies, too, that in fact my very sense of “love” has 
never been exclusively human but already summons all of the other kinds of love that exist in the 
world. All of this means that I am who or what I love; it also means I am who or what I do not or 
cannot love. It certainly means that I have learned as much about love from Sammy and Mr. 
Bojangles as I have from my parents or from Byler, that I am just as much constituted by the 
love of non-human beings as I am by the love of fellow human beings. So, it is not necessarily, 
and certainly not primarily, the case that I “project” love into, say, dogs, cats, lizards, or 
earthworms, but rather that their ways of (desirous) living and my attachments to them teach me 
more about what life and love is and that without them my life and the love in it would be 
impoverished, even unintelligible.  
While we may reflectively hesitate to ascribe an emotion like love to a non-human 
animal, this reflective hesitation, again, perhaps reflects more about us than about the epistemic 
merit of such an ascription. I think it is relevant to notice that we generally have no problem 
ascribing emotions like fear or anger or even anxiety to animals while we often hesitate to 
ascribe emotions like joy, love, or grief to them. Why is this the case? We tend to attribute 
negative affects to animals quite readily yet tend to withhold attributions of positive affects to 
them. Is this not a double-standard? In Mind of the Raven, Bernd Heinrich claims that ravens fall 
in love and carry on friendships with one another.532 Why are we so ready to dismiss such a 
claim as “unscientific” (hence as “irrational,” since of course we often uncritically take the 
methods and standards of modern science to define what it means for something to be 
“rational”)? Do we not protest too much? Perhaps we reserve certain emotions for ourselves 
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precisely because we realize, albeit sub-consciously, that it is precisely we who have difficulties 
with feeling and embodying them, or because these are precisely the kinds of emotions that we, 
at one level, esteem as constitutive of a rich and meaningful subjective life but which, at another 
level, we recognize as modes of being and relating in which we are deficient, modes of being and 
relating from which our own typical manner of being is often tensely, painfully estranged. How 
hard it is for us to abandon ourselves to true joy; how hard it is for us to expose ourselves to 
others without subterfuge; how hard it is for us to be receptive to others, to share in their 
happiness and sorrow; how hard it is for us to sustain and honor our friendships; how hard it is 
for us simply to love and to grieve. Not only is it the case, for example, that dogs love and that 
elephants grieve, but perhaps it is also the case, as Jeffrey Masson remarks,533 that they love and 
grieve in ways that are “better” or “purer” than we do, for their love and grief is not marked by 
the kind of ambivalence that so often contaminates our own. In recent years, many peer-reviewed 
scientific studies have purported to demonstrate empathy in rats, and indeed there are many 
apparent examples of empathy and altruism throughout the non-human world. Suffice it to say, 
ordinary experience suggests that rats probably have more empathy (indeed, a great deal more 
empathy) than the average Wall Street trader, corporate CEO, insurance company executive, or 
libertarian. So, if it may be said that we “project” anything into animals, perhaps it is the case 
that we project not so much those qualities that we possess but rather precisely those qualities 
that we lack. If we deny that animals can feel or think in certain ways, perhaps it is because we 
ourselves have difficulty doing so; perhaps such skepticism is a displacement of our own 
insecurities or perceived deficiencies. Indeed, our obsession with identifying some feature that 
makes us human beings “special” – our anxiousness to find that one quality or capacity that 
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absolutely distinguishes humanity from the rest of the animal world – suggests that this is the 
case. After all, a preoccupation with one’s own superiority or specialness almost always suggests 
a tacit inferiority complex. Ironically, perhaps it is precisely this neurosis that, if anything, 
distinguishes us from other animals. Perhaps human beings are the only animals that obsess over 
what it is that makes them the kind of animals that they are. Perhaps we are the only animals who 
need to distinguish ourselves absolutely from other animals or even from “animality” as such. 
Nevertheless, if we deny that non-human animals “think” or “feel” at all, or even if we suppose 
that non-human animals think or feel in ways that are somehow “lesser” than the ways in which 
we think or feel, it is clear that we are the very animals that are deficient in thinking and feeling. 
And if I cannot bring myself to ascribe love “worthy of the name” to a non-human animal, if I 
restrict myself to affirming only human forms of love, or if I am not receptive the multifarious 
forms of love and desire that ebb and flow, abound and erupt throughout the whole prodigious 
expanse of living nature, then I am precisely the one who is woefully lacking in love.      
As I mentioned earlier, nothing I have said here necessarily means we should think that 
all non-humans love in the same ways that we humans do. But (as I also mentioned earlier), love 
is a broad category, broad enough surely to embrace not only dogs and cats but all other 
creatures who desirously inhabit the world, and indeed I do not really understand or experience 
love without already being immersed in a world that is full of it, immersed with many different 
forms of love (human and non-human alike). Even if certain human modes of love are different 
from certain non-human modes of love, all modes of love are (to utter what is close to a 
tautology and what will risk appearing to be a slide into Platonism) nevertheless modes of 
“Love,” and so I do not truly know “what love is” without also knowing these other modes of 
love, or rather I more fully know what love is the more “full” my conception of it is, the more I 
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integrate into my understanding of love all of the ways in which bodies may exhibit it, the more I 
may even give myself over to forms or expressions of love far different from those with which I 
am familiar. Am I not, indeed, even more vulnerable when I risk myself to love a non-human 
being, or when I take the risk of submitting myself in love to a non-human form of love? 
Timothy Treadwell, the subject of Werner Herzog’s documentary Grizzly Man, loved grizzly 
bears dearly and took the risk of sharing his love with them. Of course, we know that Timothy’s 
love ended tragically (as do so many of our own human love stories; indeed, as do all human 
love stories insofar as they end with us having to bury and mourn those we love). Timothy’s love 
was unrequited (as so many of our ordinary human romantic forms of love are), and in the end 
the bears he loved so much ate him. Although, perhaps those bears really did love Timothy at 
some point. All of us, after all, have or will hurt the ones we love, and rather than focus on the 
fact that the bears eventually attacked and ate Timothy, we might pause to consider just how 
long Timothy was able to live amidst them in the Alaskan wilderness, that is, we might consider 
the fact that they did not harm him for a very long time indeed (maybe we might say the grizzly 
bears’ love became “consumptive,” a danger clearly inherent to human love as well). So, I am 
not necessarily convinced that the bears did not, at least in some way or to some extent, love 
Timothy, nor am I suggesting we should risk our lives to quite the extent Timothy did. It is likely 
the case that Timothy’s overtures were misdirected and that, no matter how fluid and porous 
communal boundaries may be, he did not belong in a grizzly bear community. Nonetheless, 
perhaps no one has ever loved anything so profoundly and purely as Timothy loved grizzly bears 
because no one has ever risked their bodies for love more than Timothy did when he chose to 
share his love with those bears and to live among them. And Timothy was not “crazy”; he was 
soberly aware of the risk. Throughout the documentary, he explicitly acknowledges how 
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dangerous it is to interact with grizzly bears (and if he were not aware of that danger, then he 
would not have in fact taken a “risk” at all). I know that I know more about love from the risk 
that Timothy took. I also know that grizzly bears love in their own ways, even if none of them 
love humans. Ursine subjectivity – like all forms of subjectivity – is also embodied subjectivity, 
and embodied subjectivity is always desire. “What is the I of desire? Surely it is the body.”534 
And “animals” are bodies, too. “Animals” are “the flesh of my [desiring] flesh,”535 too.  
Of course, as I have already argued, we do need to be wary of imposing ourselves upon 
our “animal” others. We do need to be cautious not to force them to speak in our own voice. We 
always need to check the egoism or human narcissism (i.e., the anthropocentrism) we are prone 
to carry into our relations with other-than-human others. We must always be vigilant against the 
prejudices that may shape our perceptions of non-human others. We must always be careful not 
to regard our non-human cohabitants as mere mirrors for our own human reflections, or as mere 
puppets for own ventriloquism; and yet, these same principles apply just as much to our relations 
with human others; and yet, non-human animals do, in their bodily comportments, simply in 
virtue of their embodiment, “mirror” our own (to varying degrees) and enrich our sense of what 
it means to be a body, enrich all that we know or experience only through our bodies; they do, in 
their own ways, “speak” to us in terms we can understand (to varying degrees and even if only 
ever imperfectly) so long as we are willing to listen, so long as we are willing to learn 
continually how to listen, so long as we are also willing to admit that something may be 
meaningful even if we cannot reduce it to our own categories, so long as we are also willing to 
change or suspend our own categories precisely in reply to those things that cannot be reduced to 
them.  
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We have to acknowledge the affective relations with other bodies of which our own are 
capable and in which they are already situated, and we should, to as great of an extent as 
possible, explore the further affective relations of which our bodies may be capable, but this does 
not mean making the mistake of thinking that intercorporeity means a pure communion or fusion 
of bodies (for in principle it does not mean this), nor is any sort of reductive identification with 
other bodies something we should seek. Lingis writes that “the movements and intensities of our 
own bodies compose with the movements and intensities of toucans and wolves, jellyfish and 
whales,” yet immediately adds here the point I alluded to above in my discussion of my 
interactions with Bo, namely that “one is not aiming at an identification with the other animal. 
Still less is one identifying the other animal with another human.”536 A respect for alterity 
demands all of this. A respect for alterity demands an acknowledgement of difference that is not 
the negation of continuity, an affirmation of distance that is not the “contrary of proximity,”537 an 
idea of space that is synonymous with community. A respect for alterity means letting others 
show themselves as they are, and that means letting them show their otherness as well as their 
carnal affinities with us, carnal affinities without which they would have nothing – no otherness 
at all – to show us in the first place; it means, moreover, acknowledging that indeed there is no 
“us” without “them,” that my carnality inherently overlaps with theirs and that their carnality is 
necessary for me to fully understand my own. Our similarities should never be emphasized in 
such a way that leads us to overlook our differences, nor should our differences be emphasized in 
such a way that leads us to overlook our similarities; still less should our similarities be 
constructed as amounting to homogeneity, and still less should our differences be constructed as 
oppositions. Indeed (and as I will further discuss in the next chapter), any differences worthy of 
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name entail what Merleau-Ponty calls “encroachment” or overlapping; any differences worthy of 
the name entail community; they entail a community in which all embodied beings constitute 
one another, which is also the very community to which all singular as well as plural first-person 
pronouns – every “I” and also every “we” or “us” or “our” – ultimately refer and from which all 
plural second-person pronouns – every “you (all)” or “their” or “they” or “them” – are derived. 
Our similarities matter and so too do our differences, yet we only ever know what our 
similarities and differences are in the same way that we only ever know anything, namely 
together.  
But another crucial point here, which I also alluded to above, is that all of the cautions 
that we ought to observe in our relations with non-human others – all of the principles just 
mentioned concerning the dangers of egoism or narcissism – apply equally to our relations with 
human others, and only double-standards and bad metaphysics and latent speciesism lead us to 
think there is some kind of essential, irreparable rift between what our relations with human 
others demand of us and what our relations with non-human others demand of us, such that we 
qualify the latter in terms we would never use to qualify the former: we would not mark any such 
difference if we had not already marked, in a way that only dualism dictates or warrants, an 
essential, categorical difference between the subjectivity of a human and the subjectivity of a 
non-human; that is, we would not mark such a difference if we had not already separated 
characteristically “human” mental qualities from their embodiment, for only in doing so are we 
led to worry about falsely attributing such characteristics to other bodies (whether they be human 
or non-human): after all, if all of the “mental qualities” with which we are familiar in “our own 
case” are thoroughly lived and known through our bodies and through our bodily engagements 
with a world, why would other living bodies, whether human or non-human, not demonstrate 
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them to us in a like manner, since they too are living bodies, since they too are flesh-become-
sentient? As Merleau-Ponty asks, “why would not the synergy exist among different organisms, 
if it is possible within each.?”538 Of course, Merleau-Ponty’s question here is rhetorical. The 
synergy through which my or any living body is constituted as such – that is, my living body’s 
self-reflexivity – already embeds it in the world and thus already embeds it with other living 
bodies; its reflexivity, or rather its ecstasy, not only affords it access to other likewise reflexive 
or ecstatic bodies but, moreover, is already implicitly in touch with them in precisely the same 
way that it is in touch with itself. To return to a remark I cited in chapter one, “one ek-stasis is 
compossible with other ek-stases,”539 and every living body is inherently what Merleau-Ponty 
calls an “ek-stasis,” which is to say a being constituted in its exposure to what is outside itself, a 
being whose “inside” is constituted by its “outside.” Every body becomes sentient when a “spark 
is lit between sensing and sensible,”540 and the spark of the sentient body, or rather the spark that 
is the sentient body, will always strike and be struck by, always further ignite and be further 
ignited by, always burn and always burn ever brighter in compact with the sparks of other 
sentient bodies until it no longer burns at all.     
So, to return to a point I made earlier, either we divorce subjectivity (hence alterity) from 
the body, or we admit that all subjectivities (hence all alterities) are presenced by living bodies 
and that, therefore, the cautions we ought to observe so that we do not violently impress our own 
egos, standpoints, or identities upon other human beings are not fundamentally different from 
those we ought to observe so that we do not do the same to non-human beings: we should not 
think that the latter is a matter of resisting or withholding “anthropomorphism” any more than 
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we should think that the former is a matter of doing so. In other words, the complexities or 
ambiguities that pervade our relations with our fellow humans are not different in kind from 
those that pervade our relations with non-humans. Only bad (dualistic) metaphysics warrants the 
notion that there must be something about non-human alterity that demands a categorically 
different set of responses and attitudes from me than human alterity demands. Now, this is not to 
say that all alterities are completely the same, for that, indeed, would not be to regard them as 
alterities at all. None of what I have just said should be taken to mean that we should group all 
others in the world together into a grand, monolithic category of (capital ‘O’) “Otherness” (any 
more than we should group all non-human beings together into a grand, monolithic category of 
capital ‘A’ “Animality”). There are as many different othernesses as there are living bodies that 
express them, and their differences matter: yet, as I mentioned above, their differences cannot 
matter to such an extent that they absolutely separate any of them from one another; we cannot 
think that such differences – no matter how significant – rend the world into self-enclosed worlds 
unto themselves; we cannot affirm such differences to such an extent that we deny the 
fundamental materiality without which neither they nor anything would “matter” at all. We 
cannot affirm differences between and among embodied beings to such an extent that denies 
their continuity with one another in virtue of their embodiment: this would be just as grave an 
error as affirming their continuity in such a manner that reductively erases their heterogeneity. 
Whether difference dissolves into unity or whether it collapses into oppositional or atomistic 
disunity, it precisely becomes indifference all the same. The point here, then, is that although on 
the one hand we should be careful not to assimilate non-human alterities to our own familiar 
human manner of being, on the other hand we presuppose or reinstate a dualistic, essentialist, or 
speciesist metaphysics if we think that human alterities are somehow removed from non-human 
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alterities in such a way that the principles that define appropriate relations with the former must 
be fundamentally different from those that define appropriate relations with the latter, because in 
truth no alterities are radically removed from one another precisely because the bodies through 
which they are presenced are never radically removed from one another: because no-body – and 
because no kind of body – is ever utterly isolated or ontologically amputated from any other, 
because being a body means already being together with other bodies.         
Whether I am interpreting and tending to the needs, desires, feelings, and thoughts of my 
romantic partner, or whether I am interpreting and tending to the needs, desires, feelings, and 
thoughts of my romantic partner’s cat, Bo – whether I am comporting myself toward or 
managing a relationship with a human other, or whether I am comporting myself toward and 
managing a relationship with a non-human other – it is always simply a question of what alterity 
demands of me, and unless we accept a division between subjectivity and the body, we can only 
affirm that all living bodies are subjectivities or alterities, and that means we can only affirm that 
non-human bodies are just as entangled with our own living bodies as those of our fellow 
humans, that all subjectivities or alterities – all “minds,” all “mental states,” all sensations and 
affects, all modes of intentionality – are expressions of the same flesh and are therefore bound to 
one another, enveloped within each other, extensions of one another no matter how great the 
distances between them may in fact be.  
The truth is that if we are concerned with respecting and affirming non-human alterity, if 
we are concerned with not imposing ourselves upon “animal” others, if we are concerned with 
not reducing animal others to ourselves, if we are concerned with not letting anthropocentric 
biases dominate how we perceive and relate to animal others, if are concerned with not letting 
our own “humanity” colonize non-human life or level non-human otherness, if we are genuinely 
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concerned with letting animal others show themselves to us as freely and authentically as 
possible, then we frame and articulate this concern badly if we do so as a concern not to 
“anthropomorphize” them; we articulate, understand, and enact our commitment to respect their 
otherness badly if we do so as a hesitancy concerning “anthropomorphism.” Do we hesitate to 
“anthropomorphize” humans? Of course not, because that would be absurd. We know “humans” 
are “human”: that is a tautology. Yet, we must remember that Descartes’ famous worry in the 
Meditations that the human bodies he sees walking down the street might just be sophisticated 
robots is precisely a worry about anthropomorphism, and as we have seen, it is a worry rooted in 
his dualism: since for Descartes the soul is separate from the body, and since for him “animals” 
could not possibly have souls (that is, since for him “soul” is coextensive with “human”), his 
worry is that we might be fooled by appearances to “project” a soul into a soul-less puppet, that 
we might err in imparting a mind to an empty husk, that we might infer (human) mental states or 
characteristics – especially thoughts, emotions, or volitions – based upon what is only a 
convincing mimicry of them, that we might, in short, attribute “humanity” to something that is 
not “human,” a “soul” to a body that is not “ensouled.” Descartes’ worry that we might be fooled 
into anthropomorphizing animate human bodies is no different from our contemporary worry 
that we might be fooled into anthropomorphizing non-human bodies: both worries rest upon the 
same ontological and epistemological presuppositions.  
Of course, though many who resist anthropomorphizing non-humans do so for tacitly 
anthropocentric reasons (i.e., merely in order to reserve certain qualities exclusively for humans), 
it is true that many others who likewise urge us to resist or suspend such anthropomorphism 
consider themselves to be allies in the battle against anthropocentrism or speciesism, for their 
resistance to anthropomorphism is precisely grounded in their commitment to respect and not 
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erase non-human otherness. I want to be clear that I share this commitment to respect and not 
erase non-human otherness. However, I also want to be clear that I think that to frame such a 
commitment in terms of a resistance to anthropomorphism, or that to assume that such a 
commitment requires skepticism toward or even a nearly deontological prohibition of 
anthropomorphism, is indeed to assume or reinscribe the false metaphysical and epistemological 
commitments – in particular, the utter solipsism – of an anthropocentric worldview. I now want 
to make clear that the very concept of anthropomorphism cannot, in the final analysis, be 
disentangled from anthropocentrism and from the bad metaphysics that all forms of solipsism – 
whether a solipsism of the individual human self or a solipsism of the human species – assume. I 
want to make clear that the very construct of “anthropomorphism” (along with all forms of 
anthropocentrism, indeed along with all “centrisms”) is logically analogous to that of the isolated 
and disembodied cogito at the heart of Cartesian skepticism and solipsism.  
Cartesian solipsism is the most traditional form of solipsism, yet anthropocentrism and 
the concomitant notion of “anthropomorphism” constitute another form of solipsism all the 
same.541 Cartesian solipsism is the concept of a fundamentally isolated human ego. 
Anthropocentrism/“anti-anthropomorphism” assumes the concept of a fundamentally isolated 
“humanness” or human species. Whereas Cartesian solipsism is solipsism at the level of an 
individual human self, anthropocentrism/anti-anthropomorphism is simply solipsism at the level 
of “humanity” or the human species; the latter merely conceptualizes the human species itself as 
the sort of isolated, radically individualized “self” that the former conceptualizes any individual 
member of that species to be: within an anthropocentric worldview or even within an 
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epistemological framework that accepts the very notion of “anthropomorphism,” “humanity” or 
the anthropos is merely the cogito by another name. Why is that the case? Descartes worried that 
we might falsely infer “mindedness” or “humanity” where there is only a very convincing bodily 
imitation of it because he thought that mindedness or “humanity” were separate from 
embodiment and because, therefore, he conceptualized any individual (human) mind as radically, 
atomistically isolated from others (if any others indeed exist). It is because all of the features of 
my own mental life are disembodied and because I am thus, as a cogito, radically individualized 
insofar as I have access only to the features of my own purely internal mental life that I may be 
mistaken when I ascribe such features to other bodies. In other words, for Descartes, when I 
perceive or think about the minds of others I inescapably do so starting from a position of 
absolute detachment from them, and that is why my perceptions or beliefs concerning the 
existence of other minds like my own are always dubious (and why only the existence of a 
perfect, omnibenevolent God can guarantee their veracity). Descartes initially posits the idea that 
consciousness or “the self” is radically individuated or isolated. As a radically individuated or 
isolated self, I might begin to wonder whether these other bodies I see moving about the world 
are “selves” as well; I might proceed to compare their movements or expressions with those that 
I typically make when I have certain experiences or am in certain mental states, and then I might 
formulate inferences that they, too, have similar experiences or mental states based on those 
comparisons. However, any judgments I make concerning the mental lives of others or even 
simply concerning the existence of other mental lives will always be problematic our doubtful 
because the only mind to which I have access is my own: my radically individuated or isolated 
epistemic position in the world will always make knowledge of anything outside that position 
suspect or nigh impossible. It is thus that, within a Cartesian framework (setting aside arguments 
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in favor of a beneficent cosmic architect and overseer), judgments concerning the existence of 
others will always be beleaguered by the anxiety that such judgments may be wrong – that one 
has been deceived despite all appearances to the contrary – and that one is completely alone in 
the world after all.  
Setting aside Merleau-Ponty’s criticisms of “projectionism” (which I discussed earlier), 
now consider the anxiety that various perceptions or judgments of “animal” mindedness may 
only be anthropomorphic “projections,” or that when I take a non-human body to exhibit certain 
human-like mental qualities I might simply be transferring those qualities to a body that, in 
reality, is devoid of them yet perhaps convincingly imitates them to some degree and thus invites 
such a transference. The analogy should already be clear. Whether one is simply an 
anthropocentrist who arbitrarily, a priori restricts certain characteristics to human beings, or 
whether one is not quite an anthropocentrist in such a crude manner but worries we might often 
be fooled into ascribing “human” mental characteristics to non-human bodies, one nonetheless 
assumes the very same kind of isolated epistemic standpoint as the old Cartesian solipsist: the 
operative assumption here is that I, as a human being, exist in a way that is radically detached 
from all of these other non-human beings in the world; as a member of the species Homo 
sapiens, I am absolutely separated from all other species of living bodies, or entirely withdrawn 
into an isolated Homo sapiens universe, such that any extension of my own “human” mental 
qualities to bodies that exist outside my Homo sapiens universe will always be dubious, or might 
only ever be impositions of my fanciful human imagination (perhaps as a result of watching far 
too many cartoons) or mere “projections” motivated by my “irrational” (but still human) 
emotions. So, when I see non-human bodies move about and express themselves in the world, I 
might look inward and consider the various mental qualities that I know for sure I possess, then I 
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might consider the ways in which I typically express such qualities behaviorally, then I might 
look again at certain non-human behaviors and compare them to those through which I exhibit 
my own human qualities, then I might note similarities between these non-human behaviors and 
my own, and then, finally, I might infer that these non-human behaviors indicate the presence of 
certain human qualities based upon such similarities. However, this inference is always doubtful 
because I and my human qualities are shut up within an entirely enclosed human reality. Thus, I 
can be sure that I possess certain “human” mental qualities, and (assuming I am not Descartes) I 
can be sure that most of the human bodies among whom I exist do so as well, but I can never be 
sure that a non-human body possesses such qualities: any judgment I might make that they do 
could just be “anthropomorphism.”  
Besides the fact that, in everyday lived experience, we do not perform the complicated 
process of reasoning I just elaborated when we take non-human beings to demonstrate human-
like characteristics, it should be clear that the skeptical worry that we might be 
“anthropomorphizing” animals when we ascribe human mental features to them is logically no 
different from the skeptical worry that I might be mistakenly “subjectifying” a human body 
whenever I ascribe subjectivity to one: the latter is the worry that, all outward appearances to the 
contrary, only one mind might exist in the world (namely, one’s own), and the former is the 
worry that, all appearances to the contrary, only one species (namely, one’s own human species) 
might have “human” mental characteristics or simply “minds” at all, and both worries are thus 
equally forms of solipsism. Instead of the notion that I am completely enclosed within my own 
individual subjectivity, the notion here is that I am completely enclosed within my own 
“humanity” or essential species-identity: again, anthropocentrism, or any epistemological 
framework that accepts “anthropomorphism” as a legitimate epistemic concept and fallacy, 
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simply substitutes “humanity” or the species Homo sapiens for the cogito. Rather than worry that 
I, as an individual human self, might be projecting mental characteristics into other human 
bodies, the worry here is that I, as a human being tethered to my own humanity, might be 
projecting (human) mental characteristics into non-human bodies. In Cartesianism, the self is 
radically isolated from others, but anxieties over anthropomorphism, or principles against 
anthropomorphism, simply introduce solipsism at another level, for they merely construct 
“humanity” or “Homo sapiens” to be “the Self” isolated from all other species of life thus 
constructed as “Others.” Within either a traditional Cartesian framework or any epistemological 
framework that takes anthropomorphism to be a sin against “logic,” “objectivity,” or even 
“respect for alterity,” the concern is that I might impart qualities of myself to entities that 
resemble me outwardly yet are devoid of anything that is really “me” “inwardly.” And equally in 
both cases, the underlying assumptions are: A) there is a divorce between interiority and 
exteriority, between mental characteristics and the bodily comportments through which they are 
expressed, B) when I take others to have mental characteristics like mine (that is, to be genuine 
“others”) I fundamentally do so as a result of some sort of analogical inference (which follows 
from A), and C) I am fundamentally divorced from any of these others to whom I might impart 
an interiority like my own and indeed, therefore, it is possible for me to know my own interiority 
or even to have an interiority – to know who or what I am or even be a “self” – apart from these 
presumed others in the first place (which also follows from A, and is assumed by B). We have 
seen, and we will continue to see, that Merleau-Ponty refutes each of these assumptions.  
In short, all epistemological worries that we might mistakenly attribute mental qualities 
to bodies – regardless of whether or not these bodies are human – are grounded in dualism. And 
because we know dualism is false, so too do we know that such worries are, in fact, without 
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ground. None of this, of course, is to suggest that we may never be mistaken about the interior 
lives of non-human beings. But I hasten to underscore – and I think I must repeatedly underscore 
– that this does not mean that such mistakes are commissions of some crime against reasoning 
called “anthropomorphism.” No one thinks that repudiating Cartesian solipsism implies that we 
can never be wrong about what is going on inside the minds of human beings. No one, likewise, 
should think that repudiating anthropocentrism or even the very concept of “anthropomorphism” 
implies that we can never be wrong about what is going on inside the minds of non-human 
beings. To repudiate anthropocentrism or, at any rate, “anti-anthropomorphism” is at heart to 
repudiate the solipsism or dualism to which it tacitly subscribes, and no more than this. Within 
an anthropocentric or anti-anthropomorphism framework, we assume that we can know what a 
human being or mind is apart from non-human beings or minds, in just the same way that within 
a Cartesian framework I assume that I can know who or what I am – that I can completely know 
myself or my mind introspectively – apart from other human selves or minds. Neither views are 
true, and they are not true for the same reasons; they are, in fact, one and the same view.  
Merleau-Ponty takes such a serious and sustained interest in non-human subjectivities 
because he knows, and both explicitly and implicitly argues, that to repudiate Cartesian dualism 
and solipsism is also to repudiate anthropocentric constructions or delimitations of subjectivity, 
that to repudiate the ontological commitments that isolate my own subjectivity from other human 
subjectivities is also, in the same stroke, to repudiate the ontological commitments that isolate 
human subjectivity from extra-human subjectivities. An anthropocentric or anti-
anthropomorphism framework tacitly posits by fiat the notion that I know my own “human” 
qualities perfectly or transparently in isolation from non-human beings, because in either case the 
foundational assumption is that I, as a human being, first look inward to see what my human 
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mental qualities are and only afterward proceed to go out into the world to determine 
(analogically), on the basis of that introspection, whether or not certain non-humans possess such 
qualities too. But of course, on this account, any judgments I might make that non-human beings 
have human mental qualities will either be false a priori (according to anthropocentrism) or 
epistemically unsound (according to anti-anthropomorphism). Anthropocentrism or anti-
anthropomorphism assumes that I already, primarily know my own “humanity” – that I already, 
primarily know all of those characteristics or capacities I associate with my own human 
interiority – in isolation from an other-than-human world, that whatever sense I attach to my 
“humanness” does not already channel, is not already infested with and immersed in, non-
humanness, that my human subjectivity is not already embedded in relations with non-human 
subjectivities. We have seen, and we will continue to see, that Merleau-Ponty dismantles these 
assumptions. In just the same way that I can have no “sense-of-self” (and thus cannot even be a 
“self”) apart from human others, Merleau-Ponty argues that I precisely can have no sense of my 
own “humanity” apart from a world that is radically more than human.     
So, to summarize and further elaborate all of the points I have just discussed, we cannot 
separate our minds from the minds of others any more than we can separate our bodies from the 
bodies of others: there is surely some separation between them, yet this separation is also already 
continuity, also already intimacy. As we have seen, we divorce our minds – or any of the 
qualities we associate with mindedness – from the minds of others through the same process of 
abstraction through which we divorce our minds from our bodies. But if our minds are not 
divorced from our living bodies – if to be a mind is to be a living body – and if our living bodies 
are never divorced from one another, then it follows that our minds are never divorced from one 
another. And non-human animals are minds, too, because they too are living bodies. Thus, since 
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all minds are living bodies and since all living bodies are minds, the process of abstraction 
through which we divorce our minds from our bodies is the very same process of abstraction 
through which we divorce our (“human”) minds from any kind of mind: the same process of 
abstraction through which we divorce our “human” minds from our “human” bodies is the same 
process of abstraction through which we divorce our human minds from non-human minds, our 
human minds from non-human bodies, our human bodies from non-human bodies, our embodied 
human minds (or minded human bodies) from “the common tissue”542 of which all living things 
– all animate bodies and all mental phenomena – are made. It is thus that ordinary solipsism and 
that speciesist delimitations of mindedness derive from the same false ontological abstraction. It 
is thus that solipsism and the concept of an “anthropomorphism fallacy” are in fact two aspects 
of one and the same fallacy. Descartes’ anxiety that he might mistakenly attribute the qualities of 
his own mental life to other human bodies and our own contemporary anxiety that we might 
mistakenly attribute qualities of our own human mental lives to non-human bodies are the same 
anxiety: solipsism assumes the fundamental separation of consciousness from others, and the 
very concept of anthropomorphism assumes the fundamental separation of human consciousness 
from other apparent forms of consciousness, and both of these notions assume the separation of 
consciousness from flesh. If non-humans are living bodies just as much as humans are, there is 
no a priori reason they may not exhibit “human qualities.” So, if non-human bodies exhibit 
human characteristics, they do so in such a way that is not essentially different from the manner 
in which human bodies do. And if my ascriptions of human characteristics to non-humans 
misfire, they do so in a manner that is no different from any manner in which I might mistakenly 
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ascribe mental characteristics to fellow humans: it is not because I have committed some unique 
and particularly egregious fallacy called “anthropomorphism.”  
I have already refuted Cartesian solipsism and the idea that attributions of mental states to 
animals are mere “projections,” so I will not rehearse those arguments. The point I mean to 
underscore here is that if we wonder whether or not various non-human bodies “have minds,” 
and even if we worry about whether we may be merely “projecting” certain mental 
characteristics into them, we assume the same separation between subjectivity and corporeality 
or behavior that we assume when we worry about solipsism, that is, when we wonder whether or 
not human bodies have minds or worry that we might be merely “projecting” mental 
characteristics into them (when in reality they might just be “zombies” or convincing 
pantomimes of human sentience). If, then, Descartes’ worry about “anthropomorphizing” 
animate human bodies is fallacious, we must also admit that our common worry about 
“anthropomorphizing” animate non-human bodies is similarly fallacious. This is, again, not to 
say that one may never falsely ascribe characteristics of oneself to a non-human. One may also 
falsely ascribe various characteristics of oneself to other humans. The point is that we can no 
longer say that the former mistake is a mistake of “anthropomorphism” whereas the latter is 
something else. The point is that these are the same mistake. Non-human bodies may exhibit 
specific “human” mental characteristics in many ways or to varying degrees. Human bodies may 
also exhibit specific “human” mental characteristics in many ways and to varying degrees. In 
either case, if I am to interpret them on their own terms, I must do the most I can to let them 
show themselves to me as they are. I must truly engage with them, yet I must also do so from an 
appropriate distance. And there are no axioms from which one can deduce what the appropriate 
proximity or distance in such cases ought to be; however, there will always be one, and the 
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process of negotiating and discovering it – the process of truly knowing another regardless of 
whether that other is a human or a cat, the process of welcoming others with the least egoistic 
impositions – will always be a complicated, delicate, difficult, vulnerable, and indeed infinite 
undertaking. 
Human minds differ very much from many non-human minds, and many non-human 
minds differ very much from one another. Yet, at the same time, our minds are just as much the 
minds of non-human others as our bodies are theirs, too; the minds of non-human others are just 
as much our minds as their bodies are ours, too. The only limit that “separates” one body from 
another, and thus the only limit that separates one mind from another, is flesh. Such limits exist. 
Differences between bodies – hence differences between minds – exist. Yet these “limits” are 
also already – like the skin - surfaces of contact and sites passage; these differences between 
bodies are also already imbrications or “enjambments”543 of bodies, also already “miraculous 
prolongations”544 of the flesh and of the world (or of the “flesh of the world”) that all bodies 
share. So, again, the whole concern over “anthropomorphism” – the whole construction of 
“anthropomorphism” as such – assumes a fundamental separation between “human” 
consciousness and “animal consciousness” that has never been real, that has only ever been a 
false abstraction no different from that which separates any individual human consciousness 
from other human consciousnesses. If human and non-human subjectivities alike are embodied 
subjectivities, and if therefore they are always already intercorporeally entangled with one 
another, there is no way to strictly isolate what is “human” subjectivity from all of the other 
subjectivities that share its carnality and its carnal world. The risk of egocentricity or narcissism 
in our relations with our fellow humans is no different from that of anthropocentricity in our 
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relations with non-humans: they are, logically and ontologically, the same risk. So yes, as we 
have seen, we should be careful not to identify “too easily” with our non-human cohabitants, but 
as we have also seen, and as so many of us still must come to see, the whole concept of 
“anthropomorphism” is unsalvageably mired in Cartesian metaphysics, in the idea that a body is 
a signifier divorced from what it signifies, that the Other’s body stands between myself and the 
Other rather than being a direct expression of the Other’s subjectivity or otherness and rather 
than already being constitutive of my own embodied subjectivity. Bad epistemology (which is 
rooted in bad ontology and also bad ideology) sets us in opposition to non-human beings and 
suppresses the knowledge we have of them as “minds” or as “others” through the carnality that 
we share with them, the carnality that constitutively grounds and entangles every form of 
subjectivity. Thus, we inescapably and primarily experience through our bodies (rather than 
reductively “constitute by our thought”545) other living beings as “variant[s] of our corporeity, 
that is, as the appearance[s] of behaviors in the field of our behavior,”546 and for all of the 
reasons just elaborated, Merleau-Ponty affirms, as we must, that “animal life refers to what is 
sensible for us and to our carnal life.”547 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
545 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 271. 
546 Ibid., p. 271. 
547 Ibid., p. 271. 
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Chapter Five 
 
“The Flesh of My Flesh” 
Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology of Radical Community 
 
 
“Animality no longer arouses horror…a brilliant and happy exuberance in favour of the animal in man is 
the most triumphant form of intellectuality.” 
 
– Nietzsche548 
 
“There is intercorporeity such that even God himself can 
become an instance only on the condition of being taken up in the tissue of carnal things.” 
 
– Merleau-Ponty549 
 
I was not present when Sammy passed away, and a part of me is glad that distance and 
timing spared me what my father has described as the “most traumatic day” of his life. Sammy’s 
health had slowly declined during the last two years of his life, and so his death was not entirely 
unexpected when, on April 8, 2011, two veterinarians reported that his organs were failing and 
that not much more could be done for him. Around a week prior to what my father describes as a 
“life changing” decision, my parents brought Sammy to the vet to be fed food and medicine 
intravenously. On April 8, my father met my mother at the vet’s office on his way home from 
work. The instant my father stepped into the area where he was being kept, Sammy perked up 
and our vet remarked: “he knows who loves him.” My parents were told that not much more 
could be done for him, and the decision was made. They knew that they were about to “lose an 
important member of the family.” My Dad even referred to Sammy as his “second son,” and 
indeed they would frequently call me Sammy’s “brother.” They said their goodbyes and cried 
inconsolably throughout the hours and days that followed. As I mentioned in the previous 
chapter, my father had initially been adamantly opposed to getting a dog. However, according to 
																																																								
548 Writings from the Late Notebooks. Trans. Kate Sturge (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
§10[21], p.180.  
549	Nature, p. 76. 
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my mother, Sammy’s death was the first time she ever saw my father cry. Sammy was buried in 
a pet cemetery near our home, and to this day my father visits his grave every weekend and talks 
to him (as he always did), claiming that Sammy “had more humanity in him than most people.” 
It is clear that my father’s relationship with Sammy constituted and transformed his 
“being-in-the-world.” The fact that my father could refer to Sammy as his “second son” – and 
the fact that my parents could refer to me as Sammy’s “brother” – begins to reveal to us the fact 
that the family is constructed without essential species boundaries, that community need not be, 
and already never is, rigidly demarcated intra-specifically. The thousands of years of coevolution 
between dogs and humans is something we know quite well yet nevertheless do not seem to 
appreciate adequately. In what follows, I will discuss Merleau-Ponty’s thesis that humans and 
non-humans fundamentally co-constitute one another, and this thesis is not merely an empirical 
one, for it concerns a fundamental ontological structure of existence and meaning. However, it is 
already empirically undeniable that our anthropological development has been inextricably 
linked with the domestication of canines (and vice versa), that just as surely as a human child 
will never achieve true “human” subjectivity without the presence and nurturance of other 
humans, so too is it the case that humans would never have achieved what we call “humanity” 
without their canine best friends, and this point deserves more attention than I can give to it here. 
Suffice it to say, it might be just as true that dogs domesticated us as the reverse. For now, the 
point I wish to make is that even though dogs do indeed have a special, perhaps even unique 
place in the human community, this fact alone already helps disclose the radical fluidity of those 
communal boundaries we often “naturalize” or take for granted as fixed, essential, or 
impermeable.  
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There are, of course, often significant differences between different forms of life, and 
these differences always matter, yet far from negating the possibility of genuine or meaningful 
relationships between them, difference – radical, irremediable, irreducible difference – is not 
only compatible with relationality or “kinship” but is always constitutive of it. A central insight 
of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology is that every genuine, fundamental relationship requires both 
proximity and irreducible distance or difference. If there is a relationship between, say, two 
things, there surely must be some difference or distance between them: were one of the terms 
reducible to, or identical with, the other, then there would in reality only be one term in relation 
with itself, and that is not really a “relationship” at all, for if, as Merleau-Ponty also argues, the 
“identity” or being of something is constituted only relative to what is “other” than itself, then a 
simple tautological identity (i.e., “A=A”) cannot be regarded as ontologically basic because that 
term (i.e., “A”) must derive its identity as such relative to something other than itself (that is, 
relative to something other than “A”). Thus, even the reflexivity of identity can never be total 
self-coincidence, for the reflexivity of anything entails its extension into what is irreducibly other 
than itself, and while this may seem to be a rather formal or abstract point, it is very clearly 
demonstrated, as we have already seen, by the reflexivity of the sentient body, or by even the 
most rudimentary sensory experiences; it is especially demonstrated, as I will further discuss 
below, by intersubjectivity, or rather by the essential intersubjective constitution of subjectivity.  
In short, no real relationship is ever purely a relationship between one thing and itself: 
solipsism or absolute solitude is precisely irrelational. To put the point more simply, 
relationships are always relationships between things, and this “between-ness” designates 
precisely the distance or difference – the non-coincidence or non-identity – that is necessarily 
constitutive of any relationship. At the same time, however, this very distance or difference 
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between the terms in a relation must also precisely bring them together, for otherwise no relation 
at all would obtain between them. This means that the distance or difference that separates the 
terms in any genuine relationship can never be conceived as oppositional, or that the terms in a 
genuine relationship can never be regarded as truly “opposed” to one another. This means, in 
other words, that the space, limit, or interval between terms in a relationship can never be rightly 
conceived as a divide that absolutely segregates them from one another or as amounting to a 
dualism; this means, in short, that their non-identity cannot be understood as a strict negation. 
“Opposition” means mutual exclusion, and terms that mutually exclude one another are not really 
in a relationship with one another at all, since for each to mutually exclude the other precisely 
means that each exists as such in a way that is radically independent of, or isolated from, the 
other: if two terms mutually exclude one another, that means that the identity or being of each is 
completely autonomous or self-standing, that the identity or being of each may not, in principle 
or a priori, incorporate or overlap with that of the other in any way. Terms that are truly opposed 
to one another are utterly, impregnably isolated from one another: there can be no continuity 
between them whatsoever; they must be separated by a vacuum. Yet, things that are truly 
isolated from one another, or things that in principle may have no continuity with one another at 
all, cannot (if the words “isolation” and “relation” have any meaning) be said to be in any kind of 
“relation” with one another.  
This, then, is why Merleau-Ponty argues and repeatedly insists that all relations between 
things – whether they be between mind (subject) and body (object), between seeing and being-
seen/visibility, between touching and being-touched/tangibility, between self and Other(s), 
between self and world, between the self and itself, between materiality (the sensible) and 
ideality (the intelligible), or even between “humanity” and “animality” – require a distance that 
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is not “the contrary of proximity” but that is “deeply consonant” and indeed “synonymous” with 
it.550 Genuine relations must be neither a reductive or totalizing unification of their relata nor an 
absolute dichotomization or severance of their relata. Genuine relations must be neither (simple) 
identities nor binary oppositions but, in a word, relations of genuine difference. Though all of 
these points seem rather simple or obvious, they have profound implications, not the least of 
which is that they require us to reject the concepts or conceptual schemas most deeply 
entrenched in Western philosophy, for the latter has historically floundered upon the antitheses 
of reductionism and dualism, immanence and transcendence, equivalence and contradiction, 
identity and negation. As we have already seen, lived experience and Being as such – the 
relations that comprise all things and phenomena – are below all of these oppositions, below 
even the opposition between ‘sameness’ and opposition itself. Being is difference, and difference 
(“worthy of the name”) is “identity without superposition…difference without 
contradiction…”.551  
Thus, relations entail both continuity and irreducible distance/difference, or rather they 
entail a kind of continuity that is itself already irreducible distance/difference. The necessary 
space between the relata of any relationship must be simultaneously disjunctive and conjunctive, 
and (as I will further discuss below) this space that both separates things and brings them 
together – this spaces that brings things together precisely because it separates them – is what 
Merleau-Ponty often calls “Flesh” (or “the flesh of the world”).552 The point I mean to 
																																																								
550	Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and The Invisible, p. 135. 
551 Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p.135. 
552 I wish to offer here some helpful remarks concerning Merleau-Ponty’s terminology: in other places, Merleau-
Ponty refers to this opening or divergence between things that brings them together as either “dehiscence” (which, 
as I mentioned in chapter one, is a term borrowed from botany) or écart (which is a term borrowed from Gestalt 
psychology). As I also mentioned in chapter one, although each of these terms (“flesh”,  “dehiscence,” and “écart”) 
may be best suited to certain contexts, they are roughly equivalent to one another, and “dehiscence” may be the one 
that best captures Merleau-Ponty’s meaning because it more clearly signifies a movement or process, or because it 
	
	 490	
underscore here is that, regardless of how similar or different various “things” or beings may be, 
all relationships paradoxically involve both proximity and infinite distance, both continuity and 
irremediable non-coincidence. All relationships entail radical difference. Contact is always 
contact-at-a-distance.553 Thus, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, “kinship” is indeed always “strange,”554 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
signifies something less “static” than what the others seem to signify upon immediate acquaintance. I will use and 
elaborate each of these terms in the following discussion, but it is always important to keep in mind that the 
difference that constitutes every relation – hence the difference that constitutes the being or meaning of anything – is 
never something static but is always differentiation; relationality (or communalization) is differentiation; coming-
into-being is ‘coming-together’ (or ‘coming-into-relation’), yet it is never a coming-together that would resolve into 
a fusion, identity, coincidence, or subsumption of things. And though relations may be stable over time, they are 
always fluid, always subject to transformation, to re-composition or decomposition, and thus are always becoming. I 
hope to make all of these points clear in what follows.  
Lastly, since genuine relations are neither unities nor oppositions, or since they involve both proximity and 
distance, they entail precisely the overlapping of their relata, and Merleau-Ponty usually refers to this as either 
“reversibility” or “the chiasm” (i.e., “the intertwining,” which is a term that also must always be read as a verb and 
not merely as a noun). The “chiasm” is also synonymous with “Flesh,” yet Merleau-Ponty often uses the former to 
highlight the overlapping or reciprocal “encroachment” of things essential to the latter (whereas he usually uses 
“dehiscence” or “écart” to highlight the divergence between things that makes possible and entails their 
overlapping). Again, all of these terms may be understood as roughly synonymous, yet at the same time they tend to 
have slightly different valences: “dehiscence” and “écart” tend to refer to the divergences between relata, while 
“reversibility” or “the chiasm” tend to refer to the overlapping of relata that accompanies their divergence, and both 
of these things at once – divergence and overlapping, or rather overlapping-through-divergence – is what Merleau-
Ponty means by “Flesh” (or “the flesh of the world”) in his later writings.  
553	See, for example, Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of intentionality according to which Husserl, 
in reducing intentional relations to structures immanent to consciousness, is unable to conceptualize the radical 
distance that must be constitutive of any relationship between consciousness and what it intends. Thus, in the 
context of discussing Husserl’s understanding of the relationship between past and present in his account of time-
consciousness, Merleau-Ponty writes:  
 
“Husserl’s error is to have described the interlocking starting from a Präsensfeld considered as without thickness, as 
immanent consciousness: it is transcendent consciousness, it is being at a distance…” (The Visible and The Invisible, 
p.173). 
 
Thus, we already see here Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to break phenomenology out of its traditional 
immanence/transcendence dichotomy and to think relationships as relationships to or with a kind of transcendence 
that is neither reducible to nor the simple contrary of “immanence” (if understood traditionally as designating the 
domain of consciousness). Conversely, Merleau-Ponty attempts to develop a concept of immanence that would be 
liberated from “the ego” yet not collapse into a reductive naturalism or empiricism. In other words, Merleau-Ponty 
attempts to conceptualize, on the one hand, “immanence” as something other than mere immanence to 
consciousness or as something other than transcendental (noetic-noematic) ideality, and on the other hand he 
attempts to conceptualize “transcendence” as something other than the antithesis of consciousness, or as something 
other than either Kantian noumenal reality or Platonic/theological ideality. As I will suggest below, Merleau-Ponty 
attempts to develop exactly what Deleuze would call a true philosophy of immanence, that is, a philosophy in which 
immanence is emancipated from both reductive materialism/empiricism and any kind of transcendental idealism or 
“supernaturalism.” Thus, Merleau-Ponty explicitly remarks that his conception of relationality – and in particular, 
his conception of the relationship between embodied subjectivity and the world – is beyond “the immanence-
transcendence alternative” (ibid., p.268). As we will see, for both Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze this also means 
developing a philosophy of difference, and I hope to show that that is exactly what Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of 
	
	 491	
always open and fluid, always a “cohesion of extreme divergencies,”555 always a limit or fission 
that both separates and binds, always a threshold through which things transgress themselves and 
overflow into one another, and this is attested in particular not only by the relationships we 
human beings have with each other but also especially by those we have with non-human beings, 
by the communities or ways of being-together that we cultivate and in which we already find 
ourselves situated with others and with other others: communities and ways of being-together 
that precisely refute the essentialisms, dualisms, solipsisms, or false and arbitrary “isms” that 
infiltrate how we later conceptualize “community” or “being-together” and that thereby violate 
what we live. There is, as Merleau-Ponty says, “a strange kinship between the human and the 
animal,”556 but Merleau-Ponty also makes clear throughout his writings that all relationships or 
forms of kinship are “strange” (or characterized by what he otherwise calls “ambiguity”), for 
they all entail both familiarity and estrangement, both intimacy and distance, both continuity and 
non-coincidence; they entail familiarity through a kind of estrangement, intimacy through 
distance, continuity through non-coincidence. This “double-bind” (if we may call it that) of 
familiarity and estrangement, of intimacy and distance, of continuity and non-coincidence is that 
which binds anything together at all: it is an “aporia” (if we may call it that) – one of those 
“figured enigmas,” “paradoxes,” or combinations of “incompossible details”557 – that is essential 
to any experience of alterity, that is essential to the possibility or constitution of any community, 
and that is indeed essential to embodied experience and to Being as such.  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
flesh is, for flesh is always relatedness through irreducible distance (or “transcendence”), always being as “being-at-
a-distance,” always a relationship with otherness that is realized in and through a shared space or carnality (and 
which is thus in no way transcendentally ideal or “supernatural”).   
554	Nature, p. 214, 271. 
555	The Visible and The Invisible, p. 84. 
556	Nature, p. 214. 
557	Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and The Invisible, p.4.	
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So, my father can make sense of the idea that he has both a canine son and a Homo 
sapiens son, and thus living with Sammy brought my father to think about his own humanity 
differently. Yet the categories of “canine” and “human” themselves must be fluid as well, as is 
evidenced by my father’s insistence that Sammy “had more humanity in him” than most people 
he had ever known. The speaker of such a claim no doubt means that what we think of as the 
finest human qualities are also to be found in a dog, and that we find such qualities in dogs more 
often than we actually find them in humans. But, as we have seen, it is not necessarily naïve, 
crude, or reductive anthropomorphism to say that Sammy really did possess “humanity”: dogs 
(and other animals) really are human in certain ways; indeed, what it means to be human is to be 
dog as well, and vice versa. That is to say, human beings and other forms of life – all styles of 
embodied existence – are defined by limits between them that are never quite clear or decidable; 
their distinct identities are achieved by precisely a bi-directional, antepredicative transference of 
sense, or by an overlapping of bodily schemas, affects, intentions, and comportments prior to 
reflective categorization and ascription. And so, as we have seen, to recognize “humanity” or an 
affect such as love in a non-human animal (like a dog) is not necessarily a “mere” projection, and 
neither is it necessarily a totalizing or reductive gesture. It is not to collapse, say, humanity into 
dogness or dogness into humanity but to recognize the ambiguity, or what Merleau-Ponty, again, 
calls the “strange kinship” – the distance as well as the continuity – between them that inflates 
them to meaning. My father recognizes his own humanity in Sammy, and this means that he also 
recognizes Sammy’s dogness in himself. To recognize “humanity” in a dog is at once to 
recognize our own “dogness.” It is not so much the case that my father “projected” human 
qualities into Sammy but rather that, in their dealings with one another, my father and Sammy 
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taught one another more about what it is to be human and dog, more about what it is to be father 
and son, and above all more about what it is to love and to be loved.   
Even months after his death, Sammy’s absence continued to linger; the traces of his life 
continued to permeate every corner of my parents’ home. My mother, for example, would walk 
around Sammy’s crate long after it had been removed from the house, and described the silence 
in the house as oppressive and unbearable. Such, of course, is always in the case in mourning. 
We have discussed the fact that lived experience always includes experiences of both absence 
and presence, that “presences” are not the only things that are ever “present” to us, for absences 
may be, and always are, present, too. Lived experience is always a play of presence and absence, 
always, we thus might say, haunted. If this were not so, there would be no such thing as grief. If 
absences could never be present, or if non-presence were the negation or absolute erasure of 
presence, we would never suffer from the deaths of others, nor would we even suffer from the 
notion of death at all; indeed, if absences could never be present, nothing could ever be present. 
All presence is inflated with absence; every presence – especially the presence of an Other – 
bears and leaves traces. Yet mourning is not the experience of any ordinary absence, not the 
experience of just any absent Other. If I am at home and think of my partner, Byler, who is at 
work, Byler’s absence is present to me, yet I know that her absence may be transformed into 
“real,” “in-the-flesh” presence, that her present absence (or absent presence) may become a 
present presence. Mourning, then, is not just the presentation of an Other’s absence, but is the 
presentation of an Other’s absence that can never be, as Husserl would put it, brought to 
intentional fulfillment (like the back of a building, or like my partner who is alive and well but 
not currently near me): it is the presentation of an absence that will never again be “really” 
present, the presentation of a radical, irrevocable absence. Like a phantom limb, grief consists of 
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the painful, stubborn assertion of an irremediable absence. And also like a phantom limb, grief 
consists of an absence that so painfully and stubbornly asserts itself precisely because it indexes 
a once pivotal fixture in our orientation in the world that is now obliterated forever, because the 
Other whose presence is now forever withheld from me once structured my existence or 
orientation in the world just as much as, say, my arms or legs.  
In grief, we palpably learn that we are bodies, that we are vulnerable and finite beings, 
but indeed this is something we learn when we confront the death of anyone, and of course we 
do not grieve just anyone. Thus, we learn something more in grief: we learn not only that we are 
bodies but also that we are never just individual bodies, that our “individual” bodies are always 
already composed of the bodies of others and that, indeed, our continual composition with other 
bodies is the very condition of our individuation. I am my body, but in grief I learn that I am not 
just “my” body but also the bodies of intimate others, that other corporealities – especially those 
with whom I share my own in love – are integral to my own, are structurally embedded in my 
embodied subjectivity. I learn that I am “through and through compounded of relationships with 
the world”558 and that these, of course, include relationships – especially, intimate relationships, 
such as relationships of friendship and love – with other living bodies. I learn that what Merleau-
Ponty says of space and time is equally true of other embodied beings and is especially true of 
other embodied beings who profoundly matter to me, namely that “I belong to them, [that] my 
body combines with them and includes them,” yet at the same time “the scope of this 
inclusion…can never be all-embracing.”559  
																																																								
558 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. xiii.	
559	Ibid., p.140.	
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I am a self only because I am differentiated from others, and this precisely means that I 
am never isolated from others, that my own presence to myself is always, in a sense, haunted by 
the presence of others. I am separated from others, yet nevertheless “our traces mix and 
intermingle,”560 and in grief we learn that we are enveloped not only by the traces (the present 
absences) of living others but also by the traces left in the world and on our bodies by others who 
are even more absent than any living absent Other, others who can never again be present as 
anything more than such traces, others who have become, in a sense, ghosts. Such “ghosts,” 
naturally, are not incorporeal but on the contrary demonstrate, in the manner in which they make 
themselves felt in their radical absence, or in the manner in which they impress themselves upon 
our flesh in grief, precisely the radical (inter)corporeality of everything that exists, the radical 
(inter)corporeal constitution especially of what we call “a self.” “There is no ghost, there is no 
becoming-specter of the spirit,” writes Derrida, “without at least the appearance of flesh, in a 
space of invisible visibility, like the dis-appearing of an apparition. For there to be a ghost, there 
must be a return to the body, but to a body that is more abstract than ever. The spectrogenic 
process corresponds therefore to a paradoxical incorporation.”561 This “abstract body” of the 
ghost of the Other who haunts me in grief consists precisely of the traces or echoes of the 
concrete, living body through which that Other was once entwined with my own but which is 
now, of course, in the grave; yet, this “abstract body” of the ghost is a body nonetheless, for in 
truth it lives as such through its inscriptions upon my living body, and thus what Derrida refers to 
as the “paradoxical process of incorporation” that constitutes any spectral phenomenon is, in 
fact, an extension of what Merleau-Ponty elaborates as the very “paradoxical process” through 
																																																								
560 Merleau-Ponty, Signs, “Introduction,” p. 19. 
561	Specters of Marx. Trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), p. 157. 
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which all living bodies come to be in-corporated as such at all, which is to say the same 
paradoxical, constitutive process through which living bodies are incorporated in one another. 
So, in short, others whom I mourn are of course other than me, yet they are also part of me all 
the same, just as I was part of them (yet also a distinct self) when they were alive. Grief precisely 
discloses to me the fact that the bodies of those whom I grieve – that the bodies of intimate 
others who can no longer live with me nor live at all, that the bodies of beloved others who can 
longer love me nor love at all – are, just like any limbs I might lose due to illness or injury, 
formerly actual but now only phantom “prolongations”562 of my bodily being; in grief, I learn 
that “my body is also made up of their corporeality,”563 that “…others become our flesh.”564  
This is why grief is so disorienting, so dis-locating. I never, in principle, experience my 
own death, and this is why Levinas is correct to argue (against Heidegger) that it is only through 
the deaths of others that I truly “experience” death at all, that “death is the death of the Other, 
contrary to the view of contemporary philosophy which remains attached to the self’s solitary 
death.”565 Any true experience of death is always relational and never purely individual (or 
individualizing), always an experience with dying or of dead others, always an experience of and 
amidst ghosts. Yet this is also why, as much as I may, in mind and in flesh, recoil from my own 
mortality or be struck with angst over the ever-looming, never to be “outstripped” “possibility of 
the impossibility of any existence at all,”566 true vertigo comes not from the abstract 
contemplation of eternity or nothingness but from the persistent, keenly felt absences of others 
																																																								
562	Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 354.	
563	Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 218. 
564 Ibid., p.211 
565	Levinas, “The Other in Proust.” Trans. Sean Hand, in The Levinas Reader, ed. Sean Hand (Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1989), p. 164.		
566	Heidegger, Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 
307. 
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whose existence formerly anchored my own, from the equally ever-looming and never to be 
outstripped yet actually experienced impossibility of any future coexistence with others who 
matter to me and who made my life matter, others whose deaths leave me, not them, to inhabit an 
afterlife that can only but be a very pale shadow of the earthly, corporeal life we once inhabited 
together. To grieve is not just to lose an Other but to lose oneself, too, because this Other was, 
though indeed truly “Other,” not just “other” but entwined with oneself – entwined with one’s 
being-in-the-world – too. This is why, in the stygian, abyssal depths of grief, we so often say that 
we feel as if we have “lost a part of ourselves,” for indeed we have; this common phrase is not, 
as I have been suggesting, merely a metaphor, for indeed others are just as much parts of 
ourselves as any limbs or organs. To lose a beloved Other is a trauma no different from the 
amputation of an arm or leg; it is an unmooring of one’s very body-schema.  
An important concern here might be that in mourning, or that at least in such a 
description of mourning, I risk failing to respect or honor the alterity of the deceased Other, I risk 
regarding the lost Other as nothing but an extension of myself. In short, one’s concern might be 
that grief can lapse into, or perhaps even inherently is, consumptive or narcissistic: when I 
grieve, I make the Other a part of myself, but an Other that is merely a “part” of me is not an 
“Other” at all. One point to make in reply to this concern is that, as I mentioned above, we do not 
grieve just anyone; rather, we grieve others who cannot be substituted for just any others, we 
grieve those who are precious to us, those whose lives were intimately, deeply intertwined with 
our own. Thus, grief must always entail an affirmation of the alterity or singularity of the Other 
whom I grieve, though this Other’s “alterity” or “singularity” cannot be, and never is, a distance 
or transcendence that abolishes any “kinship” with me, for then this Other would not be one 
whom I would grieve and indeed would not be one with whom I ever had, or ever could have 
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had, any relationship at all. We see, then, that the paradox endemic to grief is the same paradox 
endemic to any of our relationships with others, or the same paradox endemic to any lived 
experience of alterity; it is the same combination of “incompossible details” that, as Merleau-
Ponty argues, makes any kinship with others possible yet also, for that very reason, “strange” 
indeed.  
However, the point I wish to emphasize here is that, though certain forms of grief might 
be infected with egoism or narcissism, and though there surely are unhealthy, pathological forms 
of grief, at the same time there is never really any issue of “reducing” the Other to the “self,” for 
that assumes the false notion that there was ever an “otherless” self in the first place. Of course, 
others are never identical to me and I must always work to let them be (or become) who they are, 
but that is not to say that they are not “parts” of me all the same, nor is it to say that I am not 
equally a “part” of them: in fact, who we are is inseparable from the “We” that we are; we 
already co-constitute one another such that, though indeed each us is constituted as a distinct 
self, it is impossible to determine where one of us ends and where others begin. This is what 
Merleau-Ponty means when he proclaims that “in the tête-à-tête of the Füreinander [for-another] 
there is a linkage of egotism and love which wipes out their borders…”567 Who I am is 
inseparable from those others with whom I am, inseparable especially from those others with 
whom I am intimately tied. To be a “self” at all is to be an Other for an Other. Thus, the false 
dilemma that affirms that others are either absolutely removed from me or are otherwise entirely 
absorbed into me (or into my “ego”) is simply yet another repetition of dualism and solipsism. 
Others are always “parts” of me because there simply is no “me” apart from them. Though of 
course there are always ways we can fail to respect alterity, always ways we can fail to let others 
																																																								
567	“The Philosopher and His Shadow,” in Signs, p. 175. 
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be the others they are, we in fact articulate this concern to respect alterity badly if we do so (as 
we commonly do) as a concern not to “reduce the Other to the self”: there is a never a self to 
whom others may be “reduced” because there is never a self that exists or knows itself as such 
independently of others in the first place. The Other can never be reduced to the self for the same 
reason that the mind can never be reduced to the body: the notion that one might ever be reduced 
to the other assumes from the start the false notion that they were ever absolutely separate; again, 
there has never been an “otherless” self.  
Others are not me, yet they are also constitutive of me. This is, again, one of those 
“paradoxes” or “figured enigmas” that is endemic to lived experience and that even reveals, as 
we will see, the nature of Being as such.568 As far as I know, Merleau-Ponty never wrote about 
grief, but I am sure he would affirm it as an exemplary disclosure of the intercorporeity – the 
communal enmeshment or embodied togetherness – that constitutes us. So, as Merleau-Ponty 
would argue, grief is quite literally comparable to phantom limb syndrome because others are 
just as constitutive of our body-schemas – just as structurally embedded in the ways in which we 
habitually navigate and orient ourselves in the world and understand ourselves – as any of the 
organs of our senses or consciousness. Our intentionalities are always enlaced with the 
intentionalities of others, our corporeal schemas are always in composition with the corporeal 
																																																								
568	The point I am making here is analogous to the one I made in the previous chapter when I addressed the 
common concern about anthropomorphism: the concern that we might merely be “anthropomorphically projecting” 
ourselves into non-humans, and thus might be violating their non-human otherness, whenever we perceive human-
like qualities in them assumes, since such projections are conceptualized as unidirectional impositions, that we exist 
as humans apart from them in the first place. In the previous chapter, this is precisely the assumption that, following 
Merleau-Ponty, I tried to show we have good reason to reject, and in this chapter I will further elaborate Merleau-
Ponty’s argument for rejecting this assumption. To be clear, Merleau-Ponty’s account of the fundamental 
intertwining of human and non-human life is the crux of this chapter (even though it was surely adumbrated in the 
previous one). 	
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schemas of others, our flesh is always touched, shaped, and inscribed by the flesh of others. The 
flesh of others is always “the flesh of my flesh.”569 
This, again, is why the death of a beloved Other is so painfully and poignantly felt: when 
the Other I love dies, some “part” of my being does as well; when I lose the Other whom I love, I 
lose my once familiar hold on the world. Sammy, my childhood dog, was precisely just such a 
beloved Other, and my parents and I mourned him no differently, no less intensely or purely (and 
perhaps even more intensely and purely) than we had ever mourned a human member of our 
family. We mourned – and are still mourning – Sammy’s death, and it is not a lesser or 
counterfeit kind of “mourning,” not some pathological transference or displacement of ourselves 
onto an entity that was never truly our kin, an entity that was too “other” even to have ever been 
an “Other” at all. Our mourning was, and is, genuine mourning. What conclusions ought we to 
draw from this? What conclusions ought we to draw from the patent fact that non-human others 
are genuinely mournable? What conclusions ought we to draw from the fact that a non-human 
being (like Sammy) can also become a ghost, that non-human others can haunt us just as much as 
any human others? If it is possible to mourn a non-human animal, and if anyone we mourn may 
be truly said to be a “part” of ourselves, what then does this reveal to us about who “we” are? 
About who “we” have always been? About who “we” might be? About what we already are as 
embodied beings, or about the possibilities latent in our embodied being? So many of us know 
what it is to mourn an “animal other,” and if such mourning is true mourning – if it really is 
“mourning worthy of the name” – it follows that such an “animal other” must have been part of 
us just as much as any intimate human other. And if “animal others” can constitute who “we” are 
just as genuinely as human others can and do, then it follows that who “we” are – that our very 
																																																								
569	Merleau-Ponty, Signs, “Introduction,” p. 15. 
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being, our very “humanity” – has never been in principle restricted only to other humans, that 
who we are, or that who one is, has always potentially been open to and inscribed by relations 
with non-humans. Yet, if endemic to who “we” are, or if endemic to our very “humanity,” is 
precisely this potentiality to form such formative bonds with other-than-human others, precisely 
this possibility of weaving bonds with non-human others into the basic fabric of our own 
experience and sense-of-self, then we are compelled to acknowledge that who “we” 
fundamentally are has never been essentially delimited or defined by “species,” that kinship or 
filiality has never been defined by biological filiation, that our “humanity,” our flesh, our 
community has always already been more-than-human.          
Loving and grieving a non-human other therefore teaches us a profound ontological and 
not merely a psychological truth, namely that no living body is ever a priori closed off from any 
other kind of living body, or conversely that all living bodies are a priori open to, and 
fundamentally involved with, one another. Any of the actual, empirical relationships or 
experiences we may have with non-human others attests to, as their condition of possibility or 
givenness, a more fundamental intertwining of human and non-human life. We usually have no 
trouble accepting an anti-essentialist conception of “family.” That is, although we do typically 
understand family in terms of relations of biological descent, and though for most of us the first 
families we know are those composed of our genetic parents, grandparents, siblings, cousins, and 
so forth, we nevertheless have no difficulty understanding “family” otherwise to include close 
friends, romantic partners, neighbors, perhaps professional colleagues, and of course even pets. 
We have no trouble understanding “the family” as not essentially circumscribed by direct blood 
or genetic relationships or even, thus, by species. We readily accept that familial boundaries, 
though real and meaningful and not merely imaginary, are fluid, malleable, porous constructs. 
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We readily accept that my romantic partner’s relationship with me, with her best friends, and 
with her cat may even have more of a claim to being a family than the one she inherited at birth. 
None of this is controversial. Every family is a particular kind of community, and it is not one 
that is delimited by any essential or fixed boundaries, and therefore especially (as any pet owner 
knows) not by species boundaries. And if this is true of the family, why should it not be true of 
every community? Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, of course, entails that this is the case. This point 
concerning the nature of “family” is the same point that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology entails 
concerning the nature of community as such.         
My partner, Byler, is a psychotherapist who specializes in trauma and attachment, and 
she knows first-hand (as do so many others) that what we call “the family” can never be pinned 
down in any biological or speciesist way, that the circle of intimate others through which one 
thrives in the world and even achieves of a sense-of-self at all may include bonds of intimacy 
with non-human others just as well as with human others. Moreover, she knows that one’s bonds 
with non-human others may even be stronger and healthier – we might even say “more human” – 
than those one has had with other humans. Byler was raised in a profoundly abusive 
environment, one in which she and her siblings were continually neglected. Her father verbally 
and financially abused her mother, and her mother largely coped with this by withdrawing into 
insular detachment. Often for durations of several weeks, Byler’s mother and father hardly left 
their own separate rooms in the house and barely even spoke to Byler or to her two brothers. 
Byler and her brothers were hardly attended to medically let alone emotionally. Thus, Byler tells 
me that her “biological family was incapable of providing [her] with secure, healthy 
attachments,” that due to her upbringing “experiences of love, friendship, and belonging were 
foreign” to her. She needed to learn at an early age how to provide for her own survival, and 
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though this indeed led her to succeed academically and professionally, the traumas of childhood 
neglect and abuse left their marks in other ways. She was unable to form intimate attachments 
with others because she had never known true intimacy and because, moreover, the dearth of 
intimacy in her life had forced her to invest her energies in mere survival rather than in genuine 
flourishing. This alone indicates just how profoundly intersubjective everything in our existence 
truly is: without others who show me what friendship or love is, without others who befriend or 
love me, I cannot know what friendship or love really is, and my capacity to cultivate bonds of 
friendship or love is thereby deeply impoverished if not stamped out entirely. Of course, no 
matter how severe such traumas may be, the need for intimacy is never stamped out entirely. The 
need for intimacy is deeply inscribed into our being, into our very bodies; indeed, it is inscribed 
in some way into every living body, for no living body is ever isolated; no living body springs 
into the world utterly alone, fully formed, and radically autonomous or self-sufficient. Only 
humans in classical Liberal political theory or in Ayn Rand novels have never had childhoods. 
The need for intimacy is so deeply embedded in who we are, so deeply embedded in our 
corporeality, that we know, for example, that babies who are literally never touched or hugged 
suffer severe neurological deficits; their brains simply do not develop fully. Connections with 
others are in fact necessary for the formation of crucial neuronal, synaptic connections, and this 
empirical fact alone confirms and discloses at least one of the basic ontological truths to which 
Merleau-Ponty devoted his efforts to elaborate, namely the fundamental corporeality of 
subjectivity (which is also to say the fundamental intercorporeality of subjectivity).  
My point is that no matter how impoverished one’s capacity to attach to others may be, 
one never ceases to be attached, and never ceases to need to be attached, to others. If this were 
not so, severe childhood neglect would not be traumatic in the first place. Thus, no matter the 
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extent of the traumas one may have suffered, these never eviscerate one’s vital need to enjoy 
healthy, intimate relationships with others. The “intentional threads”570 that tie us to others may 
become variably attenuated or strengthened, but they can never be severed, and an absence of 
intimacy is never an erasure of others or of intimacy but is, like many other kinds of absences, 
one that painfully asserts itself and tinges every aspect of one’s life regardless of the ways one’s 
mind or body attempts to repress it. Thus, at the age of thirty, and despite all the professional 
success she had achieved, Byler came to realize she was deeply unhappy. She realized the 
“avoidant attachment patterns” that characterized most of her relationships and, along with that, 
realized, or rather finally allowed herself to feel directly or honestly, what she describes as the 
“deep-seated loneliness” that had always palpitated beneath the surface of her conciousness.  
Byler, however, did not (at least not initially) seek out close relationships with other 
humans. For the most part, other humans had never shown her warmth, kindness, love, 
friendship, nurturance, or concern at all, so why would she, or how could she, turn to them now 
for such things? How would she even know how to engage other humans in such ways? How 
would she even know how to allow other humans to engage her in such ways? How would she 
know how to show other humans these things so that they might reciprocate and show them to 
her as well? It is thus that Byler, as she puts it, “allowed a cat to adopt [her] into his family.” It is 
thus that Byler came to meet Mr. Bojangles (“Bo”) and to embark upon the long and difficult 
path of learning what love and family really are. As Byler recounts it, “legally, I adopted Bo, but 
emotionally it was the other way around.” According to her, Bo chose her and “like an adoptive 
parent who chooses to love an abused child, it was not an easy road for him.” Like many 
																																																								
570	Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. xiii, 72, 106, 130. 
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traumatized children who are unable to attach easily to adoptive parents, Byler did not and could 
not easily attach to Bo; it was not love at first sight, at least not on Byler’s part. Like many 
traumatized children, Byler, as she herself claims, “required unconditional acceptance, emotional 
support, and consistent attention over a period of time” before she was able to “experience 
attachment and eventually a sense of what people call ‘a family.’” Byler’s relationship with Bo, 
of course, developed into the intimate, deeply satisfying and thriving one that it is today, and she 
was able to transfer her attachment to Bo to other humans, that is, to carry what Bo taught her 
into human relationships. In her interactions with other humans, she is now able to access those 
once dormant or repressed parts of herself – those vital, eminently “human” affective powers – 
that Bo precisely taught her how to access. Thus, Byler’s attachment to Bo became what, in her 
training as a therapist, she learned is a “transferable attachment,” an attachment to a specific 
Other that, in modeling a healthy, secure, and rewarding attachment, opens up an expanded 
horizon of intersubjective possibilities. It is precisely in and through her relationship with Bo that 
Byler began to learn, and is still learning (as all of us always are), how to access and sustain 
those intersubjective sources of affirmation and fulfillment that make any of our lives worth 
living but that many of us are privileged enough to take for granted.  
Byler now has many close human friends and a committed romantic relationship with 
someone who loves her dearly and who is still hardly able to imagine that her emotional 
development had ever been so stunted, yet it is very likely the case that none of that would have 
been possible had Bo not entered her life to be the caregiver she never had; it is very likely the 
case that, without what James Hart calls Bo’s “gracious acts of attention,”571 Byler’s potential to 
																																																								
571 The Person and the Common Life: Studies in A Husserlian Social Ethics (Dordrecht, Netherlands: 
Springer/Kluwer, 1992), p.179. See also Hart’s discussion of the “formative original gracious empathic perception” 
(ibid., p. 180) that a human adult takes toward a human infant and which is necessary for the latter to achieve 
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form and enjoy intimate, loving relationships with others (whether human or non-human) would 
have remained unactualized. Byler now frequently refers to herself as Bo’s “mamma,” yet, from 
Byler’s own account of the history of their relationship, it is clear that Bo has been just as much 
of a “parent” to her as she now is to him, that indeed it is impossible to determine with sharp 
precision who in the relationship is “parent” or “child,” “caregiver” or “care-receiver.” I have no 
doubt that Bo was a “parental figure” for Byler in some legitimate sense of that term, and now I 
prefer simply to think that they equally take care of (or “parent”) each other. However, the most 
important point – the one to which I continually return – is that Byler’s relationship with Bo, just 
like my father’s relationship with Sammy, helps disclose the fluidity of all of these categories 
and constructs, the porousness and ambiguity of “parent” and “child,” “mother” and “daughter,” 
“father” and “son,” “sibling” and “friend,” “love” and “family,” even “human” and “dog” and 
“cat.” “Simply put,” Byler tells me, “this cat provided me with a family and taught me how to 
love – a task that humans were unable to accomplish.” Without Bo’s devoted care and 
hospitality, without Bo’s persistent affection and generous attention to her, Byler perhaps would 
never have truly learned what “love,” “friendship,” “parent,” and “family” are. Bo quite literally 
taught Byler – and is still teaching Byler – how to be (fully, flourishingly) “human,” and if this 
does not lead us to rethink radically what all of these categories mean, if this does not at the very 
least lead us to call into question the ways in which such categories are conventionally 
understood and policed, then nothing will.    
So, as we have seen, Byler’s case clearly illustrates the fact that, given prior traumas, 
bonds with non-human others may be necessary to allow one to develop healthy bonds with 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
“human” subjectivity or any conscious self-reflexivity. My point, of course, is that not only Bo but all kinds of non-
human others regard us with similar “gracious acts of attention” or “empathic perceptions” all the time, and we 
achieve a sense of self through these no less than we do through those that extend from other humans.   
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fellow humans, necessary even simply to allow one to access those very kinds of relational, 
affective experiences and attachments (such as those of love or friendship) typically considered 
quintessentially human. That this is the case is not just a fact about human psychology, for 
indeed no fact about human psychology is ever just that, and, as I mentioned in the previous 
chapter, no supposed empirical fact in general is ever just an empirical fact. As Merleau-Ponty 
remarks and as we have already seen several times, “…what one might consider to be 
“psychology” is in fact ontology.”572 So, I hope it is clear that the foregoing observations do not 
merely demonstrate facts about human psychology; they also demonstrate a fact about what it 
means to be a carnal being at all, namely that to be a carnal being is already to be situated in 
carnal relationships with other carnal beings and that these relationships, precisely because they 
are carnal, are intrinsically labile and permeable, and that therefore all of the categories 
according to which we “group” things together – whether as members of a genus or species or as 
members of a “family” or broader community – are likewise labile and permeable, likewise 
already open to and co-constituted by other “categories” of being and identity, meaning and 
relating. If the boundaries of “the family” are radically open, then so too are those of 
“community” in general, so too, indeed, are those of any of the categories through which we – 
imperfectly and often in ways that violently suppress their intrinsic fluidity – delineate and 
represent the ‘being-together’ of beings in the world, including, for example, the categories of 
“human” and “dog,” “parent” and “cat.” The possible scope of affective intimacy and 
intersubjective recognition – that is, the possible scope of any particular community, whether it 
be that of a few close friends or that of a polis – already in principle embraces all kinds of 
																																																								
572 The Visible and the Invisible, p. 176. I also wish to add, and have attempted to suggest throughout this work, that 
“what one might consider to be ontology” is also in fact ethics and politics. This point will be the focus of the 
following chapter. 
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perceiving, affective bodies, already in principle includes or “appresents” non-human others 
before we ever rationalize ways to exclude them from it, before we ever abstract from the webs 
of intercorporeity in which all of us are embedded “universals,” “natural kinds,” or classification 
schemes that pretend to shred those webs to pieces, that pretend to “carve the world at the joints” 
or that pretend that the world even has “joints” to be carved in the first place.  
If the world can be said to have any “joints,” they are those “hinges,”573 “pivots,”574 or 
“clear zones”575 – those limits, interstices, or non-figurable “between-spaces” or “mid-places” 
(“mi-lieus”576) – through which things and beings see and feel, penetrate and “encroach upon,”577 
fold and “gear into”578 one another. If the world can be said to have “joints,” they are those 
points “where multiple entries into the world cross,”579 those nodes of carnal relations between 
carnal beings. If the world can be said to have “joints,” then they, too, are flesh, and were we to 
“carve” or in any way attempt to dismember them – were we to attempt to incise divisions 
between things where in fact there can only be differences or adhesive spaces between them – we 
would be left only with yet more flesh, only with more yet wounded flesh, only with wounds in 
our flesh. We so often use concepts like scalpels and forceps. With our concepts we typically 
																																																								
573	Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and The Invisible, p.205, 225, 236. 
574	Ibid., p.205, 226, 260.	
575 Ibid., p.148. 
576	I am referring here to Leonard Lawlor’s way of articulating Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the chiasm. I will 
further elaborate Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the chiasm later in this chapter, but as I have already mentioned, it 
refers to the intertwining or overlapping of things in their constitutive, differentiating relations with one another. It is 
a point of divergence that is also at the same time a point of conjunction. As I mentioned in chapter one, the term 
“chiasm” derives from the Greek letter chi, which is written as an “X,” and also refers to a crossing of optic nerves 
in the brain. As Lawlor explains, the “mi-lieu” or liminal “mid-place” here refers to the point at which the lines in a 
decussation cross. Since such a point is simultaneously a point of intersection and divergence, it artfully captures 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of the ontological structure of relations and of the relational nature of Being, and that is 
exactly why Merleau-Ponty so often chooses to use the term in the first place. See Lawlor, Thinking through French 
Philosophy: The Being of the Question (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003), p.25, 33, 40, 44, 160.  
577	Merleau-Ponty frequently uses the term “encroachment” to refer to the chiasmatic overlapping of things. See, 
e.g., The Visible and The Invisible, p.117, 234, and “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” in Signs, p. 169, 173. 
578	Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 77. 
579	Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and The Invisible, p. 260.	
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attempt to dissect “the common tissue of which we are made,”580 to cut to ribbons the 
“ontological tissue”581 or “closely woven fabric”582 that binds everything to everything, yet the 
insuperable truth is that our concepts, and that we ourselves, are lifted from, or are distensions of, 
that very tissue, that our concepts and that we ourselves are also woven into the same fabric. 
Thus, we hardly realize that the forms of violence for which we deploy our concepts are also 
forms of violence we deploy against ourselves, for they separate from us all of those “things” or 
others upon which or upon whom we already depend for our sense of ourselves in the first place. 
In presenting a vivisected, mutilated image of the world, our concepts mutilate our ability to 
understand it and our place in it clearly; they mutilate our sense of who or what we and others 
are, and they thereby mutilate us and others, too, and often not merely metaphorically. And 
perhaps no concepts have inflicted more violence (epistemically and materially) than those of 
“humanity” and “animality,” or rather perhaps the gravest violence begins with the supposed 
opposition between “the human” and “the animal,” for we curiously tend to find this opposition 
entwined with all of the others that have inflicted the worst forms of violence upon “humans” 
and “animals” alike. Perhaps it is this (false) human/animal opposition that is the source of all of 
the other (false) oppositions or dualisms – those of mind/body, subject/object, culture/nature, 
logos/pathos, autonomy/heteronomy, self/other, individual/community, universality/particularity, 
identity/negation, public/private, masculinity/femininity, and so on – that motivate the worst 
forms of violence against ourselves, against others, and against the world. At any rate, even if we 
cannot say that this opposition (or that any other opposition) is the source of all the others, it is 
clear to me that all of them overlap and mutually reinforce one another.  
																																																								
580 Ibid., p. 203. 
581 Ibid., p. 253 
582 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. x; see also The Visible and the Invisible, p. 266. 
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As I mentioned in the introduction to this project, it is perhaps impossible to think or 
speak without concepts, and thus it is perhaps impossible to think or speak without violence. The 
point of philosophy, then, should be to create concepts that at least help us think and speak less 
needlessly violently: not without violence, but with the “least violence.”583 I believe the 
ontological concepts (if they may be called “concepts”) that Merleau-Ponty develops throughout 
his career but especially in his later writings – primarily those of “the flesh (of the world),” “the 
chiasm”, “écart,” and “interanimality” – do precisely that, and to begin to understand them we 
must begin with the basic truth that most clearly discloses them: the foundational co-constitution 
of “self” and “Other(s),” or, in a word, intersubjectivity. We have, of course, already discussed 
intersubjectivity (or intercorporeity) extensively, but here I wish to draw attention first to 
Merleau-Ponty’s insistence (following Husserl) that subjectivity (and even “objectivity”) simply 
cannot exist without intersubjectivity, that “the self” and the very intelligibility of the world is 
from the beginning shaped by relations with others all the way down. As I remarked in chapter 
one, ontological issues are always inseparable from epistemological issues, for the latter always 
tacitly depend upon the former; for this reason, though the previous chapters were primarily 
intended to address epistemological questions (i.e., “how do we know that other minds exist?” 
and “how do we know that “animals” have “minds”?”), we have already seen much of Merleau-
Ponty’s ontology, for in order to answer those questions it was necessary to dismantle the 
ontological presuppositions that motivate anyone to ask them in the first place. That being said, I 
now wish to make even more explicit the ontological concepts and commitments that Merleau-
Ponty’s answers to those questions depend upon or disclose and that are further elaborated in his 
																																																								
583	I am borrowing this phrase (which I also used in the introduction to this project) from Leonard Lawlor. See	This 
is Not Sufficient: An Essay on Animality and Human Nature in Derrida (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007), especially chapters 2 and 3.  
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later writings. Merleau-Ponty not only argues that we can and do know that others exist but also 
argues for the stronger claim (again, following Husserl) that relations with others are necessary 
structures of (embodied) consciousness, that subjectivity is constituted intersubjectively, that 
“the self” is constituted communally. From there, we will then have to proceed to the yet deeper 
truth that this one itself helps disclose and which the aforementioned concepts that Merleau-
Ponty develops in his later writings are really intended to articulate, namely that differentiation 
and communalization584 structure everything, that differentiation and communalization are at the 
core of perception, knowledge, meaning, and identity, that Being as such is what I propose we 
call “radical community”: a community that is “radical” in the original sense of the term, for it is 
a community that is the radix – the “origin” or condition – of every particular empirical 
community, the primordial relational and differentiational field in and through which all 
communities are instituted and which is also, therefore, the compresence and inosculation of all 
of them.  
In particular, Merleau-Ponty further argues that, once we truly understand the nature of 
Being as it is saliently disclosed through intersubjectivity, we realize that we are constitutively 
embedded not only in relations with other human subjectivities but also in relations with non-
human subjectivities, that indeed “intersubjectivity” has always already included human and 
more-than-human subjectivities, that “humanity” arises in sense only amidst or within 
“animality” and “nature” in the same way, and for the same reason, that a (“human”) “self” 
arises in sense only amidst or within (a “human”) community, that indeed any particular 
																																																								
584	As I hope to further clarify (in case I have not already made the point sufficiently clear), “differentiation” and 
“communalization” must be understood as one and the same ontological process, or rather as two, mutually entailed 
aspects or moments of one and the same ontological process. Since differentiation is not opposition, it entails the 
overlapping or being-together (that is, the communalization) of the things it differentiates; conversely, things cannot 
be in community with one another if they are not differentiated from one another, for “community” is not an 
amorphous, Parmenidean monolith.    
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community (regardless of how its boundaries are drawn) is already entangled with all other 
communities, thus revealing a primordial community (or communalization) of all communities 
or what I wish to call, again, a “radical community.”  
So, although I think the distinction between epistemology and ontology is tenuous at best, 
I now wish to transition from what we might call Merleau-Ponty’s epistemology of incarnate 
perception to his ontology of incarnate community. Merleau-Ponty shows not only that the “We” 
is prior to, and constitutive of, the “I” or the “ego” but also that, in the end, there is no such thing 
as an isolated “We” for the same reasons that there is no such a thing as an isolated ego and that, 
therefore, the boundaries that determine any particular “We” must always be ambiguous or never 
strictly exclusionary, always questionable or undecidable. Moreover, my conviction is not only 
that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology is simply correct but that it is one that may indeed help us dwell 
in the world more lucidly and therefore, one hopes, more responsibly, or that at any rate it is one 
that dismantles the false, abstract constructs that underlie and motivate so much of the needless 
violence we perpetrate against others and the world, forms of violence that, in most if not all 
cases, begin with a false, abstract construction of a “We” (and, correlatively, with a false, 
abstract construction of a “self” or “I”).  
In the course of demonstrating how it is possible for one to experience or “know” others 
we have, in fact, already seen that one’s experience or knowledge of others is always already a 
necessary structure of one’s experience or knowledge of oneself, that intersubjectivity always 
already constitutes subjectivity, that a “self” does not simply “have” or “enter into” or “stand in” 
relations with other selves but is in itself, all the way down, an ensemble of relations with other 
selves, that every living body is itself a knot of ties to other living bodies, that intentionality even 
at the most “rudimentary” level is interlaced with other intentionalities. However, now it is 
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important to elaborate this point more explicitly, for it is utterly integral to Merleau-Ponty’s later 
ontology of flesh (or to what I have proposed we call Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of radical 
community). As I have suggested and as I hope to show, in Merleau-Ponty the phenomenon of 
alterity, or the relation between self and Other, discloses the essential relational and 
differentiational – that is, the radically communal – nature of Being, and, as Merleau-Ponty 
explicitly argues, such an account of Being has profound, transformative consequences for how 
we ought to understand the nature of any particular community of beings, including especially 
that community of beings we call “human.”  
Though it is important not to assimilate Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to one another and to 
honor the important differences between them (for one thing, I think it is clear that Merleau-
Ponty abandons “transcendental” philosophy and seeks to develop a thoroughly post-
transcendental phenomenological ontology585), it is also important not to elide or downplay the 
close relationship between them, or the deep extent to which Husserl’s arguments and concepts 
inform Merleau-Ponty’s. I hope that I have already clearly and responsibly drawn attention both 
																																																								
585 Merleau-Ponty’s relationship to transcendental philosophy is, to say the least, complicated (and we might even 
say “ambivalent”), and the question concerning whether or not Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy may be characterized as 
belonging to the transcendental tradition (broadly construed) is one that that continues to be debated, and it is one 
that I do not intend to address any more directly or extensively than I have done so here. I hope that my exposition 
of Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology will make it obvious (if it is not already obvious) that his philosophy is ultimately 
opposed to transcendental philosophy. My position is that Merleau-Ponty, even in his early writings and despite the 
resources he borrows from Kant and Husserl, makes a decisive break from transcendental philosophy in favor of a 
“naturalistic” alternative (broadly construed), for he consistently seeks to exorcise all vestiges of dualism or 
supernaturalism from philosophy and to demonstrate the ways in which forms of transcendence (i.e., forms of 
ideality and alterity, or what he calls “the invisible”) emerge from, and are always embedded within, the carnal 
world (or “the visible”); he is, therefore, thoroughly committed to what Deleuze calls an ontology of immanence. I 
bring up the point here only to say that, though Merleau-Ponty is decidedly not a transcendental thinker insofar as 
his ontology is decidedly not in any way dualistic or supernaturalist, he does often strategically adopt a 
transcendental style of argumentation, for he often reasons from a given phenomenon to the grounds of its 
givenness. Nonetheless, Merleau-Ponty explicitly repudiates any commitment to dualism, and that includes any 
dualism between “the transcendental” and “the empirical” (see below). For a good example of an (erroneous) 
interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy as a transcendental philosophy, see Sebastian Gardner, “Merleau-
Ponty’s Transcendental Theory of Perception,” in The Transcendental Turn, eds. Sebastian Gardner and Matthew 
Grist (Oxford University Press, 2015).      
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to the differences and similarities between them, yet I mention this point here because Merleau-
Ponty’s radically communal conception of subjectivity hews so closely to Husserl’s that it is 
simply impossible to discuss the former without reference to the latter, or because it is indeed 
often difficult to determine where the latter ends and where the former begins. In fact, Merleau-
Ponty accepts Husserl’s basic account of the intersubjective constitution of subjectivity, yet he 
uses this account as a point of departure for developing an ontology that arguably goes beyond 
anything Husserl was able to envisage, an ontology beyond the terms or parameters of 
“transcendental” philosophy, that is, an ontology whose method would not be a classical 
regression to “conditions of possibility,”586 an ontology that would be beyond the traditional 
“immanence-transcendence alternative”587 or beyond the supposed “absolute difference 
between…the transcendental and the empirical.”588 In other words, Husserl’s account of 
intersubjectivity is a starting point for Merleau-Ponty’s own later radical rethinking of 
phenomenology and ontology. Husserl’s account of the co-constitution of self and Other 
discloses what Merleau-Ponty calls the “chiasmatic” relationality or “reversibility” that 
constitutes every form of being, identity, phenomenality, or meaning. In particular, Merleau-
Ponty extends Husserl’s insights into the relationship between self and Other to the relationship 
between “humanity” and “animality” and, even yet more broadly, to the relationships between all 
distinct communities of embodied beings. As we will see, the co-constitution of self and Other 
reveals an even more primordial co-constitution of “humanity” and “animality” that, as such, 
disrupts the conventional ways in which we conceptualize what is indexed by both of those 
terms, or that transforms the senses of each precisely because it designates the cross-
																																																								
586 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 177. 
587 Ibid., p. 268. 
588 Ibid, p. 266. 
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contamination or undecidable limit – the “strange proximity”589 or “strange kinship”590 – 
between them.  
Husserl’s radically communal (hence, in a sense, anti-Cartesian) conception of “the self” 
or “ego” – his insistence upon the ontological, epistemological, and experiential primacy of the 
“We,” or his insistence upon the fundamental, constitutive sociality and publicity of selfhood and 
worldhood – is perhaps his most significant contribution to philosophy, yet it is one that is 
perhaps still not adequately appreciated as such, and his argument for it certainly remains widely 
(albeit excusably, given his often dense and tortuous style of exposition) misunderstood. Husserl 
develops this argument throughout many of his writings, though most famously (and succinctly) 
he develops it in the fifth of his Cartesian Meditations, in which he addresses directly the 
problem of solipsism. Since up to this point in the text Husserl’s investigation into the basic 
structures of lived experience has involved what he calls a “reduction” to the ways in which 
appearances are structured and given meaning by intentional acts and processes that seem to be 
exclusively immanent to the unitary, monadic ego (i.e., to the “transcendental ego”) to whom 
they appear, the question concerning how any genuine experience or presentation of alterity is 
possible – how a supposedly solitary, transcendental ego could conceivably enter into relations 
with other supposedly solitary, transcendental egos – is an urgent one.  
The objection that Husserl poses to himself and attempts to answer here is that it seems to 
be the case that his phenomenological method of investigation inevitably results in solipsism. 
When I perform what Husserl calls the “phenomenological” or “transcendental” reduction (or 
“epoché”), I bracket all preconceptions I may have concerning the “objective” existence of 
whatever appears to me – that is, I suspend all traditional metaphysical questions or 
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590 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 214, 271. 
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commitments – and attend exclusively to those appearances themselves and to the ways in which 
they appear to me, and from that point I regress to the underlying structures or processes that 
make those appearances (and ways of appearing) possible. Importantly, this means that I neither 
doubt nor affirm that such things “really” exist (either at all or in the ways in which they appear): 
I focus only upon how they appear in order to discover their conditions of appearance; I attend to 
what is given purely as it is given in order thereby to learn its conditions of givenness. Thus, in 
order to reveal the conditions that make everyday lived experience – experience in the mode of 
what Husserl calls “the natural attitude” – possible, it is (paradoxically) necessary to distance 
oneself from such experience or to adopt a different kind of attitude toward it; rather than remain 
absorbed in one’s immediate, direct consciousness of things, one must bend the ray of one’s 
consciousness back upon itself so as to thematize or uncover the ways in which one is conscious 
of things; rather than remain pre-reflectively engaged with things, one must reflectively take 
stock of the ways in which such things present themselves in order to understand the structures 
that make their presentation possible.  
We have already seen that this sort of reflection yields many important and fruitful truths. 
In chapter two, for instance, we saw that it reveals the constitutive play of presence and absence 
in experience. And in chapter one, I mentioned that it reveals that experience is always in the 
dative case, that appearances must appear to someone: all experiences must be indexed to some 
subject who “has” them, and in order for such experiences to be minimally coherent (hence 
experienceable), they must be unified in some way, and their unity precisely corresponds to the 
monadic unity or individuation of the subject who experiences them. This subject to whom 
appearances appear – this dative pole of experience – is precisely what Husserl calls the 
transcendental ego. It is a “transcendental” and not an empirical, psychological, or biographical 
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ego because it refers to a structure that makes any ordinary, empirical experience – including 
even any ordinary experience of oneself – possible; again, it is that pole around which all 
possible and actual appearances cluster or gravitate, a center to which all experienceable and 
experienced phenomena and meanings centripetally refer. Thus, even any possible empirical 
appearances of oneself to oneself presuppose an index or pole around which such appearances of 
oneself (like the appearances of anything) must be organized, an index or pole of empirical 
appearances that, as such, cannot be identified with any self who appears empirically and thus 
must be below or outside such appearances, or must itself be a non-empirical (and non-
empirically intuited) structure. The problem, then, is to explain how such a transcendental 
subject is not utterly isolated, hopelessly imprisoned within its own sphere of appearances or 
within its own sphere of “ownness” or sphere of “immanence.” In particular, since it seems that 
such a transcendental ego has always already constituted the meaning of anything that presents 
itself to it – since it seems that nothing ever presents itself to me that my transcendental ego has 
not conditioned or constituted in advance of its presentation – it becomes a problem to 
understand how any genuine presentation of otherness is possible, or how it is possible for a true 
“alter-ego” to come onto the scene for me within a sphere of experience I have already 
constituted, a sphere of experience within which everything that appears is uniquely mine. How 
can I affirm that other egos exist – how can I even experience the existence of other egos (qua 
other) – when every possible object of my experience is supposedly a correlate of my own 
transcendental ego? In other words, how can otherness truly breach the fortress of what Husserl 
calls my “sphere of ownness”? These are the questions Husserl attempts to answer in the fifth 
Cartesian Meditation.  
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I am not going to deny that Husserl’s transcendental philosophy is problematic in many 
of the ways that his critics (including Merleau-Ponty) have argued, however I do not think that 
his answer to the problem of solipsism is flawed in the ways many critics have claimed, and 
neither does Merleau-Ponty. Husserl’s argument in the fifth Cartesian Meditation is often poorly 
understood, yet properly understood it offers, as I have suggested, a radical rebuke to the 
traditional Cartesian conception of consciousness, and this is a point that Merleau-Ponty not only 
appreciated but composed an entire essay (“The Philosopher and His Shadow”) in order to 
elaborate. Moreover, Husserl’s argument in the fifth Cartesian Meditation crucially informs 
Merleau-Ponty’s own account of intersubjectivity (which I have already extensively examined) 
and later relational ontology (which I have broached in the preceding chapters but intend to 
explain in greater detail in this one). 
In order to put solipsism to the test, Husserl invites us to perform a particular thought 
experiment: he asks us to perform a reduction to a pure “sphere of ownness.” This reduction to a 
pure sphere of ownness is “a peculiar kind of epoché” in which “we disregard all constitutional 
effects of intentionality relating immediately or mediately to other subjectivity…”.591 The 
thought experiment Husserl asks us to perform here is a simple yet radical one. In order to see 
whether it is at all coherent to suppose that I (or that my transcendental ego) might be completely 
isolated,  Husserl simply asks me to reflect on whether I truly can imagine myself to be 
completely isolated and autonomous, or whether my experiences of the world are even possible 
or coherent if I truly, consistently pare them down to nothing but the meanings and appearances 
that my ego alone would constitute. Is it, in fact, possible to do this? Is it, in fact, possible to 
conceptualize oneself consistently as an atom? Is it possible to bracket or strip away any sense of 
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alterity and still be left with something that would be intelligible as a self or locus of experience? 
Is it even possible to experience anything that would not bear any traces of otherness? Husserl’s 
argument is precisely that it is not possible to do this, and that therefore solipsism is intrinsically 
absurd; his argument is that the notion of a purely isolated and autonomous ego – that the notion 
of a self whose existence or whose experiences would be utterly removed (whether in content or 
in structure) from others or from any inscriptions of otherness – is as conceptually incoherent as 
the concept of a square circle. Husserl intends this thought experiment to demonstrate that the 
concept of a truly isolated, atomistic self – that the concept of a self without an Other (or without 
others), that the concept of an “I” primitively separated from a “We” – is quite literally a 
contradiction in terms.  
We need to understand exactly what Husserl demands we do here: it is not enough simply 
to screen out the factual existence of others. As Husserl says, “if I abstract from others, I “alone” 
remain. But such abstraction is not radical.”592 Such an abstraction is not radical because, for one 
thing (and this is a point to which I will soon return), the very concept of “aloneness” is 
unintelligible apart from a sense of otherness, but moreover, in merely imagining myself to be 
factually alone in the world, I do not thereby truly restrict myself to a sphere of appearances that 
I alone would constitute. If I simply imagine that I wake up one morning and, like the 
protagonist of a “Twilight Zone” episode, shockingly find myself to be the only person who any 
longer exists in the world, it is nevertheless the case that “such aloneness in no respect alters the 
natural world-sense, “experienceable by everyone,” which attaches to the naturally understood 
Ego and would not be lost, even if a universal plague had left only me.”593 What Husserl means 
here is that, in order to carry out a true reduction to a “sphere of ownness,” I must also strip away 
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even the very publicity of the world itself, for to imagine a world that is even hypothetically 
available to others is still to imagine a world whose sense would also be constituted by others or 
marked by otherness. If I imagine myself alone in the world such as I ordinarily conceive of it – 
that is, if I imagine myself in a world in which no others actually exist but which is nonetheless 
still potentially available to others – I have not yet radically abstracted myself from others. If I 
radically abstract myself from others, I must also abstract myself even from a world whose 
meaning would refer to others in any way. A world that presents itself to me as “available-to-
others” is a world whose meaning is structured by a sense of otherness even if no others actually 
inhabit it. Thus, to perform a reduction to a genuine “sphere of ownness” is to perform a 
reduction to an utterly private sphere of experience, a sphere of experience that would include 
nothing that in any manner refers to others.  
So, it is crucial to appreciate the radicality of this thought experiment. Husserl does not 
simply ask me to imagine that I am factually alone in the world. In order to test the coherence of 
solipsism, one must, again, screen out “all constitutional effects of intentionality relating 
immediately or mediately to other subjectivity,” that is, one must screen out from one’s 
consciousness of the world everything that depends in any way upon a sense of otherness for its 
meaning or intelligibility. More than merely imagining myself to be Robinson Crusoe, I must 
disregard or strip away any kind of experience that refers in any manner to the presence of 
others, any experience that a sense of otherness even makes possible. Naturally, I might begin by 
stripping away any experience of the presence of others, but I must also go further than this: I 
must also strip away any experience of the absence of others as well, for an experience of even 
the absence of others is still an experience of otherness, or still an experience whose possibility 
or intelligibility depends upon the presence of others. I must, of course, systematically disregard 
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all social phenomena and institutions; I must remove from experience anything pertaining to 
culture, religion, politics, morality, education, commerce, art, entertainment, and so on. I must 
abolish my notions of competition, cooperation, sharing, stealing, buying, selling, owning, 
feeling crowded, feeling isolated or lonely, arguing, speaking, agreeing, disagreeing, leading, 
following, helping, harming, trusting, distrusting, abandoning, mourning, promising, betraying, 
lying, etc. I must strip away my race, my ethnicity, my gender, my sexuality, my class, my 
species, and my historical context. I obviously must discard language since, as Wittgenstein 
argues, there is no such thing as a truly private language; thus, I must discard from my mind all 
words, for the meanings of words are intersubjectively determined and sedimented. In order to 
perform this thought experiment, then, even thinking in terms of words or concepts whose 
iterable meanings derive from social or cultural convention is cheating. Furthermore, I must 
surely screen out any qualities of myself that depend upon others: being a son, being a cousin, 
being a nephew, being a member of a family at all, being a partner, being a friend, being a 
professor, and so on. I must bracket family, friendship, work, all forms of communication, and 
all conceivable social relations. I must even remove all aspects of my physical appearance, since 
endemic to my physical appearance is my visibility to others. Not only must I remove all of the 
ways in which I do appear to others, I must remove all of the ways in which I can appear to 
others. I must also bracket all aspects of my personality and all emotions that depend upon my 
relations with others: kindness, generosity, compassion, empathy, love, lust, honesty, anger, 
indignation, hatred, envy, jealously, shame, avarice, selfishness, cruelty, introversion or shyness, 
extroversion, independence, interdependence, codependence, courteousness, insensitivity, 
apathy, and so on.  
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What, then, remains at the end of this process of abstraction? Have I now unearthed my 
“true,” essential, singular self? Have I now uncovered the “real,” ontologically basic “me”? Am I 
even left with anything we may rightly call a “self?” Am I even left with any consciousness at 
all? Husserl’s (and Merleau-Ponty’s) answer is decidedly “no,” and it should already be clear 
why that is the case. When I attempt to perform a reduction to a pure “sphere of ownness,” I find 
that such a reduction is, in fact, impossible, or that I cannot help but smuggle into such a sphere 
experiences that refer to others, for even my own, most minimal awareness of myself depends 
upon an awareness of otherness. We should recall that if I truly, consistently remove all 
otherness from experience, I must disregard even any feelings of aloneness or isolation, for such 
feelings implicitly depend upon others. As we just saw, not only must I bracket the presence of 
others, so too must I bracket even any experience of the absence of others, for of course any 
experience of the absence of others presupposes a sense or experience of their presence. As I 
discussed in chapter two (and as I discussed above in my consideration of the experience of 
mourning), the absence of others is itself a mode of their presence. So, if I truly, consistently 
strip away every experience that has anything to do with the presence of others, so too must I 
strip away anything that derives its meaning from the absence of others. Thus, when I strip away 
all of my relationships with others, I cannot even experience, understand, or articulate myself as 
alone or isolated, and furthermore I cannot even experience, understand, or articulate myself as a 
distinct self or as an “individual” at all, because any sense or concept of oneself as a distinct self 
or individual – hence any sense-of-self at all – is necessarily a sense or concept of oneself as a 
self amidst or relative to others. To be aware of oneself as a distinct self – hence to be aware of 
oneself at all – is to differentiate oneself from others, but of course to differentiate oneself from 
others entails an awareness of others or a sense of otherness; it entails being situated in relations 
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with others. There is no self prior to or independent of others because “selfhood” is 
differentiation from others in the first place; without others or without some presentation of 
alterity, there simply is no such thing as “individuation,” and therefore so too is there no such 
thing as experience at all. As Merleau-Ponty writes:  
To say that the ego “prior to” the other person is alone is already to situate it in relation to a phantom of 
the other person, or at least to conceive of an environment in which others could be. This is not the true 
and transcendental solitude. True, transcendental solitude takes place only if the other person is not even 
conceivable, and this requires that there can be no self to claim solitude either. We are alone only on the 
condition that we do not know we are; it is this very ignorance that is our solitude…The solitude from 
which we emerge to intersubjective life is not that of the monad…What “precedes” intersubjective life 
cannot be numerically distinguished from it, precisely because at this level there is neither individuation 
nor numerical distinction. The constitution of others does not come after that of the body; others and my 
body are born together from the original ecstasy.594  
 
By systematically stripping away all of my attachments to others or all of my intersubjective 
roles and relationships, and moreover by stripping away all of my experiences of anything whose 
meaning depends upon the presence of others, I do not uncover some fundamental kernel that is  
“me” or, at any rate, a conceivable subject of experience; I do not come to some sphere of 
experience that is peculiarly, privately, or exclusively “mine” because even such a sense of 
“mineness” implicitly refers to, or is parasitic upon, a sense of otherness or “not-mineness.” My 
consciousness or understanding of myself – even the very predicate “mine,” even the very 
concept or utterance of the pronoun “I” – depends upon a sense of alterity, a “primordial We.”595 
To modify one of William James’ most well-known claims, “the trails of others are over 
everything.” 
Thus, Husserl concludes that “…Ego and alter ego are always and necessarily given in 
an original “pairing.”596 Many interpretations of Husserl’s argument fail to appreciate his 
insistence that any attempted reduction to a “sphere of ownness” precisely demonstrates that 
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such a sphere is from the beginning constitutively infested with otherness, that a “sphere of 
ownness” always already, irrecusably derives its very sense of “ownness” from a sense of 
otherness, that anything pertaining to “the self,” or that anything that might be predicated of 
“me,” is necessarily founded upon relations with others, necessarily “given in an original 
pairing” with others. It is important to heed consistently Husserl’s insistence upon the primordial 
co-constitution of self and Other. For Husserl, there simply is no self without the Other and no 
Other without the self. It is never the case that I am first aware of myself and only later come to 
posit the presence of others, for I would have no awareness of myself at all if I were not already 
aware of others, that is, if I were not aware of myself as distinct from others (or of others as 
distinct from myself). It is not the case that I acquire self-awareness and then others step onto the 
scene for me. Husserl is clear that the self is founded upon, and thus in no way precedes, a 
reciprocal (bilateral) exchange of meaning between self and Other. This means that, contrary to 
Cartesianism, the self is no longer a privileged, originary, autonomous seat of meaning, for its 
whole existence or field of experience is, from the start, communally embedded and dependent. 
The “self” only ever perceives, feels, thinks, knows, believes, doubts, or acts together with 
others.  
Thus, it is crucial to appreciate that Husserl’s (and Merleau-Ponty’s) account of the 
intersubjective constitution of subjectivity radically decenters “the self” or cogito in the order of 
being, meaning, and knowing. If there is such a thing as a “self” or “cogito” at all, it is a surface 
phenomenon of a prior, immemorial yet continual process of communalization. What we call “an 
individual” comes into being as such only through a process of individuation or differentiation 
that presupposes, or that rather already is, a process of coming-together with others. As Husserl 
demonstrates, the very ipseity or sense of “mineness” that, as Kant argues, must accompany all 
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of “my” appearances must also, as Kant did not argue, have already derived from, or must also 
already be accompanied by, a sense of otherness or “not-mineness.” My “self” at the most basic, 
immediate level of experience only “gets this character of being “my” self by virtue of the 
contrastive pairing that necessarily takes place.”597 Thus, Husserl also clarifies that the point of 
the argument he presents in the fifth Meditation is not to establish a sort of “bridge” between 
“ego” and “alter-ego,” for that assumes that they were ever separate in the place, whereas the 
point of his argument is precisely to show that they have never been separate or separable at all, 
and unfortunately this is often lost on readers of the text. Husserl’s point is not to establish a 
bridge or epistemic relationship between a solitary sphere of ownness and genuine alterity; 
rather, his point is to show that such a “sphere of ownness” was never purely or exclusively a 
“sphere ownness” all along but has always already been coupled with, or lifted into meaning by, 
otherness:   
These two original spheres, mine which is for me as ego the original sphere, and his [the alter-ego’s] 
which is for me an appresented sphere – are they not separated by an abyss I cannot actually cross, since 
crossing it would mean, after all, that I acquired an original (rather than an appresenting) experience of 
someone else? If we stick to our de facto experience…we find that the sensuously seen body is 
experienced forthwith as the body of someone else and not merely as an indication of someone else. Is not 
this fact an enigma?...But the enigma disappears only if the two original spheres have already been 
distinguished – a distinction that already presupposes that experience of someone else has done its 
work.598  
 
Thus, though I might consider my “sphere of ownness” to be “original,” the outcome of my 
attempt to reduce my experience to a pure sphere of ownness is, in fact, to realize that such a 
sphere of ownness is not “original” at all, since, again, it derives its being or sense as a sphere of 
ownness only from its relations with “spheres of otherness” (or spheres of “not-its-ownness”). In 
other words, what is ontologically originary is not my “sphere of ownness” but an antecedent 
differentiation of my “sphere of ownness” from a sphere of alterity (or from phenomena outside 
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the determinations of my ego); what is fundamental is a differentiation and, therefore, a coupling 
or overlapping of what we call “immanence” and “transcendence.” For Husserl, there must be a 
primary apperception of an Other that founds any sense I have of myself in the first place and 
that is, therefore, logically prior to any sharp, abstract distinction one might draw between a 
“sphere of ownness” and a “sphere of otherness,” a sphere of “immanence” and a sphere of 
“transcendence.” 
 It should now be clear that Husserl’s proposed reduction to a “sphere of ownness” is 
simply a thought experiment intended to demonstrate the impossibility of such a reduction, or 
intended to demonstrate the phenomenological and ontological primacy of “the We.” Husserl’s 
point is, in fact, to decenter the “ego”; it is to show that the ego is never an autonomous, primal 
source of its own intentional acts or of the intelligibility of its own experiences. The point of 
attempting to abstract the self from all conceivable relations with others is precisely to prove the 
absurdity of such an abstraction, or precisely to bring to light the essential, inseverable bonds 
with others that always already tether and suffuse everything one experiences or thinks, and 
Merleau-Ponty understood this. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “reduction to egology or the “sphere 
of belonging” is, like all reduction, only a test of primordial bonds, a way of following them into 
their final prolongations.”599 As I have mentioned, however, this is often a point that scholars 
misinterpret. A representative example of how Husserl tends to be misinterpreted (and thus 
wrongly criticized) is M.C. Dillon’s interpretation and critique of him: 
It [Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations] is, in my judgment, a noble failure. It fails – has to fail – because it is 
written within the brackets of a radical epoché and conceives its task as moving from the standpoint of 
immanence and reflective solitude to arrive at the phenomenon wherein the transcendental ego recognizes 
its counterpart in an alter ego. Given the point of departure to which Husserl is committed, the destination 
cannot be reached…the validity of his reasoning demonstrated, by an unintended reductio, the falsity of 
his premises and thereby opened the way for another approach from a different direction…the major 
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problem Husserl faces is that of explaining how the meaning ‘other ego’ can be constituted in the sphere 
of ownness: if, as he claims, the sphere of ownness is primordial and foundational, and if all sense of 
alienness or otherness is initially absent from this sphere, then it is difficult to see how the sense of 
otherness can emerge within it. Again, if the world and all its contents are experienced by me as correlates 
of my conscious life, then how do they acquire the significance of being correlates for subjectivities other 
than my own when I have as yet no direct experience of any subjectivity other than my own (and, 
moreover, can never have any such experience)? The answer to this question is that the experience of an 
alter ego as alter ego is an impossibility within the sphere of ownness: the problem Husserl defines is 
insoluble within the framework of his definitions.600 
 
Contrary to Dillon’s critique of Husserl here, Husserl’s argument in the fifth Meditation is not an 
unintended reductio but in fact an intended reductio. Husserl never actually claims, as Dillon 
alleges here, that a sense of alienness or otherness is absent from the sphere of ownness; rather, 
Husserl invites to see whether we can imagine that it is, and the point of such a thought 
experiment is precisely to show that imagining it as such is impossible. As we have just seen, 
Husserl’s point is not to posit the “sphere of ownness” as originally lacking any sense of 
otherness and then to show how otherness may somehow come to presence or meaning within it; 
rather, his point is to show that the so-called sphere of ownness was never devoid of alterity all 
along, that it is not, in fact, possible to imagine a sphere of ownness as lacking any sense or 
traces of otherness, that any supposed sphere of ownness has always already been constituted as 
such relative to alterity or to a “sphere of transcendence.”  
This is why Dillon’s critique of Husserl is misdirected. Husserl never actually posits the 
“ego” as fundamentally isolated from any “alter-egos” but challenges us to see whether it is 
possible for us to conceive of a fundamentally isolated ego precisely so as to reveal that it is not, 
in fact, possible to do so. Husserl attempts to demonstrate that the ego never has been, and never 
can be, truly isolated but is, from the beginning, dependent upon its relations with others. Indeed, 
Husserl’s whole point is that the “phenomenological reduction” in general has never truly a 
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reduction to an “I” but a reduction to a “We.” Thus, as Merleau-Ponty writes (contrary to 
Dillon’s reading of Husserl):  
…The “solipsist” thing is not primary for Husserl, nor is the solus ipse. Solipsism is a “thought 
experiment”; the solus ipse a “constructed subject.” This isolating method of thinking is intended more to 
reveal the than to break the links of the intentional web. If we could break them in reality or simply in 
thought – if we could really cut the solus ipse off from others and from Nature…there would be fully 
preserved, in this fragment of the whole which alone was left, the references to the whole it is composed 
of. In short, we still would not have the solus ipse…in reality the solus ipse does not merit its name. 
Although the abstraction we have carried out is justified intuitively, it does not give us the isolated man or 
the isolated human person. Furthermore, an abstraction which did succeed in doing so would not consist 
in preparing a mass murder of the men and animals surrounding us, a murder in which the human subject 
I am would alone be spared.”601  
 
For Husserl, the subjectivity to whom appearances appear has always already been not an 
atomistic, solitary subjectivity but an intersubjectivity (or an intersubjectively constituted 
subjectivity). Appearances primordially appear never just to me but to us. Thus, the fundamental 
dative referent of experience has always been a first-person plural and never a first-person 
singular referent. Just as my own subjectivity necessarily subtends the primal, immediate 
appearance of the world and accompanies all possible subsequent appearances, so too does 
intersubjectivity. As I will mention again later when I discuss Husserl’s thesis that 
intersubjectivity constitutes not only subjectivity but also objectivity, the world’s publicity is 
fundamental to the world's appearing: it is not something that is "added on" to the world later. 
Built into the appearance of the world to me is its experiential availability to others, or all of the 
ways in which the world can appear not just from my own perspective but also from the 
perspectives of actual and hypothetical others. This means that appearances are always 
necessarily given in the first person plural dative case, that my appearances are never solely 
given to me as appearances to me but also already as appearances to a We. As James Hart puts it, 
the fundamental, constitutive condition of experience is not the “I” but the “plural dative of 
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manifestation as the correlate of the world’s publicity, i.e., the world appearing as ‘the same for 
us all.’”602  
So, we see that the very point of attempting to perform a reduction to a “sphere of 
ownness” is to demonstrate that such a reduction is logically impossible. Husserl’s argument in 
the fifth Cartesian Meditation is, in fact, a particular reductio ad absurdum: its point is for us to 
suppose provisionally that a certain premise is true in order to show that such a premise entails a 
contradiction (or is in fact inherently contradictory or self-refuting) and therefore cannot be true: 
if I suppose myself to be completely isolated, I eventually discover that even the sense of myself 
as “isolated” depends implicitly upon the presence of others or upon some basic sense of 
otherness; to be “isolated,” after all, is to be isolated from others; to be alone is always already to 
be situated in some way relative to actual or hypothetical others. Thus, the notion of an isolated 
self is inherently contradictory, for no self would ever be able to think itself as isolated without a 
sense of otherness or if some presentation of alterity has not already come to pass. In short, then, 
solipsism is self-refuting because its formulation presupposes the truth of its own negation. I 
cannot imagine myself as utterly isolated without situating myself relative to others. Indeed, I 
cannot be aware of myself at all – that is, I cannot have any notion of myself as a distinct, 
individual self – if am not differentiated from others. In order to have any awareness of oneself – 
hence in order to be “a self” – one must be differentiated from others, yet to be differentiated 
from others is, of course, to be embedded in relations with others. Individuation is differentiation 
from others, which is also to say that individuation is at the same time communalization. The 
process through which a self is individuated or constituted as such and the process through which 
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a self is plunged into relationships with others are not two different processes but two moments 
of the same process.  
In other words, Husserl’s argument (which Merleau-Ponty accepts and simply expands) 
is that something we might take to be doubtful (i.e., the presence of others, or more broadly the 
sphere of transcendent things and beings) is in fact always already implicated in what we take to 
be apodictically, a priori true (i.e., the existence one’s own ego, or one’s sphere of immanent 
appearances). If Descartes got one thing right, it is that the statement “I do not exist” is a 
performative contradiction. Yet, Husserl shows that to declare that the only conscious existence 
that is real or certain is one’s own is as much of a performative contradiction as the denial of 
one’s own conscious existence, for there is no self that can have any minimal reflexive sense of 
itself at all – hence there can be no “self” as such – without the presence of others, and this is the 
case precisely because to be a self is to be differentiated from others. Thus, if I reflect or meditate 
on my existence in a way that is even more radical than Descartes’ “hyperbolic” method of 
doubt, what is disclosed to me as certain or indubitable is not my ego in solitary communion with 
itself, or not simply my own bare existence as a monadic “thinking thing,” but rather my “ego” 
or “self” as rooted in an “intersubjective field”603; what is revealed as apodictically true is that 
“vision…is not the originator of its own presence in the visible world” and that “there is no hyle, 
no sensation which is not in communication with other sensations or the sensations of other 
people…”.604 As Husserl argues, and contrary to what initially might seem to be the case, the 
phenomenological reduction does not lead to solipsism; it does not reveal to us the existence or 
primacy of a solitary ego or “sphere of ownness” but, on the contrary, reveals the existence and 
primacy of the ego in relation to alter-egos. What is foundational is not the relationship between 
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the self and itself (as Descartes took it to be) but the bilateral relation between self and Other (or 
rather the web of multilateral relations between self and others). It is precisely alterity (or 
community) that enables and mediates selfhood as such, and this is why (as we saw in chapter 
two) Husserl proceeds to elaborate the ways in which the self comes to an awareness of itself in 
and through “pairing” with others. A “sphere of ownness” – a space of actual and possible 
appearances whose content would derive entirely from the unique ego to whom they appear, or 
which would include nothing whose meaning depends in any way upon a sense of otherness – is 
in fact conceptually and phenomenologically impossible: a so-called “sphere of ownness” is 
always already, constitutively infested with alterity. If I attempt to strip away all experiences that 
depend upon the presence of others for their meaning, then so too must I strip away even my 
own experience of myself. By getting rid of all of my involvements and relationships with 
others, I also get rid of the very conditions of my own consciousness. Severing all of my 
attachments to others cannot unearth or result in an experience of a more basic, pure, atomistic 
“me,” because in doing so no “me” or “I” would remain to think or experience itself. In just the 
same way that I can only ever experience an object against a background or amid a horizonal 
context, a “self” can only come presence amid an intersubjective horizon or a context of 
coexistence. I can only perceive and understand myself against the background of a life I live 
with others. So again, for Husserl (and for Merleau-Ponty) the essential dative referent of 
experience is plural rather than singular: that to whom the world appears – the fundamental 
“subject” of experience – is never just “me,” but “us,” never merely an “I,” but a “We,” not a 
solitary ego, but a community. And as Merleau-Ponty further argues, if intersubjectivity requires 
us to reconceptualize the nature (or “boundaries”) of the self, so too does it require us to 
reconceptualize the nature (or boundaries) of every community of “selves.”  
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As we saw in chapters one and two, “interiority” – a “subject” or a “self” – is defined and 
constituted not by its isolation from the exterior world and from others but, on the contrary, by 
its distension beyond itself into the exterior world and into the lives of others. It is for this reason 
that, though it is impossible for the self to know others completely or “without remainder,” it is 
likewise impossible for the self to “know” itself completely or “without remainder,” for the self 
can only ever exist as such in and through its paradoxical exposure to, or participation in, what is 
irreducibly other than itself. In short, “I know myself only in ambiguity.”605 The self’s 
constitutive relationship with itself, far from being the private, unmediated communion that 
Cartesian philosophy imagines it to be, is mediated by the conduit through which it is ensconced 
in the world outside itself, which is to say its flesh. The self’s corporeity is what lets it relate not 
only to itself but to others, for these others are corporeal beings as well. As I discussed earlier, 
there is no such thing as a self that is not a living body, and since there is also no such thing as a 
self without others, it follows that there is no such thing as a self or living body without other 
living bodies: the self’s corporeity, then, is always already shaped and informed by its relations 
with other corporeities. The self’s corporeity is always already intercorporeity; intersubjectivity 
is always already intercorporeity. Merleau-Ponty’s original contribution to phenomenology (and 
to ontology) consists in recognizing and extrapolating the implications of this truth and in 
developing a new vocabulary – even a new method of phenomenological reflection, or a new 
“expressive” mode of writing and thinking – in order to do just that. The Husserlian insights we 
have just discussed inform Merleau-Ponty’s own ontology of radical relationality (or of “radical 
community”); as we will soon see, they lead Merleau-Ponty to problematize and transform our 
conception of the relationship between the “human” and “the animal” and, in general, lead him 
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to argue (primarily through his concepts of “flesh,” “écart,” and the “chiasm”) that the singular is 
necessarily an effect – a surface phenomenon – never of the One but only of the already, 
irreducibly plural.  
Husserl himself labored to explain my awareness of others in terms of intercorporeity. As 
we saw in chapter two, it is undeniable that for Husserl the living, behaving body mediates 
intersubjectivity, yet if there is one likely insuperable problem that Husserl’s account of 
intersubjectivity confronts, it is how to make sense of this role that embodiment clearly plays in 
founding intersubjectivity within the framework of transcendental philosophy. In short, the 
problem is to make sense of how a supposedly “transcendental” ego can be embodied, of how a 
subjectivity that is always behind the scenes of natural, empirical phenomena as their condition 
of possibility can have (or rather be) flesh. In the end, I do not think – nor does Merleau-Ponty 
think – that this is a problem Husserl was able to solve, and it is this problem that motivates 
much of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. Merleau-Ponty recognizes that the most important insights 
of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology carry us beyond it, that is, beyond the classical 
distinction between “the transcendental” and “the empirical,” or beyond the traditional antithesis 
of “immanence” and “transcendence.” Merleau-Ponty even points out that Husserl, despite 
himself, encountered and glimpsed beyond the limits of his own transcendental phenomenology, 
for his efforts to explain lived experience purely in terms of meanings constituted by acts of 
consciousness or intentionality eventually led him to realize that consciousness must depend or 
live upon, or must express or sublimate, certain ontological conditions and processes it does not 
constitute, conditions and processes that are below the very distinction between “noesis” and 
“noema” and that, therefore, are radically anterior to, and can never be recuperated or fully 
brought to presence by, phenomenological reflection. Though “originally a project to gain 
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intellectual possession of the world,” Merleau-Ponty writes, “constitution becomes increasingly, 
as Husserl’s thought matures, the means of unveiling a back side of things that we have not 
constituted…,” and, Merleau-Ponty adds, “the picture of a well-behaved world left to us by 
classical philosophy had to be pushed to its limit…in order to reveal all that was left over: these 
beings beneath our idealizations and objectifications which secretly nourish them and in which 
we have difficult recognizing noema.”606 For Merleau-Ponty, Husserl’s example throws into 
relief the inherently aporetic character of phenomenology, since Husserl leads us to see (as we 
already saw in chapter two) that phenomenology – that any rigorous investigation of lived 
experience – forces us to confront dimensions or structures of reality that necessarily exceed 
phenomenological reflection. The aporia here, however, consists in the fact that, though such 
aspects of the world must escape phenomenological reflection, they nonetheless call for (indeed, 
demand) it; the light of phenomenological reflection cannot illuminate those elements of Being 
upon which it depends, but it is precisely their very radical darkness or absence that 
phenomenology must register and integrate into its considered understanding of subjectivity and 
Being. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “the ultimate task of phenomenology as philosophy of 
consciousness is to understand its relationship to non-phenomenology.”607 To radicalize 
phenomenology is to confront and pass beyond, while also always heeding or never completely 
transcending, its limits (or to reckon with its “impossibility” in Derrida’s sense of the term); or as 
Heidegger argues, it is to engage in genuine thinking, and genuine thinking – thinking “worthy 
of the name” – must be, in a sense, a thinking of the “unthinkable,” a thinking of what “turns 
away from us” or most “withdraws” from thought.608 If conducted properly, phenomenology 
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leads us to discover that “what resists phenomenology within us – natural being, the “barbarous 
source” Schelling spoke of – cannot remain outside phenomenology and should have its place 
within it,” and that therefore “the philosopher must bear his shadow, which is not simply the 
factual absence of future light.” I think we may rightly consider this to be the basic thesis 
statement of Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy, and as we will soon see, this “barbarous source” 
of lived experience – this “brute,” “wild,” or “savage” Being” (être sauvage),609 this “back side 
of things we have not constituted” – is exactly what Merleau-Ponty’s later concept of “flesh” is 
intended to articulate, and it is why intercorporeity is integral to his broader ontological project, 
for we find that this “flesh (of the world)” or “savage Being” is saliently disclosed through our 
intercorporeal relationships with others (and with things and the world). Intercorporeity reveals 
the paradoxical logos that is always beneath the constructions of philosophical reflection, 
scientific analysis, and classical logic; it reveals “the logos of the sensible world,”610 “the only 
pre-existent Logos [that] is the world itself.”611   
We have seen that my non-coincidence with myself is what makes my self-awareness and 
awareness of others possible, but it is important never to lose sight of the fact that self-awareness 
and awareness of others dawn in the same instant, that selfhood and alterity are equiprimordial. 
Moreover, we have also seen that self-awareness is possible only in virtue of my incarnation, for 
only if I am sensible (that is, incarnate) may I be sensible to myself. I may see things only 
because I myself participate in their visibility, I may touch things only because I participate in 
their tangibility, I may hear things only because I participate in their sonorousness, and in 
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general I can sense things only because I participate in their sensibility, only because all of my 
“senses” are enveloped in one another and are enveloped by the world to which they are open. 
And it is precisely my incarnation – precisely the implication of my consciousness in the sensible 
world – that exposes me to others and that implicates me in their lives, for these others are 
themselves likewise implicated in the very same sensible world. The sensible world folds back 
upon me (and back upon itself) insofar as I sense it, and it is through the medium of this sensible 
world that others – that other sensing, behaving bodies – fold into, elaborate, or encroach upon 
my own senses, behaviors, or vital intentions and that I, in turn, fold into, elaborate, or encroach 
upon theirs. We are caught up in the same “circuit,” the same skein of phenomena; it is because 
self and Other are not pure subjects but incarnate subjects that they are implicated in one and the 
same carnal world, and it is for this reason that they are intercorporeally implicated in one 
another:   
What is interesting is not an expedient to solve the “problem of the other”…it is a transformation of the 
problem. If one starts from the visible and the vision, the sensible and the sensing, one acquires a wholly 
new idea of the “subjectivity”: there are no longer “syntheses,” there is a contact with being through its 
modulations, or its reliefs…The other is no longer so much a freedom seen from without…a rival subject 
for a subject, but he is caught up in a circuit that connects him to the world, as we ourselves are, and 
consequently also in a circuit that connects him to us…612 
 
Syncretic unity – total communion, coincidence, or fusion – with others would be the dissolution 
of the self and also of others. My relations with others are possible only if I am indeed a distinct 
or individualized self, but at the same time I am, by definition, the distinct or individualized self 
that I am only if I am differentiated from, hence situated in and amid, relations with others. This, 
again, is what Husserl means when he claims that self and Other are primordially paired or co-
constituting: the self may only be differentiated as such in and through contact with others. The 
self – or consciousness at even the most germinal level – is relationally constituted. The self can 
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only be individualized on the basis of its relations with others, and this means that the self can 
never be atomistically individuated and can never enjoy a pure, translucent, private, unmediated 
contact with itself. The contact of the self with itself is always at the same time dependent upon 
and suffused with its paradoxical contact with what is not itself, its contact with a world and with 
others; and just as I would not be able to touch anything if I were not tangible myself, any 
contact with things or others outside myself would be impossible if I did not myself “have” an 
“outside,” which is to say if I were not embodied. This means that what Husserl calls the 
“transcendental” ego cannot in fact be a transcendental ego at all or, at any rate, must be 
something that either radically transforms the meaning of “transcendentality” or that renders 
“indistinct” the “borders of the transcendental and the empirical”613: it means that what we call 
an “ego” must be a living body; more precisely, it must be flesh in contact with other flesh. It is 
only through integration into a community, only through the incorporation of one’s own 
corporeality into other corporealities and of other corporealities into one’s own, only through the 
“reciprocal insertion and intertwining”614 of perceptual, bodily schemata and powers, that a 
“self” or “subject” is baptized into existence.  
It is crucial to appreciate the carnality through which (inter)subjectivity is realized. My 
own interiority is inextricably enlaced with exteriority, already exposed to what is outside itself, 
and this exposure to what is outside itself is not only the condition of interiority – not only that 
peculiar involution through which “a self” or form of life comes into being – but is already 
access to, and already contact with, other interiorities in the world. This means that my presence-
to-myself, that my presence-to-others, and that the presence-of-others-to-me are mutually 
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dependent structures of being-in-the-world, that self-presence is constituted precisely by the 
self’s passage into otherness and that otherness as such is possible only on the condition that 
there is a self that is differentiated from others in the first place; again, it means that self and 
Other are, as Husserl maintained, primordially paired, but Merleau-Ponty argues that this pairing 
can only happen through corporeal reflexivity (or affectivity). And as we saw in a passage cited 
above, Merleau-Ponty is careful to clarify that it is not the case that we first achieve self-
awareness, or that our body first becomes a living, self-reflexive body, and that we only 
subsequently become receptive to or aware of others. On the contrary, “others and my body are 
born together from an original ecstasy.”615 Self and Other arise in sense and being only together. 
Self and Other are paired in and through their common embodiment, or in and through the very 
exteriority that they share, the flesh into which their interiorities are necessarily extended. I do 
not have any sense of myself as a self – I do not even have any reflexive awareness of my own 
body – if I am not immersed in ensembles of relations with other living bodies. The self and the 
Other, then, arise as two moments of a primordial dehiscence in nature or in the world’s flesh; 
the very dehiscence through which a body acquires a sense of itself or becomes a living body – 
that is, the opening through which a body becomes also a phenomenal body, or the opening 
between the objective and phenomenal aspects of a living body that precisely makes a living 
body a living, sentient body – is the same dehiscence or opening that simultaneously separates 
and couples a living, self-sensing body with other living, self-sensing bodies. In short, I sense 
myself only through the sensibilities of other self-sensing bodies. Even my own corporeal self-
reflexivity (or auto-affection) is only possible because other self-reflexive corporealities mirror 
it. As Merleau-Ponty writes:  
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It is necessary and it suffices that the other’s body which I see and his word which I hear, which are given 
to me as immediately present in my field, do present to me in their own fashion what I will never be 
present to…an absence, therefore, but not just any absence, a certain absence and a certain difference in 
terms of dimensions which are from the first common to us and which predestine the other to be a mirror 
of me as I am of him, which are responsible for the fact that we do not have two images side by side of 
someone and of ourselves, but one sole image in which we are both involved, which is responsible for the 
fact that my consciousness of myself and my myth of the other are not two contradictories, but each the 
reverse of the other.616 
 
It is traditionally supposed that the “mirror stage” is a key, necessary moment in the development 
of self-consciousness, that one is not conscious of oneself until one becomes an object for 
oneself (as one does in a mirror). This is correct, however Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that the 
“mirror stage” does not primarily signify one’s literal recognition of oneself in a mirror, which 
indeed is a solitary affair; moreover, the traditional mirror stage tends to be regarded as the 
moment at which one achieves thematic or reflective self-consciousness, yet such an 
achievement of reflective self-consciousness presupposes – indeed sublimates – a prior 
achievement of pre-reflective (or reflexive) bodily self-consciousness, and so the classically 
conceived “mirror stage” fails to account for how, in fact, subjectivity or “selfhood” is 
primordially achieved. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty the true “mirror stage” does not consist in the 
self, alone with itself like Narcissus, gazing into and identifying itself with its own literal image 
in a mirror; on the contrary, the true or fundamental “mirror” stage is that wherein others mirror 
me or my embodiment, that wherein I come to a sense of myself or of my own body through the 
affirmations and even the literal senses – the visions and palpations, the “encroachments” – of 
other bodies. The true or fundamental mirror stage is that wherein I learn what I am through the 
compact of my bodily affects, potencies, vulnerabilities, and intentions with those of other 
bodies. If a body ever becomes an “object for itself” – hence a sentient body – it is only insofar 
as it (at least pre-reflectively) identifies itself with the manner in which it is sensed by or given to 
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others, and it first senses itself or is given to itself as such because others, through their own 
living bodies, mirror its very own visibility and tangibility, its own affectivity, its own life 
outside itself, its own peculiar enknottedness with exteriority, its own ecstasy. I can sense myself 
only because I have already passed through the senses of others, or only because others, through 
their (sentient) flesh, reflect back to me the flesh with which I too am entwined, the flesh through 
which I am perceptible to others as they are reversibly perceptible by me, the flesh that I myself 
am.  
So, as Merleau-Ponty suggests in the above passage, the relationship between self and 
Other is a sort of specular relationship or phenomenon, or is founded upon and expresses a kind 
of reflexivity. Like the relationship between an object and its mirror-image, or like the chiral 
relationship between two hands, self and Other are irreducibly different or non-superposable yet 
nonetheless are not “contradictories” or negations of one another and are, indeed, interdependent. 
This kind of paradoxical relationship in which things are non-superposable yet co-constitutive, 
irreducibly different yet interdependent, separate yet inseparable, foundationally continuous yet 
non-identical or non-coincident, is, in a word, what Merleau-Ponty calls a “chiasm,” and for 
Merleau-Ponty all fundamental relationships are chiasmatic relationships. Thus, “the chiasm is 
not only a me other exchange…it is also an exchange between me and the world, between the 
phenomenal body and the “objective” body, between the perceiving and the perceived.”617 
Indeed, all identities or phenomena are, at the ontologically fundamental level, constitutively 
embedded within a lattice of chiasmatic relationships. Any “identity” or distinct manner of being 
– not just a “self” or “subject” – is a sort of reflexive relationship or torsion with itself that, like 
all reflexive relationships, requires its distension beyond itself, its folding-back upon itself 
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through a detour into what is outside itself. This point may seem “abstract,” but not only is it 
simply what any form of identity or meaning entails, we have already seen that it is attested by 
even the most ordinary, concrete, lived sensory experiences (such as experiences of vision or 
touch). As we have already observed, a space between perceiver and perceived is necessary for 
perception. Vision, for example, is possible only if there is some distance between “seer” and 
“seen,” yet this distance between seer and seen cannot be a vacuum or strictly exclusionary 
(dualistic) partition, for the negation of any continuity between them would just as surely negate 
any relationship between them as would the negation of any distance between them.  
Now, Merleau-Ponty realizes that this essential relational structure of perception is 
essential not only to perception but to Being as such. That is, Merleau-Ponty generalizes this 
paradoxical relationality-through-distance as the very relationality that is endemic to all forms of 
existence and meaning, for it is not only the relationship between self and Other that entails 
contact with and through otherness. Not only the experience of alterity but even perception in 
general (e.g., vision and touch) discloses a paradoxical contact with and through otherness that 
constitutes any distinct being, phenomenon, or presentation of meaning. It is clearly the case that 
relationality (or difference) is, in general, constitutive of any identity, particular manner of being, 
or form of meaning: “to be” is to be differentiated, yet traditionally such differentiation has been 
deformed into binary oppositions or sharp antitheses, that is, into precisely irrelational 
constructs, or at any rate into abstract relations that are carved out of a more basic relational 
fabric and generative movement. As I mentioned earlier, on the one hand genuine, fundamental 
relations are not simple, self-standing identities, for such identities arise only through a process 
of differentiation in the first place; yet, on the other hand, genuine relations are also not 
oppositions, since oppositions are always oppositions between already constituted or taken-for-
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granted “simple” identities, and since no oppositional “relationship” – that is, no relationship of 
mutual exclusion – is truly a “relationship” at all because mutually exclusive terms are, by 
definition, isolated and autonomous. So, as neither an identity nor an opposition, as neither a 
strict equivalence nor a strict contradiction, as neither a unity nor a binary, or as neither a 
totalizing or reductive monism nor a dualism, every ontologically fundamental relationship is 
what Deleuze calls “difference” and what Merleau-Ponty calls an “intertwining” or a “chiasm.” 
Thus, we are already seeing why, for Merleau-Ponty, intersubjectivity reveals the very nature of 
Being itself and entails a radical reformulation of our traditional ontological categories.  
A chiasmatic relationship is one whose terms reciprocally determine yet never absorb one 
another and therefore constitutively overlap or intertwine with one another. A chiasmatic 
relationship is, in short, a relationship of genuine difference, for it designates a relationship that 
is neither a simple identity nor a strict opposition; indeed, a chiasm is never a static relation but 
is always a relational process, a process of differentiation: it “binds as obverse and reverse 
ensembles unified in advance in process of differentiation.”618 As we have just seen, for 
Merleau-Ponty the flesh of the sentient body (or the intercorporeity in which sentient flesh is 
implicated) is a “mirror phenomenon,”619 and it is a mirror phenomenon that discloses a more 
basic ontological process at work in the world: the constitution of being, identity, and meaning 
through differentiation or “othering,” that is, through a kind of reflexivity of which ordinary 
specular phenomena are merely particular exemplars. The relationship between self and Other 
and the “perceiving-perceived Einfühlung”620 exhibit the proximity-through-distance or 
overlapping-through-difference – the intertwining and dehiscence, the “flesh” – at the heart of all 
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619 Ibid., p. 255. 
620 Ibid., p. 248. 
	 543	
relationships and thus at the heart of all “things.” As I will elaborate below, this is why Merleau-
Ponty considers not just the flesh of the sentient body but “flesh” as such (or the “flesh of the 
world”) to be a “mirror phenomenon,” for it is a field of chiasmatic relationships as well as the 
originary spacing or interval that is the crux of every chiasmatic relationship, the hiatus at the 
heart of every reflexive movement or the distance that lets anything relate either to itself to 
anything other than itself. The relationship between the self and itself and the relationship 
between self and Other are particular exemplars of a more basic or general reflexivity at work in 
the world, exemplars, that is, of the mediation of identity or determinacy through differentiation 
(which is also communalization, or intertwining), a relational process or process of becoming 
that is, in fact, synonymous with (“capital B”) Being.  
Contrary to Sartre, Merleau-Ponty argues that it is not pure, absolute “nothingness” but 
reflexivity – the liminal space that weaves things together precisely by distancing them from one 
another, or the interval through which things enfold one another – that “lies coiled in the heart 
being – like a worm.”621 Being as such is a “coiling” of things over one another and back upon 
themselves, or rather is the space that enables and entails this coiling, envelopment, or 
“encroachment” of things, this “relation of transgression and overlapping”622 through which all 
things are constituted as such. As we began to see in chapter two and as we will further see later 
in this one, for Merleau-Ponty “Being” is not the antithesis of “nothingness” or “non-being” but 
is in itself an altogether new kind of “negativity”: it is a “negativity that is not nothing”623 or a 
radically immanent, productive or “fecund”624 negativity, a “negativity” demonstrated by (but 
																																																								
621 Sartre, Being and Nothingness. Trans, Hazel E. Barnes (New York, NY: Washington Square Press/Simon & 
Schuster, 1992), p. 56. 
622 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 248. 
623 Ibid., p. 151. 
624 Ibid., p. 263. 
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not equivalent to) the reflexivity of the living body, that is, by the “coiling over of the visible 
upon the seeing body, of the tangible upon the touching body, which is attested in particular 
when the body sees itself, touches itself seeing and touching the things…”.625 In Sartre’s 
dualistic ontology, Being (or the “in-itself”) is pure, “absolute plenitude.”626 For Sartre, “there is 
not the slightest emptiness in being, not the tiniest crack through which nothingness might slip 
in,”627 and thus it is only consciousness (or the “for-itself”) that introduces “difference,” 
“nothingness,” absence, or non-identity into the world by negating Being (and by negating itself 
in its intentional directedness toward Being and toward things other than itself), yet Merleau-
Ponty shows at length that such a dualism (like all dualisms) cannot account for any supposed or 
asserted relationship between its terms and is a false abstraction carved out of a relational fabric 
in which those terms are intertwined and which itself, as such, cannot be understood on the side 
of either of them.  
Merleau-Ponty points out that Sartre (despite himself) arrives at the insight that 
“nothingness” (the for-itself) must be immanent to Being (the in-itself), yet the dualistic 
opposition Sartre insists between the two makes such a relationship between them logically 
impossible, and in the end Sartre’s ontology founders as a result of this inconsistency. Sartre’s 
philosophy “begins by opposing being and nothingness absolutely, and it ends by showing that 
nothingness is in a way within being, which is the unique universe,” and as Merleau-Ponty asks, 
“where are we to believe it? At the beginning or at the end?”628 So, whereas for Sartre 
consciousness (or intentionality) alone brings “difference” or “negativity” into the world in 
opposition to Being, for Merleau-Ponty difference (or “negativity”) must be endemic to Being 
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627 Ibid., p. 121. 
628 The Visible and the Invisible, p. 66. 
	 545	
itself, which precisely means that Being, properly understood, is below the traditional distinction 
between “the in-itself” and the “for-itself.”629 Moreover, as Merleau-Ponty will further argue, to 
conceive of “Being” (as Sartre does) as an “in-itself” is to conceive of it as an object set over and 
against the gaze of a subject, yet Being as such is not an object at all; rather, it is the elemental 
condition or medium from which the very distinction between “subject” and “object” is derived, 
and as such it is not something we can understand by adopting a “frontal” (objectifying) 
perspective toward it.630 This also implies (as we will further see) that the “negativity” we must 
ascribe to Being must not be understood as mere “negation” (i.e., as “negation” as it is conceived 
in traditional logic and metaphysics): it is not the contradiction of some already given, positive 
identity or determinacy because it is that through which any given, positive identity or 
determinacy emerges into being or meaning (or is given) in the first place. Since this “negativity” 
is the source of any “identity,” it must be prior to the distinction between identity and opposition 
and thus cannot be understood as the pure or mere privation of some already presupposed or 
established identity. As Merleau-Ponty claims, “in thinking on the basis of the pure negative we 
already decide to think according to identity…”.631 Thus, the “negativity” Merleau-Ponty refers 
to here and which he argues is endemic to Being is not negation as it is conceived in classical 
logic or metaphysics, for it is below the classical alternatives of identity and negation, sameness 
																																																								
629 As I will soon elaborate, this is why Merleau-Ponty says that the lived body is a phenomenon that saliently 
discloses the nature of Being, and it is why he often chooses to refer to Being as “flesh.” As I discussed in chapter 
one, Merleau-Ponty demonstrates (primarily in Phenomenology of Perception) that the lived body is prior to, and the 
condition of, the distinction between “the in-itself” (object, body, exteriority) and “the for-itself” (subject, 
consciousness, interiority, etc.), and the same is true of Being.  
630 This is why Merleau-Ponty calls for what he calls an “intra-ontology,” which would be an ontology that “defines 
being from within and not from without” (Nature, p. 220), that is, a thinking of Being that does not deform Being 
into an object set over against oneself, but takes stock of the truly elemental character of Being: the fact that Being 
constitutively envelops and invades us from all sides because it is the always presupposed condition of any thought 
or presentation of an “object,” or the fact that Being is that “in the midst of which” we think or perceive anything at 
all. For Merleau-Ponty’s explicit references to such an “intra-ontology,” see The Visible and the Invisible, p. 225, 
227. 
631 Ibid., p. 67. 
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and contradiction. What Merleau-Ponty calls the “fecund negative” that defines “flesh” or 
chiasmatic relationality is, we might say, a “positive” or “impure” negative, a “negative” that is 
not reducible to the “negation” operator of classical logic, a negative that cannot be 
conceptualized in opposition to identity or that itself cannot be conceptualized as opposition; in a 
word, it is difference; and in a word, difference is “intertwining” (or chiasmatic relationality, 
which is also to say community).  
I will return to this concept of (“fecund”) “negativity,” but it is crucial to keep in mind 
that it informs how Merleau-Ponty conceptualizes all ontologically foundational relationships, 
including especially the relationship between “humanity” and “animality,” and I briefly wish to 
offer a preview of its implications here. Since such a notion of “negativity” (or of difference) is 
below the classical alternatives of identity and contradiction (or “negation”), it will follow that 
the kind of relationship (i.e., the chiasmatic relationship, the “fecund negativity” or dehiscence) 
that institutes “humanity” and “animality” is one that demands we radically transform the 
conventional manner in which we understand those two categories; it will follow that we may no 
longer conceptualize “animality” as the mere negation of “humanity” (or as simply that which is 
not human), and correlatively it will follow that we may never take for granted “humanity” as a 
transparently clear or sharply determined or determinable, entirely autonomous or self-standing, 
unambiguous positive category of identity or being; though irreducibly different, “humanity” and 
“animality” – like “self” and “Other” – are co-constitutive or interdependent and thus 
nonetheless continuous or inextricably entangled with one another, and such a relationship or 
“strange kinship,”632 properly understood, registers a “never-finished differentiation”633 (which is 
also, I must always hasten to add, a never-finished communalization) that renders any limit 
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between them undecidable. Simply put, all of this means that we will mistakenly interpret 
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the “human-animal” relation if we simply interpret it as a relation 
of complementary opposites or if we think that, for Merleau-Ponty, “the human” simply and 
fundamentally defines itself by negatively contrasting itself with “the animal” and that, 
consequently, “the animal” is merely the privation of “the human.” To conceptualize “the 
human” (and correlatively, “the animal”) in such a manner is implicitly to ascribe to “the human” 
precisely the sort of positive identity that is, far from a primary or immediate given, at best a 
derivative abstraction, a sort of identity or form of meaning that is only ever constructed upon 
the basis of, and that is always disrupted, displaced, and deferred by – that is always ambiguated 
or deprived of clear and autonomous determinacy by – the chiasmatic, symbiotic imbrications of 
“human” and other-than-human forms of life, by the shared flesh, or by what I have proposed we 
call the “radical community,” in which all beings, and in which all communities of beings, are 
embedded. 
Being as “flesh” or chiasmatic relationality – as a “negativity that is not nothing” – is thus 
thoroughly “material” in a broad sense of the term, for it is no more “transcendental” or 
“supernatural” than the auto-affection of a living body through which it is saliently expressed, 
yet Merleau-Ponty is careful to indicate that, as inherently a movement of reflexivity or of 
intertwining through differentiation (that is, as a particular kind of relational process), “the flesh 
we are speaking of is not matter,”634 which is to say it is not “matter” as traditional materialism 
or empiricism (or as traditional substance ontologies) conceive of it; in other words, it is not on 
the side of the “in-itself” but is below or outside the distinction between the “in-itself” and the 
“for-itself,” object and subject, exteriority and interiority. This is why Merleau-Ponty draws an 
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analogy between the lived body and the space of relations (or “mi-lieu”) that constitutes and 
weaves together all beings and phenomena and refers to both as “flesh” (though often he 
distinguishes the latter as the flesh “of the world”): as the former is prior to, and the condition of, 
the traditional distinction between subject and object or interiority and exteriority, so too is the 
latter; indeed, the latter is precisely disclosed through (though is not reducible to) the former; that 
is, the flesh of the sentient body expresses a more basic relational tissue and process that 
Merleau-Ponty often calls the “flesh of the world” or the “chiasm.” The “fission of its own 
mass”635 that constitutes the reflexivity of a living body – that is, the dehiscence that at once 
institutes the distinction between and couples the objective and phenomenal aspects or 
“leaves”636 of a living body – instantiates a more fundamental process of differentiation, a 
process of differentiation (and communalization) that constitutes the Being of all beings and not 
just the being of a living (sensible-to-itself) body. We see, then, that for Merleau-Ponty neither 
perception nor intersubjectivity nor Being itself can be understood in terms of the traditional “in-
itself/for-itself” dichotomy but only in terms of a kind of relationality, or only in terms of a 
(quasi-transcendental) plane of relations, that is prior to such a dualism and that is prior to all 
dualisms (and thus prior to all complementary reductive monisms). Being (“qua Being”), or the 
world that precedes and escapes all analysis, presents itself “neither in the for Itself, nor in the in 
Itself, [but] at the joints, where multiple entries of the world cross.”637    
We have already discussed the paradoxical character of any experience of alterity: it 
would be impossible for me to recognize or affirm an Other if there were no continuity or 
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637 Ibid., p. 260. Italics are Merleau-Ponty’s. Notably, this is why Merleau-Ponty suggests we “take topological 
space as a model of being,” for topological (as opposed to classical Euclidean) space is a “milieu in which are 
circumscribed relations of proximity, of envelopment…” (ibid., p. 210; see also p. 213, where Merleau-Ponty refers 
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“kinship” between us, and yet the Other—in order, precisely, to be Other—must also be 
irremediably distant from me. This is the aporia of intersubjectivity. Self and Other are co-
constituting: my relations with others (or any experiences of alterity) are possible only if I am 
indeed a distinct or individualized self, but at the same time I am the distinct or individualized 
self that I am only if I am differentiated from, hence situated in and amid, relations with others. 
The self may only be differentiated as such in and through contact with otherness. Auto-affection 
is always hetero-affection. However, as we are now seeing, this paradoxical contact with 
otherness is not only essential to one’s (equiprimordial) awareness of oneself and awareness of 
others: it is essential to all beings and phenomena. If all beings and phenomena are relationally 
constituted, then in order to understand the Being of beings and phenomena it is necessary to 
understand what any genuine relationship entails, and, as we have seen, all genuine relationships 
entail a kind of distance between their terms that is not contrary to their proximity but that is 
“deeply consonant” or “synonymous”638 with it. Relata must be different (or separated from one 
another) yet also in some sort of contact with one another (for otherwise they would not indeed 
be in any “relationship” with one another at all). Thus, contact (or relationality) cannot be a 
fusion or pure communion of terms, for then there would only, in fact, be one term in 
communion with itself, and we have already established that nothing can ever truly achieve pure 
communion with itself, for nothing can exist in utter isolation or apart from its relations with 
other things. Relational contact between terms (or simply relationality as such), then, requires a 
distance or space between them that is also, paradoxically, the condition and realization of their 
proximity.  
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In short, proximity is always “proximity through distance”639 and distance is thus always 
a “strange proximity,”640 and this compresence of distance and proximity, or rather this 
constitution of proximity (or relationality) through distance, is what Merleau-Ponty designates as 
“chiasmatic” relationality or be(com)ing. Of course, this “proximity through distance” or 
chiasmatic relationality constitutes any relationship between self and Other, but we have also 
seen that it constitutes any relationship between a perceiver and a perceptual object, and now we 
are seeing that it constitutes any relationship at all. All ontologically foundational relationships – 
principally but not only the relationships between self and Other and (as Merleau-Ponty will later 
argue) between “humanity” and “animality” – are “strange kinships.” So, the point I wish to 
underscore here is that Merleau-Ponty realizes that the apparent aporias – the “figured enigmas” 
or “incompossibilities” – of lived experience are variations or different aspects of one and the 
same “aporia,” different instantiations or disclosures of the aporia of (or of the aporia that is) 
Being as such. The “paradox” of alterity and all of the “paradoxes” of lived experience are 
ultimately this paradox of proximity-through-distance or of overlapping-through-difference, this 
paradox of “cohesion of self with self, identity in depth, transcendence as being-at-a-distance”641; 
ultimately, they are all this paradox of what Merleau-Ponty calls “the chiasm” or the “flesh,” and 
it is “indeed a paradox of Being, not a paradox of man, that we are dealing with here.”642 
We have seen that not only is subjectivity always already intersubjectivity but that 
intersubjectivity is always already intercorporeity. Not only is my interiority constituted by its 
exposure to other interiorities, but all interiorities are already entangled with one another through 
their shared embodiment:  
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640 Merleau-Ponty, Signs, “Introduction,” p. 15. 
641 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 208. 
642 Ibid., p. 136. 
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…Before others are or can be subjected to my conditions of possibility and reconstructed in my image, 
they must already exist as outlines, deviations, and variants of a single Vision in which I too participate. 
For they are not fictions with which I might people my desert…but my twins and the flesh of my flesh.643  
 
Though Merleau-Ponty refers to others here as my “twins,” it is clear that this is not intended to 
be a totalizing or reductive gesture, for (as he states here) others cannot fundamentally be 
“subjected to my conditions of possibility” or “reconstructed in my image.” Merleau-Ponty 
agrees with Levinas’ insistence that “the Other” is irreducible to “the same” (that is, to the self or 
to the egoistic economy of the self’s worldly enjoyments and appropriative, sense-making acts), 
yet Merleau-Ponty also insists that there must be some sort of “sameness” (that is, some sort of 
ontological continuity) between self and Other if there is to be any relationship between them (or 
any presentation of alterity) at all. As I have repeatedly underscored, there must be some sort of 
“sameness” between self and Other that does not dissolve the irreducible difference between 
them but that paradoxically also is the irreducible difference between them. In other words, we 
might say that, for Merleau-Ponty, intersubjectivity (or intercorporeity) is below Levinas’ 
opposition between “sameness” and “transcendence” altogether. So, Merleau-Ponty’s point here 
is not that others are literal mirror-doubles or mitotic offspring of myself; rather, his point is that 
other living bodies “mirror” my own no less so than my own body’s literal image in a mirror 
because, indeed, it was never the case that my embodied consciousness existed radically, 
autonomously apart from other embodied consciousnesses: I have no consciousness at all 
without being exposed to and affirmed by the (embodied) consciousnesses of others, and this, 
again, is why it is a mistake to think that I am constituted as a distinct embodied self first and 
only later enter into relations with other embodied selves. Self and Other – or all living bodies – 
only come into being as such together. As Merleau-Ponty suggests in the above passage, there is 
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an intertwining of self and Other before there is ever any question or worry concerning the self 
“reducing” the Other to itself or even before the self reflectively compares and contrasts itself 
with others. To return to a point I made toward the beginning of this chapter, there is a sense in 
which the worry concerning the “reduction of the Other to the self” is misdirected because there 
has never been an “other-less” self in the first place. Of course, I am not denying that respect for 
alterity is important (as it also clearly is for Merleau-Ponty, which I will further discuss below). 
Such a worry is to be taken seriously, yet so often it seems to presuppose or to be framed in 
terms of an opposition between self and Other (or between “sameness” and “transcendence,” as 
Levinas puts it) that has never been (or that never can be) real if any relationship between them is 
possible in the first place.  
Subjectivity is made possible and realized by the flesh through which it inhales and 
respires the myriad meanings, affordances, and demands that the world incessantly impresses 
upon it, the “being by porosity”644 that is essential not only to its own flesh but to all flesh and 
that, as such, constitutes a liminal space of passage between itself and (enfleshed) others, a 
“frontier surface…where occurs the veering I-Other Other-I,”645 “a sort of straits between 
exterior and interior horizons ever gaping open,”646 a site of exposure not only to a world but to 
the senses and tremulations, enthusiasms and antipathies, vitalities and lethargies, desires and 
intentions, capacities and vulnerabilities of other corporealities that come along with the world, 
or that are likewise embedded within the world, as well. Kant was right to insist that experiences 
must be indexed to a subject who “has” them, that appearances must by definition appear to 
someone. However, Kant was wrong to consider this subject of experience, this pole or center of 
																																																								
644 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 149. 
645 Ibid., p. 263. 
646 Ibid., p. 132. 
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gravity around which experiences or appearances cluster, to be a solitary or purely discrete ego. 
For Merleau-Ponty (as for Husserl), no content of “my” experience can ever just be indexed “to 
me” but is already indexed to actual and possible others, or is already emergent within a shared 
carnality or “anonymous visibility,”647 already emergent amid the horizon of a world that is “the 
correlative not only of my consciousness, but of any consciousness which I can possibly 
encounter.”648 As we have seen, the singular first-person dative referent of appearances is always 
already founded upon a “primal latent plural first-person dative of appearing.”649 The “I” or 
“me” is but the surface effect of an “anonymous primal latent ‘we,’” of a “foundational 
communalization which is the frame for all subsequent communalization.”650 What Kant called 
the “transcendental unity of apperception” is already a communal “unity,” already a “unity” in 
and through being-together with others. The sensible world – which is “decidedly the universal 
one”651 – draws together, yet never dissolves into syncretic oblivion, other affective, perceiving 
bodies in its sweep, others whose affects and perceptions are indeed “thorns in my flesh”652 for 
the simple reason that we are of the same world or of the same flesh, that we are “moments of 
the same syntax”653 or nodes – individuated yet nevertheless entangled instantiations – of the 
same relational, “polymorphic matrix,”654 “differentiations of one sole and massive adhesion to 
Being which is the flesh.”655  
So, self and Other are co-present and co-constituting, differentiated and coupled 
articulations or “folds” of a common sensible-carnal world. Self and Other are reflexively related 
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or open to themselves in and through their reflexive relation or openness to one another, and they 
are reflexively related or open to – which is also to say, differentiated from – one another on the 
basis of their shared incarnation. Self and other can be and are sensible to one another because 
they are sensible to themselves by virtue of a common carnality or Sensibility, or by virtue of 
their embeddedness in a common field of relations (or in a common relational field) – their 
autochthonous belonging to a “common tissue”656 – that Merleau-Ponty calls “the flesh (of the 
world).” We are open to and already implicated in one another through this “flesh” that we share, 
that is, through this “intermundane space (l’intermonde) where our gazes cross and our 
perceptions overlap,”657 through this spatiality or interval that joins or conjugates the very things 
it separates, this elemental field or limit that is at once conjunctive and disjunctive, at once 
adhesive and othering, at once a site of “overlapping and fission.”658 We are inseparably, 
irremissibly tied to one another through this distance or “thickness”659 that every relationship and 
experience – that any mode of contact with what is other – requires. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, 
“…the thickness of flesh between the seer and the thing is constitutive for the thing of its 
visibility as for the seer of his corporeity; it is not an obstacle between them, it is their means of 
communication.”660 Contact between things is possible only on the condition of a kind of 
continuity that brings them together precisely because it does not fuse them together into an 
identity or amorphous totality, or precisely because it is a continuity that does not resolve into an 
absolute communion or Parmenidean “Oneness” (or Hegelian synthesis) but is also irreducible 
																																																								
656 Ibid., 203. 
657 Ibid., p. 48; for other references to this concept of an “intermundane space” or “interworld,” see ibid., p. 62, 84, 
269, and Nature, p. 210, 214. 
658 Ibid., p. 142. 
659 See e.g., ibid., 173, 220, 264, 268. 
660 Ibid., p. 135. 
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distance or separation, “a torsion of self upon self…which calls “coincidence” in question”661; 
conversely, any contact (or relationship) between things is possible only on the condition of a 
kind of separation between them that is not a dualistic, exclusionary divide, a kind of separation 
that does not separate absolutely. As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, every 
relationship entails a divergence between its relata that is “not an ontological void”662; in other 
words, every basic relation must be a space of pure difference or a site and movement of 
differentiation. Relations must be neither a fusion or synthesis nor a diremption of their relata, 
neither an identity or assimilative totality nor an opposition. All ontologically basic relations are 
relations between irreducibly distinct yet interdependent, co-given or co-determining (hence 
overlapping, mutually “encroaching,” cross-contaminating, or intertwined) terms, and thus the 
ontologically basic structure that enables and founds all beings and phenomena is precisely this 
“between-ness” endemic to any relation between things, which is, again, what Merleau-Ponty 
calls “flesh.”  
We see are now able to understand clearly why intersubjectivity (or intercorporeity) 
instantiates a more fundamental ontological dynamic – even the very nature of Being itself – and 
thus why it is integral to Merleau-Ponty’s ontology. The core thesis of Merleau-Ponty’s later 
philosophy is that co-existence or overlapping-through-difference – in word, community – is 
ontologically (hence also epistemically) foundational. Merleau-Ponty argues that everything is 
necessarily constituted relationally, and foundational relations – which are attested by lived 
experience if we attend to it lucidly – are neither syntheses nor antitheses, neither monistic 
unities nor dualistic non-identities, neither identities nor contradictions (or negations), but 
generative sites of difference (or sites of generative differentiation); that is, they are 
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intertwinings. As we have seen, this is what Merleau-Ponty (in his later writings) calls 
“reversibility” or the “chiasm”663 or simply “flesh.” Now, as I mentioned above, in Merleau-
Ponty the “flesh (of the world)” is surely intended to evoke, but is not at all reducible to, the 
flesh of the sentient body (similarly, it is also intended to evoke, but is not at all reducible to, 
“materiality” as traditionally conceived), and this point is often a source of confusion for readers 
of Merleau-Ponty’s later writings (especially for those who are new to them). For this reason, 
Merleau-Ponty insists that “the flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance.”664 That is to 
say, “the flesh” (at this ontological register) is not a thing or even a kind of thing but is the 
relational medium or mediation of things; it is the differentiation – the diacritical space, 
openness, or interval, or what Merleau-Ponty also often calls the “dehiscence” or “écart” – that 
enables and constitutes any relation and that therefore constitutes the meaning and being of any 
particular thing or being. What Merleau-Ponty calls “the flesh of the world” is the all-pervasive, 
elemental enabling condition of that reflexivity that respires at the heart of subjectivity and 
identity, the matrix within and through which all things emerge into being, presence, and 
meaning. As I have just discussed, an irreducible divergence between the relata of a relationship 
is necessarily constitutive of relationality as such (indeed, it simply is the very “between-ness” of 
any relationship between things), but at the same time this divergence between relata cannot be 
																																																								
663 I wish note here that Merleau-Ponty often uses certain German terms as substitutes for “chiasm.” Most often, he 
uses the term Ineinander, which of course literally means “in/into-one-another,” and thus may be translated as 
“intertwining.” Merleau-Ponty will often simply use the term Ineinander untranslated as a synonym for “chiasm.” 
Merleau-Ponty also uses the term “Einfühlung” (which we have already encountered in several places) as a 
substitute for “chiasm.” “Einfühlung” means “empathy” in German, and it is a common term used in German 
phenomenology (especially in Husserl’s philosophy) to describe the relationship between self and Other. However, 
Merleau-Ponty often artfully uses this term not only to describe the relationship between self and Other but also the 
relationship between the self and (non-sentient) perceptible things and the world. Lastly, chiasms are relationships of 
intertwining, so the term “intertwining” appears frequently throughout Merleau-Ponty’s writings (usually wherever 
he opts not to use either “Ineinander” or “Einfühlung”). The French word for “intertwining” is “entrelacs,” and 
“entrelacs” directly translates the German word “Verflechtung” (in addition to “intertwining,” “Verflechtung” may 
be rendered as “interconnectedness,” “interwovenness,” “interlinkage,” “interlacing,” “interlocking,” etc.). 
664 The Visible and the Invisible, p. 139. 
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the negation of any continuity between them, for this would dissolve their relationship just as 
surely as would the total absorption of one in, or the total reduction of one to, the other. Thus, the 
point to which we continually return is that a relationship requires both proximity and distance, 
both conjunction and estrangement, which is to say a kind of divergence between its terms that is 
not an impassable divide but is precisely that which brings them into touch with one another, a 
limit that – like the literal skin of a living body – is at once a site of separation and contact, an 
institution and blurring of the distinction between “interior” and “exterior.” This is what 
Merleau-Ponty means by “the flesh of the world”: the paradoxical conjunctive distance or, 
conversely, the paradoxical disjunctive continuity – that is, the relational or differentiational field 
or limit, the “between-ness” – at the heart of every particular, empirical relationship, the 
spatiality that couples or entwines things with one another because it differentiates them from 
one another. And the reflective inflection or reification of this coupling-through-divergence as a 
binary opposition is precisely what engenders a mind/body problem and consequently a problem 
of other minds (whether human or non-human).  
I have alluded to the fact that Merleau-Ponty suggests an analogy between the flesh of 
living body and what he later calls the “flesh of the world.” Merleau-Ponty likely could have 
chosen other terms or expressions to designate what he calls “the flesh of the world” (and doing 
so might have obviated certain confusions or problems of interpretation that such an expression 
has invited), yet he chooses the latter expression partially in order to evoke “flesh” or carnality in 
its more ordinary valences, and he does not make this choice for merely poetic reasons; though 
they are not reducible to one another, there really is an important analogy to be registered 
between them, and the “flesh of the world” – or “flesh” in Merleau-Ponty’s peculiar, deeper 
ontological sense of the term, which we might helpfully render (in a way Merleau-Ponty does 
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not) as (capital ‘F’) “Flesh” – is, according to Merleau-Ponty, saliently disclosed through the 
flesh of the living body and through relations between living bodies. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of 
“Flesh” is an extension of his earlier insights into the incarnation of (inter)subjectivity. If 
subjectivity is essentially incarnate, and if (as Husserl argued) subjectivity is always already 
intersubjectivity, then intersubjectivity is essentially intercorporeity. Now, as the living body is a 
kind of “middle term” or “a third genus of being”665 below the distinction between subject and 
object, so is the “flesh of the world” a kind of “middle term” or “element”666 – a metaxic, 
differentiating and conjunctive spacing (écart)667 – between all “things” and phenomena that 
both weaves them together and institutes them as the distinct things or phenomena that they are; 
it is a thoroughly “material” (not at all “supernatural”) though nevertheless non-empirical 
relational field or tissue between subjectivity and behavior/the body, between subjectivity and 
perceptible things, between subjectivity and the world, between subjectivity and other 
subjectivities, and even between (and within) all perceptible “things” themselves:  
When we speak of the flesh of the visible, we do not mean to do anthropology, to describe a world 
covered over with all our own projections, leaving aside what it can be under the human mask. Rather, we 
mean that carnal being, as a being of depths, of several leaves or several faces, a being in latency, and 
presentation of a certain absence, is a prototype of Being, of which our body, the sensible sentient, is a 
very remarkable variant, but whose constitutive paradox already lies in the visible. For already the cube 
assembles within itself incompossible visibilia, as my body is at once phenomenal body and objective 
body…What we call the visible is, we said, a quality pregnant with a texture, a surface of a depth, a cross 
section of a massive being, a grain or corpuscle borne by a wave of Being. Since the total visible is 
always behind, or after, or between the aspects we see of it, there is access to it only through an 
experience which, like it, is wholly outside itself…One can say that we perceive the things themselves, 
that we are the world that thinks itself – or that the world is at the heart of our flesh. In any case, once a 
body-world relationship is recognized, there is a ramification of my body and a ramification of the world 
and a correspondence between its inside and my outside, between my inside and its outside.668   
																																																								
665 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 350. 
666 See Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 139. 
667 I wish to mention here that I think that the “Flesh” in Merleau-Ponty is very close in meaning to Plato’s concept 
of the khôra (or that it is at least close in meaning to the concept of the “khôra” as it has been appropriated by later 
thinkers, in particular Heidegger and Derrida), though to elaborate this comparison would take me too far afield 
from the present discussion.  
668 Ibid., p. 136. Note that the portion after the second ellipsis is included by the editor as a footnote at the bottom of 
the page from which the first portion of the passage has been taken, as it was originally a note Merleau-Ponty 
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As the lived body is defined by both a separation and coupling of its “objective” and 
“phenomenal” aspects and, as such, precedes and institutes the abstract distinction between 
object and subject – or as the lived body is constituted by a kind of irreducible non-coincidence 
yet overlapping of what we traditionally refer to as “mind” and “body,” hence by a kind of 
difference between “mind” and “body” that is also the condition of their continuity or 
enmeshment – so is the “flesh of the world” (or “the flesh of the visible”) a kind of immanent,669 
interstitial “depth,” “thickness,” or distance, a simultaneously conjunctive and disjunctive space 
or hiatus (or a kind of non-oppositional separation or non-negating “negativity”), between all 
perceiving bodies, between all perceiving bodies and all perceived things, and between all 
perceptible things themselves that is necessary for them to be at all. If all things are relationally 
constituted, and if every relation is a kind of “reflexivity” (that is, a kind of relationship with or 
passage through otherness), then the flesh or reflexivity of a living body is but one instantiation 
(albeit an “exemplary” one) of an originary openness, depth, and liminality (hence of a more 
basic kind of “flesh”) through which all beings, determinacies, or phenomena are necessarily, 
relationally mediated, or but one “variant” (albeit a “remarkable” one) of a cohesion with 
otherness – thus of a kind of reflexivity or movement of othering – at the heart of presence, 
meaning, and identity; it is one site of an intertwining, or one site of a “coming-to-self” or 
“Selbstung of Being,”670 that is “untiringly enunciated within us”671 and within all things.  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
included between brackets in the French manuscript (in the French manuscript, it occurs before yet close to the first 
portion of this passage). I have chosen to include it here due to its thematic connection to the rest of the quoted 
passage.  
669 Here I mean “immanent” not in the Husserlian sense of “immanent to consciousness” but in the Deleuzian sense 
of “contrary to transcendental ideality or Platonic/ontotheological transcendence.” In Merleau-Ponty, the “Flesh” is 
“immanent” in exactly the latter sense of the term. 
670 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 268. 
671 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. xviii. 
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In short, for Merleau-Ponty there is an analogy between the flesh of the lived body and 
the “flesh of the world” because, if the former precedes and institutes the distinction between 
subject and object and is thus an intertwining of the two, the latter precedes and institutes any 
distinctions whatsoever (including especially that between subject and object) and is thus an 
intertwining of all things; if the lived body is an intertwining of subject and object at the level of 
an individual sentient being, the flesh of the world is an intertwining of all beings (sentient and 
non-sentient alike). The flesh of the world, then, is a primordial (or radical) community (or 
communalization, which is also differentiation) of things from which all ordinary, empirical 
identities or determinacies – from which all “things,” or from which all particular communities 
of things and beings – arise. As a living body is at once the dehiscence and contact between 
perceiver and perceived – as perception is the folding back of flesh upon itself – so is the flesh of 
the world the dehiscence and consequent encroachment of all perceivers or embodied 
perspectives and even of all perceptible things (qua perceptible). As my right hand and my left 
hand can reversibly touch one another because they both belong to the same living, self-sensing 
body, so can my living, self-sensing body sense not only things but also other living, self-sensing 
bodies because all living bodies are nodes or folds of reflexivity in the same “Flesh”; they all 
belong to the same carnal world, the same differentiating and connective tissue or field of Being 
or, in a sense, the same “Body.”  
As the lived body is to the relationship between subject and object, so is the flesh of the 
world to the relationships between all living bodies. Thus, “my two hands “coexist” or are 
“compresent” because they are one single body’s hands. The other person appears through an 
extension of that compresence; he and I are like organs of one single intercorporeality.”672 All 
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embodied beings – no matter how deeply divergent their styles of bodily being may in fact be – 
intercorporeally constitute a community, and thus what Merleau-Ponty says of the parts of an 
individual living body may equally well be said of all living bodies in their relationships with 
one another and with the world that differentiates and grounds them in common, namely that 
they are ““inter-related” in a peculiar way…not spread out side by side, but enveloped in each 
other.”673 All things are in community; they encroach upon one another, and their mutual 
encroachment entails a distance or hiatus between them (and reciprocally, the distance or hiatus 
between them entails their mutual encroachment). So, I hope I have made it clear that Merleau-
Ponty’s concept of “Flesh” is not mystical pablum or cheap poetry but refers to the necessary, 
ontologically basic relational (or differentiational) medium and process through which every 
form of existence is instituted; it is not reducible to the flesh of the lived body, yet the flesh of 
the lived body is an illustrative “exemplar”674 or “remarkable variant”675 of it. This is why 
Merleau-Ponty says, on the one hand, that “the flesh of the world is not explained by the flesh of 
the body…it is by the flesh of the world that in the last analysis one can understand the lived 
body,”676 yet, on the other hand, that “the flesh of the body makes us understand the flesh of the 
world.”677 This is not a strict inconsistency (as it might seem to be upon first glance). Merleau-
Ponty’s point here is analogous to the one Heidegger makes in Being and Time concerning the 
relationship between his “analytic of Dasein” and his inquiry into the meaning of Being. For 
Heidegger, “Dasein” – the manner of being-in-the-world that essentially characterizes those 
beings that we (human beings) are – discloses, but does not itself constitute, the meaning of 
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675 Ibid., p. 136. 
676 Ibid., p. 250. 
677 Nature, p. 218. 
	 562	
Being as such (and the argument of Being and Time is largely devoted to demonstrating how that 
is so). This means that it is through Dasein’s manner of being-in-the-world that we come to 
understand something more fundamental than (hence irreducible to) it, something that indeed 
retroactively illuminates Dasein and justifies it (in a “virtuously” rather than “viciously” circular 
way) as the appropriate point of departure for our inquiry into the meaning of Being. Merleau-
Ponty’s similar point is that the lived body discloses the nature of Being (as “Flesh”), yet at the 
same time Being (as “Flesh) is surely not reducible to the phenomenon of the lived body; after 
all, the “flesh of the world is not self-sensing as is my flesh,”678 yet it is nevertheless that which 
makes the reflexivity of the lived body possible: Being (as Flesh) is the basis for the existence of 
the lived body in the first place and is therefore retrospectively revealed to be the basis for 
understanding it.  
Intersubjectivity and the “natal secret” of the lived body disclose the nature of Being 
itself as “identity without superposition…difference without contradiction…the divergence of 
the within and the without…”.679 Lived, embodied experience – especially the lived of 
experience of otherness, or rather the lived experience of one’s own body through otherness and, 
reversibly, of otherness through one’s own body – disrupts the disjunctive, binary logic of 
traditional philosophical frameworks and of ordinary reflective thought. Lived experience has its 
own logos, and it is one that both grounds and unsettles the categories or schemas through which 
we usually articulate and explain the world. This is why Merleau-Ponty suggests that the 
phenomenon of alterity demands a revolution in ontology, that is, a relational ontology or 
ontology of difference that is beyond the polarities of dualism and monism, idealism and 
reductive materialism, the transcendental and the empirical; it demands an ontology that 
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transforms not only how we conceptualize Being but especially how we conceptualize relations 
between beings or between categories of beings. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “against the doctrine 
of contradiction, absolute negation, the either or – Transcendence is identity within 
difference.”680 Merleau-Ponty consistently argues that lived experience and Being as such 
operate according to a “both/and” logic (which is, again, what he often refers to as a logic of 
“ambiguity”) that both founds and disrupts any conventional “either/or” logic. This is why 
Merleau-Ponty frequently contrasts “identity” with “non-difference” and suggests that we 
substitute the latter for the former,681 for the traditional contrary of identity is negation (i.e., 
contradiction or opposition), yet neither identity nor negation (or contradiction) describe the 
fundamental ways in which things are related to one another. To think of things or relations in 
terms of identity and negation (or absolute non-identity) is to remain caught up in precisely a 
traditional, disjunctive (“either/or”) logical framework that fails to honor lived experience or the 
nature of Being (as Deleuze argues, such a logical framework is one that illicitly reifies identity 
as ontologically primary when in fact it is only an effect of difference, and this is precisely 
Merleau-Ponty’s point as well). “Non-difference” is thus one way in which Merleau-Ponty 
attempts to signify an alternative to the concept of identity that we find within traditional binary 
schemas of logic, that is, an alternative to “identity” defined relative to contradiction or negation; 
in other words, it signifies a kind of continuity between things below the conventional opposition 
between identity and opposition, or a way of being-together that does not amount to coincidence 
or analytic equivalence or to a reductive or totalizing unity. “Non-difference,” then, is in fact 
another way of articulating “difference,” since it is neither “identity” (in the classical sense) nor 
negation (in the classical sense); it is but one way in which Merleau-Ponty succinctly expresses 
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the (“both/and”) “logic” of Being disclosed through lived, embodied experience, which is also 
the logic of community.  
Thus, the intercorporeal constitution of subjectivity clearly has profound implications for 
how we conceptualize and draw the boundaries of identity and community (and even for how we 
conceptualize the nature of Being as such). It reveals to us our embeddedness in what I have 
suggested we call a “radical community,” that is, a community that is “radical” in the original 
sense of that term: a community that is the radix – the originary, generative and differentiating 
field, the ‘dehiscence’ and attendant overlapping – of all beings or of all communities and 
lifeworlds. Such a “radical community” is another name for what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the 
“flesh of the world” (or simply “Flesh”); it is that lattice of internal and affective relations, or 
that “formative medium of the object and the subject,”682 that renders all living bodies receptive 
to a common world, perceptible to themselves, and perceptible to one another. No matter how 
different they may be from my own style of being, all living bodies truly are, as Merleau-Ponty 
says, “the flesh of my flesh,”683 for all embodied beings, hence all communities of embodied 
beings, are differentiated articulations of a common sensible world, different styles of a shared 
embodiment, expressions of the world in which I too participate, the world of which my sensing 
body is also a variant.  
We are all caught up in the same “circuit” or skein of phenomena, and at the most 
fundamental level we must understand this “we” to embrace all living bodies. All living bodies – 
human and non-human alike – are fundamentally in-corporated into the world they interrogate, 
and they are therefore fundamentally in-corporated into one another. My body is “in a circuit 
with the world, an Einfuhlung with the world, with the things, with animals, with other 
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bodies…”.684 All carnalities are implicated in one another. We saw in chapters three and four 
that if subjectivity is incarnate, we cannot maintain a rigidly “speciesist” or otherwise essentialist 
account of subjectivity, but this also entails that we cannot maintain a rigidly speciesist or 
otherwise essentialist account of community. All living bodies are “subjectivities,” and living 
bodies simply cannot be dualistically (or essentialistically) opposed to one another. Not only 
does the embodiment of subjectivity mean that every living body is embedded in an 
intercorporeal community with other living bodies, it also means that every such intercorporeal 
community is itself embedded in community with other intercorporeal communities: if no living 
body is ever utterly isolated from other living bodies, it follows that no specific community of 
living bodies is ever utterly isolated from other communities of living bodies. Thus, though 
distinct communities do exist in the world and though these distinctions are often significant, 
such distinctions can never be conceptualized (and thus ought never to be policed) as strict, 
exclusionary borders or divides, and it follows that all of the ways in which we do commonly 
conceptualize or police them as such – including especially in speciesist or anthropocentric ways 
– are false abstractions. As M.C. Dillon writes, “the bifurcation of body and soul is the essential 
presupposition of humanism”685; by doing away with the bifurcation of body and soul, we also 
do away with all of the other specious bifurcations we construct in our heads and violently 
impose upon the world, and therefore we also do away with those (violent) ideologies (such as 
“humanism”) that conceptually or structurally depend upon such bifurcations.  
So, for Merleau-Ponty, though human beings and animals often demonstrate very 
different styles of existence, these styles nevertheless envelop and implicate one another, for 
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different corporeal schemata or styles of existence are, indeed, nevertheless corporeal. Different 
carnalities necessarily overlap one another through the “elemental” carnality that they share. 
Differences between living bodies are, in principle, never oppositional: living, behaving bodies 
are never totally closed in on themselves or closed off from one another (no matter how different 
from one another they may be); they never belong to separate domains of Being but are 
intertwined through the very flesh and through the world (or through the flesh of the world) that 
they share. Thus, Merleau-Ponty claims that animals are (like non-sentient things and 
“madmen”) our “quasi-companions,” “thorns in our flesh.”686 Is it not the case, then, that “animal 
others” constitute who “we” are just as much as human others do, and that we reciprocally 
constitute “animal others” as such? Must we not say that, as “the self” is to “the Other,” so is 
“humanity” to “animality”? This is, indeed, the conclusion to which Merleau-Ponty was led 
toward the premature end of his philosophical career.  
Following Husserl on the pairing relation between self and Other, Merleau-Ponty 
decenters the cogito as the locus of all meaning and value in the world; instead, he locates 
meaning and value in the compresence and manifold synergies – in the communal embeddedness 
– of living bodies, that is, in intercorporeity, in “Flesh.” Husserl shows that the “ego” is not the 
central or autonomous source – not the pure, atomic origin – of its own being or identity or 
immanent sphere of appearances and is thus not entirely, unidirectionally or centrifugally 
responsible for the meanings it may constitute through its modes and acts of intentionality. The 
“ego” only arises in sense together with others, and thus all of its achievements – all of the things 
it may ever perceive, intend, think, know, or do – are ultimately communal, or are ultimately 
only achieved in and through reciprocal, multilateral exchanges with others. Merleau-Ponty 
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simply proceeds to decenter the “ego” more radically than Husserl ever did. In his later writings, 
Merleau-Ponty takes Husserl’s project one step further – the logically necessary step further – by 
decentering the traditionally presupposed “humanity” of this ego. Merleau-Ponty recognizes that 
what applies to the “ego” must equally apply to the implicit “humanity” of the ego. Just as there 
is no “self” or “cogito” without others, so too is there no “humanity” – no “human” selves – 
without “animal others.” Since the pairing of self and Other entails that the self cannot be 
understood as an originary and autonomous, purely self-contained locus of meaning, neither can 
“the human,” or neither can the “humanity” of any supposed “self,” be understood in such a 
manner (and moreover, Merleau-Ponty denies that there are any such “pure,” simple origins in 
the world). Everything said thus far concerning the relationship between self and Other is 
analogously true concerning the relationship between “the human” and “the animal,” for indeed 
the “self” in the “self-Other” relationship has traditionally, implicitly been a “human” self and, 
reciprocally, “the animal” has always been “the Other” of “the human.” However, traditionally 
“animality” has been conceptualized merely as the negation or privation of “humanity,” yet the 
non-dualistic or non-binary “logic” of intersubjectivity and even, more broadly, of lived 
experience and of Being as such – that is, the logic of difference or of community, the logic of 
“Flesh” or of the “chiasm” – demonstrates that such a conceptualization of the “human-animal” 
relationship is a false abstraction and therefore demands that we radically transform how we 
conceptualize it, that we radically transform what we mean by “human” and “animal” and even, 
therefore, what we mean by “we.”  
Merleau-Ponty argues that we are essentially (we might say “quasi-transcendentally”) in 
community with “animal” others, that the “We” has always fundamentally enunciated human 
and non-human forms of life, that “intersubjectivity” has not only always already been 
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intercorporeity but also, and for that very reason, “interanimality.”687 In short, “humanity” and 
“animality” and all embodied beings are foundationally, intercorporeally intertwined. As I will 
elaborate below, Merleau-Ponty argues that “humanity” is necessarily continuous with, and is 
thus necessarily but a particular expression or articulation of, “animality,” but this is not to say 
either that “animality” is merely the privative counterpart to “humanity” or that humanity 
“arises” or “descends” from animality, for they both – like “self” and “Other” as Husserl 
explained them – primordially arise in sense together. It will be crucial that we heed (as 
Merleau-Ponty insists we do) this strict analogy between the “self-Other” relation and the 
“human-animal” relation, for otherwise we will misinterpret the latter. As the “self” is to the 
“Other,” so is “the human” to “the animal.” Thus, Merleau-Ponty affirms that “it is humanity that 
grounds the animal as animal and animality that grounds man as man.”688 For Merleau-Ponty, 
however, this does not mean that they reciprocally ground one another simply by negative or 
complementary contrast, for that, again, is to conceptualize the “difference” between them as 
derived from some prior, already positively given and self-standing identity (presumably that of 
“the human”), or it is simply to conceptualize the difference between them as some sort of 
ordinary predicative, empirical difference (which also derives from already given or presupposed 
identities), yet neither is “difference worthy of the name,” or neither is the kind of difference 
through which they (or any other distinct kinds of things in existence) are instituted.  
So, for Merleau-Ponty “humanity” and “animality” are neither opposed nor reductively 
identical to one another and are neither “higher” nor “lower” than, or neither “anterior” nor 
“posterior” to, one another. Their relationship is certainly not oppositional, but it also cannot be 
hierarchical since, given that they are equiprimordial or foundationally co-given and 
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interpenetrating, it is impossible to conceptualize one as either the pure, autonomous, simple 
origin or as the predetermined “telos” of the other. As I argued in the previous chapter, there is 
logically no non-arbitrary way to privilege one’s own distinctive manner of being over others, 
yet here Merleau-Ponty dismantles the ontological commitments – the supposed transparency, 
autonomy, essentiality, primacy, or isolation of one’s own manner of being – that one assumes 
whenever one privileges it as the Archimedean pivot of all meaning and value in the world 
relative to which all other forms of existence are to be derivatively or negatively interpreted, 
categorized, and evaluated. “Humanity” and “animality” are (like everything else in existence) 
instituted through an irreducible process of differentiation, and this means that their relationship 
does not resolve into a classical “ladder of Being” or scala naturae because neither descends 
from the other as from some pure hearth of creation: there is only ever differentiation and “cross-
contamination” – hence only ever ambiguity, only ever hybridity or “promiscuity”689 (or what 
Alphonso Lingis calls “bestiality”), only ever community, or only ever webs of ontological 
interdependencies – all the way down. So, as we will soon see, this is why Merleau-Ponty insists 
upon what he calls the laterality – both the equiprimordial and non-hierarchical nature – of the 
“human-animal” relationship. At the most basic level, “humanity” and “animality” are laterally 
related, or co-constituting: coupled and interdependent by virtue of a constitutive difference 
between them or by what Merleau-Ponty calls a shared Flesh. This means that each is defined as 
such by a limit between them that is ultimately undecidable, or that each is defined by an 
inexpugnable ambiguity, by the impossibility of any sharp demarcation of its identity relative to 
the other because each is always already intertwined with the other.   
																																																								
689 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 84, 253. 
	 570	
Again, this is not, of course, to deny that there are distinct and often deeply divergent 
communities of living beings in the world. But all communities or lifeworlds are never 
absolutely divorced from one another, for they precisely acquire their distinct identities or styles 
of being (as do all distinct beings, identities, or styles of being) from their mutual differentiation 
from one another, hence also from their mutual involvement with one another; they are all but 
variations of the same world, irreducibly different styles of corporeity that are, for that very 
reason, nonetheless intercorporeally implicated in one another. The world is “…a pell-mell 
ensemble of bodies and minds,” a “promiscuity of visages, words, actions, with, between them 
all, that cohesion which cannot be denied them since they are all differences, extreme 
divergencies of one same something.”690 Though they may indeed be extremely different from 
one another, all embodied beings, and all communities of embodied beings, are nevertheless but 
different folds or expressions of “the flesh of the world.” If there is one simple yet, at the same 
time, exceedingly difficult point in Merleau-Ponty – one that challenges or frustrates our habitual 
ways of thinking – it is that we must learn to conceptualize irreducible, even extreme divergence 
and radical continuity together, as two compresent aspects or mutually dependent conditions of 
any genuine or fundamental relationship. This is, again, why Merleau-Ponty considers all 
fundamental relationships or “kinships” to be “strange” or paradoxical. Kinship is not the 
contrary of difference, but is constituted by it. It is in this sense that “there is a “kinship” of the 
living beings and us among them,”691 and such kinship is a necessary, ontological and not merely 
empirical condition of our existence and of the existence of all beings. 
Thus, Merleau-Ponty realizes that if we are truly to reject the solipsism or egocentricity 
of traditional reflective thought – or if we are truly to reject the solipsism or egocentricity that 
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Husserl took great pains to disentangle from phenomenology – then so too must we also reject 
everything else that goes along with the traditional standpoint of reflective thought (or with the 
traditional standpoint of phenomenological reflection), including especially its implicit 
anthropocentricity. Phenomenological reflection is radical inasmuch as it aims to excavate and 
dismantle all of those prejudices that insidiously keep us from actually “knowing what we see,” 
and for Merleau-Ponty this includes (among others) humanist prejudices. If we are truly to 
radicalize phenomenology, we must decenter not merely an ego-centered perspective on the 
world but also a human-centered perspective on it.  
However, before I continue to elaborate the conception of the human-animal relationship 
(or, more broadly, the conception of community) that Merleau-Ponty extrapolates from this 
insight and bring this discussion to a close, and in order to better clarify everything that has been 
discussed up to this point, I wish to address an important, even potentially devastating, objection 
one might pose here. The objection in question is one we implicitly encountered in Nagel’s 
famous essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?,” yet it is also one that might even be motivated by 
certain core insights of hermeneutics and phenomenology. As I discussed in the previous two 
chapters, phenomenology rejects the classical, Enlightenment conception of knowledge and 
“objectivity” as a false abstraction and insists upon the fundamentally situated or perspectival 
nature of thought and knowledge. In other words, thought and knowledge are (like perception 
itself) always grounded in a particular, concrete standpoint; far from being an obstacle to 
knowledge or “objectivity,” a situated perspective or worldly standpoint and identity is precisely 
the condition of our access to knowledge or “objective truth,” or is indeed the condition of the 
possibility of all thought, meaning, and experience. All of those “encumbrances” that constitute 
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our material, bodily, context-specific being-in-the-world are not “encumbrances” at all but are 
what make knowledge, experience, or any kind of objectivity “worthy of the name” possible.  
The question, then, is this: is this repudiation of a classical conception of knowledge or 
“objectivity” – is this general commitment to a “standpoint epistemology” – not in tension with 
the demand to decenter our human standpoint? In other words, will not the position from which 
we perceive, reflect upon, or seek to know the world (and others) always be inescapably, 
inexpugnably “human”? Is not my species or “humanity” just as constitutive of the standpoint 
from which I will always necessarily understand the world as any of the other axes of identity 
(race, gender, sexuality, class, ability, and so on) that constitute me? If it is, then what hope can 
we have to “decenter” it? And moreover (or more damningly), far from “radicalizing” 
phenomenology, is Merleau-Ponty’s call for us to decenter our “human” standpoint therefore but 
a reinstatement of the very classical, Enlightenment ideal of objectivity or impartiality – the ideal 
of a God’s eye “view from nowhere” – that he (or that phenomenology in general) repudiates? Is 
it not the demand that we transcend rather than heed our own specific standpoint in the world? 
And is not such a demand not only inherently impossible to satisfy but also inconsistent with the 
core – and, I think, fundamentally correct – tenets of phenomenology or hermeneutics? If we 
take seriously (as we must) the situated, perspectival nature of being and knowing, must we not 
accept that we will forever be enclosed within an “all-too-human” vantage point, or that we will 
only ever be able to think anthropocentrically? As William James famously puts it, is it not the 
case that “the trail of the human serpent is thus over everything”692? Are we in fact condemned 
to a world “in which every object displays the human face it acquires in a human gaze”693? If so, 
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it seems that the project of Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy (and that the philosophical project I 
myself have sought to advance throughout this work) are doomed to failure.  
I think that Merleau-Ponty (or that phenomenology in general) offers a decisive answer to 
this objection, and though it is one we have already broached in the previous chapters, I now 
wish to articulate it more explicitly, and doing so will further elucidate the central concepts of 
Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy. The objection in question assumes a particular false dilemma 
and in fact reflects a false understanding of the phenomenological or hermeneutic alternative to 
classical epistemology (or at least a false understanding of what such an alternative entails). The 
false dilemma in question affirms that we are either able to extricate ourselves entirely from our 
own situated, embodied standpoint in the world and ascend to a God’s eye “view from nowhere” 
(which is an inherently absurd notion), or we must accept that we are absolutely imprisoned 
within our own worldly standpoint. However, phenomenology or hermeneutics (or standpoint 
epistemology) advances a third alternative beyond these two equally false ones; it rejects the 
false abstraction or absolutism of a “view from nowhere,” but it also rejects, and logically does 
not collapse into, the equally false abstractions of solipsism or relativism.  
It should already be clear that Merleau-Ponty repudiates Enlightenment rationalism and 
its abstract, ontotheological conception of “objectivity.” “If we ask ourselves what philosophy 
can be today,” writes Merleau-Ponty, “we shall see that the philosophy of God-like survey was 
only an episode – and that it is over.”694 God, Platonism, and Cartesianism are dead. Following 
Husserl and his phenomenological precursors (such as Nietzsche), Merleau-Ponty thus 
emphatically rejects what he calls “high-altitude thought (pensée de survol)”695 or the ideal, 
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disembodied vantage point of a “kosmotheoros”696 or “pure spectator.”697 For Merleau-Ponty, 
phenomenology demands that we abolish the “illusion of an absolute view from above” and 
consequently demands “a radical examination of our belongingness to the world before all 
science.”698 “Philosophy does not hold the world supine at its feet,”699 and so in order to do 
philosophy (or phenomenology) appropriately we “…must plunge into the world instead of 
surveying it…”.700 This commitment is one to which Merleau-Ponty remains consistently and 
passionately committed, and it is necessary to understand that his demand to decenter the 
conventional anthropocentricity of human thought and philosophical reflection is not only not 
inconsistent with such a commitment but is, on the contrary, entailed by it; it is no more 
inconsistent with such a commitment than is the equally necessary demand to decenter the 
conventional egocentricity of human thought and philosophical reflection. Indeed, such 
“centrisms” or “centricities” are only conventions (and equally false abstractions), and they are 
ones that keep us from genuinely thinking at all.  
There is no question that we must take seriously the core insight of phenomenology (and 
of hermeneutics) that all thought and knowledge is perspectival or situated, which is to say 
grounded in a particular experiential or interpretive standpoint, a standpoint always constituted 
by an ensemble of overlapping markers of identity: culture, history, race, class, gender, sexuality, 
(dis)ability, and, we should add, species. However, the point of phenomenology (and of 
hermeneutics) is not that one therefore ought to withdraw deeper into the confines of one’s own 
specific standpoint. Though Gadamer, for example, in repudiating the Enlightenment concept of 
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objectivity as a “view from nowhere,” or in repudiating the classical concept of the ideal knower 
as an utterly disengaged spectator, repudiates what he calls the Enlightenment’s “prejudice 
against prejudice,”701 that is, the notion that knowledge (or that subjectivity in general) can or 
ought to be unencumbered by antecedent historical, cultural, political, and otherwise existential 
horizons of meaning, he and others make clear that the point of hermeneutics (and of 
phenomenology) is never to make excuses for, or never to insulate from critique and leave intact, 
whatever cloistered, blinkered, un/pre-critical attitudes and beliefs one may have about the 
world; it is not an excuse to dismiss or to refuse to engage with other standpoints; indeed, the 
point is precisely the opposite: the point is to acknowledge that one’s own standpoint is one 
amidst, and in fact one always already entangled with, an irreducible plurality of other 
standpoints and to push against and interrogate, as much as possible, the limits of one’s own. The 
point is to bring one’s own horizons of lived experience into closer proximity with others yet 
never in such a manner that would deny any distance between them or that would presume they 
may ever coincide. As Merleau-Ponty insists, the point is to acknowledge, and to think according 
to rather than against, the distances between different subjectivities, between different lifeworlds 
or communities, or between different horizons of being and knowing that precisely make contact 
or communication (whether perceptual, affective, semiotic, or epistemic) between them possible, 
that in fact already fold them into and round about one another in fluid and ever shifting 
involutions and circumvolutions and that ground their presence and intelligibility from the start. 
The point is to confront authentically one’s own horizons of lived experience and thereby the 
manifold alterities that constitute them, the othernesses that are the other sides of one’s own 
familiar sphere of existence. In other words, the point is to see the limits of one’s own standpoint 
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not as strict “limits” or impermeable borders – or as boundaries that merely separate – but as 
sites or thresholds of passage, as horizons that let alterities come to presence in the first place and 
thus separate yet never divide or isolate, as limits that are therefore liminal, ambiguous, or 
undecidable rather than oppositional or exclusionary. The point, moreover, is precisely to enrich 
one’s own standpoint through encounters with other standpoints (and even with other “worlds”) 
that are non-assimilative, that appreciate and affirm rather than consumptively negate (or 
sublatively resolve into a higher unity) their otherness.  
In short, then, the point of the hermeneutic or phenomenological critique of the 
traditional Enlightenment conception of knowledge is not to retreat to some sort of isolationism 
or relativism, yet it is also not to resort to the abstract universalism or absolutism that is 
traditionally regarded as the only conceivable alternative to relativism. As Gadamer writes: 
…A hermeneutically trained consciousness must be, from the start, sensitive to the text’s alterity. But this 
kind of sensitivity involves neither “neutrality” with respect to content nor the extinction of one’s self, but 
the foregrounding and appropriation of one’s own fore-meanings and prejudices. The important thing is to 
be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own 
truth against one’s own fore-meanings.702 
 
The upshot of a hermeneutic or phenomenological alternative to classical epistemology is not to 
entrench the false notion that one’s own standpoint is the central pivot of all meaning and truth 
but precisely to decenter one’s own standpoint through lucid encounters with other standpoints 
and with the fact that one’s own is but one among them, indeed one whose being owes itself to 
them. Moreover, as Gadamer suggests in the above passage, otherness as such is only possible – 
otherness can only come to presence as such – relative to embodied, worldly axes of experience, 
identity, meaning, and knowing, or relative to some concrete, situated standpoint. “Having” a 
standpoint and lucidly acknowledging one’s own standpoint are preconditions for any genuine 
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appreciation of alterity. Indeed, nothing can come to presence at all except with respect to some 
particular perspective or experiential/epistemic context. As Heidegger would put it, one’s 
standpoint in the world is what clears the presencing of phenomena; it is what opens the space 
wherein something may appear. And as Merleau-Ponty argues, no boundary – no demarcation of 
a specific standpoint or context – is ever impermeable; like the skin of the body, every boundary 
is at once a site of ingress and egress, a waypoint between “interior” and “exterior,” a limit that is 
simultaneously disjunctive and conjunctive, and therefore the indices of “interior” and “exterior” 
or of “self” and “Other” are always already coupled: every boundary that constitutes one thing 
by differentiating it from others inherently entangles it with those “others” that are differentiated 
from it. There is no “inside” without an “outside,” no mind without flesh, no self without others 
(or without a community), no community without other communities, no standpoint or 
perspective without the standpoints or perspectives of others, and it is precisely this 
interdependence that we overlook or suppress with relativism and absolutism alike: the latter 
erases the differences between apparently different standpoints or absorbs all standpoints into a 
universal, monolithic one, whereas the latter collapses reality into a plurality of utterly isolated, 
incommunicable, or self-contained standpoints or realities, and in the shift from the former view 
to the latter (and vice versa) we thus exchange “one abstraction for a counter-abstraction.”703  
As we have seen, it is absurd to think that I can ever completely inhabit another’s 
subjectivity, but this truth far from legitimates solipsism, or far from negates the equally basic 
and indisputable truth that I have no subjectivity or selfhood independently of relations with 
others, and the point here concerning one’s perspectival or epistemic “limitations” – that is, one’s 
standpoint or situatedness – in the world is analogous. The ultimate lesson here, paradoxical 
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though it may seem, is that one transgresses one’s limits precisely by acknowledging and 
heeding them, and that the limits of one’s own “standpoint” are in fact not “limits” at all in the 
traditional sense, for rather than completely sequester one from others, they are precisely what 
afford one access to others and, moreover, are always already embedded with and within other 
standpoints. The point, then, is (or ought to be) to resist the common tendency to reify the notion 
that one’s own standpoint is the central, universal, originary, “pure,” “natural,” or essential 
standard of knowledge, being, and meaning, as well as to resist the suppression of other 
standpoints that such a reification tacitly entails yet conceals. To refuse to essentialize or 
universalize one’s own particularity is the condition that makes responsive and responsible 
relations with alterities or other particularities – other beings, other standpoints, other 
communities – possible.  
So, on the one hand, we must reject the idea of truth, knowledge, and objectivity as 
Absolute, that is, as accessible from a “view from nowhere,” and must regard them as 
constitutively perspectival and carnal. We need to rethink the meaning of objectivity such that 
we understand any instance of objective truth or knowledge as tied to a situated, embodied 
standpoint. On the other hand, though thinking can never disavow or wish to extricate itself 
entirely from such a standpoint or situated site of appearances – though thinking must 
acknowledge its own embodied standpoint as an inescapable, inalienable, always already given 
condition of its own possibility – it must not lapse into the equally false abstraction of a kind of 
solipsism or subjectivism that would only be the reactionary counterpart to the sort of 
Absolutism just mentioned. Though thinking is always grounded in and by a particular 
standpoint that it will never be able to transcend completely, it is also never completely 
imprisoned within such a standpoint; if such a standpoint were purely both its point of departure 
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and terminus ad quem, thinking would be forever trapped within itself, as if in a lucid nightmare 
from which it could never awaken or in vicious, ouroboric circularity. Moreover, thinking would 
in fact be impossible were it trapped entirely within its own standpoint for the same reason that 
no self can ever be aware of itself in pure, total communion or coincidence with itself. Just like 
the self that “occupies” it, no standpoint can ever be entirely self-enclosed but must also already 
be an opening to and amidst other standpoints. This is exactly why Merleau-Ponty states that 
philosophy must “confront human artifice with its outside, with Nature” and suggests that 
“thinking cannot live in an exclusively human and artificial universe.”704 “Humanity” cannot 
exist in a world constructed solely in its own image any more so than an ego can exist in a world 
constructed solely in its own image; both notions are equally solipsistic.  
So, I must always register the standpoint through which I access the world and others, yet 
I must also register the fact that this standpoint is my access to a world and to others, that my 
standpoint is already in contact with other standpoints, that my standpoint already carries me 
outside itself and exposes me to others and to a world it can never, as such, totalize, appropriate, 
or reinscribe in its own image, that my standpoint is from the start constituted by its exposure to 
what is irreducibly Other. No philosophy and certainly no phenomenology worthy of the name 
can be the mere projection, repetition, or reinscription – and certainly not the egoistic or 
imperialistic imposition – of the standpoint from which it begins and of which it must always 
bear the trace or signature, but rather must be a continually renewed overture to what is other 
than itself, a perpetual openness to an exteriority that it cannot assimilate or recuperate as a mere 
extension of itself yet which is also, paradoxically, constitutive of itself. In recognizing one’s 
own standpoint as inherently implicated in what is irreducibly other than itself, we precisely 
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cannot conceive of such a standpoint as an isolated, autonomous, immobile, pure origin; we must 
rather acknowledge it as something whose nature is never settled, decidable, or transparently 
intelligible, or as something whose nature is never properly a “nature.” What is true of the 
subjectivity of an individual is true of that individual’s epistemic standpoint in the world, of the 
intersecting axes of identity that structure his/her perspectival access to truth, knowledge, and 
other subjectivities. I cannot totally step outside my own subjectivity, but I know better than to 
conclude from this fact that my subjectivity is something utterly atomistic, autonomous, self-
enclosed, or transparent. We know that the essential, inescapable first-personal givenness of 
experience does not entail solipsism, since after all it is precisely solipsism that makes 
experience impossible. We know that subjectivity is constituted by intersubjectivity and that, 
therefore, there is no contradiction in affirming that I am always inescapably myself yet also 
other than myself, that I am a self only because I am ensconced in relations with other selves. 
The same is true with respect to any epistemic standpoint or marker of identity. The same is 
therefore true even with respect to “humanity.” No, we cannot shed our human perspective, but 
we can and must also realize that our human perspective is constitutively intertwined with, hence 
unsettled, decentered, and displaced by, other-than-human perspectives or alterities.  
There is, in principle, no such thing as a “view from nowhere,” yet far from being 
inconsistent with the demand to decenter one’s own standpoint, this truth precisely impresses 
such a demand upon us, for it forces us to acknowledge the irreducible plurality of standpoints 
amidst which our own stands and without which it would have no standing at all. Decentering 
one’s own standpoint does not mean abolishing or transcending it but recognizing it as one of 
many and not according it any special privilege in the order of existence or meaning; it in fact 
entails radically taking one’s own standpoint seriously rather than repressing or seeking to 
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eradicate it. Indeed, it is precisely the (usually unreflective) notion that one’s own standpoint is 
somehow “special” or “central” that involves its repression: when one regards one’s own 
standpoint as the default standard of all meaning and value, or when one reifies one’s own 
standpoint as the universal and essential fount of all conceivable truths and forms of knowledge, 
that is exactly when one ceases to regard one’s own standpoint as a “standpoint” at all; that is 
exactly when one comes to regard one’s own perspective as perspective-less, as not a perspective 
at all but as a view sub specie aeternitatis; it is this that leads to the repression of the standpoint-
ness of one’s own standpoint, to the projection of it as a locus of universal and essential truth; 
this is what engenders the imaginary of every false absolutism, and this is what underlies or 
reinforces every form of colonialism. So, one can see and appreciate other perspectives or 
“visions” even if one cannot strictly see through or from them; one can hear and listen to other 
voices even if one cannot (and should not) speak in or for them; one can do the hard work of 
attempting to understand and “do justice to” other perspectives – of not just making sense of 
them but also of learning how they already tacitly constitute one’s very own sense of things – 
even if one cannot “know” or live them “from the inside.” One may not be able to know another 
perspective from the “inside out,” but one can know it (at least partially) from the “outside in,” 
because we know that “inside” and “outside” are not opposites but two co-dependent aspects (or 
“leaves”) of every form of subjectivity, two entwined aspects of every bodily orientation in and 
toward the world, two compresent aspects of every world.  
Thus, the effort to critique, suspend, distance, or decenter our human-centered standpoint 
cannot mean to seek to transcend or erase it (were we to attempt to do so, its erasure – like every 
erasure – would unavoidably leave traces); on the contrary, it means to open such a standpoint to, 
or rather to illuminate the ways in which it is already open to and constituted as such by its 
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openness to, other standpoints, other alterities it otherwise suppresses insofar as it does not 
acknowledge itself as a “standpoint” at all. We tend to forget that selfhood and alterity are 
mutually constitutive: others can appear to me only if I am a distinct self, only if I “have” a 
distinct identity or only if I occupy a distinct, individuated standpoint, and reciprocally I “have” 
no such selfhood, identity, or standpoint at all if I am not differentiated from, hence already 
exposed to, others. Thus, in just the same way that we must reject solipsism yet not abolish the 
existence of the self or of “individuality” altogether, so too must the same be the case regarding 
our “human” standpoint: human and non-human standpoints are already paired, or already 
mutually constitutive, in just the same way that “self” and “Other” are already paired or mutually 
constitutive: each is different from yet also already invaded by the other. Anthropocentrism 
elevates the human standpoint to the exclusion of any non-human standpoint, or rather isolates 
humanity entirely from animality, and that is why it is strictly analogous to solipsism. As I 
argued in the previous chapter, anthropocentrism is simply solipsism at another, higher or 
broader ontological level. So, we will never extricate ourselves from our human standpoint, but 
such a standpoint is also, like every standpoint, already a point of partial ingress into other 
standpoints (or a point of partial egress from itself).  
The real problem, then, is not that we attempt to distance ourselves from our “human” 
standpoint in order to take up, however partially or imperfectly, a non-human one. The problem 
is that we hardly ever recognize our own “humanness” as a standpoint at all precisely because we 
tacitly regard it as the default identity-category or mode of being with respect to which 
everything else is derivatively or comparatively definable, intelligible, or valuable (such an 
attitude, of course, is analogous to the manner in which “whiteness” is regarded in a white 
supremacist society or to the manner in which maleness/masculinity is regarded in a patriarchal 
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society). Furthermore, the problem is that we regard our “human” standpoint as not already 
constitutively enmeshed with other-than-human standpoints. There will always be something 
“all-too-human” about the perspective from which we think about or experience the world, but 
nevertheless the true task of human thought is to decenter, as much as possible, its very 
anthropocentricity, to see what might and does reveal itself when we “suspend” or “bracket” (as 
much as possible) our human vantage point; or rather, to the put the point more accurately, the 
task is not so much to decenter our own human standpoint but to realize that it has never been 
“centered” or “central” in the first place. The supremely difficult, surely infinite and perhaps 
aporetic task of philosophy – the fundamental, proper task of any epistemology, ontology, ethics, 
or political philosophy worthy of the name – is to realize the already decentered standing or 
constitutive displacement (that is, the “ambiguity”) of our own “humanity” and, more generally, 
to decolonize our own standpoints in the world.  
We saw in chapter two that the horizons that circumscribe one’s own perspectival 
standpoint in the world are – like, for example, the horizons that literally enable visual 
perception – precisely what enable knowledge of the world in the first place. A “view from 
nowhere” is, in fact, blind, for it is no point of view at all. As Merleau-Ponty insists (following 
the insights of Gestalt psychology), without a background amid which things appear, without the 
(itself non-foregroundable) differentiation of foreground and background (which he calls écart), 
or without some position from which one perceives things, nothing would “appear” or be 
perceptible at all. A perspectival or phenomenological account of truth and “objectivity” is thus 
below or beyond the false dichotomy of “reality” and “mere appearance,” hence also the false 
dilemma of absolutism and relativism. Any concept of objectivity abstracted from the very 
horizons and markers of identity that let things emerge into presence and intelligibility and as 
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matters of attentive concern in the first place is not a concept of objectivity “worthy of the 
name,” or rather is just as much of an imperious absurdity as anything that contradicts or 
pretends to transcend its own conditions of possibility. The pertinent point here is that no 
perspective or standpoint in the world is ever utterly isolated from others; no matter how distant 
or different from other perspectives or standpoints my own may be, it is from the very beginning 
open to and entwined with them, just as the perspectives on an object I do not presently occupy 
and even those I may never be able to occupy – whether the underside of the table on which I am 
typing this sentence yet which I might see if I were to change my perceptual orientation toward 
it, or a night enshrouded landscape perceived through eyes and ears that will never be mine, such 
as those of a bat – tacitly enable, shape, line, envelop, trespass upon, even “haunt” those that I do 
or can occupy, those that are open to and actualized through my body and all the 
“encumbrances” – whether physiological, cognitive, or historical and cultural – it bears in its 
bearings and in its joints, in its plastic sensitivities and potentialities. The point here is more 
compellingly and dramatically demonstrated by the fact that every perspective or standpoint is 
indeed one that is embodied. To repudiate Enlightenment epistemology is precisely to repudiate 
the notion that knowledge, truth, or objectivity may be divested of the rich, fundamental 
materiality of lived experience(s), that the production of knowledge – like the constitution of 
being, experience, or meaning – can ever be fleshless. And again, there are no bodily, enfleshed 
standpoints in the world – whether human or non-human – that are ever utterly severed from one 
another and that are not already (yet to varying degrees) implicated in one another. Simply put, 
no standpoint or form of subjectivity is an island. “The” world is not a collection of worlds that 
are utterly self-enclosed or cut off from one another, for “it is the same world that contains our 
bodies and our minds, provided that we understand by world not only the sum of things that fall 
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or could fall under our eyes, but also the locus of their compossibility, the invariable style they 
observe, which connects our perspectives, [and] permits transition from one to the other…”.705 
What, then, does it mean to attain an “objective” perspective upon the world? It means nothing 
else than making the “intersubjective rounds,” so to speak, that is, taking stock of how the world 
can and does appear to every being to whom it does or may appear, attempting to perceive it 
from the angle of every being who inhabits it; thus, it means nothing less than the infinite task of 
fleshing out all of the possible and actual perspectives of which the world is composed, all of the 
possible ways in which the world may appear or offer itself “in the flesh” and to flesh. In all of 
our overtures to one another and to others, in especially all of our efforts to know and to 
elaborate the worlds in which we and others dwell, there is only ever an infinite conversation 
between bodies and worlds, only ever “flesh responding to flesh.”706  
We are now in a position to appreciate what we might call the radical 
“communitarianism” of phenomenology. For Husserl, intersubjectivity is truly foundational, and 
it is foundational in ways we have not yet fully appreciated. For Husserl (and for Merleau-
Ponty), not only subjectivity but also “objectivity” is constituted by intersubjectivity, by a 
primordial “we-subjectivity.”707 What Husserl means by this is not the crude relativistic thesis 
that truth is somehow determined by consensus or that reality is nothing more than a social 
convention, nor does he mean to repeat something like Berkeley’s idealist thesis that esse est 
percipi. We have seen that Husserl (and that phenomenology in general) rejects the classical 
metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality, but to reject the distinction between 
appearance and reality is not to say that reality collapses into “mere” appearances, for the very 
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notion of a “mere appearance” is the counterpart to that of a reality absolutely beyond all 
appearances, and it is precisely this whole appearance/reality binary, and the concomitant 
dilemma of relativism and absolutism, that Husserl means to reject. If we truly reject one term of 
a conceptual dyad, so too must we reject the other. As Nietzsche proclaims: “The real world – 
we have done away with it: what world is left? The apparent one, perhaps?...But no! With the 
real world we have also done away with the apparent one!”708 So, to reject the idea that 
fundamental reality is a “second-world” forever veiled “behind the scenes” of subjective 
appearances is also to reject the concept of a (“mere”) scene of subjective appearances that only 
veils or dissembles a more fundamental or transcendent reality, a screen of phenomena that 
stands between subjectivity and “objective” Being.  
What, then, is “objective” reality for Husserl, or what does Husserl mean when he argues 
that objectivity is intersubjectively constituted? The being of a thing, and the objective world in 
general, is not something radically separate from the ways in which it can appear, but neither is it 
merely reducible to any single way in which does or can appear; rather, the objective being of a 
thing, or the fundamental nature of the world as such, consists of all of the ways in which it does 
or can appear, and appearances are always indexed to actual or potential perceivers, to those to 
whom such appearances actually or may appear. Thus, Husserl states that the “intersubjective 
constitution of the world” means that “…the world as it is for us becomes understandable as a 
structure of meaning formed out of elementary intentionalities.”709 So, as we have seen, for 
Husserl the objective being of a thing (or of the world itself) is an ensemble – or what he often a 
calls a “horizon,” a delimited yet ever open, in principle inexhaustible range – of overlapping 
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actual and possible modes of appearance. “Objective” reality is “…always, and for everyone, a 
unity for consciousness of the openly endless multiplicity of changing experiences and 
experienced things, one’s own and those of others.”710  
This is the first sense in which the objective world, for Husserl, is intersubjectively 
constituted: it is intersubjectively constituted insofar as it is composed of all of the ways – of the 
infinite number of ways – in which it can appear. What, sense, indeed, would it be to speak of 
something that could never experientially present itself in any conceivable way? Something that 
could never show itself – whether in the strict perceptual sense or otherwise – is precisely 
nothing at all or is, at any rate, inconceivable and nothing that may count as a meaningful object 
of thought, discourse, or knowledge. It is for this reason that we must jettison the traditional 
opposition between “reality” and “appearance,” between noumena and phenomena. As Nietzsche 
dramatically puts this point:  
What is ‘appearance’ to me now! Certainly not the opposite of some essence – what could I say about any 
essence except name the predicates of its appearance! Certainly not a dead mask that one could put on an 
unknown x and also take off x!711  
 
The relationship between Kant and Husserl is a complicated issue, and it is not one that I am 
going to pursue here. However, here it will suffice to say that, no matter how much his 
transcendental philosophy may borrow from Kant’s, Husserl is quite clear in his repudiation of 
the Kantian construct of a noumenon (though perhaps not as clear as Nietzsche is on this point):  
Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being, whether the latter is called immanent or transcendent, 
falls within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that constitutes sense and being. 
The attempt to conceive the universe of true being as something lying outside the universe of possible 
consciousness, possible knowledge, possible evidence…is nonsense…If transcendental subjectivity is the 
universe of possible sense, then an outside is precisely – nonsense. But even nonsense is always a mode 
of sense and has its nonsensicalness within the sphere of possible insight.712  
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Setting aside the problems we may have with the concept of a transcendental subjectivity that 
constitutes the meaning of all conceivably meaningful things, Husserl here clearly rejects the 
notion of a “reality behind the scenes”; that is, he rejects the intelligibility of a thing absolutely 
shorn of all possible manners of appearance, a thing that would be utterly outside the purview of 
possible experience (broadly construed). For Husserl (as for Nietzsche), then, the Kantian 
concept of the “noumenon” is the sort of thing that, like the concept of a square circle, we think 
is intelligible or thinkable because we can verbalize it even though it is in fact incoherent or 
vacuous. No sense whatsoever attaches to a thing that can never appear at all, for all “sense” or 
meaning is, of course, precisely a mode of appearance. For Husserl, then, to be is not to be 
perceived, but it is – in a maximally broad sense of the term – to be perceptible, and therefore the 
being of any-thing consists in all of the ways in which it can appear, in all of its possible modes 
of presentation (whether these be sensual or mental). And this is not necessarily to say that 
reality is reducible to presence. For Husserl, reality is phenomenality, and this includes, as we 
have seen, not only phenomena but also the structures that make phenomena or presence 
possible, and such structures can never themselves be made fully present; as conditions of 
presence, they will always be radically absent, yet (perhaps paradoxically) their absence is 
something to which we can meaningfully, albeit imperfectly or obliquely, attend, something at 
the periphery of lived experience to which we can gesture yet never quite glimpse, something we 
can express in thought and language yet never quite capture.  
Merleau-Ponty follows Husserl in similarly defining “the real” as “the sensible”: “there is 
no intelligible world, there is the sensible world.”713 In Merleau-Ponty, this definition of “the 
real” as “the sensible” does not express a commitment to crude empiricism or positivism but 
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simply a commitment to radical immanence, or a repudiation of any dualistic (“two-world”) or 
supernaturalist ontology. Thus, Merleau-Ponty affirms that “ideas can no longer be considered a 
second positivity or second world which puts its riches on display beneath a second sun.”714 For 
Merleau-Ponty, there are such things as “universals,” but “the universal is not the concept but 
this perception in flesh and blood,”715 “a transtemporal and transpatial element of which we do 
not take account by supposing an essence outside of time.”716 There are such things as 
“universals,” but they are not transcendent(al) objects and must therefore be entirely rethought 
(beyond the classical alternatives of Platonism and nominalism); they are sense-directions that 
radiate from my living body and its pre-reflective orientations toward the world, “ideas that are 
already encrusted in the joints of my body,”717 “lines of force”718 or stable axes of meaning that 
emerge between my body and the world, or rather poles of generality or identity – what Husserl, 
again, calls “horizons” and what Merleau-Ponty often calls “the invisible armature”719 of the 
visible – that, as such, subtend, coalesce, and index distinct manifolds of perspectival 
presentations of the world to and through my body; they are structures of presence that precede 
and make intelligible any reflective, abstractive or idealizing re-presentations of things, 
conditions of givenness that are nevertheless immanent to the given (as well as immanent to 
whom the given is given); they are idealities that are not “alien to the flesh” but “that [give] it its 
axes, its depths, its dimensions,”720 “rays of the world”721 that are enlaced with, though not 
possessed by or reductively equivalent to, the flesh of the living being to whom a world appears, 
																																																								
714 Signs, “Introduction,” p. 20. 
715 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p 78. 
716 Ibid., p. 176. 
717 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 114; wording slightly modified.  
718 Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, p. 168. 
719 Merleau-Ponty uses this expression in many places. See e.g., The Visible and the Invisible, p. 149 and Nature, p. 
224. 
720 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 152. 
721 Ibid., p. 146, 218, 240-242, 265. 
	 590	
that are threaded through the flesh of the perceiving body as well as through the flesh of all of 
the appearances it perceives, for indeed both are incarnations of a common, underlying, more 
basic flesh, and it is this that constitutes, or which rather expresses itself through, anything like 
what Kant understood as an “I think that must be able to accompany all our experiences.”722 
Thus, for Merleau-Ponty “it is naïve to seek solidity in a heaven of ideas or in a ground (fond) of 
meaning – it is neither above nor beneath the appearances, but at their joints. It is the tie that 
secretly connects an experience to its variants.”723  
Now, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “universals” or of “the invisible” and its relationship 
with “the visible” – or rather his re-conceptualization of the traditional distinction between 
‘essence’ and ‘existence’/‘fact’ – is beyond the scope of the present discussion, but I have 
mentioned it here simply to draw attention to the important point that, for Merleau-Ponty, a 
phenomenological understanding (broadly construed) of truth and Being repudiates Platonism 
yet does not resolve into an “anything-goes” kind of subjectivism or nominalism; it does not 
plunge experience into a “blooming, buzzing confusion” or “wandering troop of sensations,”724 
and therefore it does not abolish meaningful differences between and among things and beings in 
the world; rather, it affirms that structures of intelligibility are endemic to the perceived, carnal 
world itself and that they reveal themselves as such in and through our perceptual, carnal 
engagements with it. As we have seen, for Merleau-Ponty this means that Being itself is 
relationality, or rather the differentiation at the heart of every particular, empirical relation. The 
crucial point for the topic at hand is that Merleau-Ponty’s repudiation of dualism or 
supernaturalism is not a reversion to a sort of reductive naturalism or to classical empiricism, yet 
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clearly neither is it a reversion to any sort of idealism, or neither is it to conceptualize 
“immanence” as mere immanence to consciousness (as Husserl arguably does); rather, to think 
“the real” as “the sensible” (or perceptible) is, for Merleau-Ponty, to conceptualize it below the 
traditional (Platonic) distinction between “the sensible” (visible) and the “intelligible” 
(invisible), to think it as an intertwining or cross-contamination of immanence and 
transcendence, to think it as Flesh. This – not some reversion to a kind of empiricism, positivism, 
reductive naturalism, or metaphysics of presence – is what Merleau-Ponty ultimately means 
when he proclaims that the “perceptual world is at bottom Being in Heidegger’s sense.”725  
To think Being as “Flesh” is certainly not to think it as an object of or for a conscious 
subject but is to think it, like the flesh of the lived/living body, as precisely below – as logically 
and ontologically prior to – the very distinction between subject and object and, therefore, as 
quite other than a “substance” (whether mental or material) and therefore as more fundamental 
and quite other than “flesh” as it is traditionally conceived and as more fundamental than even 
the flesh of the ‘body-subject’ itself; it is to think it as certainly not transcendent(al) ideality but 
also “nowise as matter”726 and, for that reason, as “something that has no name in any 
philosophy”727; it is neither a substance nor a “union of substances.”728 As I have suggested in a 
number of places, we might say that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology is not so much a break from 
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Husserl’s phenomenology as it is a radicalization of it to the extent that he liberates immanence 
from transcendental ideality so as to better account for the relational and thoroughly corporeal 
genesis of truth, being, and meaning. We have seen that the “flesh of the world,” for Merleau-
Ponty, is precisely the relational space constitutive of everything that is, hence of everything that 
does and can be meaningful or known, of everything (inter)subjective but also of everything 
“objective”; it is the “inner framework of intersubjectivity”729 – that is, the more basic structure 
and genesis of relationality and difference of which intersubjectivity is but one (albeit an 
exemplary) site and effect – in virtue of which all things, including the world as such, emerges 
into meaning and presence in the only way it ever can: as a world for us all, as a world 
constituted and disclosed in common to and by every body – to and by the literal, material flesh 
of every being – at home in it. The point that is most relevant to the present discussion is that, for 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, knowing the world or knowing “what something is” is the infinite 
task of elaborating all of the ways in which it can appear, a task that is infinite because it is 
radically communal. To say that objectivity is intersubjective or perspectival is precisely to say 
that, if we wish to know what is objectively real or true, we must, to as great of an extent as 
possible, take stock of all of the perspectives through which things or the world may emerge into 
presence. If what Merleau-Ponty calls “the flesh of the world” (rather than the a priori structures 
of a transcendental ego) weaves our experiences of the world into coherent, meaningful wholes, 
then so too does everything that comes along with that flesh, including the flesh of others, 
including all other sense-making corporealities.  
Furthermore, there is a second, related reason Husserl claims that objectivity is 
intersubjectively founded, and that is the essential publicity of objective truth and reality. What it 
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means for something to be “real” – really real – is that it is, at least in principle, available to the 
perspectives of others:  
Prescientifically, in everyday sense-experience, the world is given in a subjectively relative way. Each of 
us has his own appearances; and for each of us they count as that which actually is…But we do not think 
that, because of this, there are many worlds. Necessarily, we believe in the world, whose things only 
appear to us differently but are the same.730  
 
In everyday life (or in what Husserl calls the “natural attitude”) we all come to the world with a 
unique, individuated and inalienable perspective. My experiences of the world are, of course, 
inescapably mine. As we have already discussed, it is logically absurd to suppose that I may ever 
quit my own consciousness so as to inhabit the consciousness of another. That is, I can never 
experience the world precisely as others do. I can no more see the world precisely through the 
eyes of another any more than I can conceive of a square circle, and this, as we saw in chapter 
one, is what Merleau-Ponty calls “the truth of solipsism.” We each “have our own appearances,” 
and yet, as Husserl notes, we nevertheless do not believe that solipsism is strictly true. We do not 
believe that we each occupy our own isolated worlds; we do not take the world in which we 
dwell to be a private theatre of appearances. Even though we each have our own appearances, we 
take these appearances to be appearances of a common, “objective” world. My appearances are 
immediately given not only as singularly and irrecusably “mine” but also as public, as 
appearances of a reality that transcends or always outruns my consciousness of it and that I can 
meaningfully communicate to others. In short, we do not think that our own perspectives 
constitute self-enclosed worlds unto themselves, but rather we think that every particular 
perspective is polarized toward one and the same, shared and abiding world, that every point of 
view is a point of view on the world. When, for example, I see something, I assume that others 
do or would be able to see it too. If I see something (say, a pink elephant) cross my path and I 
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point it out to others, it is only and precisely when others claim not to see it that I naturally doubt 
the veracity of my perception. Something that appears to me yet does not and, in principle, 
cannot appear to anyone else is exactly the sort of thing that we regard as not real in any 
objective manner.  
I think Husserl’s point here parallels Wittgenstein’s argument concerning the 
impossibility of a private language, so a brief comparison of the two may be instructive. 
Wittgenstein argues that there can be no such thing as a truly private language, for a language 
whose terms and rules are intelligible in principle only to one person – that is, a language 
understood and used by only one person and that absolutely cannot be translated into terms that 
would be comprehensible to anyone else – would have to be one that lacks any stable meanings 
or consistent rules of usage (in Derridean terms, it would be a language devoid of iterability), yet 
a language that lacks stable meanings or consistent rules of usage is one that cannot be 
understood or used by anyone, including the single, solitary person who supposedly understands 
and uses it. Husserl’s point, similarly, is that there can be no such thing as an utterly private 
appearance: a thing that can in principle only appear to one person is just as meaningless as a 
word that can only be understood by one person, and it is surely not something that may count as 
“real”; such a thing does not have any place in our inventory of objective things, for in order to 
be “objective” it is necessary that something be, at least possibly, available to other perspectives. 
In chapters three and four I discussed the fact that when I perceive an object I immediately 
perceive not only the profiles of it that are given to me “directly” – not only those aspects of it 
that are frontally or presently present to me – but also those profiles that these conceal, those 
aspects of it that are presently absent from me as well (such as its back or underside). Now we 
can add that the absent profiles or aspects of an object that I immediately perceive are not only 
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those that are available to me but also those that are available to others. Everything I perceive is 
pervaded by the absences not only of other possible perspectives for me but also of the possible 
perspectives of (actual or hypothetical) others, of other perspectives given in the mode of 
“available-to-others.” Therefore, “even what is straightforwardly perceptual is 
communalized.”731 Every object of perception is necessarily shot through with the alterities or 
absent perspectives of every being to whom it may be given; it is always already a nexus of 
intersubjectivity, a terminus of multiple and in principle indefinite intentionalities and 
standpoints. This, then, is why for Husserl truth, reality, or “objectivity” is inherently public or 
communal, inherently embedded in webs of perspectival, intersubjective relations; it is why 
“…we, in living together, have the world pregiven in this “together,” as the world valid as 
existing for us and to which we, together, belong…”.732  
So, for Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the world is something one can only inhabit with 
others, and likewise it is something one can know or think only with others. For Husserl, 
objectivity is constituted by intersubjectivity. For Merleau-Ponty, likewise, Being is constituted 
by the relational envelopment of everything within everything – and by the correlative 
differentiation of everything from everything – that he calls “the flesh” or “the chiasm” and that I 
have proposed we call radical community. In any case, for both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the 
“objective” world is something we only constitute or usher into expression together, something 
in an endless, ever creatively open process of communalization; it is not an object or possession 
of any particular embodied perspective nor even the mere aggregate of all embodied perspectives 
but is the organic, ever efflorescent lattice of interstices between all bodies and perspectives, that 
which blooms in the spaces and intervals in and through which all bodies encounter one another 
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and their milieus. The (“objective”) world, for Merleau-Ponty, is “an open and indefinite 
multiplicity of relationships which are of reciprocal implication.”733 Thus, “objectivity” or 
worldhood does not preexist or absolutely transcend the situated, bodily perspectives that are 
necessarily polarized toward it but is constituted by all of them in concert; it is continually made, 
unmade, and remade, continually formed and reconfigured through the differentiation and 
compresence of every bodily being and perspective. The objective world is not a static object of 
knowledge and is not, indeed, an “object” at all but is quite analogous to a conversation, for it is 
something whose being or meaning, like that of every conversation, cannot be divorced from the 
contributions (or “views”) of each of its participants but is at the same time not reducible to any 
single one of them, for it rather emerges in and through the exchanges of each, in and through all 
of the perspectives spoken (and unspoken) in response to one another and to the subject of 
conversation that gathers them. The objective world is, indeed, always, in some way, the subject 
of “conversation” – and is something that comes to presence only through “conversation” – 
between all who share it; yet, unlike ordinary conversations, that concerning “the world” – or 
rather that which is the world – is one whose participants cannot be counted, and one that will 
never be finished until there are no bodies left to express it. This is why, as Merleau-Ponty 
remarks, “expressing what exists is an endless task.”734 However, the most important lesson here 
is that if we are to learn about what “the world” is, if we are to work continually to bring the 
world to its fullest, richest possible expression, we must listen to every being who has, or who 
may have, something to say about it, and every living being – every being whose body 
encounters, perceives, or “makes sense” of it in its own way, every being who either thrives or 
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suffers in it in its own way – indisputably does. Thus, if we truly are to learn about the world, we 
will especially have to allow to be heard those beings who have traditionally been denied “a 
voice” in our discourses, we will have to allow to be seen those bodies that have traditionally 
been denied visibility in our lives, and that will mean learning anew how to listen and how to 
see.  
Heidegger notoriously argues that animals are “poor in world” whereas human beings are 
“world-forming” or “rich in world.”735 Heidegger is wrong, though to demonstrate this 
satisfactorily would require a separate, elaborate treatment of the texts in which he develops his 
argument for this claim, and that would take me too far afield from the present discussion. Here, 
it will suffice to state not only that denying “richness” in world to animals is, ultimately, founded 
on humanist prejudices of the sort Heidegger himself repudiates elsewhere, and not only that 
Heidegger is easily guilty of what Derrida calls the “asinanity” of supposing that all non-human 
beings may be meaningfully grouped together a priori in such a monolithic, homogenizing, or 
totalizing way, but also that there is simply no way to establish a categorical distinction between 
Dasein and non-Dasein – that is, between human and non-human manners of being-in-the-world 
– without reinstating the very dualism Heidegger otherwise critiques and which we know better 
than to accept.736 The most important point I wish to make here, though, is this: if it is true that 
objectivity is constituted by intersubjectivity, then the world we inhabit – the “objective” world – 
is precisely constituted by all of the perspectives that do and may have a home in it, or by all of 
ways in which it can appear to all possible perceptual, bodily orientations toward it, including 
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(Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1995), §46-50, p.192-212. 
736 In the passage in which Heidegger claims that apes “do not have hands,” he asserts that the (human) hand is 
“infinitely different from all grasping organs – paws, claws, or fangs – different by an abyss of essence” (What is 
Called Thinking, p.16). Even on the most charitable reading, I think it is difficult to maintain that the claim that 
human hands are different from non-human “grasping organs” by an “abyss of essence” is anything but a regression 
to dualism. 
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those of humans and non-humans alike. The world is a tapestry of all of the possible perspectives 
through which it may come presence, and the more of these perspectives one can, if not inhabit, 
at least affirm and appreciate in respectful, humble curiosity, the more of these perspectives in 
which one may delight in rapt wonder, the more of these perspectives or vectors of bodily being 
one threads into, or acknowledges as already thoroughly woven into, one’s own small patch of 
this tapestry, the more fleshed out, the richer will one’s sense of the world be.  
As Nietzsche argues, the perspectival constitution of what we call the “objective” world 
means that “the more affects we allow to speak about a thing…the more complete will be our 
‘concept’ of the thing, our ‘objectivity.’”737 I think this captures the fundamental 
epistemological, ontological, and finally ethical lesson of phenomenology: in order to inhabit the 
world in the richest, most lucid and responsive ways we can, we must surrender ourselves to as 
many other perspectives or affects through which the world expresses itself as we can; we must 
learn how to see and hear, or rather we must learn how to let be seen and heard, as many visions 
and voices besides our own as we can; conversely, we must do the hard work of unlearning the 
habits of thinking and dwelling, the conceptual constructs and schemas of interpretation, that 
invisibilize or silence various others, especially non-human others. This is why, later in his 
career, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that “the transcendental reduction” – the suspension of one’s 
immediate (“natural”) attitudes toward the world so as to bring the essential structures of those 
attitudes to light that, for Husserl, defined the method of phenomenology – needs to be 
radicalized in ways Husserl was perhaps not able to accomplish, for if it is a suspension of one’s 
own attitudes toward the world, this must not simply involve a regression to one’s own self or 
ego, because (as Husserl himself demonstrated) one’s self or ego is already constituted by its 
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relationships with others, relationships with others and with a world that far outstrip oneself. 
Thus, the “reduction” must have as its aim not the illumination of any radically solitary or 
inward domain of experience, but rather the illumination of everything outside or other than 
oneself that already shapes one’s self, even if such illumination means respecting the opacity into 
which such things must withdraw. The “bracketing” of the “natural attitude” must not be a 
regression to a transcendental ego but rather a bracketing of the very notion that one 
fundamentally is a transcendental ego in the first place. Merleau-Ponty also suggests, yet more 
radically still, that one must “bracket” the tacit “humanity” of one’s ego as well. In short, the 
“phenomenological reduction” must aim to let those others with whom one is already enmeshed 
show or speak for themselves, to liberate the “voices” of those others through whom my world 
already speaks to me just as it likewise already speaks to them through me, others many of whom 
are not and never have been only human. This is why Merleau-Ponty comes to think (as 
Nietzsche did before him) that in order for philosophical or phenomenological reflection to 
realize its aim, it would have to let the world speak in as many ways or voices or through as 
many carnal perspectives as possible, that in order for philosophy or phenomenology to fulfill its 
“task of wakefulness” it must “step back only in order to see the world and Being, or simply put 
them between quotation marks as one does with the remarks of another, to let them speak, to 
listen in…”738 
  This means that those who shut their eyes and ears to alterities of every kind – human and 
non-human alike – are those who are precisely “impoverished” in their worldhood. This means 
that those who think it is only from within the parochial parameters of their own familiar ways of 
‘being-in-the-world’ that Being or the world as such is best, most fully, truly, or “objectively” 
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disclosed are those to whom so much is precisely foreclosed. We know that those who have 
never truly had intimate relations with their fellow humans – that those who have never truly 
known the bonds of family, friendship, or love, that those who live amidst other humans yet 
nevertheless are alone in their midst – are lamentably lacking in their worldly being, or rather are 
those whose worldly being is lamentably lacking in meaning. Likewise, human beings 
inescapably live amidst non-human animals as well as other humans, but those who do not or 
have never lived with any animals – those who have never had a pet, those who have never really 
gotten to known a non-human other, those who have never truly formed or at least opened 
themselves to affective bonds with non-human others, those who have never cared for, or who 
have themselves never been cared for by, a being outside one’s own species, or those who have 
never risked letting a truly other Other into one’s life – are deprived of the full measure of 
knowledge and experience, of joy and sorrow, of wonder, surprise, and meaning available to 
them.  
The ways in which a table may appear to me are no more constitutive of the being of the 
table, or are no more integral to the objective truth of the table, than those that may appear to my 
partner from the other side of the room, than those that may appear to my partner’s cat prowling 
around it in pursuit of his favorite ball, than those that may appear to a pigeon who glimpses it 
through our window, or than those that may appear to a spider that crawls along its surface. If 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty teach us anything, it is that the world is constituted by all 
perspectives, and “all” means all. Therefore, if I wish to know what, say, a table is, I must seek 
to know it from every potential perspective or according to its every potential mode of 
presentation: I must walk around it, view it from above and below, palpate and auscultate it, 
smell and perhaps even taste it, consider it geometrically as well as artistically, consider the 
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social or political context of its production, and so on. But, moreover, I must also consider how 
the table may appear to other beings, even those whose manner of being I can never (at least not 
fully) inhabit: how it may look or smell to a dog or a cat, to a bird or an ant, how it may figure in 
the behavioral, perceptual, and conceptual schemas of other animals, for these too are as much 
extensions of its objective nature as anything else; if such standpoints or schemas are absent to 
me – if such standpoints or schemas are ones I can never truly adopt as my own – then their 
absence nevertheless must count, and indeed is always already implicitly felt, in my own sense 
or understanding of the table. Some perspectives I can take up, some I can only intuit partially or 
very imperfectly, and some I may never take up at all. But if the perspectives of certain non-
human others elude me, that is no reason to dismiss their significance or even deny their 
presence, no reason to ignore or disclaim their place in the ontological, experiential, and semiotic 
composition of things. If the elusiveness or transcendence – the irrecuperable alterity – of a non-
human being’s perspective upon the world should motivate any feeling or attitude in me, it 
should be humility, wonder, and perhaps even (cognitive, epistemic, or existential) pain. I should 
feel – indeed suffer – the proliferate excessiveness of the world. I should register, even if 
painfully, those objective dimensions of my world – those other worlds within my world – that 
outrun me, those aspects of the world allusively revealed through animal bodies that will forever 
elude me. I should feel that there is much of interest and value I am missing out on, much that is 
being said behind my back, much that is being seen, heard, tasted, or smelled that I will never 
see, hear, taste, or smell, much that is being felt or enjoyed that I will never feel or enjoy, much 
truth I will never attain, much about my world I will never know.  
But again, the lesson here is not defeatist or quietist resignation; it is not to ratify an 
excuse to retreat ever further inward into one’s own subjectivity or circle of familiar experience. 
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Human beings are, as Heidegger says, “world-making” beings, yet non-human beings have 
always been part of any world we humans have ever made for ourselves, and they always will 
be. The better I can understand and appreciate, even from an appropriate, sometimes great 
distance, the ways in which the world may appear to various non-human others, the more I 
respect non-human alterities enough to let them show themselves on their own terms and the 
more that I thereby allow them to show me (even if at best obliquely) aspects of the world and 
even of my own experiences of it that I would not be able to sense or appreciate in any other way 
– or the more that I at least include non-human perspectives (no matter how foreign to my own 
they may be) in my sense and knowledge of the world, or the more I let such perspectives 
challenge, interrupt, inform, complicate, humble, and in some cases transform the sedimented 
“human” assumptions, sensibilities, and concepts that make the world familiar to me and that 
indeed often keep me from genuinely thinking about the world at all – the more enriched will my 
understanding of the world be, the more “rich in world” will I be. On the other hand, insofar as I 
dismiss, suppress, ignore, marginalize, or silence non-human perspectives and voices, indeed 
insofar as I disavow my in fact irrecusable corporeal, affective relations with non-human others, 
or insofar, moreover, as I refuse to explore the corporeal, affective relations with non-human 
others of which my living body may be capable – insofar as I shut myself off (or pretend to shut 
myself off) entirely from other worlds, even those to which I do not completely or rightly belong 
– the poorer is my understanding of “the” world, the more “poor in world” I am. If Heidegger 
thinks that animal perspectives on the world disclose nothing of much positive value or 
significance about “the world,” if, that is to say, Heidegger thinks that animal styles of being-in-
the-world only disclose the world privatively, in mere contrast to our own human manner of 
being-in-the-world thus posited as the default and essential “measure of things,” or if Heidegger 
	 603	
thinks that only the human manner of being-in-the-world discloses all that is most worth 
knowing, all that most calls for thinking or all that is fundamentally true, then it is precisely 
Heidegger who is “poor is world.”  
So, one can never abandon one’s own situated perspective in the world in order to adopt a 
“God’s eye” view from nowhere. One can never extricate oneself from one’s own particular, 
embodied standpoint in order to soar to the rarefied firmament of Platonic ideality or fleshless 
universality, nor can one, therefore, completely transpose oneself into another’s standpoint. One 
can never shed one’s skin in order to ascend to a plane of ethereal, disembodied truths or in order 
to don another’s, but at the same time one’s standpoint is never utterly isolated, for indeed one’s 
own standpoint has substance and intelligibility only because it exists amidst and overlaps with 
others. One can never take leave of one’s skin, but one’s “skin” is already labile, porous, and 
ecstatic, already in contact with other skins and bodies, already enmeshed with other flesh, 
already open to other surfaces of sensibility or subjectivity. As Merleau-Ponty argues, what is 
true of the boundary that is the skin is true of every boundary. We have seen that, for Merleau-
Ponty, the lived body and its (auto)-affectivity disclose a more basic ontological truth and 
generative process at work in the world, or rather it simply discloses the nature of Being as such; 
it reveals the relationality in virtue of which any-thing or any-body is, the non-oppositional or 
non-exclusionary, fluid and liminal spaces or boundaries between things – the fissures and 
intervals, differences and deferrals between things – that lets them be and constitutes them as the 
things they are, that distinguishes or “individuates” them as such yet does not absolutely isolate 
or segregate them, that indeed distinguishes or individuates them only because it does not 
absolutely isolate or segregate them. Again, this is why Merleau-Ponty extends the kind of 
relationship demonstrated between the living body and itself (that is, by living body’s reflexivity 
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or self-othering auto-affection), as well as the kind of relationship demonstrated between living 
bodies (that is, by intercorporeity), to the basic constitution of every being, phenomenon, and 
empirical relationship. For Merleau-Ponty, the kind of relationship that constitutes the existence 
of all things (the only kind of relationship “worthy of the name”) is neither an opposition (an 
‘either/or’ dualism) nor a reductive unity or simple (analytic) identity, but difference, and this is 
why one may understand the nature of Being by attending to the literal skin of the living body, 
for the skin is precisely a boundary that imparts shape or identity to a living body while never 
utterly isolating it, that indeed is already necessarily an exposure to, or already a site of contact 
with and passage into, that which is outside itself, and no living body would be what it is – no 
living body would even be alive – if it did not have this access to an “outside.” As I mentioned 
earlier, this is one reason that Merleau-Ponty claims that “carnal being” is a “prototype of 
Being,”739 for it demonstrates precisely the overlapping-through-difference that constitutes all 
things, the involution of “inner” and “outer” that is endemic not only to the literal skin of the 
living body but also to the formation of any distinct identity or being. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, 
“the very pulp of the sensible, what is indefinable in it, is nothing else than the union of the 
“inside” with the “outside,” the contact in thickness of self with self.”740 So, it is just as accurate 
(if not more accurate) to say that the skin of a living body is a “prototype of Being.” In any case, 
what is true of a living body is necessarily true of anything that has any kind of meaning or 
identity at all, including especially what we call a “community,” namely that it is constituted as 
such only in virtue of its differentiation from, hence at the same time enmeshment with, what is 
“other” than or “outside” itself. In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty demonstrates 
that the lived body precedes and institutes the distinction between subject and object; in his later 
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writings, he demonstrates that the lived body discloses a more basic “flesh of the world” that 
similarly precedes and institutes the distinction between every “inside” and every “outside” and 
which is, therefore, a kind of community from which every particular community arises, a 
“radical community” that, as such, includes every particular community, yet is below the 
traditional opposition between “inclusion” and “exclusion.”   
The ontological lesson that the living body and its skin teaches us is precisely what 
community as such is and that nothing exists apart from one. Every living body must be 
embedded in community with other bodies (living and non-living alike), and even the living 
body itself, composed as it is by tens of thousands of other organisms within and on it, composed 
indeed so much by other forms of life that most of the genes that make it what it is are, 
paradoxically, not “its own,” is already itself a community, already itself a community within 
other communities, already itself a community of communities, already itself a community of 
communities within a community of communities. As Alphonso Lingis articulates this point:  
The number of microbes that colonize our bodies exceeds the number of cells in our bodies by up to a 
hundredfold. Macrophages in our bloodstream hunt and devour trillions of bacteria and viruses entering 
our porous bodies continually. They replicate with their own DNA and RNA and not ours; they are the 
agents that maintain our borders. They, and not some Aristotelian form, are true agencies of our 
individuation as organisms…We also live in symbiosis with rice, wheat, and corn fields, with berry 
thickets and vegetable patches, and also with nitrogen-fixing bacteria in the soil…We also move and feel 
in symbiosis with other mammals, birds, reptiles, and fish…The form and substance of our bodies are not 
clay shaped by Jehovah and then driven by his breath; they are coral reefs full of polyps, sponges, 
gorgonians, and free-swimming macrophages continually stirred by monsoon climates of moist air, blood, 
and biles.741  
 
I cannot elaborate this point better than Lingis has done here, so I will not attempt to do so. This 
point discloses what is, I think, the basic thesis of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology. This prodigious 
multiplicity of forms of life in community with one another – this irreducible menagerie of 
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organisms in complex webs of interdependence, this synergy even between living and non-living 
entities alike – that constitutes a “human” or “animal” body is, of course, an empirical fact 
concerning the nature of life, indeed a microcosm of the complex, holistically integrated, 
ecological structure of any biome or lifeworld, yet it is not just an empirical fact. It is not simply 
an accident that wherever we find a living being so too do we find a being that is not only in a 
community but that is also itself a community. Every “empirical” (or what Heidegger calls 
“ontic”) fact or phenomenon rests upon and discloses a foundational ontological truth that it is 
the job of philosophers to extrapolate and clarify, and the empirical fact that Lingis describes 
here discloses the basic ontological thesis of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy (especially as he 
develops it in his later writings). The basic thesis of Merleau-Ponty’s whole philosophy is that 
community goes all the way down, that Being is radical community. Properly understood, no 
community – like no individual being or form of life – can ever be purely insulated from any 
other, and this more basic relational or differentiational matrix, or rather this founding medium 
and process of communalization, that underlies and engenders any particular community and that 
(properly understood) entwines all particular communities with one another – just as it underlies, 
engenders, and entwines all particular phenomena and embodied beings with one another – is, 
again, what Merleau-Ponty calls “Flesh.” There is, of course, no “self” without others, or no “I” 
outside of a “We,” but likewise there are no “We’s” without other “We’s” and, moreover, there 
are no “We’s” outside of a fundamental (radical) “We” in and through which they are each 
simultaneously distinguished from and in perpetual contact with one another, a space or 
dimension of being that – like, again, the literal skin of a body – simultaneously separates and 
joins them, or in other words non-oppositionally distances them. It is this Flesh or “radical 
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community/communalization” – this “Umwelt of Umwelten,”742 or what Merleau-Ponty calls the 
“Urgemeinschaftung [Ur/originary-community] of our intentional life,”743 – that institutes the 
very distinction between “inside” and “outside” itself and consequently defies the often tacitly 
supposed “purity” or autonomy of both of those indices in opposition to one another, that couples 
the “inside” of every particular community with its “outside(s)” (that is, with other communities) 
just as it couples the interiority of every self with its exteriority (its body) and, in virtue of that, 
every embodied self with embodied others (within a particular intersubjective community). In 
short, if individual living bodies are constituted intercorporeally, so too are particular 
intercorporeal communities; just as intercorporeity obtains between and constitutes living bodies 
within a particular community, so too does it obtain between and constitute particular 
communities of living bodies; reciprocally, just as living bodies together constitute a particular 
intercorporeal community, so too do particular intercorporeal communities together constitute 
(or rather disclose) a radical community, an intercorporeal community of intercorporeal 
communities.  
So, as I already hope to have indicated, Merleau-Ponty’s ontology has profound 
consequences for how we understand what it is to be and to be together: to be is always to be 
together with others, yet this togetherness is not the contrary of difference or distance from 
others, but is in fact constituted by it. One’s sphere of lived experience is inseverably tethered to 
other lives or carnalities; one’s distinctive, yet always bodily or affective, manner of being-in-
the-world is grounded in and through bonds of variable lengths, strengths, and tensions with 
other bodies and affects, other beings and worlds, and our task is simply to extrapolate the 
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implications of this fundamental truth rigorously, “to study what the world and truth and being 
are, in terms of the complicity we have with them.”744  
Though I already critiqued Thomas Nagel’s famous essay, “What Is It Like to Be a 
Bat?”, in the previous chapter, I mentioned there that I would reserve my full response to it for 
this chapter, and now we have come to our final answer to the provocation of this essay. 
Merleau-Ponty himself affirmed that our human perspective is inexpugnable and consequently 
worried about its “limitations.” “If we try to describe the real as it appears to us in perceptual 
experience,” Merleau-Ponty writes, “we find it overlaid with anthropological predicates.”745 Yet, 
Merleau-Ponty’s later concept of the “flesh of the world” not only decenters our human 
perspective (or our human flesh) in the constitution of meaning, being, and worldhood, it also 
accounts for how it is possible in general for different forms of flesh to be accessible to one 
another, and indeed entails that all forms of flesh always already, at least to some extent, overlap 
and interpenetrate one another. Thus, to recall a relevant remark from a passage cited earlier in 
this chapter, “when we speak of the flesh of the visible, we do not mean to do anthropology, to 
describe a world covered over with all our own projections….”746 Fundamental ontology 
necessarily decenters the human perspective, and in doing so demonstrates the intertwining of 
that perspective with non-human perspectives (and with “Nature”). With “the flesh of the 
visible,” “the flesh of the world,” or simply “Flesh,” Merleau-Ponty designates and finally brings 
to its fullest explication what was always implicit in everything he ever wrote about 
intersubjectivity (or intercorporeity), namely a more basic element or ontological structure that 
makes all intersubjective, intercorporeal relationships possible and of which such relationships 
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are “remarkable variants,” a primordial, universal “Flesh” in which all forms of flesh – especially 
our own and those of other animals – participate and thus through which all forms of flesh 
participate in, or always already “encroach upon,”747 one another. Thus, “it is already the flesh of 
things that speaks to us of our own flesh, and that speaks to us of the flesh of the other.”748 It is 
already the flesh of the world that speaks to me of my own flesh and that affords passage – or 
that is already passage or “transitivity”749 – between different forms of flesh, whether between 
the flesh of human bodies or between the flesh of human and non-human bodies (including the 
bodies of bats).    
…This flesh that one sees and touches is not all there is to flesh, nor this massive corporeity all there is to 
the body. The reversibility that defines the flesh exists in other fields; it is even incomparably more agile 
there and capable of weaving relations between bodies that this time will not only enlarge, but will pass 
definitively beyond the circle of the visible…there are…those strange movements of the mouth and throat 
that form the cry and the voice. Those movements end in sounds and I hear them. Like crystal, like metal 
and many other substances, I am a sonorous being, but I hear my own vibration from within…I hear 
myself in my throat. My voice is bound to the mass of my own life as is the voice of no one else. But if I 
am close enough to the other who speaks to hear his breath and his effervescence and his fatigue, I almost 
witness, in him as in myself, the awesome birth of vociferation. As there is a reflexivity of the touch, of 
sight, and of the touch-vision system, there is a reflexivity of the movements of phonation and of hearing; 
they have their sonorous inscription, the vociferations have in me in their motor echo.750 
 
Since Nagel’s essay specifically addresses the alterity of bat-subjectivity, and since bats 
primarily inhabit their world through sound, I have chosen to highlight this passage due to its 
discussion of phonation and hearing, or due to Merleau-Ponty’s claim here that other 
“vociferations have in me their motor echo,” that all beings who are capable of hearing are open 
to a common sonorous world and, at least to that extent, open to (or sonorously inscribed in) one 
another. Of course, humans and bats are both incarnate subjectivities, and as such they belong to 
the same fundamental, carnal world. We can see the world only because we share its visibility, 
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we can touch the world only because we share its tangibility, and likewise we can hear the world 
only because we share its sonorousness, or only because we inhabit not only a common visible 
and tangible world but a common sonorous one as well. Humans and bats may have very 
different ways of perceiving and navigating their environments, and bats surely rely upon their 
sense of hearing in ways humans will never be able to know in a fully lived, experiential way, yet 
we all nevertheless inhabit a sonorous reality.751 I too inhabit a world whose vibrations ripple 
through my flesh as sound. The world bellows through my body as well; it murmurs and sings, 
clamors and screams, even speaks through my body. The “push and shove of being”752 in which 
my body is caught up is also a chorus of sounds and voices, of phonations and reverberations, of 
percussions and amplitudes. Bats surely think with and through their ears in the same way that 
dogs can be said to think with and through their noses, and I will never completely be able to 
think with and through my ears in the manner of a bat. Yet, I do think with and through my ears 
whenever I discern meaning in the manifold noises of the world,753 whenever I pick up a specific 
meaning amidst the chatter or cacophony of my environment. Moreover, as Derrida discusses 
extensively, even my consciousness of myself and of time – even self-presence – is continually 
instituted and unfurled through the reflexivity and diachrony of hearing myself speak: whether in 
literal phonation or in internal monologue, whether through outer voice or through inner voice, 
even thought and temporality – even auto-affection or a sense-of-self – is founded by the 
																																																								
751 This is not to exclude deaf people, but is simply to say that we all inhabit a world that is capable of disclosing 
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752 Merleau-Ponty, Signs, “Introduction,” p. 14. 
753 Indeed, as Heidegger argues, I never “just” hear noises: every noise I hear is always already meaningful. I 
immediately hear the backfire of a car, the alarm of an ambulance, the thumps and cadence of footsteps down the 
hall, and so on.  
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irreducible hiatus between speaking and hearing oneself speak. “The speaking-listening duality 
remains at the heart of the I,”754 and this “duality” or reflexivity is one that I share with any 
beings who experience and cope with their world through phonation and auscultation, and it is 
but one form of that reflexivity that defines any sentient body. Thought and temporality are 
“mutually entangled,”755 yet both are also, in a sense, entangled with auditory, auscultatory 
perception, with a sonorous just as well as with a visible and tactile world.  
There are innumerably many different forms of flesh in the world, but every form of flesh 
in the world is a form of the flesh of the world. Different forms of flesh may never completely 
coincide with one another – “what it is like” to be one form of flesh will never totally coincide 
with “what it is like” to be another, and one may never be completely transposable or perfectly 
translatable into another – yet nevertheless all flesh is continuous, and since all minds are 
enfleshed, so too are all minds continuous. So, Nietzsche is right to insist that “we behold all 
things with the human head and cannot cut off this head,”756 yet what we can do is recognize that 
we are more than just our “heads,” that our “minds” are not “contained” within our heads or 
brains but diffused throughout our whole bodies and thus already extended into the world and 
into other bodies, that we are living bodies whose affects and intentionalities are, as such, already 
entangled with those of other living bodies, already embedded with other sentient flesh. As 
Merleau-Ponty claims, “my perception is not in my head, but it has “attachments” with it.”757 So 
no, we cannot cut off our heads, but we are not just our heads: we are our living bodies and 
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everything that sustains them, we are flesh and our flesh already belongs to everything else that 
is also flesh.  
We may indeed differ quite significantly from other kinds of living bodies, and thus we 
may not be able to understand very well what it is like to exist as those bodies, but no living 
body is ever utterly divorced from any other, no form of flesh is ever categorically or 
ontologically isolated from any other. In short, since the mind is necessarily embodied, or since 
to be a mind is to be a living body (and vice versa), it follows that continuity of sentient flesh or 
embodiment is continuity of sentience or mindedness, and of course all flesh is continuous. Thus, 
“there are no substantial differences between physical Nature, life, and mind.”758 Merleau-Ponty 
is often critical of Darwin, but one of the most profound insights that follows from Darwin’s 
theory of evolution (and one that Merleau-Ponty embraces and elaborates) is that continuity of 
living flesh is continuity of mind; certainly after Darwin there is no question of denying this 
thesis. And as Merleau-Ponty underscores time and again, this continuity must be understood as 
not the contrary of difference but as “deeply consonant” or “synonymous” with it; it is a 
continuity that is already irreducible difference. The point here is that we should neither 
emphasize continuity at the expense of difference nor emphasize difference at the expense of 
continuity; we should neither construct continuity as homogeneity nor construct discontinuity or 
difference as binary opposition or mutual exclusion: this is just what difference “worthy of 
name” is. To think properly the differences between living beings, or to think the differences 
between human and non-human beings, is neither to cleave such differences into oppositions 
(dyads of mutually exclusive terms) nor to collapse them into monolithic, totalizing unities 
(identities that leave standing only one term or into which every supposedly distinct term would 
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become absorbed). This is what Leonard Lawlor means when he urges us to conceptualize the 
“human-animal” relationship beyond the contrary, equally false alternatives of “metaphysical 
separationism” and “biological continuism.”759 As Lawlor writes, “…biological continuism 
makes the two one; metaphysical separationism keeps the two two….Metaphysical 
separationism is Platonism (or Cartesianism); biological continuism, in a word, biologism, is the 
mere reversal Platonism,”760 and neither of these alternatives correctly describes the relationship 
between “the human” and “the animal”; indeed, they do not correctly describe any ontologically 
fundamental relationship at all. As I hope to have already demonstrated, Merleau-Ponty’s 
ontology of Flesh is a genuine ontology of difference, and as such it is exactly a third alternative 
beyond the two that Lawlor defines here, that is, an alternative to Platonism (or Cartesianism) 
that is not merely a reversal of Platonism (that is, a reductive, totalizing materialism or 
“biologism”).  
The “Flesh” designates a kind of continuity that does homogenize, totalize, or subsume as 
well as a discontinuity (or distance) that does not divide, negate, or exclude. This is also what 
Merleau-Ponty means by a “strange kinship,” and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of a strange kinship 
between “the human” and “the animal” – that is, his notion of an intertwining of “humanity” and 
“animality” – designates what Lawlor calls a “staggered analogy” between the two, for a 
staggered analogy is not an “analogy of proportion, in which one of the terms of the comparison 
is determinate, well defined so that it is able to determine the other term”; rather, in a staggered 
analogy “both terms are fundamentally indeterminate, which means that the analogy is always a 
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bit off center, inaccurate, and incorrect – in a word, insufficient.”761 That there is a “strange 
kinship” between “humanity” and “animality” precisely means that they cannot be 
conceptualized as either identical or opposed to one another, and this, in turn, means that they are 
intertwined, that neither is determinate independently of the other and that both are therefore, 
fundamentally, indeterminate or “ambiguous,” intermingled in such a way that equally deprives 
both of any essential, self-enclosed, autonomous, or transparent positive determinacy. On 
Merleau-Ponty’s account, “humanity” and “animality” are never positive determinacies but are 
rather positive indeterminacies (that is, indeterminacies that are not merely privations or 
derivations of some already established or presupposed, self-standing positive determinacy, since 
in fact no such positive determinacy ever exists). Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of an 
“intertwining” of “humanity” and “animality” precisely dismantles or unsettles, rather than 
reinstates or leaves untouched, a dualism in which those terms would designate fixed, self-
contained, transparent, or exclusionary identities, natures, or essences.  
It is not an accident that “animality” tends to be traditionally coded as anything that is 
(“merely”) “bodily.” As I will mention again soon, for Merleau-Ponty “the human” is to “the 
animal” not only as self is to Other but also as mind is to body, and given the manner in which 
Merleau-Ponty conceptualizes the latter, the radical implications of such a claim should be clear. 
We can no more separate humanity from animality than we can separate mind from body (or self 
from Other), and this means we have to rethink the human-animal relation just as radically as we 
have to rethink the mind-body relation. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, and as I will now 
proceed to elaborate before bringing this discussion to a close, the basic point here comes down 
to understanding correctly what Husserl means by the “pairing” of self and Other and then to 
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apply the meaning of this consistently to the relationship between “the human” and “the animal,” 
since the latter are “paired” in precisely the same way. That we need to think the human and the 
animal together means that we need to think them radically otherwise than they have hitherto 
been thought, for it is to think them outside any binary logic of identity and negation, sameness 
and (absolute) transcendence; it is to think them, as Lawlor (following Derrida) insists we must, 
beyond the alternatives of (Platonic/Cartesian) dualism and (reductive) “continuism.” 
We have seen that Merleau-Ponty’s insights into intersubjectivity lead him to rethink 
what it means to be that specific kind of embodied being that “we” are, namely a “human” being.  
Merleau-Ponty comes to understand the relationship between ‘humanity’ and ‘animality’ in just 
the same way that he, following Husserl, understands the relationship between self and Other: 
not as oppositional or hierarchical or reductively identical, but as primordially “paired” (or 
“lateral”). Thus, Merleau-Ponty argues that humanity and animality are co-constituting in just the 
same way as self and Other: the sense and being of each are instituted only together; they are 
distinct yet inseparable, which is to say coupled through reciprocal differentiation. This coupling 
or overlapping through differentiation is, of course, chiasmatic be(com)ing: foundationally, “the 
human” and “the animal” are intertwined in and through a constitutive fission – a “divergence 
that is not an ontological void,”762 hence also a shared “flesh” – between them. Merleau-Ponty is 
clear that we must conceptualize the “human-animal” relation as strictly analogous to the “self-
Other” relation. For Merleau-Ponty, we must “…[think] not the animal-human, not the human-
animal, but truly the one being the alter ego for the other….”763 In short, Merleau-Ponty 
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maintains that as the self is to “the Other” (or to others), so is “the human” to “the animal”: 
each are necessarily paired or co-constituting, and this means we radically have to rethink both, 
for no longer can they be understood (as they traditionally have been) as categorically separate 
rather than inseparable, as mutually exclusive rather than reciprocally constitutive, as opposed 
rather than coupled. Whatever it is we mean by “the human,” it can no more emerge from, or be 
shut up entirely within, an impenetrable chrysalis of being than a “self” can emerge from, or be 
shut up entirely within, a condition of utterly asocial, solipsistic seclusion. Humans can no more 
come to presence to themselves as such without relationships with other-than-human others (and 
with “nature”) than any individual human can acquire “human” self-consciousness without 
relationships with other humans. “Humanity” can no more constitute or understand itself in 
isolation from “animality” than “one can pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the 
swamps of nothingness.”764  
Of course, it is clearly the case that a human being cannot achieve full “human” 
subjectivity without the affirmations or “gracious acts of attention” of human others. Feral 
children attest to this fact: infants who develop outside of a human community – infants who 
only “pair” with animals – do not become fully “human,” and Merleau-Ponty acknowledges 
this.765 We only achieve full human subjectivity by pairing with other human beings, and while 
the very existence of feral children already demonstrates the fluidity or ambiguity of the border 
between “the human” and “the non-human,” it is still the case that “human” infants possess a 
potentiality for “human subjectivity” that, say, rocks, trees, and dogs do not. So, we need to 
recognize that Merleau-Ponty’s claim here is one that is deeper than any claim concerning the 
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psychosocial development of an individual human being: it is a claim concerning the ontological 
condition of “being-human” (or of the sense of “humanness”) in the first place (which any 
account of psychosocial human development presupposes). Merleau-Ponty’s implicit question, 
then, is this: how is it that anything originally comes to be (or to mean) “human” in the first 
place? That is to say, how does any being acquire the sense of “being human” such that we can 
make any observations concerning the psychosocial development of “human beings” in the first 
place? Yes, human infants require the attention of human Others in order to achieve full human 
subjectivity, but how does such a claim or observation “make sense”? How are we to account for 
the sense of the term “human” that we are using here? We only become human in a community 
of humans, but how does such a community itself become “human”? If we say that such a 
community becomes a human community by “pairing” with other human communities – in just 
the same way that a human infant becomes fully human by pairing with a human adult – then we 
have only pushed the question farther back, and we confront an infinite regress. Merleau-Ponty’s 
answer, of course, is that there is a primordial Ineinander (intertwining) of “the human” and “the 
animal” that constitutes the human as such and that therefore subtends the constitution of any 
distinct human self or community. The primal differentiation and consequent overlapping of “the 
human” and “the animal” – the dehiscence between them that also envelops them in one another 
– is what enables any specific being or community of beings to appear as “human” or, 
correlatively, as “animal.” We only become “human” in community with other humans, but a 
human community itself only becomes human in a larger, “radical” community with other-than-
human others and communities. Our sense of ourselves as human is necessarily – again, we 
might say “quasi-transcendentally” – structured by our relationships with non-human forms of 
life. And we must always recall that this means that neither “humanity” nor “animality” can be 
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conceptualized as pure, self-contained positive determinacies, for they are always already 
infested by one another, or defined as such by a liminal space between them that renders them 
irreducibly ambiguous, different yet continuous. Again, the relationship between humanity and 
animality – just like the relationship between self and Other – does not conform to a classical, 
dualistic logic of identity and negation. Thus, contrary to Heidegger’s view on the matter, 
Merleau-Ponty insists that there is no “ontological abyss” between human beings and other 
animals; or, if we say that there is an “abyss” between them, then we must also recognize, along 
with Merleau-Ponty, that “an abyss is not nothing,” for it has its “environs and edges.”766 
To be clear, all of this means that what we (usually very inadequately and thoughtlessly) 
designate as “animality” cannot be understood by mere privative contrast to “humanity,” or as 
that which is simply what “we” are not, since the claim here is precisely that there is no positive 
human identity or nature – no human “we” or “humanity” – prior to, or independently of, non-
human beings. To begin with a positive concept of what is “human” and then proceed to define 
“the animal” in negative, derivative, oppositional contrast to it is not merely to adopt, as I have 
already mentioned, an arbitrary yardstick with which to understand and assess other forms of 
life, it is also to assume such a thing as a “humanity” that may define itself on its own terms 
independently of other forms of life, or a humanity whose being and meaning originates 
autonomously, that is, conceptually or ontologically prior to, or apart from, other forms of life, 
yet this is precisely what Merleau-Ponty denies. To define or interpret other forms of life in such 
a way that derives their being from our own case – that defines or interprets them as either more 
or less similar to who or what “we” are, hence in negative terms relative to “us” – is already to 
assume a humanity, or already to assume such a thing as a “human” “We” or “Us,” that royally 
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bootstraps itself into being and meaning first so that everything else may be defined or 
understood relative to it secondarily, but the assumed primacy of such a “humanity” or “human 
We” is precisely what Merleau-Ponty calls into question; it is precisely one of the foundational 
assumptions of Western philosophy to which, Merleau-Ponty urges, we are never entitled.  
In short, if there is nothing we may assume or refer to as “human” in positive terms 
independently of relations with non-humans – if only being with other forms of life inflates our 
own to meaning – then neither may we assume or refer to anything as “animal” in negative, 
derivative contrast to what is “human.” We therefore cannot understand what “we” are in 
hierarchical opposition to “animals” (or to any supposed “them”): 
The human cannot appear in its qualitative difference by the mere addition of reason to the animal 
(body)…The relation of the animal to the human will not be a simple hierarchy founded on an 
addition…We study the human through its body in order to see it emerge as different from the animal, not 
by the addition of reason, but rather, in short, in the Ineinander with the animal…767 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, the moment we begin from some assumed understanding of ourselves as 
clearly and distinctly “human” and proceed to use that as the measure according to which we 
compare and contrast other forms of life – the moment we begin to interpret other forms of life 
relative to our own thus assumed as a primary or central locus or standard of meaning – we have 
already erred. We cannot think the “human-animal” relation either in such a way that ascribes a 
transparent, self-contained, or autonomous “positive” identity or determinacy to “humanity” or 
in such a way that denies “animality” any positive identity or determinacy of its own, or that 
would merely conceive “animality” as the opposite or privation of “humanity.” If humanity and 
animality are intertwined, then the latter cannot be understood as the mere privation of the 
former, for to do so is to assume the former as a primary and immediate given or autonomous 
source of its own identity or intelligibility as such, which is precisely contrary to a chiasmatic 
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relationship; in a chiasmatic relationship, neither term precedes or unilaterally founds the other, 
for each reciprocally constitute one another and are thus only ever given together.  
So, Merleau-Ponty’s view is not that we know what we (humans) are by contrasting 
ourselves with “animals” or with beings we supposedly “are not,” for this assumes a false 
oppositional or hierarchical relationship between “humanity” and “animality.” The relationship 
between the two cannot be conceptualized as hierarchical because, again, they only come to 
presence or meaning together, or co-constitutively. To regard “animality” as the negation of 
“humanity” – as what humanity “is not” – is to think beginning from humanity as an already 
established positive determinacy, rather than to think beginning from humanity as a positive 
indeterminacy, or rather than to think beginning from the positive indeterminacy that is the very 
divergence and co-constitution of humanity and animality. This why Merleau-Ponty claims (as 
he alludes in the above passage) that “humanity is not animality (in the sense of mechanism) + 
reason.”768 We cannot conceptualize “humanity” as merely the addition of some property (or 
perhaps of some set of properties) to “animality,” for that is to conceptualize the latter 
derivatively or privatively relative to the former, and that is to conceptualize the former as a 
central, autonomous, or privileged source of the intelligibility of its own and of other forms of 
life, when in fact the intelligibility of its own and of other forms of life is founded by their 
primordial intertwinings with one another, or in the reciprocal divergencies and exchanges of 
sense between them. So, if, for example, “humanity” is not “animality plus reason,” then 
“animality” is not “humanity minus reason.” In other words, “animality” is not the privation of 
some sort of presupposed (and usually unaccounted for) “properly human” characteristic or 
capacity. The claim that “humanity is not animality + reason” is simply another way of 
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articulating the point that animality must be thought otherwise than as the mere negation or 
privation of humanity, or that animality cannot be defined derivatively relative to humanity, that 
is, in terms of the extent to which it lacks already positively determined human qualities or 
valences of being. This is the only way to think appropriately the difference between “the 
human” and “the animal,” and indeed it is the only way to think difference “worthy of the name” 
at all.  
Merleau-Ponty even suggests in this context that we should dispense altogether with 
attempting to assess human beings and animals according to a scale of “intelligence” (which, of 
course, usually means assessing other forms of life according to some sort of standard of 
“human” intelligence). Thus, Merleau-Ponty radically suggests that we should abandon the very 
concept of human/animal “intelligence” altogether, because such a notion “encounters the 
distinction machine-intelligence.”769 Merleau-Ponty’s point here is that invariably anything one 
conceptualizes as “intelligent” behavior is always contrasted with those behaviors that are 
“merely” instinctual, reactive, conditioned, or “mechanical.” So, conceptualizing the distinction 
between humanity and animality according to distinctions in “intelligence” not only illicitly 
conceptualizes animality as the mere negation or absence of an already assumed positive “human 
nature” – it not only defines “the animal” only to the extent that it either approaches or lacks 
already assumed characteristically “human” cognitive capacities – but, moreover, the concept of 
(human or animal) “intelligence” ultimately presupposes or reproduces a classical opposition 
between “reason” and “non-reason”, logos and mechanicity that is not only unstable and 
untenable on its own terms but that itself is founded upon, or that itself reproduces, the very 
Cartesian mind/body, human/animal dualism Merleau-Ponty has already thoroughly refuted. As 
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we saw in chapter three, there is no way to understand the body as a mere “machine” (or 
behavior as merely “mechanistic”) without, in fact, assuming or reinscribing classical mind/body 
dualism, for the body can only be conceptualized as such in opposition to an absolutely extra-
mechanistic (hence disembodied) mind or soul: again, if we give up the idea that the mind is a 
“ghost in the machine,” so too must we give up the concomitant idea of the body as a mere 
(“mindless”) machine. Descartes advanced a mechanistic understanding of the body (and of 
materiality in general) because it was precisely the counterpart to his supernaturalist 
understanding of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty’s point here, then, is that one can only ever 
conceptualize “rationality” or “intelligence” in opposition to putatively “non-rational” or 
mechanical forms of behavior, but to do so is ultimately to resuscitate a Platonic/Cartesian 
opposition between logos and mechanicity, hence between spirit and matter, mind and body.  
Setting aside even all of the hidden anthropocentric biases through which such a concept 
of “intelligence” would be inflected, it is nevertheless the case that any concept of “intelligence” 
– regardless of whether one conceptualizes it as differentiated across forms of life in a gradated 
rather than discontinuous manner – will only ever be intelligible in contradistinction to merely 
“reflexive,” “mimetic”, “instinctive,” “appetitive,” “blind,” or “mechanical” behaviors, and 
therefore such a concept is indeed that of a “spiritual” faculty in disguise, or the concept of a 
kind of thought, interiority, intentionality, self-presence, or sense-constituting agency that would 
“inhabit” and animate an inherently, utterly thought-less, interior-less, non-intentional, sense-less 
body. Thus, inasmuch as the concept of “intelligent” behavior is inevitably contrasted with the 
concept of merely “mechanistic” behavior, there is no way to understand or deploy either 
concept in a manner that does not conjure the old “ghost in the machine,” or in a manner that 
does not reinstate the very sort of dualistic conceptual framework we know to be just as dead or 
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“dumb” as the mechanistic body imagined within such a framework. For this reason, Merleau-
Ponty suggests that there is no notion of “intelligence” that is not tacitly committed to an 
untenable opposition between “logos” and “nature”/“mechanicity” or that, in other words, does 
not tacitly insulate “intelligence,” logos, or “self-presence” from its “outside” or its “other,” that 
is, from (a reductively, abstractly conceived) materiality. In short, Merleau-Ponty is suggesting 
here that there is no concept of “intelligence” – or at any rate no notion of a “scale” or 
“spectrum” of intelligence according to which forms of life may be ranked – that is not 
inherently logocentric. And to the extent that such a notion of (human/animal) “intelligence” 
holds sway even today in the sciences that study human and animal behavior, we see, as we do 
time and again, that so much of what passes itself off as “science” is in reality theology or bad 
metaphysics (not to mention bad ethics and oppressive politics) in disguise.     
Thus, if we interpret Merleau-Ponty’s thesis as affirming that we come to understand our 
humanity by merely contrasting it with what our humanity “is not,” then we fail to understand 
what he means when he speaks of an intertwining between “the human” and “the animal,” or 
what he means when he speaks of a positive (“fecund”) indeterminacy – an irreducible 
differentiation – that subtends and founds any supposed positive determinations of being, 
identity, or meaning. To regard “animality” as the privation of “humanity” is not only to ascribe 
an erroneous ontological primacy to the latter, it is also to conceptualize both as opposed rather 
than, in fact, intertwined or coupled. To regard animality as the mere negation of humanity is, in 
fact, to regard both as mutually exclusive (i.e., A and not-A are mutually exclusive or 
contradictory terms), yet this fails to understand the relationship between them as chiasmatic, or 
fails to understand the relationship between them as analogous to that between “self” and 
“Other.” In short, opposition is mutual exclusion, not co-constitution, so if Merleau-Ponty is 
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right, it is no longer permissible to conceptualize “the human” in isolation from “the animal,” 
and this also means it is no longer permissible to conceptualize “the animal” in a merely negative 
or derivative way relative to “the human.” If we cannot conceptualize the “Other” as the mere 
privation or contradictory of “the self,” or if we cannot accord any kind of ontological primacy 
or autonomy to the self, then neither can we conceptualize “the animal” as the mere privation or 
contradictory of “the human,” or neither can we accord any kind of ontological primacy or 
autonomy – any “special” or “central” station in the order of Being – to “the human”; the 
egocentricity of the former conception of the self-Other relation is analogous to the 
anthropocentricity of the latter conception of the human-animal relation.  
Moreover, what it truly means to be “Other-than-us” cannot be defined negatively 
relative to “us” (as the term “non-human” already problematically suggests), for that is to make 
of “the Other” but a satellite in our orbit, which is not, of course, to be genuinely “Other” at all. 
Merleau-Ponty is consistently committed to the phenomenological or ontological and not only 
ethical imperative to honor alterity:     
Do we have the right to comprehend the time, the space of the child as an undifferentiation of our time, of 
our space, etc.…? This is to reduce the child’s experience to our own, at the very moment one is trying to 
respect the phenomena. For it is to think it as the negation of our differentiations. It would be necessary to 
go all the way to thinking it positively, unto phenomenology. But the same question arises with regard to 
every other, to the alter ego in particular…Solution: recapture the child, the alter ego, the unreflected 
within myself by a lateral, pre-analytic participation, which is perception…intentional transgression. 
When I perceive the child, he is given precisely in a certain divergence (écart)…and the same for my alter 
ego, and the same for the pre-analytic thing.770   
 
As Merleau-Ponty clearly argues here, we will never correctly understand the being of an 
“Other” – whether such an “Other” is a child, another adult human, a cultural other, an “animal” 
other, or even a thing – if we proceed to do so relative to our own standpoint as the default 
comparative, contrastive, or otherwise evaluative measure, for that, indeed, is to “reduce the 
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Other” to ourselves, or to construct the Other as derived from our own familiar manner or sphere 
of being. The “Other” can never be properly regarded as the mere “negation” of “the self.” Yet, 
in respecting the irreducibility of “Others” to ourselves, Merleau-Ponty also makes clear here 
this does not mean that we posit such Others as opposed to or radically exterior to ourselves; on 
the contrary, “Others” are not “reducible” to “me” or to “us” precisely because we are 
intertwined from the very beginning (that is, in virtue of our “lateral pre-analytic participation” 
in one another), or precisely because there is no “me” or “us” prior to or independent of “them” 
to which they may be reduced or in terms of which their being may be derivatively or negatively 
defined.  
So, on the one hand, there are living beings (i.e., “animals”) that are “other” than “us” 
(humans), but these other-than-human-others are also, paradoxically, “us,” or are nonetheless 
endemic to who “we” are from the very start. Animal Others are not identical to us, but they are 
not the negation of us; rather, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, they are “non-different” from us. 
Animal Others are not “us,” but they are also not not “us.” However difficult or paradoxical it 
may seem, the point is to accept and think through both of these claims at once, and to do so is to 
think a deeper, more radical “We” (or “Us”) that founds – and that confounds or overspills – any 
neat delineations one may draw between any “we” or “us” and any “them,” a “We” that does not 
resolve into a mere aggregate of isolated, self-enclosed beings, identities, or communities, nor 
one that dissolves all differences into an amorphous, all-consuming totality or “night of 
identity.”771 Again – and this is perhaps the most difficult point in Merleau-Ponty – chiasmatic 
relationality (or radical community) is defined by a “both/and” logic that both founds and 
disrupts the constructs of our later “either/or” conceptual frameworks: “animals” are not “us,” 
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and they are “us” (or are not not us). This may appear to be a formal contradiction at first glance, 
but the conjunction as a whole is supposed to indicate that the “not” here is not the “not” of 
classical logic: it signifies not negation, contradiction, or absolute non-identity, but otherness (or 
difference), and otherness (or difference) as such simply cannot be accommodated by any 
classical, strictly bivalent or disjunctive framework of logic. Genuine otherness (or difference) 
cannot be accommodated by any framework of logic that takes the “law of the excluded middle” 
to be an exceptionless axiom that governs thought and reality (that is, to be a law), for in a sense 
otherness (or difference) is precisely the “middle” that is thus excluded.   
This fundamental, radical “We” is, then, a “we” that is always in question, or one whose 
boundaries, though real, are always undecidable precisely because it is the “We” that “we” and 
everything else are before we ever take to distinguish between ourselves and anything else, the 
“We” in the midst of which anything has being or meaning, the “We” that underlies and 
envelops all thought and that cannot, therefore, be pinned down or policed by its categories; it is 
a kind of community that cannot be thought as some object in opposition to one’s own “subject-
position” in the world, because one’s own “subject-position” in the world is already embedded in 
it, already instituted only in and through it. It is necessary to confront the fact that one exists only 
together with others who constitute, along with oneself, this primal, radical “We,” others who 
thus cannot be conceptualized as “other” in a traditional, oppositional or merely contrastive way, 
for to do so is, again, to take for granted the false notion that one’s own selfhood, identity, 
subject-position, standpoint, or circle of existence in the world has been determined in advance 
or independently of them. This is why Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the laterality of the “human-
animal” relationship: “The relation of the human to animality is not a hierarchical relation, but 
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lateral, an overcoming that does not abolish kinship.”772 There is much to unpack here, but we 
may begin by noting that Merleau-Ponty’s reference to the “laterality” of the human-animal 
relationship is clearly intended to evoke the reciprocal, bilateral (or equiprimordial) constitution 
of self and Other, and thus it is intended to repudiate or displace any oppositional, “frontal” 
(unidirectional), and hierarchical conception of the ontological relationship or exchange of 
meaning between them. To say that humanity and animality are related "laterally" (non-
oppositionally and non-hierarchically) is to say that they are related chiasmatically, that the 
institution of the distinction between "humanity" and "animality" is just one instance (though an 
exemplary instance) among others of dehiscence in Being/Nature, and like all such instances it 
entails a kind of “strange kinship” or "encroachment" between its relata. Since this dehiscence or 
opening between “the human” and “the animal” is not an opposition or ontological vacuum but is 
filled by a common carnality and carnal world, it entails (or simply is) their intertwining and 
compresence, and thus it indeed compels us to rethink the signifiers “human” and “animal,” for 
they no longer signify anything like clearly demarcated and disjunct essences or “natures”; and 
yet, even though “the human” and “the animal” are continuous with one another, and even 
though there is a sense in which the former “arises” from the latter, we cannot conceive of the 
former as having “descended” from the latter (as if from some pure origin or some sort of 
homogenous and inert background), for each can only arise in sense – they can only ever 
be(come) – together. Self and Other only emerge into meaning and presence together, and the 
same is true with respect to “humanity” and “animality.” Humanity “arises” from animality, 
then, simply in the sense that it is constituted as such through a process of differentiation from 
other-than-human alterities (and reciprocally, other-than-human beings are constituted as such 
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through their differentiation from human and other other-than-human alterities). The 
fundamental “lateral” relationship – or what I have been calling the “radical community” – 
between human and non-human beings instantiates the coupling-through-differentiation or the 
“identity-within-difference”773 constitutive of all forms of life, identity, and meaning.  
For Merleau-Pony, “humanity” is constituted as such only with or in the midst of 
“animal” others. This means that animality always already envelops and infests our humanity 
such that it simultaneously distinguishes “us” as the kinds of beings we are – hence constitutes 
the human “we” to which we belong – and undermines all of the ordinary ways in which we 
displace “animality” outside ourselves, that is, any of the ways in which we displace it onto 
others typically labeled “animals” or any of the ways in which we “otherize” it as the negation of 
who or what “we” are or as signifying a strictly antithetical “them.” If we are to develop a lucid 
conception of our “humanity,” we must think it always in the midst of other-than-human 
alterities, and this, again, requires that we unlearn most of the ways in which we typically 
conceptualize or categorize the world. To say that the relationship between ‘the human’ and ‘the 
animal’ is “lateral” is to say that humanity is constituted by animality in precisely the same way 
that selfhood is constituted by otherness; it is to say that humanity is of animality in precisely the 
same way that subjectivity is of flesh or of the world, that “being-human” is a distinct expression 
or particular incarnation of “being-animal,” that being-human and being-animal are (like “self” 
and “Other”) two indissociably entangled moments of a process of differentiation (and 
communalization) in Being, and that they are therefore defined as such by a limit between them 
that renders them intrinsically “promiscuous” or ambiguous. This limit that constitutes the 
identity or being of any distinct being or body, as well as the limit that constitutes any distinct 
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community of beings or bodies, is what Leonard Lawlor describes as a point of both intersection 
and diffraction, the “halfway point in the middle of the X, the mi-lieu…”.774 It is impossible to 
understand either “being-human” or “being-animal” apart from one another, and this means that 
we have to unlearn our tendency to think of one beginning solely from the standpoint or identity 
of the other, that is, our tendency to assume, say, a “human” standpoint or identity with reference 
to which we would then proceed to compare and contrast “animals.” In order to think properly 
any terms that are truly constituted in and through their intertwining one another, one has to try 
to think them not from the side of one term or the other but from a standpoint between them, or 
from the sides of both at once. In other words, if terms truly are related to one another 
chiasmatically, one will unavoidably distort or violate them unless one thinks them truly 
together, or from precisely that metaxic threshold, in-between place, or “mi-lieu” (that center of 
the “X” or chi-asm ) where they simultaneously overlap and diverge from one another. This is 
why Merleau-Ponty claims that we must “gradually approach the Ineinander from two ends.”775 
The logic of the chiasm displaces and repudiates every supposed “centricity” we might take as 
the point of departure for our thinking; it demands a thinking of and, more importantly, from “the 
between.” Thus, the “Ineinander of animality-humanity”776 incessantly disrupts, decenters, or 
defers anthropocentricity in just the same way that the intertwining (Ineinander) of self and 
Other incessantly disrupts, decenters, and defers egocentricity.  
As Merleau-Ponty profoundly asks, “where are we to put the limit between the body and 
the world, since the world is flesh?”777 Of course, Merleau-Ponty’s point is not that there is no 
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limit between the body and the world, for if the world truly, utterly engulfed the body, there 
would be no such thing as sentience and no such thing as a distinct body in the first place; rather, 
his point is that there is no sharply determinable limit between the body and the world, that the 
body and the world are neither identical nor absolutely separate but intertwined, that the limit 
that individuates any individual living body is also necessarily a “frontier surface”778 through 
which the world passes into it and through which it, reversibly, passes into the world. If there 
were no distinction between myself and the world, I would not be a “self” or would not exist at 
all, yet nonetheless I am also not outside the world: I am thoroughly immersed in it, I am 
essentially of it. Now, what is true concerning the limit between the body and the world is true 
concerning every “limit,” that is, every boundary through which things are differentiated from 
one another (including, of course, the limit between “the human” and “the animal”). What is true 
concerning the limit between the body and the world is true concerning the limits that distinguish 
all beings – and all communities of beings – from one another. No limit or boundary is ever a 
sharp division. Every limit is analogous to “the zero of pressure between two solids that makes 
them adhere to one another,”779 or is “…a surface of separation” that is also a “place 
of…union.”780 “Limits” are real because differences are real, but every limit is fluid, blurry, and 
porous.  
In a word, all limits are intrinsically ambiguous, and therefore so too are the things or 
beings they differentiate. This is why Merleau-Ponty claims that the “limits” through which 
distinct beings are constituted as such are positive or productive (“fecund”) indeterminacies (or 
“negativities”), that is, interstitial spaces (or “mi-lieus”) through which any and all “positive,” 
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empirical determinacies or distinctions arise and in virtue of which no such positive, empirical 
determinacy is ever “purely” positive, ever unambiguous or ever not already intermixed with 
what is “other” than itself. This is precisely how we must understand the “limit” between 
“humanity” and “animality,” or is another way to understand what Merleau-Ponty means when 
he speaks of a “lateral” relationship or “chiasm” between them. Merleau-Ponty writes that “our 
own body is in the world as the heart is in the organism,”781 and one may replace “body” and 
“world” here with “humanity” and “animality”, respectively, and the claim would be equally 
true. There is a “limit” between “human” beings and other-than-human beings, but just like the 
limit between body and world or between self and Other, it is not one that ever allows us to 
determine with precision where one ends and where the other begins, and such an indeterminacy 
is necessarily constitutive not only of “us” but of all things, beings, and phenomena; such an 
indeterminacy (or “negativity”) is, again, endemic to Being as such. As we saw earlier (and 
contrary especially to Sartre), Merleau-Ponty thus affirms that Being is “interiorly woven with 
negation.”782  
I have invoked Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the “fecund negative,” and he explicitly 
equates this with what he elsewhere refers to as “Flesh” and “dehiscence” (or “écart”), writing 
that “this fecund negative…is instituted by the flesh, by its dehiscence…”.783 Notably, Merleau-
Ponty’s later concept of the “fecund negative” recalls his injunction in Phenomenology of 
Perception (in the context of his discussion of the famous Müller-Lyer illusion) to “recognize the 
indeterminate as a positive phenomenon.”784 For Merleau-Ponty, there is a crucible of 
indeterminacy that necessarily precedes and generates every “determinacy” (that is, any distinct 
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empirical being, identity, phenomenon, or form of meaning), and since such an indeterminacy is 
the source of any determinacy, it cannot conceptualized as merely a negative indeterminacy, that 
is, as an indeterminacy that would be a mere lack of determinacy, for that would posit some sort 
of determinacy as ontologically primary, or would posit the indeterminacy in question as 
derivative relative to an already constituted determinacy. Such a foundational indeterminacy, 
then, must be, in a sense, a “positive” and generative (i.e., “fecund”) indeterminacy, an 
indeterminacy from which all determinacies (and consequently all negative indeterminacies, or 
ordinary privations) arise. In his later writings, Merleau-Ponty simply realizes that the positive 
indeterminacy that he earlier identified at the heart of perception – the sort of indeterminacy 
through which anything comes to perceptual presence – is also operative at the heart of Being. 
So, for Merleau-Ponty the “fecund negative” is precisely the limit or site of difference (the 
“frontier surface”) through which all things are relationally engendered, or the (mid-)place where 
the very distinction between “inside” and “outside,” “self” and “other” is instituted. This is why 
he compares the “fecund negative” to “the finger of the glove that is turned inside out.”785 This 
“fecund” or parturitive, positive negativity is, as we saw earlier, a “negativity that is not 
nothing,” for it is the non-figurable or non-presentable limit between things that constitutes them 
as the distinct things that they are yet which is also (like the literal skin of the body or, as 
Merleau-Ponty suggests here, like the surface of a glove) a site of interchange (or “reversibility”) 
between them, a “hinge”786 about which they fold or “rock into one another,”787 or rather a 
separation between them that does not divorce them from one another but precisely brings them 
together. Thus, “the only “place where the negative would really be is the fold, the application of 
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the inside and the outside to one another, the turning point.”788 The “fecund negative,” the “Flesh 
(of the world),” “écart”, and the “chiasm” are all different names for (or different valences of) 
one and the same thing: Being as difference (or differentiation), which is also radical community 
(or communalization).  
We see, then, that “fecund negativity” designates a kind of difference that is not a mere 
lack or negation of some identity, not the mere absence or privation of some determinacy; rather, 
it is the productive source of every identity or the genesis of every determinacy. A difference that 
is prior to, and constitutive of, identity cannot simply be a negation or lack of identity, for that 
conceptualizes difference as difference from some assumed or already given identity, and to 
regard it in such a way is to assume the given identity in question as fundamental when in fact it 
is not, when in fact such an identity is an effect of difference rather than the source of it; it is to 
regard difference as derived from identity when in fact the truth is the reverse: every identity is 
fundamentally produced by difference; likewise, a process of determination that precedes and 
founds every determinacy is in a sense an “indeterminacy,” but it cannot be understood as simply 
a negation of determinacy, for again, to regard it as such is to regard it is as derived from a prior, 
positive, already established or given determinacy, which gets the order of being precisely 
backwards: it is not positive determinacies that are fundamental but rather the process of 
determination through which they emerge. Thus, if we call this process of determination that 
antecedes and founds every positive determination in the world an originary indeterminacy, it 
cannot be a negative indeterminacy – not an indeterminacy that is a mere privation of 
determinacy – but a positive indeterminacy. So, here we see that Merleau-Ponty already 
articulates Being as what Deleuze defines as “difference in-itself”: not as “diversity” or as 
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empirically given difference, but as “that by which the given is given, that by which the given is 
given as diverse.”789 “Fecund negativity” is simply another way that Merleau-Ponty designates a 
kind of difference that is not oppositional or dualistic, a kind of difference, therefore, that entails 
the overlapping and “ambiguity” of its relata, and such is the only kind of difference “worthy of 
the name.”  
Similar to the question he poses above, then, Merleau-Ponty also might as well have 
asked (and implicitly invites us to ask) the following one: “where are we to put the limit between 
“the human” and “the animal,” since they (or since their world) is flesh?” This is why Merleau-
Ponty claims that we need to see “humanity emerge just like Being in the manner of a 
watermark, not as another substance, but as interbeing…”.790 That is to say, a watermark is a 
real, distinct thing or phenomenon, yet – like waves in the ocean, clouds in the sky, or an area of 
illumination within a darkened theater – it is also necessarily blended into its surroundings; it is 
differentiated from the element wherein it emerges as such, yet in such a way that it is never 
sharply separated from it: it is a particular incarnation of its element, and that is why we can 
never say precisely where it ends and where the element in the midst of which it arises begins; its 
being exfoliates into the world beyond and all around it, a world that thus invades it from every 
direction without thereby obliterating it. Likewise, humanity “emerges” only through and in the 
midst of “animality,” “Nature,” or the “flesh of the world” in such a way that it is never 
dissolved or fused entirely into it yet also never sharply delineated from it. This point clarifies 
Merleau-Ponty’s remark that the relationship between humanity and animality is an 
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“overcoming” or “surpassing” (dépassement) that “does not abolish kinship.”791 Given that 
Merleau-Ponty insists that this relationship is essentially lateral (i.e., a non-hierarchical 
relationship of “pairing”), he certainly does not mean that humanity “overcomes” animality in 
the sense of superseding, mastering, or absolutely transcending or “rising above” it; rather, 
“overcoming laterally”792 just means “the work from within to without, by growth and 
differentiation”793; it simply means transcendence through differentiation, or the constitution of 
identity through becoming-other. Of course, in a sense any distinct being “surpasses” or 
“exceeds” Being insofar as it is distinguished from Being, but it does not do so in the sense of 
absolutely transcending or raising itself to a position beyond or outside of Being: again, lateral 
“overcoming” is an overcoming that does not abolish kinship. Similarly, I escape or, in a sense, 
“transcend” the world inasmuch as I am distinct from it, and reciprocally the world escapes or, in 
a sense, “transcends” me, yet nevertheless “the world and I are within one another…”.794 I am 
other than the world, yet (paradoxically) there is no aspect of my being that is separable from it, 
and (paradoxically) I only become other than it by means of my endless “detour”795 through it. 
This is what Merleau-Ponty means by “lateral overcoming.”  
Thus, “lateral overcoming” designates something’s differentiation from the elemental 
condition and setting of its being, or something’s differentiation from something other than itself 
that is, at the same time, its embeddedness with that other. This is why Merleau-Ponty frequently 
suggests that a relationship of “lateral overcoming” is exemplified by the relationship between 
self and Other as Husserl understood it: 
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What do I bring to the problem of the same and the other? This: that the same be the other of the other, 
and identity difference of difference…this 1) does not realize a surpassing, a dialectic in the Hegelian 
sense; 2) is realized on the spot, by encroachment, thickness, spatiality…796 
 
The relationship between self and Other is one of difference (or of differentiation) that does not 
resolve into a binary, hierarchy, or sublative unity, and as such it describes exactly what 
Merleau-Ponty elsewhere describes as “lateral overcoming.” In other words, “lateral 
overcoming” signifies a kind of “transcendence” that is not the contrary of “immanence”; it 
signifies “transcendence as being-at-a-distance,”797 a “that-is-openness to things, with 
participation on their part, or which carries them in its circuit…”.798 And in case the concept of 
“lateral overcoming” is still not sufficiently clear, Merleau-Ponty explicitly compares the lateral 
relationship (or Ineinander) that constitutes intersubjectivity to the “rigorous simultaneity 
between the body and its reflection.”799 That is, the lateral relationship between self and Other 
(and of course, by extension, the lateral relationship between humanity and animality) is 
comparable to the relationship between the objective and phenomenal “sides” of the living body, 
or to the relationship between those two compresent aspects (or “leaves”) of the living, self-
reflexive body that are instituted as such through an irreducible dehiscence or hiatus between 
them. The implication here, then, is that “the human” and “the animal” are (like self and Other) 
no more related to one another hierarchically (or oppositionally) than are the objective and 
phenomenal aspects of a living body, or that “humanity” no more “overcomes” “animality” than 
the phenomenal body “overcomes” the “objective body” in the movement of the living body’s 
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reflection upon itself. More simply put, self and Other, “human” and “animal” are differentiated 
from yet intertwined with one another through the “flesh of the world” in precisely the same way 
that “subject” and “object,” “mind” and “body” are differentiated from yet intertwined with one 
another in the lived body; there is a sense in which they are “incompossible,” yet their “unity is 
irrecusable.”800 
We can now appreciate even more clearly why Merleau-Ponty insists upon the 
“laterality” of not only our primary relations with the world but also of our primary relations 
with others (human and non-human alike). If community is (like Being) the very element in 
which one dwells, that means one must understand one’s relationships with communal others 
primarily as lateral and never merely as “frontal” or “hierarchical,” only as those with whom one 
is and of whom one is; and if “the animal” is “the Other” of “the human,” it follows that we must 
understand the relationship between them as lateral as well, that we cannot understand the 
relationship of the latter to the former as merely “frontal” (that is, as a relationship between a 
subject over and against an object, or as a unilateral relationship between one term posited as 
primary and another posited as secondary or derivative relative to it). In other words, being-
human is being-animal, but this copula is not to be interpreted as one of strict (analytic) identity 
(again, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, we should say that it is a relation not of identity but of “non-
difference”): humanity is not to be equated with animality as such, for it is but a distinctive 
expression or incarnation of animality, but a particular manner of being (sentient) flesh, or “first 
another manner of being a body”801 (as is, indeed, every form of life). The style of fleshy being-
in-the-world that is “humanity” is but an articulation of the flesh that is “animality,” and the flesh 
that is animality – the flesh that is shared by every living being – is an articulation of the flesh of 
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the world, an articulation of the Flesh that is Being or the world, an articulation, then, of the flesh 
that is mine, too, an articulation of the flesh that is mine but, at the same time, other than mine, 
too.  
We must learn not to see a formal contradiction in the notion, for example, that I am not 
the bacteria that colonize my gut yet these bacteria are “me” all the same, for there is no “me” 
without them, as there is no “them” without “me”: what “I” am is, indeed, this organic 
community of different organisms, or rather there is no “me” above and beyond the flesh that 
extends between “me” and living others, between what is human and what is other-than-human. 
There is no “self” and no “humanity” above and beyond this space within and through which self 
and other(s), humans and non-humans come into relation with one another, this space that makes 
everything, including all living beings, different yet inseparable from one another. I am a 
community; indeed, as I mentioned earlier and as Alphonso Lingis argues, I am a community in 
the midst of communities, a community of communities within a community of communities. 
There is never anything but community – or rather, there is never anything but communalization 
– all the way down, never anything but “fields in intersection, in a field of fields wherein the 
“subjectivities” are integrated.”802 I and my “humanity” are nothing but an ensemble of 
intercorporeal relationships, a site where the overlapping of things and bodies in nature comes to 
a certain kind of fruition or reflexive expression, and it is one that, like any “body” or 
community of bodies, certainly has limits (for otherwise it would truly be nothing), but these 
limits – like all limits worthy of the name – are intrinsically undecidable or, again, what 
Merleau-Ponty frequently calls “ambiguous”: not “either/or” fault-lines, but “both/and” double-
binds; not absolutely exclusionary partitions, but simultaneously disjunctive and conjunctive 
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“hinges”803 or “pivots”804 of Being; they are, in a word, what Merleau-Ponty calls chiasms, or 
sites of intertwining.  
Thus, Merleau-Ponty argues that there is nothing we may speak of as “human” that is not 
already intertwined with what is other-than-human, that the presentation of any “human” style of 
being is at once a composition and “appresentation” of innumerable other bodily (“animal”) 
styles of being, a particular expression, say, of canine affection, playfulness, and loyalty, of 
feline curiosity, poise, tenderness, and even cruelty, of elephantine nurturance, joy, and sorrow, 
of vulpine cunning and mischief, of taurine stubbornness and perseverance, of cervine 
vulnerability and timidity, of corvine cleverness and deceptiveness, of octopean inventiveness 
and dexterity, of equine grace and strength, of ursine reclusiveness and ferocity, of cetacean 
sociality and loquacity, of strigine perceptiveness and vigilance, of murine empathy, of leonine 
courage, of formicine solidarity, of testudine torpor, of porcine voraciousness, of oscine 
canorousness, and so on. As there is no “self” or individual that is not fundamentally, all the way 
down an ensemble of relations with others, or as there is no self that is not a distinctive 
expression of an already operative intersubjectivity, so is there no “humanity” that is not a 
distinctive expression of an already operative “interanimality,” or of an intercorporeity that 
inherently overflows essentialist constructions and taxonomies of identity, including those of 
“species.” Every living body, and every kind of living body, arises from a prior togetherness with 
innumerable other living bodies that is not the effacement of differences between them but that 
is, in fact, entailed by their differences. Togetherness is the “other side” of difference; 
communalization is simultaneously differentiation. In short, there is nothing in existence – no 
																																																								
803 Ibid., p.205, 225, 236. 
804 Ibid., p. 205, 226, 260. 
	 640	
“self” or form of life, no human or other-than-human being – that is not an expression of a 
primal chiasmatic mélange of carnalities, or that is not a member of a radical community.  
We know it is not the case that a “self” first comes onto the scene and then extends itself 
to an “Other,” for they both emerge and exist in the world – each arises in sense – only as a 
“pair,” only together. Likewise, there is no “human” who first comes onto the scene, knows what 
he/she is “qua human,” and only then begins to notice and compare him/herself to other beings 
“qua animals,” or in other words there is no “humanity” that arises in the world first and then 
extends itself to (or refuses to extend itself to) something it constructs as “animality”: neither 
term is opposed to, isolated from, or prior to (hence “higher” or “lower” than) the other, nor are 
they ever simply fused into a union that dissolves the distinction between them. Perhaps it will 
help to remember that the same chiasmatic relationship that obtains between the “phenomenal 
body” and the “objective body” and that, as such, constitutes the lived/living body is the same (in 
its basic structure) as the one that characterizes the relationship between ‘self’ and ‘Other’ (since, 
indeed, all chiasmatic relationships have the same basic structure). In just the same way that 
there is no “mind and a body” but only a “mind with a body”805 (or only an embodied mind) – 
only “a being of two leaves, from one side a thing among things and otherwise what sees and 
touches them”806 – and in the same sense that, in virtue of its embodiment, there is no embodied 
mind and a world but only an embodied in or of or intermixed inextricably with a world, only a 
consciousness that, through its flesh, is “meshed into the visible world,”807 so too is it the case 
that there is no self and others but only a self with others, only ever a self that is “an-Other-to-
others,” only ever an already “othered” self that exists amid and through other (also already 
																																																								
805 Merleau-Ponty, The World of Perception, p. 56. 
806 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 137. 
807 Merleau-Ponty, “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” in Signs, p. 166. 
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othered) selves, only ever (to put it somewhat inelegantly) a “selfothers” whole (or Gestalt), 
which is to say a primary, indecomposable compresence of distinct living beings. Likewise, there 
are no human beings and “animal” beings, no “humanity” and “animality,” but only ever 
“humans” with “animals,” only ever “humanity” with and through “animality”: only ever a 
“humanimal” being, only ever a “humanimality.” In other terms, just as the “invisible,” for 
Merleau-Ponty, is “in-visible,” that is, immanent yet not reducible to “the visible,” so is the 
“inhuman” alterity of “the animal” “in-human”: immanent yet irreducible to “the human,” 
constitutively entwined yet not coincident with “humanity.”  
Merleau-Ponty himself draws precisely the analogy I have just suggested between the 
“mind-body” relation and the “self-Other” or “human-animal” relation, affirming that “the use of 
the life teaches us not only the union of our soul and our body, but also the lateral union of 
animality and humanity.”808 In just the same way that it is only later, through a reflective act of 
abstraction, that we come to divorce mind from body/behavior or self from Other(s), so too is it 
only later, through a similar act of abstraction (one that is of course motivated and reinforced by 
contingent social and political infrastructures), that we come to divorce “humanity” from 
“animality” and thereby come to regard the former as having some kind of meaning or rigorously 
determinable manner of being on its own from which the latter may then be oppositionally, 
derivatively, or privatively defined, that is, from which the latter may be understood only as 
either lacking characteristics already assumed and defined as “human” or something into which 
such characteristics may at best be inferentially transposed. Merleau-Ponty’s basic point here is 
the one he makes consistently throughout his entire career, namely that all dualisms (and 
therefore also all reductionisms, since every reductionism is patristic upon some sort of prior 
																																																								
808 Nature, p. 217. 
	 642	
dualism) commit the same error, the same fallacy of reifying as separate or autonomous things 
that are foundationally compresent and interdependent, things that are, as Husserl puts it, 
“primally instituted” in an “original pairing”809 such that the presentation of each is already 
infested with the “appresentation” of the other, which is to say given only together, only as a 
whole (or Gestalt) that cannot, as such, be decomposed into any of its constitutive elements, or as 
a phenomenon that defies all of the ways we typically speak or think about it provided our 
tendency to do so in ways that illicitly compartmentalize – that atomize, autonomize, or “purify” 
– its constituents. 
So, for Merleau-Ponty (and also for Husserl) there is a ‘being-together’ or co-givenness 
of living beings that is irreducible to any of them considered apart from one another and that is 
also lived by each of them as precisely the condition of their own sense-of-self or distinct 
existence: in a word, all living beings, or all identities and communities, are moments of a 
Gestalt genesis of sense, or what Merleau-Ponty otherwise calls “écart” or a movement of 
“dehiscence”: a differentiation or spacing that does not divide or isolate but rather weaves 
together beings and phenomena, an opening between things that is at the same time “a being by 
proximity.”810 Thus, Merleau-Ponty maintains that what applies to mind/body, subject/object, 
self/Other, or individual/community dualism equally applies to any (explicit or implicit) 
human/animal dualism, and indeed all of these dualisms are just as intertwined with one another 
as are the terms of which they are composed. Just as there is the phenomenon of the “lived body” 
that defies categorization as either purely, exclusively subject or object because it is an 
intertwining of both and is, as such, the very source of the distinction between the two in the first 
place, so too, Merleau-Ponty argues, is there an intertwining of “humanity” and “animality” – a 
																																																								
809 See, again, Cartesian Meditations, §50, p. 111-112. 
810 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 234. 
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“humanimality,” we might say – that antecedes, institutes, and disrupts any opposition between 
the two. Again, just as it is only later, through an act of abstraction – through a violent incision 
made by the gaze of reflective, analytical, conceptual thought – that we come to divorce and 
regard as opposed mind and body or self and Other(s), so too is it through a similar, violent 
abstraction that we divide “humanity” from “animality” and thereby come to regard them as 
unproblematically clear, pure, isolated, and monolithic in meaning, or as not already tangled up 
and contaminated with one another in such a way that defies any sharp determination of one in 
opposition to the other. Just as there is the phenomenon of intersubjectivity (or intercorporeity) 
that precedes and institutes any supposed opposition between “self” and “Other(s)” or that 
founds at once our very sense of both – just as there is an irreducible entanglement of self with 
others that comes, logically and experientially, before any reflective diremption of the two, hence 
before any question of “solipsism” or “problem of other minds” – so too, Merleau-Ponty 
suggests, is there an “interanimality” that precedes and institutes any supposed opposition 
between “the human” and “the animal” (or any supposed oppositions between “species”), an 
intersubjectivity (or intercorporeity) not only between members of a single species but one that 
obtains between and constitutes the living bodies of all species, an inter-specific intercorporeity 
or background of life-in-common that, therefore, knows no essential species barriers and that is, 
in fact, the tacit source of any intra-specific relations or lifeworld. 
We will recall that the term “écart” (which Merleau-Ponty borrows from Gestalt 
psychology) originally refers to the spacing between foreground and background that lets things 
appear to conciousness,811 yet in his later writings Merleau-Ponty also deploys this term to refer 
																																																								
811 It is important to note here that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of écart is not only indebted to Gestalt psychology but 
also to structuralist linguistics. In many places, Merleau-Ponty explicitly compares the difference between 
foreground and background that enables perception (or perceptual meaning) to the diacritical difference between 
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to the differentiation through which all things come into being and meaning (thus, it comes to be 
synonymous with “dehiscence” and to designate an important valence of “Flesh” and chiasmatic 
relationality). As Merleau-Ponty writes, “to be conscious = to have a figure on a ground – one 
cannot go back any further,”812 and though here he is only referring to the account we must give 
of consciousness, in his later writings it is also clear that there is another sense in which we 
cannot “go back any further” than the “perceptual separation (écart)”813 of figure and ground: we 
cannot go back any further because this originary separation (or differentiation) of figure and 
ground expresses Being as such; it is that non-presentable differing-deferring movement through 
which anything comes to meaning or presence (and thus, as we saw in chapter two, it is that 
paradoxical “originating presentation of the unpresentable”814). So, as we have repeatedly seen, 
Merleau-Ponty realizes that what initially presents itself as a structure of perception is not just a 
structure of perception but also a structure of Being (or a structure that discloses the nature of 
Being), and that “it is to experience therefore that the ultimate ontological power belongs…”.815 
The differentiation and attendant intertwining (or reversibility) of foreground and background in 
perception instantiates the differentiation and attendant intertwining of any “chiasmatically” 
instituted terms, and so it may help clarify the chiasmatic relationship between “humanity” and 
“animality” and especially why Merleau-Ponty insists such a relationship must be “lateral” rather 
than hierarchical.  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
signs that enables linguistic meaning. In any case, “écart” always refers to the difference or differentiation that 
constitutes any form of meaning. For Merleau-Ponty, meaning (and being) is never “in” things but only between 
them. In fact, I think we may accurately describe Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy as a whole as a philosophy of “the 
between” (which, of course, is simply another way of describing it as a philosophy of ambiguity).   
812 Ibid., p. 191. 
813 Ibid., p. 191. 
814 Ibid., p. 203. 
815 Ibid., p. 110. 
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It is obvious that “foreground” and “background” are necessarily co-given and co-
constitutive (or “paired” in Husserl’s sense of the term) yet also irreducibly different, and it is 
precisely the irreducible difference between them that enables anything to appear or have a 
distinct, intelligible existence at all (i.e., as we have seen, in order for something to be a “thing,” 
it must be distanced from other things and come to presence amid a global background or 
horizon). Foreground and background, then, are “chiasmatically” (or “reversibly”) related, for 
they are irreducibly different yet also inseparable, non-coincident yet also co-constitutive, hence 
intertwined or blended into one another; they are different, yet the difference between them is 
itself a non-presentable or non-figurable limit, or a spatiality (prior to any empirically discernible 
or delineable “space”) through which they emerge as such and enfold one another. Now, this 
intertwining or “reversibility” of foreground and background means not only that foreground and 
background are interdependent, overlapping moments in the unfolding of phenomena and 
genesis of sense, it also means that what is now “foregrounded” can always shift into the 
background, that what is now part of the background can shift and become foregrounded, that 
foreground and background can always slip into or displace one another, and that indeed Being 
as such is this ceaseless, creative reconfiguration and mutual encroachment of the two through 
which beings and meanings, phenomena and styles of existence emerge in the world.  
“There is no other meaning than carnal,”816 and (like any Gestalt) carnal meaning 
fundamentally emerges through the “gravitation”817 of foreground and background round about 
one another, as well as through their “dislocation” from one another and “leakage”818 into one 
another. The truth concerning what it means to be “human” is also the truth concerning what it 
																																																								
816 Ibid., p. 265. 
817 Ibid., p. 265. 
818 Ibid., p. 265. 
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means for anything to be or for anything to mean, namely that it be instituted through an ever-
open process of becoming-other-than-others that is, at the same time, a process of coming-
together with others, that it be separated from yet at the same time blended into a world and 
Others, that it becomes (and is always becoming) what it is through its indissoluble yet ever 
malleable ties to its “Other(s),” that the reflexivity through which it comes to sense for itself as 
such is never a purely solitary or autonomous communion with itself but what we thus might call 
a kind of pas de deux: a synergic, co-production of meaning, or a relational movement whose 
relata are certainly distinct yet interdependent moments. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “to have the 
experience of a Gestalt is not to sense by coincidence…”.819 “Human” and “animal” – like “self” 
and “Other” – are two inseparable moments (two “leaves”) of an originary and continual 
dehiscence in nature, two aspects of a primordial and restless inflorescence of life, subjectivity, 
and community, or two aspects of an “écart” through which certain living beings come to be 
distinguished from one another yet, at the same time and on the same condition, swept into a 
carnal life-in-common with one another; before they designate “aggregate[s] of things or of 
external beings,” “humanity” and “animality” designate “determinate indetermination[s],”820 
horizons of being and meaning that, as such, are not nothing yet are ever open, that necessarily 
cross into or osculate one another, that always transgress the limit between them, and “in this 
transgression, one does not know who is engulfing and who is engulfed.”821  
It is this very dialectical movement in which we and everything are caught up, and this 
fact demonstrates to the fullest extent Merleau-Ponty’s early remark (which is, of course, a not-
																																																								
819 Ibid., p. 205. 
820 Merleau-Ponty, “Course Notes: Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology,” in Husserl at the Limits of 
Phenomenology. Eds. Leonard Lawlor and Bettina Bergo. Trans. Leonard Lawlor (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 2002), p. 35. 
821 Ibid., p. 63. 
	 647	
so-subtle criticism of Sartre) that we are “condemned to meaning.”822 Simply put, for Merleau-
Ponty the “meaning of Being” is the being of meaning, which is to say: difference (or 
differentiation). When one properly thinks the nature (or meaning) of Being, one must not think 
it as an object over and against one’s gaze, for it is the primordial, elemental condition of any 
thought or “gaze,” and one must also not think it as absolutely removed from lived experience or 
the perceptual world, since likewise it is the primordial, elemental condition of perceptibility and 
intelligibility, or the source of all appearances and meanings. To think Being properly is to think 
it as the process through which beings, appearances, and meanings arise or, in a word, to think it 
as “écart” (or as chiasmatic relationality or Flesh), which is also to think it as both “immanent” to 
and “different from” beings, or which is also to think it as both “immanence” and “difference” as 
such (in Deleuze’s senses of those terms), as the “other side”823 of every body, thought, 
experience, and perceived or spoken meaning. Thus, when one “renounces the affirmation of an 
absolute exterior, of a world or Being that would be a massive individual,” one “turns toward 
that Being that doubles our thoughts along their whole extension, since they are thoughts of 
something and since they themselves are not nothing – a Being therefore that is meaning, and 
meaning of meaning.”824  
We often speak of an “exchange of meaning” between, say, self and Other, self and 
world, or perhaps “human” and “animal,” but at heart this notion is in fact redundant and 
potentially misleading, for meaning as such is nothing but the differentiation and attendant 
overlapping of heterogenous beings or phenomena, that is, nothing but the creative, dialogical 
																																																								
822 Phenomenology of Perception, p. xix. 
823 Merleau-Ponty frequently uses this phrase to convey non-dualistic or lateral (that is, chiasmatic) relationships 
between certain kinds of things and phenomena. See e.g., Nature, p. 268, where Merleau-Ponty writes that “the 
world is not an inaccessible in-itself, but the “other side” of [the human] body.” Merleau-Ponty conceptualizes the 
relationships between humanity and animality in exactly the saw way in which he conceptualizes the relationship 
between the human body and the world (and also between mind and body, which I discussed above). 
824 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 107. 
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exchange between terms that are constituted as such in and through that very exchange. To speak 
of an “exchange of meaning” between terms (say, again, between “self” and “Other”) is perhaps 
to suppose that each such term fully possesses a certain meaning or identity on its own which it 
simply “transmits” to the other, or rather that each term is what it is somehow independently of 
the other, but fundamentally meaning is never on one side or the other of a relationship: meaning 
is only ever between the terms of any relationship, or rather meaning is simply the relationship – 
simply relationality – itself. “Meaning” is that “exchange” between terms that makes them what 
they are, that exchange wherein terms reciprocally constitute one another. Husserl only described 
the relationship between ego and alter-ego as one of “pairing,” yet for Merleau-Ponty we can say 
that “pairing,” in a sense, constitutes every relationship and instance of meaning and that it is 
therefore operative at every level of reality, that Being just is an infinite plane of what he prefers 
to call “chiasms”, “folds,” or “reversibilities,” a field of things that exist and acquire meaning as 
such only through their intertwining with one another through that very field itself in which they 
are commonly embedded. The fundamental meaning of “meaning” – which is also the meaning 
of Being – is the endless relational genesis of things, beings, phenomena, or identities, hence the 
genesis of difference, hence also the genesis of community. There is never anything but a 
universal unfolding-enfolding of beings and phenomena, never anything but a “never finished 
differentiation,”825 never anything but “meaning in genesis,”826 never anything but “one sole 
explosion of Being which is forever.”827 In a word, there is never anything but, or nothing further 
back than, “écart.”  
																																																								
825 Ibid., p. 153. 
826 Merleau-Ponty, “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence,” in Signs, p. 69. 
827 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 265. 
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As I have been suggesting, in Merleau-Ponty the relationship between “humanity” and 
“animality” may be considered analogous not only to the relationship between “self” and 
“Other” but also to the relationship between “foreground” and “background.” Properly 
understood, this means that neither has any sort of ontological primacy or autonomy, that one 
does not unilaterally ground the other, that one is not the pure and privileged source of the other, 
or that one cannot function as some sort of pure, self-contained center of meaning with reference 
to which the other may only be peripherally defined; rather, both only emerge in the world as 
such through that dehiscence between them that also couples them. We must always keep in 
mind that “foreground” and “background,” though different, are also intertwined and reversible, 
or are different in virtue of a non-figurable limit or space between them that is, as such, 
intrinsically undecidable, a limit that brings them together just as much as it differentiates them 
from one another (since differentiation that does not resolve into dualism is also, necessarily, 
communalization) and that, therefore, imparts to them its own undecidability at the same time 
that it imparts to them their being and intelligibility. And moreover, we must also, finally, keep 
in mind that neither “foreground” nor “background” are ontologically primary, for what is truly 
primary is the non-foregroundable differentiation through which they come to presence as such. 
Thus, chiasms can never truly be hierarchies because they are intertwinings through difference 
and because there is never anything “further back” than difference, that is, never a simple, 
undifferentiated origin from which “things” might arise, or never a transcendental, itself 
ungrounded ground that would ground everything else in existence. At the most fundamental 
level, there are only things that inter-constitute and overlap one another in and through their 
differentiation from one another. In short, there is no hierarchical ontological ordering of 
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foreground and background or of “self” and “Other,” and therefore so too is there no hierarchical 
ordering of “humanity” and “animality” (or of any forms of life).  
Since meaning or being is essentially relational, and since every genuine, foundational 
relationship entails the overlapping of its relata, it follows that in order for anything to be, or in 
order for anything to have any kind of identity, “selfhood,” “substance,” or meaning, it must be 
defined by a limit or “frontier surface” between itself and everything other than itself that denies 
it anything like an “essence” (in the classical sense of the term) and anything like the privileged 
position of either an origin or a telos (of either a first or final position in what would thus be 
imagined as a hierarchy of meaning or “ladder of Being”), yet such a limit also must not deny it 
“individuality,” “identity,” or distinct existence altogether. This is exactly why Merleau-Ponty 
rejects teleology and the correlative idea of a pure origin of being or meaning. As Merleau-Ponty 
proclaims, “I am not a finalist because there is dehiscence.”828 The implications of this for how 
we conceptualize something like the relationship between “humanity” and “animality” ought to 
be clear (as they were for Merleau-Ponty). Given his repudiation of first and final causes, or 
given his consistent insistence (following Husserl and Gestalt psychology) upon the laterality of 
every fundamental ontological and semiotic relationship, that is, given his insistence that it is 
neither opposition nor coincidence but rather difference that inflates everything to being and 
meaning, Merleau-Ponty even goes so far as to say that he “call[s] the evolutionist perspective 
into question,”829 by which of course he does not mean to reject the core scientific tenets of 
Darwinism, but rather means to challenge the notion that the development of life – at the 
fundamental ontological level – is the “descent” of ever increasingly complex (or “higher”) 
organisms from “simpler,” “lower” ones, which ultimately imposes the false construct of a 
																																																								
828 Ibid., p. 265. 
829 Ibid., p. 265. 
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hierarchical understanding of Being, an understanding of Being that is, ironically enough, 
theological inasmuch as it reinstates the notion of either a telos toward which life is headed or a 
pure, simple origin from whence it arose. For this reason, Merleau-Ponty suggests the need to 
conceptualize evolution “otherwise than as empirical “filiation””830 and claims that we “must not 
derive human life as an in-itself, or conceive evolution as without an inside or as a theory of 
descent.”831 What Merleau-Ponty means here is that the appearance of any form of life – just like 
the appearance of anything – is not a mere object (an “in-itself”) and is, moreover, the result of a 
process of differentiation (a process that may be said to have an “inside” or a kind of 
“interiority” insofar as it involves the very same kind of dehiscence or opening between things 
and phenomena that constitutes all forms of reflexivity, identity, and meaning). Such a process of 
differentiation cannot be properly conceptualized as any kind of hierarchy, since to do so would 
be to presuppose some already fully formed, ready-made “thing,” being, or identity from which 
or toward which it would proceed, and that would precisely be to conceptualize such a “thing,” 
being, or identity rather than the process of differentiation itself as fundamental or originary. 
Thus, Merleau-Ponty writes that his next major philosophical work (the one that The Visible and 
the Invisible presumably would have become, yet which unfortunately he did not live to 
accomplish) “must be presented without any compromise with humanism, nor moreover with 
naturalism, nor finally with theology,” since “precisely what has to be done is to show that 
philosophy can no longer think according to this cleavage: God, man, creatures…”.832 
																																																								
830 Nature, p. 213. 
831 Ibid., p. 271. 
832 The Visible and the Invisible, p. 274. Merleau-Ponty is so committed to dismantling hierarchical ways of thinking 
about the relationships between human and non-human forms of life that he remarkably even suggests that any 
notion of a “natural” or “objective” hierarchical ordering of forms of life is just as problematic or fallacious as any 
notion of a natural or objective hierarchical ordering of human cultures. That is, Merleau-Ponty suggests that we are 
no more entitled to categorize forms of life hierarchically than we are entitled to categorize cultures hierarchically, 
and so he suggests that we should critique the former notion in biology (and ontology) in a way that would be 
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So, there is a sense in which humanity “emerges” from animality, yet it does not do so as 
if animality were some homogenous ground, transcendental background, or simple origin that 
exists only to found or nourish humanity as some sort of teleologically supreme or “higher-
order,” always foregrounded or centered site of being, meaning, and value, or as that which was 
destined to bring life as such into perfect fruition and relative to which all other living things are 
thus retrospectively revealed to be merely precursory and subordinate in their existence and 
value; still less is it to suggest that humanity arises from animality in the manner of some sort of 
Darwinian notion of filial descent, which would reinstate an onto(theo)logical hierarchy – 
precisely the medieval sort of scala naturae – that Merleau-Ponty argues is contrary to the nature 
of Be(com)ing. As I have frequently emphasized, it is crucial to take seriously Merleau-Ponty’s 
insistence upon the laterality of the “human-animal” relationship. Humanity and animality are 
interdependent moments of an open, creative movement of differentiation or of expressivity in 
Nature (or in “the flesh of the world”). We should always read “lateral” as “bilateral” (or as 
multilateral). Again, what is truly fundamental in the relationship between every foreground and 
background is not the background itself (and still less is it the foreground in favor of which we so 
often overlook the background) but is the opening between them: what is fundamental is neither 
the foreground nor the background but the differentiation between foreground and background 
itself (the écart).833 The differentiation that engenders “humanity” (and correlatively 
“animality”), or rather the écart or Flesh through which “humanity” and “animality” envelop one 
another without appropriating or coinciding with one another, is nothing else but the incessant 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
analogous to critiques of the latter notion in ethnology or anthropology. Thus, Merleau-Ponty writes in a note to his 
Nature lectures: “Don’t postulate that the simplest is chronologically first. Critique analogous to that of ethnology. 
Don’t postulate that all animals are classifiable according to an objective hierarchy (like cultures).” - Nature, p. 257. 
833 I wish to remind us here that, as I mentioned earlier, “écart” is synonymous with what Merleau-Ponty also calls 
“Flesh.” Thus, Merleau-Ponty defines “écart” in exactly the same way that he defines “Flesh,” writing that “the 
figure-ground distinction introduces a third term between the “subject” and the “object”” (The Visible and the 
Invisible, p. 197). 
	 653	
differentiation of different styles, valences, fields, spheres, orders, planes, or layers of existence, 
and if we understand correctly that this differentiation does not proceed from an origin but is 
already itself the origin of everything that exists and has meaning – that there is never a One 
prior to or above the Many, but only ever a One that is already Many (and many-ing) – then we 
must agree, as Merleau-Ponty asserts for that very reason, that “there is no hierarchy of orders or 
layers or planes…,”834 that indeed Being (as “Flesh”) is, again, outside the traditional 
“immanence-transcendence alternative”835 and (as is attested especially by the phenomena of the 
lived body and intersubjectivity) is, as such, always a “double-inscription [of] outside and 
inside.”836  
It should be clear, then, that Merleau-Ponty’s objection to the notion of evolutionary 
“descent” is not an absurd or crude “anti-scientific” gesture but is a critique of the ontological 
framework such a notion typically presupposes. Merleau-Ponty rejects the notion of “descent” 
because “descent” always means ontological derivation from sort of origin, yet differentiation is 
never derivation from an origin because it is itself the “origin” of all things. As Merleau-Ponty 
puts it, “metamorphosis” is “not a beginning from zero.”837 For Merleau-Ponty, there are no 
simple origins: there is only differentiation all the way down, only “dehiscence” or “écart” as the 
“Abgrund”838 from which all things come into presence and sense. What is truly “originary” is 
never “an origin”: it is the singular that is always already plural (and self-pluralizing), “not a 
passage from the single to the Multiple, but from one type of unity to another, from a certain 
																																																								
834 Ibid., p. 270. 
835 Ibid., p. 268. 
836 Ibid., p. 261. 
837 Nature., p. 272. 
838 See ibid., p. 37. 
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relation of a multiple to another.”839 What is truly “originary,” in other words, is community and 
difference. So, if Being truly is differentiation (and communalization), then at the most basic 
level of reality there are never any oppositions or hierarchies to be found because there are no 
pure origins or final causes, no “essences,” Forms, substances, beings, or identities that in any 
manner antecede and direct the becoming of things.840 Thus, “fundamentally,” writes Merleau-
Ponty, “I bring the high-low distinction into the vortex where it rejoins the side-other side 
distinction.”841 Merleau-Ponty consistently insists upon the laterality of every fundamental 
relationship, and we need to heed his insistence on that point: every fundamental relationship – 
including especially the one between “humanity” and “animality” – is to be understood as strictly 
analogous to the one that Husserl described between self and Other. The relata of every 
fundamental relationship are, again, moments (or “leaves”) of what Merleau-Ponty calls 
dehiscence (or écart): a constitutive divergence between things that immediately couples or 
implicates them in one another and that, as such, precisely forbids us from ordering them either 
in opposition to one another or as “higher” or “lower” than one another. Any genuine 
relationship of difference – any relationship between things that are constituted as the distinct 
things that they are only insofar as they are given together, or only insofar as “there is reciprocal 
insertion and intertwining of one in the other”842 – must be a lateral one. Just like the relationship 
																																																								
839 Ibid., p. 241. 
840 I have, of course, been strongly insinuating here that Merleau-Ponty thus anticipates Deleuze’s critique of 
“arborescent” conceptions of Being/becoming in favor a “rhizomatic” one. Merleau-Ponty did not live to develop it, 
but it is clear that such an ontology and theory of life was the direction toward which he was heading. As Merleau-
Ponty writes in a note for one of his late lecture courses on nature, “Production: Not a tree, but bushes with several 
roots mixed together” (Nature, p. 258).  
841 The Visible and the Invisible, p. 265. 
842 Ibid., p. 138. 
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between self and Other as Husserl understood it, “we must say: animality and human being are 
given only together.”843 
In the final working note published in The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty 
indicates that he was planning to provide “a description of the man-animality intertwining.”844 
As I hope to have shown, it is clear that Merleau-Ponty came to see that “the human” and “the 
animal” are intertwined in precisely his technical understanding of that term, and that an account 
of this intertwining has a significant place in his larger ontological project. The human and the 
animal are two moments of a particular dehiscence in Being. Simply put, “dehiscence” is 
generative differentiation; it is the opening or spacing – the “écart” or the positive, “fecund” 
indeterminacy – through which specific relations, affects, phenomena, identities, styles of being, 
and meanings are engendered; it is precisely that differentiation that weaves together the skein of 
perceptual life and perceptible Nature, that commingling or “encroachment” through divergence 
that Merleau-Ponty also calls the Flesh, the chiasmatic institution and imbrication of all things. 
As Merleau-Ponty writes, “infinite distance or absolute proximity, negation or identification: our 
relationship with Being is ignored in the same way in both cases.”845 Neither identity nor 
negation, neither sameness nor opposition, neither synthesis nor antithesis, but rather 
overlapping through differentiation – or, in a word, genuine, radical community – constitutes life, 
identity, and meaning. As the living body is the dehiscence (and thus the site of an intertwining 
or “strange proximity”) between subject and object, so is the “flesh of the world” the dehiscence, 
or relational openness, between all beings and phenomena; it is that “intermundane space”846 or 
																																																								
843 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 271. 
844 The Visible and the Invisible, p. 274. 
845 Ibid., p. 127. 
846 Ibid., p. 48, 84, 62, 269. 
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“interbeing”847  – that metaxic element or medium – that, like the literal flesh or skin of a body, 
joins or blends the very terms it separates, or which is at once a limit and a site of passage. The 
“Flesh” or “the chiasm” names Being not as a monistic substance, unitary identity, simple origin, 
or subsumptive totality, but rather as a movement of reflexivity (or as a kind of “mirror 
phenomenon”), that is, as the mediation of identity through differentiation, of which the 
reflexivity (or auto-affection) of the sentient body is but a particular though “remarkable 
variant.”  
In closing, human beings and non-human animals often demonstrate very different styles 
of existence, but these styles necessarily envelop and implicate one another. Merleau-Ponty 
argues that there is no such thing as a self that is not already constituted as such by its 
intercorporeal relations with others, and for the same reasons he argues that there is no such 
thing as a community that is not already constituted by its intercorporeal relations with other 
communities, that indeed there is no “human We” without other-than-human “We’s,” no 
“humanity” without “(inter)animality.” As I mentioned toward the conclusion of the previous 
chapter, the human body is “in a relation of intercorporeity in the biosphere with all animality 
and by projection-introjection…,”848 and thus “…we cannot understand the human organism 
without its external circuit, its planetarization…”.849 On Merleau-Ponty’s account, we are just as 
radically embedded in relations with other-than-human Others as we are with human Others. 
Conspecific community – or the constitution of a “human We” – necessarily depends upon and 
expresses a larger, deeper, radical inter-specific community, an ensemble of overlapping 
																																																								
847 Nature, p. 208, 230. 
848 Ibid., p. 268. 
849 Ibid., p. 265. 
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lifeworlds, horizons, and styles of being, a (mid-)place or “interworld”850 where borders are 
trespassed or where “avenues are crossed”851 the very moment they materialize. The 
intercorporeal differentiation and communalization of living bodies subtends any binary logic of 
identity/negation or of inclusion/exclusion through which boundaries between them are later 
often policed, or through which their intercorporeality is later suppressed. Such a radical 
community is not established through either the dualistic expulsion or the totalizing, reductive 
appropriation of what is “Other”; rather, it is “the being society of society…that Ineinander 
which nobody sees, and which is not a group-soul either, neither object nor subject, but their 
connective tissue.”852 For these reasons, Merleau-Ponty affirms that selfhood, identity, 
community, and especially “humanity” are already hybridities, that all kinships – and that 
therefore all categories of kinship – are porous, fluid, “ambiguous,” or “strange,” that there is no 
kind of relationship worthy of the name that is not, in principle and in fact, radically open. For 
these reasons, I think Merleau-Ponty would also affirm that my partner, Byler, really was 
parented by a cat. And for these reasons Merleau-Ponty would also affirm that not only have I 
been a brother to a dog, but that I always already belong to a radical, “humanimal” community, 
to a carnal world that “even in my most strictly private life, summons up within that life all other 
corporeities,”853 “quasi-companions” and “strange kin” who are also, as such, the “flesh of my 
flesh." 
 
 
 
																																																								
850 Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 210, 214. 
851 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 160. 
852 Ibid., p. 174. 
853 Merleau-Ponty, “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” in Signs, p. 171. Emphasis mine. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Conclusion 
 
We Are What We (Do Not) Eat 
Toward an Ethics of Radical Community 
 
 
“Let us say yes to who or what turns up, before any determination, before any anticipation, before any 
identification, whether or not it has to do with a foreigner, an immigrant, an invited guest, or an 
unexpected visitor, whether or not the new arrival is the citizen of another country, a human, an animal, or 
divine creature, a living or dead thing, male or female.” 
 
– Derrida854 
 
 
“…Who was I to deny the crocodile the food of my body?”  
 
– Val Plumwood855 
 
 
“…We are what we do to others…”  
 
– Merleau-Ponty856 
 
 
At the beginning of The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty discusses the inherently 
paradoxical task of phenomenology, and elaborates the various difficulties or paradoxes with 
which it must it contend: “We see the things themselves, the world is what we see…but what is 
strange about this faith is that if we seek to articulate it into theses or statements, if we ask 
ourselves what is this we, what seeing is, and what thing or world is, we enter into a labyrinth of 
difficulties and contradictions.”857 The effort to bring unreflective life to reflective clarity – the 
effort to understand thematically the pre-thematic sources of thematic knowledge – is inherently 
aporetic or “impossible,” yet it is not “impossible” in the traditional sense of the term; its 
“impossibility” is not the contradiction of “possibility” but is an altogether different kind of 
																																																								
854 Of Hospitality. Trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 77. 
855 The Eye of the Crocodile. Ed. Lorraine Shannon (Canberra, ACT, Australia: ANU E Press, 2012), p. 36.	
856 Humanism and Terror: The Communist Problem. Trans. John O’Neill (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction 
Publishers, 2000), p. 109. 
857 The Visible and the Invisible, p. 3. 
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possibility, one that is confirmed by lived experience itself. Indeed, as we have seen, for 
Merleau-Ponty the perceived world is inherently paradoxical, an ensemble of “figured enigmas” 
and “incompossible details.”858 Throughout all of his works and before the introduction of 
deconstruction, Merleau-Ponty labored to show that any binary, either/or logic or conceptual 
schema is grounded in, and disrupted or displaced by, the both/and “logic” (the double-binds, the 
ambiguities or “teeming incompossibilities”) of lived experience. It is the task of 
phenomenology – our eminently possible and urgently important task – not to undo these 
paradoxes or ambiguities of lived experience but to honor them, to learn how to see and listen to 
them, to create concepts that felicitously (even if always imperfectly) express them, to think 
according to rather than against them, since without them we would never be able to “think” at 
all, since in fact they are most worthy of thought, since their suppression is precisely 
thoughtlessness itself.  
What I wish to underscore here is that one of these “figured enigmas” or aporias – the 
first one that Merleau-Ponty states in the opening passage of The Visible and the Invisible – is 
precisely our relations with others, or precisely the nature of the very community (the “We”) in 
which all forms of life are always already embedded. Merleau-Ponty registers the nature and 
constitution of the “We” to be just as paradoxical or questionable as the nature of perception, 
selfhood, and worldhood; in fact, as we have seen, he takes intersubjectivity to pose the most 
important aporia of lived experience, one that reveals itself to be an aporia of Being (indeed, the 
aporia of Being) and not just an aporia of experience. I think we can even say that Merleau-Ponty 
considers the question of the “We” to be what is often called “first philosophy”: the 
philosophical question that comes before, and that is implicated in, all other philosophical 
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questions. Intersubjectivity, or the nature of the “We,” discloses the nature of Being as such, that 
is, the nature of Being as “Flesh” or as chiasmatic relationality. This is why Merleau-Ponty 
becomes occupied with the question of the relationship – the “strange kinship” or “radical 
community” – between “the human” and “the animal,” that is, with the question of human-
animal difference (which is at the same time the question of human-animal togetherness). This 
question is an extension of Merleau-Ponty’s earlier insights into the nature of perception and 
intersubjectivity, and if we pursue it rigorously, it eventually reveals the ambiguity – the abiding 
openness or questionability – that constitutes, decenters, and attends the meaning not only of “the 
human” but of any being or category of identity, the being-together-through-difference that 
infinitely defers the closure of any community.  
Thus, as I hope to have clearly indicated in the previous chapters, Merleau-Ponty 
demands and develops a radical reorientation of ontology, which is to say an ontology of 
difference, and which is also to say an ontology of radical community. Following Merleau-Ponty, 
one of my main aims has been to apply the aforementioned anti-dualistic, “both/and” logic of 
lived experience – that is, the logic of a philosophy of difference – to the question of “the We,” 
or to the general question concerning the constitution of communal boundaries and identity-
categories, and in particular to the question concerning the constitution of what it means to be 
“human” and “animal.” However, there has surely always been more at stake in this “question of 
the We” than just ontology, for indeed there is always more at stake in ontology than just 
ontology. As I argued in the introduction to this project, ontological questions are always 
intertwined with ethical and political questions (and vice versa). This is not to say that 
ontological issues are reducible to normative ones (or vice versa), but it is to say that they are 
inseparable, that every normative or ideological framework presupposes an ontology, and that 
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any ontological framework or category we accept – especially if we unconsciously or uncritically 
accept it – informs how we think about and orient ourselves in the world, how we perceive and 
treat (or misperceive or mistreat) other beings in the world, and thus ineluctably has material 
ethical and political consequences.  
There is never truly a “neutral,” non-normative way to describe or categorize the world, 
for even “truth” and “falsehood” themselves are values, and they – like all values – direct how 
we act in the world. All values inform thought and conduct, and thus there is no way to sharply 
separate epistemic or alethic values from ethical, political, or even aesthetic ones. In a sense, 
then, axiology is not a “branch” of philosophy among others but is its very trunk. Whether we 
are dealing with first-order predicate logic or with trolley problems, whether we are considering 
what constitutes the “best” among competing scientific hypotheses or whether we are 
considering the permissibility of consuming animal flesh, whether we are considering the merits 
of transcendental idealism or of rule-utilitarianism, we are always, ultimately, dealing with 
values, because regardless of how “abstract” some such issues may seem, or regardless of how 
morally detached or politically innocuous some such issues may seem, we are always, ultimately, 
dealing with issues that will influence how we think and perceive the world, and therefore how 
we live in the world, in one way or another. 
This is not to say that we can directly derive normative conclusions from either 
ontological or empirical facts or simply from a description of the world alone, but it is to say that 
any rigorous, lucid attention to lived experience – that any phenomenology worthy of the name – 
repudiates the supposed opposition between the ontological and the normative, or the positivistic 
“fact”/“value,” “is”/“ought” binary; it is to say that questions of being (as well as question of 
knowing) are always entangled with questions of conduct, value, and power, that every question 
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concerning “what something is (or is not)” has implications for how we treat the thing in 
question, even if the thing in question is deemed to be “just a thing,” and especially if the thing 
in question is not “just a thing”; it is not to say that we can infer the normative from the 
ontological or descriptive (which will always be a fallacy), but it is to say that normativity is 
woven into lived experience in the same way that subjectivity is woven into flesh, and therefore 
just as worries about inferring “subjectivity” from a living body are misdirected, so too are 
worries about “inferring” normative truths from phenomenological description or investigation.  
Moreover, to say that the question of the “We” is “first philosophy” is to say that the 
question of “the Other” is first philosophy. And since there is no relationship with an Other that 
is not inherently ethical in character, it seems to be the case, as Levinas argues, that ethics is 
“first philosophy” after all. At any rate, the question of “the We” or of “the Other” is obviously 
value-laden (or “loaded”), and it is at least one way that ontology reveals itself to have always 
already been ethics, that in fact there has never been any such thing as value-free, purely amoral 
(or apolitical) ontology. Yet, if “the animal” is more “Other” than any other, if “the animal” is 
truly or fundamentally “our” Other, then the question of “the We” or of “the Other” – hence 
“first philosophy,” hence not just the primary question of ontology, but the primary question of 
ethics (and political philosophy) as well – is, in fact, the “question of the animal,” or rather the 
question concerning the relationship between “humanity” and “animality.”  
So, in the concluding portion of this project, I wish to make more explicit what I think 
has always been implicit in Merleau-Ponty’s account of intersubjectivity and Being: the ethical 
(and political) stakes of such an account, or the ethical and political framework that follows from 
it. As I mentioned in the introduction and as I have alluded throughout each of the previous 
chapters, my primary aim here has been to show that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology justifies (indeed 
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entails) a non-anthropocentric ethical (and political) framework, and moreover that it does so in 
ways that allow us to avoid the problems that I think beset traditional critiques of 
anthropocentrism. My view is that most conventional critiques of anthropocentrism, or that most 
proposed alternatives to anthropocentric moral and political theories, in fact reinscribe core 
anthropocentric presuppositions, and that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy precisely provides us the 
resources to critique anthropocentrism without conceding too much to it, indeed without 
conceding anything to it all. That is, I think that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology offers the foundation 
for a thoroughly non-anthropocentric or anti-human separatist/supremacist account of moral and 
political community; moreover, it offers us an account of moral and political community – a kind 
of “communitarianism” – that avoids the (false) alternatives of assimilative universalism and 
relativistic (which is really, at heart, solipsistic) isolationism or atomism; it avoids (or 
deconstructs) the false dilemma of what Leonard Lawlor calls a “continuism” that erases 
difference and a “separationism” that cleaves difference into opposition, the false dilemma of 
either appropriative inclusion or binary exclusion. Of course, much more will have to remain to 
be developed here. I do not intend to formulate every detail of such a non-anthropocentric, 
“radically communitarian” moral and political framework, nor to extrapolate exhaustively all of 
the normative implications of such a framework. I wish to demonstrate, in broad terms, the 
ethical and political implications of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology and to indicate the avenues for 
further radical reconsiderations of ethical and political concepts and questions it paves for us, 
avenues for further, better thinking – and thus for better, more wakeful, responsive, and 
compassionate living – that justice already demands we follow, and that the justice of “doing 
justice to the things themselves” has tacitly been about from the very start.   
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It is often assumed or alleged that phenomenological reflection is merely a descriptive 
(that is, “value-free”) undertaking, and its supposed aloofness from matters of ethics or politics 
often seems to motivate attitudes of suspicion and even hostility toward it. Surely nothing 
pertaining to human experience or being-in-the-world is ever purely value-free or apolitical, and 
so if phenomenology were to pretend otherwise, that would be a good reason to critique and even 
reject it. However, as I have just suggested, the notion that phenomenology is inherently just a 
matter of describing how the world appears to us and is, therefore, inherently non-normative (or 
at any rate incapable of revealing or grounding normative truths) reflects a profound 
misconception of phenomenology as well as, most likely, a profound (yet common) 
misconception of the relationship between “the descriptive” and “the normative,” “fact” and 
“value.” Naturally, one relevant yet rather banal point to mention here is that phenomenology 
endeavors to describe rigorously all aspects of lived experience, and since morality and politics 
are undeniably constitutive and pervasive features human experience, since indeed no concept 
that structures how we think about or perceive the world is ahistorical or without its own 
complex genealogy, phenomenology clearly must involve, and certainly cannot a priori exclude, 
an examination of social, cultural, historical, moral, and political phenomena.  
Of course, “merely” describing social, cultural, historical, moral, and political aspects of 
lived experience is not equivalent to justifying or critiquing them or to providing normative 
directives for how we should live. However, not only has it always been the case that a sober 
understanding of the social, cultural, historical, moral, and political conditions of lived 
experience has always been a necessary component of any critique of those conditions, to 
suppose that there ever truly is such a thing as “merely” or “purely” describing such conditions 
or phenomena is to suppose a dichotomy between “the descriptive” and “the normative,” 
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between “facts” and “values” that phenomenology repudiates, since such a dichotomy simply 
fails to comport with lived experience and is, in fact, a holdover from dualism and positivism. 
So, the important point here is that phenomenological “description” is never purely descriptive 
because no account of reality or experience is ever purely descriptive, and no phenomenologist 
has ever pretended otherwise. Indeed, a core phenomenological insight is that lived experience is 
always already imbued with values, that values are already “part of the woven stuff of 
phenomena.”859 As I will proceed to elaborate, phenomenology reveals that values necessarily 
condition and arise from any interactions between a living body and other living bodies and a 
milieu, that values are not “projected” onto “things,” experiences, or the world any more so than 
meaning is “projected” upon a word or any more so than happiness is “projected” into a smile (or 
any more so than subjectivity is projected into a behaving body in general).  
Phenomenology does not attempt to reduce “values” to “facts” or to “infer” normative 
judgments from purely ontological or empirical premises, but rejects the supposed divorce 
between “fact” and “value,” “the real” and “the normative” altogether, or rather demonstrates the 
intertwining of the two such that there is never truly any such thing as a purely ontological or 
empirical premise, or such that there is no problem of “inferring” values from the perceptible, 
already communalized or intersubjectively constituted world for the same reason there is no 
problem of “inferring,” say, consciousness from behavior. As we saw in chapters two and four, 
“meaning is not on the phrase like the butter on the bread…,”860 and the same is true concerning 
the relationship between the perceived world and those salient meanings we encounter in it 
called “values.” We do not “have” experiences and then add values to them post factum; rather, 
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lived experience is always already, constitutively value-laden, and Husserl, for example, knew 
this:  
In my waking consciousness I find myself…at all times, and without ever being able to alter the fact, in 
relation to the world that remains one and the same, though changing with respect to the composition of 
its contents. It is continually “on hand” for me and I myself and am a member of it. Moreover, this world 
is there for me not only as the world of mere things, but also with the same immediacy as a world of 
objects with values, a world of goods, a practical world. I simply find the physical things in front of me 
furnished not only with merely material determinations but also with value-characteristics, as beautiful or 
ugly, pleasant and unpleasant, agreeable and disagreeable, and the like. Immediately, physical things 
stand there as Objects of use, the “table” with its “books,” the “drinking glass,” the “vase” and the 
“piano,” etc. These value-characteristics and practical characteristics also belong constitutively to the 
Objects “on hand” as Objects…Naturally this applies not only in the case of the “mere physical things,” 
but also in the case of humans and brute animals belonging to my surroundings. They are there as 
“friends” or “enemies,” my “servants” or “superiors,” “strangers” or “relatives,” etc.861 
As Husserl claims here, the world presents itself to me as value-laden with the same immediacy 
that it presents itself me as a world of “mere things,” which of course is to say that the world 
never quite appears to me immediately as just a world of “mere things” (blosse Sachen) at all. It 
takes a rather focused, strenuous effort to see things as mere blosse Sachen for the same reason it 
does so to “see” them as aggregates of atomic “sense-data.” In fact, when I experience the world, 
I no more immediately experience “brute,” value-less “facts” or “things” than I experience raw, 
atomic sense-data. We do not “project” values onto things any more so than we mentally 
construct and project meaningful “wholes” into the world from discrete units of sense-data. The 
separation of sense-data from perceptual wholes is an abstraction on par with the separation of 
values from them, for both abstractions conceptualize phenomena as not already meaningful and 
context-dependent, as “prime matter” (or what Husserl calls “hyletic data”) that is only later 
impressed with some sort of “form.”  
The horizons or contexts of meaning (or Gestalts) amid which things appear to us are 
																																																								
861 Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, Trans. F. 
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already horizons of value-meanings, already situations suffused with affective, prudential, 
cultural, ethical, and political valences. This is, of course, entailed by the fact that lived 
experience – and that even (as Husserl argues) our very notion of “objective” reality – is always 
already constituted communally, for the moment one inhabits a world with others (that is, the 
very moment one inhabit a world at all), so too does one inhabit a moral and political world: 
relations with others obviously can never be amoral or apolitical, and thus no intersubjective 
phenomena, or nothing whose intelligibility is at all structured intersubjectively, can be truly 
amoral or apolitical either. There is no such thing as a community that is not a moral and 
political community, and, as I have been suggesting, this is why no inquiry into the nature of 
community can ever be amoral or apolitical (or purely ontological). But if there is no such thing 
as an amoral or apolitical community, then nothing that is in any way “communalized” is amoral 
or apolitical either. Thus, if appearances are already structured intersubjectively, so too are they 
already structured morally and politically, or so too are they already, broadly speaking, infused 
with values. Appearances could only be purely “value-neutral” in a solipsistic reality, but of 
course nothing may appear at all in a solipsistic reality, because such a reality is not a possible 
sphere of experience. Values are necessary modes of appearance, necessary ways that things or 
phenomena present themselves to us as things or phenomena. Even if I find myself practically 
indifferent to something, or even if a matter appears as morally trivial to me, or even if an issue 
appears to me as politically irrelevant, such characteristics – (practical) “indifference,” (moral) 
“triviality,” and (political) “irrelevance” – are themselves modes of (prudential, moral, and 
political) value. Whether, for example, I always choose to tie my right shoe before I tie my left 
one might be a matter of no moral significance whatsoever, but even such a lack of moral 
significance is itself a mode of moral significance, a way in which something may show up for 
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me only if a horizon of moral meaning is already in place, and the same point applies to any 
other modes of value. Whether such values be practical, epistemic, cultural, moral, political, or 
aesthetic, nothing in perceptible reality can be perceived without them. Similar to 
conceptualizing an object of experience as a collection of sense-data, to conceptualize 
appearances or “facts” as not already charged with values requires a quite sophisticated and 
concerted effort, or the performance of a highly contrived reflective analysis, in order to 
accomplish; meaning-less and value-free “facts” or phenomena are simply not primary or 
immediate givens. The presence (or presencing) of the world is inseparable from my living body 
– from its affects and needs, from its schemas and potentialities of perception, attunement, and 
comportment – and from my living body’s relations with other living bodies, and this alone 
demonstrates that a value-free world is just as inconceivable as a world devoid of others or of 
meaning in general.  
Thus, for Husserl and for phenomenology in general, it is not the case that our 
experiences flow “value-lessly” and that we retrospectively tack values onto them (or “project” 
values into them) later, and still less is it the case that there are only certain special, discrete 
situations (like runaway trolley or lifeboat scenarios, for example) in which morality and politics 
are at play, and which therefore punctuate an otherwise amoral or apolitical procession of 
existence: every “situation” is a moral and political situation, and experience is value-laden all 
the way down. Values – whether epistemic, prudential, moral, political, or aesthetic – are already 
basic modes of perceptual givenness, or are already immanent to any given appearances of the 
world, already immanent to the dialectical relations between living bodies and between living 
bodies and the world. For example, I do not see the shadow cast by the branches of an old tree 
upon my bedroom wall at night and project “spookiness” onto it: I see it as spooky; I do not see 
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Freddy Krueger and project scariness or evil onto him: I see him as scary or evil; I do not see a 
blurry, magnified and partial image of the “Mona Lisa” and then infer that such an image of it “is 
too close” or not taken from an “apt” distance or angle: I see the image as too close, or as taken 
from an inapt distance or angle; I do not see a sofa and project “comfortableness” onto it; I see it 
as comfortable; I do not see Monet’s “Water Lilies,” watch a film such as 2001: A Space 
Odyssey, hear Beethoven’s “Moonlight Sonata,” read a sonnet of Shakespeare, or play a video 
game featuring shifting, vibrant, meticulously crafted water-color tableaus intended to symbolize 
the stages of grief, and tack the value of “beauty” onto them later: I experience them as beautiful; 
likewise, if my partner bakes cookies for me in order to help relieve my stress from writing a 
dissertation, I do not “project” kindness or love into the gesture: I experience the gesture as kind 
and loving, I see its kindness or lovingness; if I see children bullying one of their peers, or if I see 
a person torturing a dog for amusement, I do not see these acts and then later impart cruelty to 
them: I see them as cruel, I see their cruelty.  
And the very moment a living, behaving body enters my field of experience, I also see a 
body that can flourish or suffer, a body with needs and desires, a body that is vulnerable. I see a 
body different from yet like unto my own, one that I can either assist, ignore, or harm, but one to 
which I cannot fail to respond in some manner, one that cannot fail to appeal to me in some 
manner. Quite some time ago, I was walking my dog, Sammy, and noticed frantic chirping that 
seemed to be coming from across the street. I eventually discovered a baby bird on the ground 
with an apparently injured wing. I rushed to inform my parents, and we carefully placed the bird 
in a shoebox and drove it to a local emergency animal hospital. Such an encounter was one in 
which an ethical demand was unavoidably impressed upon me, one that is not essentially 
different from that of any ethical encounter with a human Other. If a homeless person asks me 
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for money or food, an unavoidable ethical demand is presented to me: whether I choose to give 
or withhold assistance, I cannot fail but to respond in some way; I may choose not to help this 
person, but I cannot choose not respond to his/her appeal for help; I may pretend to ignore such 
an appeal, but to ignore it is thus only a pretension: even to “ignore” a beggar is to choose to do 
so and is thus to respond to him/her in some manner.862 The case was no different with respect to 
the bird whose life I tried to rescue. As Alphonso Lingis claims, “the cries of the fledgling bird 
fallen from the nest appeals to us.”863 The injured wing of a bird appeals to me, or impresses a 
demand upon me, just as much as any outstretched hand; its chirping calls for my response just 
as much as any human voice or gesture, as do all kinds of non-human bodies, gestures, and 
expressions. Thus, Christine Korsgaard argues that it is just as impossible – or, at any rate, just as 
																																																								
862 Of course, what is even worse than this are those institutions and systems of power that disappear or make 
invisible others who merit or urgently demand our moral attention, such that we do not even so much as have the 
“choice” to ignore them because they (or their needs and plights) do not even show up for us at all; or rather, these 
others are there for us in experience, but political institutions, frameworks, and systems of privilege cause us to 
overlook them, to fail to “see” them even when we do “see” them. It is obvious that various social systems collude 
to make various human beings or human problems invisible, but it is also pertinent to notice the deep extent to 
which they make non-human beings invisible as well. There is an entrenched, systemic effort to invisibilize, for 
example, the horrors of factory farming. Indeed, there are laws in the United States designed solely to keep people 
from ever seeing where the meat on their tables really comes from. One walks into a supermarket and sees 
meticulously, cleanly presented packages of meat (say, a round piece of beef neatly wrapped in cellophane) on the 
shelf, yet one surely does not see everything that had to be done to a cow, everything that a cow had to suffer, in 
order for its flesh to appear on the shelf in that manner; in this case, the way in which something appears in fact 
disappears more than it actually brings to appearance. Phenomenologically, those aspects of lived experience that 
we do not “see” are just as important – indeed, are often more important – than those we do see; those hidden 
structures that shape lived experience are often ethically and politically urgent for us to see, for they themselves are 
ethical and political structures, and our failure to see them – or rather their inbuilt self-concealment – necessarily has 
ethical and political consequences. All of this only further proves the deep extent to which political systems and 
institutions shape lived experience, or how even ordinary human perception is already political, and thus I think it 
also further proves the already political (and ethical) character of phenomenological reflection. Merleau-Ponty 
frequently remarks that phenomenology is about “learning how to see” the world, yet he also makes it clear that 
“seeing” can also be (and often is) failing “to see”; thus, “learning how to see” is also unlearning the habits of 
thought and perception that lead us not to see, and given that what we often fail to see are moral and political matters 
that demand our attention, and given that the habits of thought and perception that lead us to fail to see such matters 
are themselves implicated in background ethical and political systems and frameworks, “learning how to see” has 
always been an ethical and political project. As I have discussed, the primary aim of radical, phenomenological 
reflection is to let appear, to let be seen and heard, those things or others that various frameworks (whether 
ontological, epistemological, ethical, or political) would otherwise dis-appear, invisibilize, or silence, and is thus 
inherently committed to the critique and abolition of such frameworks. 
863 “Doubles,” in Itinerant Philosophy: On Alphonso Lingis. Eds. Bobby George and Tom Sparrow (Brooklyn, NY: 
Punctum Books, 2014), p. 67. 
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much of an artifice and false abstraction – not to perceive directly in the cries of an animal an 
expression of needs and interests, or the impingement of an ethical demand, as it is to perceive 
the words spoken to me by another human being as mere noise:  
An animal’s cries express pain, and they mean that there is a reason, a reason to change its condition. And 
you can no more hear the cries of an animal as mere noise than you can hear the words of a person. 
Another animal can obligate you in exactly the same way another person can. It is a way of being 
someone that you share. So of course we have obligations to animals.864  
 
Any suppression of an animal’s alterity is an abstraction as logically absurd and ethically violent 
as the suppression of a fellow human’s alterity, and given the fact that the very category of “the 
animal” has traditionally been deployed in order precisely to suppress the alterities of those 
beings we call “animals,” it is not an accident, as Adorno observes, that we tend to find it 
deployed in order to oppress, exploit, and perpetrate cruelty against humans and so-called 
“animals” alike:   
The constantly encountered assertion that savages, blacks, Japanese are like animals, monkeys for 
example, is the key to the pogrom. The possibility of the pogrom is decided in the moment when the gaze 
of a fatally-wounded animal falls on a human being. The defiance with which he repels this gaze – ‘after 
all, it’s only an animal’ – reappears irresistibly in cruelties done to human beings, the perpetrators having 
again and again to reassure themselves that it is ‘only an animal’, because they could never fully believe 
this even of animals.865 
 
If subjectivity is necessarily embodied and thus directly expressed in and through behavior, then 
to regard the living, behaving body as a mere machine or object – as a thing whose movements 
are taken to be mere mechanical reactions to causes rather than responsive, intentional 
comportments toward meanings – is not only (as I discussed in chapters three and four) to adopt 
the sort of reductionism one might otherwise repudiate with respect to human behavior, and is 
not only to reproduce the very dualism one might (and should) otherwise repudiate in general, 
																																																								
864 The Sources of Normativity. Ed. Onora O’Neill (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 153. 
865 Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life. Trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (New York, NY/London, UK: Verso, 
2005), §68, p. 105.  
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but is also simply to choose to suppress that body’s subjectivity or alterity; such a perspective 
toward a non-human being is a willful suppression of its subjectivity, and all suppressions of 
subjectivity are alike in their fundamental, phenomenological structure. This objectification or 
de-subjectification of non-human beings is logically analogous to the objectification or de-
subjectification of human beings that is implicated in every form of human oppression; it is a 
form of “otherization” in the bad sense of that term, for it is that form of otherization that 
precisely denies rather than affirms otherness, that form of otherization that relegates others 
beyond the bounds of community or of intersubjective affirmation and respect, that form of 
otherization that is precisely the suppression or erasure of otherness. Of course, once otherness is 
encountered, it can never truly be erased; it can only either be affirmed and welcomed or 
marginalized and repressed. The oppression of others always begins with the disingenuous, self-
undermining repression of their otherness, with the objectification of what is not merely an 
object, with the de-subjectification of what is truly a subjectivity. As Adorno suggests, it is for 
this reason that we can indeed understand a lot about the horrific, needless forms of violence we 
inflict upon one another from those we inflict upon animals, from the violence of even simply 
referring to animals as “just animals.”  
Thus, we anthropocentrically tend to equate oppression with “dehumanization,” but we 
forget that this means that oppression already begins – that the pretext for it has already been 
established, that its machinery has already been set into motion – with prior processes or 
apparatuses of “humanization,” that is, with the construction and imposition of a “human” 
subject-position or identity-category relative to which, or in service to which, others will be 
ranked, policed, subjugated, exploited, brutalized, or excluded from the scope of full moral and 
political considerability. “Animalization” coincides with, or is synonymous with, every 
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oppressive otherization. As I have mentioned, “the animal” is certainly not a “natural kind”; 
there is, in fact, no such thing as “the animal,” for, as Derrida remarks, there are only animals; 
there is only ever “an irreducible living multiplicity of mortals.”866 Indeed, the category of “the 
animal” is no more a natural kind, and no less a political construct, than, say, that of “the 
barbarian” (with which it is historically and conceptually aligned). In short, “the animal” is an 
empty placeholder to which we consign any being or “other” we wish to exploit or dominate. 
Since there is no “animalization” – no “dehumanization” – without a prior, correlative 
“humanization,” the hard truth we are thus forced to confront is that oppression, exploitation, or 
domination already begin with every “humanization,” or already begin with any fixed 
determination of “the human” in opposition to “the animal.” This is why we should never 
uncritically deploy the categories of “humanity” and “animality,” and it is perhaps why, in the 
end, we should jettison them from our thinking altogether. It is certainly why I admittedly have 
always been uneasy about Merleau-Ponty’s own usage of these categories, and it is why I think 
we may have to move beyond Merleau-Ponty in refusing to use them in our thinking at all; 
indeed, I am not sure that these categories do anything else but keep us from wakeful thinking. 
Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate that Merleau-Ponty intends to transform radically how 
we think about these categories. As I hope to have already made clear, when Merleau-Ponty 
speaks of the intertwining of “the human” and “the animal,” if we truly understand what he 
means by “intertwining,” we must understand that he means that no oppositional understanding 
of their relationship, hence no fixed or essential delimitation of the being or meaning of either of 
them, can ever hold. If we understand what he means by the “intertwining” of “humanity” and 
“animality,” and if he is right, then it follows that we precisely need to problematize and rethink 
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these categories in ways that disrupt, now and forever, those traditional conceptualizations and 
deployments of them that underlie every oppressive ethical or political scheme of categorization 
or “otherization,” every caste system, every “centrism,” separatism, or supremacism.  
To recall an encounter similar to yet more recent than the one I had with an injured bird, 
this past winter I encountered a very large, elaborate spider web that had been spun across two 
pillars that stand in front of the entrance to my partner’s building. Such an encounter likewise 
presented me with an ethical choice, or the demand for some sort of ethical response: I could 
have found some means to destroy the web so as to have unobstructed entry into my partner’s 
building, or I could have chosen to find an alternative means of entry, say by simply walking 
around it or by entering from the back of the apartment complex; I chose to walk around it. In 
this encounter, a spider’s web appealed or “spoke” to me in just the same manner as the injured 
wing and distressed chirps of a bird; it was just as much of a moral experience as any other, and 
indeed it was an experience that was inherently moral: my experience of the spider web simply 
could not be dissociated from the moral possibilities and qualities that accompany it any more so 
than from any of its visible or tactile qualities. I am addressed by wings and spider webs, by gills 
and feelers, by paws and tails, by chirps and barks, by hissing and panting, by bee hives and ant 
hills just as much as I am addressed by human hands and words, by human laughter and groans, 
by human tears and cheers, by human frowns and smiles, by human visages, words, and 
behaviors.  
Morality is simply endemic to our lived, Gestalt experiences of the world and, in 
particular, to our lived experiences of others, that is, to our experiences of other living, behaving 
bodies. Every vulnerable body is an Other whose needs or goods directly address me, and every 
living body is a vulnerable body. To be a living body is to “have,” or to be oriented toward, a 
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good, or to possess and express needs and desires (whether physiological or otherwise) the 
satisfaction of which is necessary for the realization of its good, necessary for it to flourish as the 
living body it is. When confronted with a living body, I cannot but respond to the appeals it 
inherently expresses to me in some manner: I may attempt to suppress its subjectivity or alterity 
– that is, to regard it as either “just an animal” or as a mere object (blosse Sache) – so that I need 
not be bothered by having to respond to it, or perhaps so that I may harm or exploit it with an 
untroubled conscience, but doing so will always be a hypocritical or self-undermining 
abstraction (to say the least), for my objectification (or “otherization”) of such an Other is itself 
already a response to its subjectivity or alterity; that is, such an attitude on my part could only be 
motivated by an encounter with something I know is not truly “just” a thing, an encounter with 
something that is a genuine “Other” – a “way of being someone” that I share, as Korsgaard puts 
it – rather than an “other” that is so other as to be not truly an “Other” at all. As Freud knew, 
repression is never absolute erasure: what we repress always reemerges in our lives in other 
ways. Repression (like self-deception more generally) is always self-undermining (or self-
deconstructing) because it always involves a disavowal at one level what one knows to be true at 
another. Whether I attempt to suppress (or repress) the alterity of a living human or non-human 
being, I am, self-defeatingly, disavowing at one level what I in fact already know by direct 
acquaintance, namely that such a being is indeed an Other, one that demands a response from 
me, one to which I am already responsive, and indeed therefore one with whom my own body is 
already entangled, one with whom I am already, radically in community.     
Thus, when I perceive a living body I perceive its “good” and its needs – or at any rate I 
perceive the fact that it has a good along with needs that must be fulfilled in order for its good to 
be realized – just as directly as I perceive its subjectivity in general; indeed, to perceive any 
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subjectivity at all is already to be addressed by its needs and desires, its possibilities of either 
flourishing or failing to flourish, and this is why, as Levinas argues, any experience of alterity is 
inherently ethical experience. However, as Levinas does not argue (and even often seems to 
argue against, as I will further discuss below), experiences of alterity are not restricted to 
experiences of other humans. Any experience of a living body is an experience of alterity; all 
living bodies are alterities. All living bodies are vulnerable bodies: to be a living body is to be a 
vulnerable body; and so to perceive directly a body as a living body is to perceive directly its 
vulnerabilities, which is also, of course, to perceive its needs and goods. As Lingis writes:   
…To see something is to see what it requires to exist. If I see a tree, I also see that it requires earth and 
sunlight…We do see needs and wants directly. And then to see what it requires is to sense the kind of 
action that would supply this requirement. For example, if I see a deer, which has been caught in branches 
in the flooding river, I see that it needs to be freed from these branches or that it will drown. And at the 
same time I see that I could do that. Or somebody could do that, if not me, maybe somebody else. I 
experience myself as different motor possibilities to rescue something or protect it, or restore, or repair it. 
That’s true just of our ordinary perception. Just when we walk around, what we see are not just shapes 
and forms and colours. There are distinct and independent beings, that we see what they require. And if 
we get active, we sense the sorts of actions that could supply their needs.867 
 
Birds (like spiders and deer) are different from humans, yet they appeal to us, and the appeals of 
avian others are not essentially, transcendentally different (as Levinas, for example, claims) from 
the appeals of human others; their appeals span the differences between us, as all appeals do, 
because such differences are never divides, because true differences are never divides; their 
appeals surge across the continuity between us, because this continuity is also already difference, 
also already flesh. Whether it comes from a human or other-than-human Other, an “appeal” is an 
overture across difference; there are irreducible differences between all kinds of beings – 
between humans, between humans and non-humans, and between innumerably many non-
humans – yet these are always differences in and of flesh, and so they are also always circuits 
and confluences of meaning between them, courses along which course their common affects 
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and needs, their appeals and responses to one another. There are infinitely many irreducible 
differences in the world. Difference as such is irreducible difference; yet difference is also (in 
Deleuze’s sense of the term) univocal: all beings are irreducibly different, yet all differences are, 
as we have seen, differences “of the same stuff,”868 “extreme divergencies of one same 
something”869: differences do not resolve into dualism, nor do they dissolve into Parmenidean 
monism or Absolute idealism. All differences are differences in and of flesh, and are therefore 
already relationships between forms of flesh, even already “appeals” of one form of flesh to 
another. Through that reflexivity or affectivity that defines every living body, a transference of 
affects between living bodies always takes place, one in which the needs and flourishings of 
others are immediately impressed upon, indeed already inscribed into, my own flesh and joints, 
my own corporeal schema and “motor possibilities.”  
In short, we “see” values – especially corporeal needs and desires, benefits and harms – 
in the same way that we “see” minds (or alterities), emotions, intentions, meanings, or any of 
those “in-visible” features of the world that inflate the world to “visibility” and meaning. As we 
discussed in chapter two, “there are certainly more things in the world and in us than what is 
perceptible in the narrow sense of the term,”870 and among these are what we call values. Values 
are not real in the way that ordinary physical objects are, but it does not follow they are not real 
at all or that they must be either “purely” mental or “supernatural”: not only does the latter 
notion not follow logically, but an ontology that only admits physical objects (or “mere things”) 
as real – or a kind of materialism whose conception of “materiality” is restricted to that of 
physics or to the “data” directly available only to the “five senses” – is so patently false that it 
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869 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 84. 
870 Merleau-Ponty, “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” in Signs, p. 171. 
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nearly does not even merit criticism. As we have already extensively seen (and as any cursory 
phenomenological reflection reveals), there are many “things” that are deep and pervasive, even 
structural features of lived experience that are not “mere things,” or that are not reducible to 
phenomena presentable to the “five senses” alone and that are even conditions for the 
formulation and intelligibility of any scientific explanation or model of the world (even the lived 
body and Being as such, though constitutive of experience, and though obliquely experienced, 
are not “objects”). Moreover, there are social constructs and so-called “abstractions” that are 
absolutely real and that have concrete, material effects in the world even though they will never 
be encountered in experience as ordinary physical objects. For example, one will never trip over 
or stub one’s toe on “generosity,” “cruelty,” “sorrow,” “courage,” “tragedy,” “culture,” 
“history,” “art,” “truth,” “belief,” “knowledge,” “number,” the Pythagorean theorem, linguistic 
denotation, “race,” “gender,” “freedom,” “equality,” “democracy,” or even consciousness and 
otherness – one will never “see” or “touch” such things as one “sees” or “touches” an ordinary 
material thing – yet these are all clearly very real, even necessarily thoroughly “material,” things 
indeed, and there is no sound, non-arbitrary reason to regard values any differently. If we attend 
to lived experience, it is clear that ethical, political, and even aesthetic values are just as real as 
any of the “things” I just enumerated, even though they are not real like tables or rocks. I 
(ap)perceive values in the same way I (ap)perceive anything. “Goodness” or “justice,” for 
example, are undeniably not equivalent or reducible to factual appearances or states of affairs, 
but it does not logically follow that they are divorced from them: to varying degrees and in 
various modes of manifestation, “goodness” and “justice” are nonetheless ways in which a world 
inhabited corporeally and communally always already shows itself.  
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So, values are already built into our involvements with others and into the ways in which 
the world immediately appears to us in and through our engagements with it: we do not impart 
them to things later. If we separate the moral or political dimensions of a situation from its other 
material or phenomenal elements, or if in general we divorce values from “facts,” that is 
precisely what we do later: that is an abstraction or incision made by reflective thought rather 
than primally, immediately given reality. Values are not idealities that hover above and beyond 
the world, nor are they mere mental constructs or projections, nor are they “things” in any 
positivistic or reductively materialistic sense of the term; they are not ordinary material objects 
or “bodies,” yet they are not without flesh; they are not absolutely extra-subjective (or 
“objective” in the classical sense of the term), yet they are not purely “subjective” either. It 
should already be clear that any such dilemma between (reductive) materialism and idealism, or 
between “objectivism” and “subjectivism,” is a false one, and indeed Merleau-Ponty devoted his 
efforts to demonstrating its falsity. The notion that something must either be a “mere,” “brute” 
thing or otherwise either a “purely” subjective or supernatural entity is a commitment to the sort 
of dualism we have long since discarded and that any rigorous account of lived experience or 
Being necessarily dismantles. The notion that there are such things as “value-free” facts (hence 
value-free descriptions of the world), and the correlative notion that values (if there truly are any) 
must either be supernatural objects or purely mental constructs, that is, things that somehow float 
outside carnal existence or that are “freed from all inherence”871 (and which would thus truly be, 
as J.L. Mackie famously describes them in his argument for moral anti-realism, “queer” things 
indeed), are notions rooted in the very positivism and dualism to which phenomenology is 
emphatically opposed.  
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In the end, the supposed “fact/value” or “is/ought” dichotomy is nothing but an iteration 
or corollary of classical body/mind or object/subject dualism, and thus it is impossible to reject 
the latter without also rejecting the former. It is not an accident that, traditionally, “facts” are 
aligned with “objectivity” and “values” are aligned with “subjectivity”: the supposed opposition 
between “fact” and “value,” “is” and “ought,” “the descriptive” and “the prescriptive,” 
“ontology” and “normativity” corresponds directly to the classical opposition between “the 
objective” and “the subjective,” “body” and “mind,” “immanence” and “transcendence,” 
“materiality” and “ideality,” and we have already seen where the latter dualisms lead us and why 
they are not tenable. The idea of value-free facts and the idea of fleshless, supernatural or purely 
subjective values are mutually entailed, logical counterparts: one cannot accept one without 
accepting the other, and one cannot reject one without rejecting the other. Fact/value dualism is 
simply parasitic upon body/mind dualism or, more generally, a dualism between the empirical 
and the ideal/transcendent(al), the “natural” and the super-natural. To repudiate subject/object or 
mind/body dualism is also, necessarily, to repudiate “value/fact” dualism, and indeed one must 
repudiate the latter in order to make sense of the moral and political aspects of experience, that 
is, to make sense of the fact that such values are neither real in the manner of ordinary objects of 
sensory perception nor as disembodied, supernatural entities or mental projections. It follows that 
only an ontology that demonstrates the intertwining of “object(ivity)” and “subject(ivity),” of 
“body/nature” and “mind,” or of “materiality” and “ideality” – only an ontology that can 
“recognize an ideality that is not alien to the flesh”872 – can provide a “moral realism” worthy of 
the name, which is to say a kind of “moral naturalism” that would not be a contradiction in 
terms.  
																																																								
872 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 152. 
	 681	
For all of these reasons, a phenomenological ethics is certainly not a category mistake; 
nor does such an approach to ethics collapse into crude subjectivism, and still less does it involve 
“naturalizing” or normatively legitimating all appearances; it is no more a “naïve” moral realism 
than it is a “naïve realism” in general. We have seen that appearances can be “true” or “false” (or 
that certain appearances can be more or less close to the truth than others), yet we also know 
better than to consider truth and falsehood as absolutely beyond all appearances, and the same is 
true concerning moral or political phenomena and truths. “Goods” (and “bads”) are also things 
that appear, and like anything else, they are composed of all the ways in which they can appear, 
or are constituted by all of the embodied perspectives to whom they may appear. Some goods 
may be more distant from others, many goods will not exactly coincide with one another, and 
some appearances of goods and bads, rights and wrongs, justices and injustices may be quite far 
removed from what is truly good (or bad), right (or wrong), or just (or unjust), or such 
appearances may appear from partial, obstructed, askew, inapt or inappropriate vantage points 
(analogous to the manner in which a painting would present itself to me if I were to view it one 
inch from my face or from a sideways angle), but nonetheless all goods – just like everything 
else in perceptible, carnal reality – overlap, and thus every appearance of a good is an 
appearance of “the Good” in the same way that every appearance of a thing is an appearance of 
“the thing itself,” or in the same way that, in general, all appearances are appearances of the 
world. A point to which I will return is that though there exists a plurality of goods, and though 
often these goods may be in tension with one another, nevertheless there is no such thing as an 
isolated, purely self-contained good for the same reasons that there is no such a thing as an 
isolated, self-contained self or community. Moral solipsism/relativism vanishes along with every 
other form of solipsism. In just the same way that all communities or worlds are embedded 
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within and co-constitute an objective, common world, so too is it the case that all goods are 
embedded within and co-constitute an objective, common Good.  
Moreover, given phenomenology’s vigilance against reification and commitment to 
developing a maximally lucid conception of the world in which we dwell, given 
phenomenology’s commitment to dismantling those abstractions and frameworks that precisely 
suppress (or lead us to repress) what we live, or given phenomenology’s commitment to making 
“visible” precisely those integral aspects of our lives that certain schemas of knowledge and 
ideologies render invisible or marginalize, it follows that phenomenological “description” is 
never truly a non-normative endeavor, or that phenomenology is always already critique. To put 
this point another way or to be more specific, I think it is accurate to say that, at an ethical and 
political register, phenomenology’s vigilance against reification and obscurantism – that is, its 
vigilance against all abstractions and frameworks that occlude or distort what we in fact live or 
know by direct acquaintance, or its vigilance against anything that would invisibilize or silence 
our experiences of the world and of others, and that would especially invisibilize or silence 
certain others – may be understood as a vigilance against certain prevalent, even systemic forms 
of gaslighting. When certain abstractions or conceptual frameworks – especially those embedded 
within our social institutions – motivate one to deny, doubt, or repress one’s lived experiences, 
what else is that but a kind of gaslighting? It is in this sense that “doing justice” to the “things 
themselves” is a kind of ethical and political justice, for it means honoring all of the ways in 
which the world is experienced corporeally and communally, especially from traditionally 
marginalized bodies and communities; it does not just mean taking an inventory of “the way 
things are” but also means letting appear or letting be heard testimonies of or against “the way 
things are” from perspectives that entrenched, hegemonic abstractions and frameworks 
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invisibilize or silence. In general, since the world is filled with so much “asinanity,” since widely 
accepted understandings of reality are so infested with all kinds of reifications, metaphysical 
mystifications, and ideological mythologizations (especially those that serve the interests of 
dominant groups and oppressive power-hierarchies), or since our conceptions of “the world” and 
of “ourselves” tend to be shaped so deeply by illicit exclusions, unstable binaries, or hardly 
inevitable or a priori necessary constructs, it follows that describing the world as lucidly as one 
can, and especially that describing (or letting be “seen” and “heard”) lived experiences that 
dominant narratives and conceptual frameworks would have us repress, is a radical, liberatory 
act.  
To describe lived experience is not necessarily to naturalize or essentialize what is 
described: social constructs and contingent, historically emergent institutions and relations of 
power can be, and of course are, materially, experientially real even though they are not 
“natural” or “essential” aspects of the world, and as I mentioned earlier, developing a lucid 
understanding of the world – especially doing justice to others’ lived experiences of the world – 
is the necessary first step toward any cogent critique of the world. Consider race, for example. 
To describe how a black person appears to a racist, white gaze is not to legitimate or naturalize 
such a gaze but to describe accurately, hence “do justice to,” the lived experience of black 
identity in a racist, white supremacist world. It is not to justify normatively how a black person 
appears to a white gaze under white supremacy, but to confront the fact that appearing in such a 
manner constitutes what it means to be black under conditions of racial oppression. Systemic 
racism and negrophobia are endemic to a black person’s lived of experience of his/her own 
blackness under white supremacy (and, it must be added, they are also endemic – in manifold 
subtle and unconscious ways – to any white person’s lived experiences of blackness under white 
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supremacy). To suppose otherwise is to advocate for precisely that sort of “color-blindness” that 
is not only itself precisely one of those false abstractions that distort lived experience and that 
phenomenology endeavors to extirpate, but is an abstraction that is actively complicit in white 
supremacy and racial oppression for the very reason that it is blind to it and seeks to make others 
blind to it as well. Any “color-blind” account of the world – any account of the world that erases 
race from lived human experience – is precisely an instance of gaslighting, and it is one that 
rigorous phenomenological reflection can empower us to undo.873 Moreover, phenomenology 
can help show us why white supremacy, for example, is (to say the least) a bad perspective. This 
is, I think, a clear case in which phenomenological description is not purely descriptive but is 
already an ethical and political project. Indeed, properly understood, I think radical 
phenomenological reflection is necessary in order to critique oppressive systems and frameworks 
and further the ends of justice, emancipation, and flourishing. After all, we cannot dismantle 
what we do not or cannot “see.” 
																																																								
873 Of course, it should go without saying that rigorous phenomenological reflection – especially concerning matters 
of political oppression and marginalization – requires epistemic humility, or an attitude of surrendering oneself to 
listening to or letting be heard other “voices” rather than “speaking” oneself, particularly on the part of those who 
belong to dominant or privileged social groups. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, phenomenology enjoins us 
to decenter or suspend our own standpoints in the world precisely in order to let other standpoints come to presence 
(and also in order to reveal the webs of interdependencies in which all standpoints are embedded). One example of 
this is what is often referred to as “checking one’s privilege.” Though I think it is incontestable that racism 
systemically informs all of our lived experiences and especially the lived experiences of being a person of color, I 
am also white, and so there are necessarily aspects of a person of color’s lived experiences of the world that will 
never be fully accessible to me. “Privilege” means that there will always be social, ethical, and political truths whose 
testimony I must cede to those who in fact live them. A point I wish to emphasize here is that “privilege” is also a 
phenomenological concept just as much as it is an ethical and political one. Appeals to privilege (i.e., the principle 
that one should “check one’s privilege”) are appeals to epistemic or experiential limitations relevant to the 
formulation and assessment of certain truth or knowledge-claims, especially those concerning social and political 
reality or matters of justice, marginalization, and oppression. The idea that there are structures, systems of power, 
and identity-categories that inherently limit the sorts of experiences to which one has complete access is an 
inherently phenomenological one, or one that emerges from any sound phenomenological examination of one’s 
lived experiences of social and political reality. To this extent, not only do I think it is accurate to say that 
phenomenology is already ethical and political, but also that any ethics or political theory worthy of the name is 
already phenomenological.  
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 Of course, the targets of my critique in this project have been those abstractions, 
conceptual frameworks, or presuppositions that underlie and motivate the marginalization and 
oppression of non-human beings. As much as our lived experiences in the world today are 
shaped by, say, white supremacy, so too are they shaped by assumptions of human supremacy or 
“specialness,” or by abstractions that repress our fundamental, constitutive relationships with 
other forms of life, abstractions that situate “humanity” in hierarchical opposition to “animality” 
or that advance any sort of “human/animal” dualism, which are also the same abstractions that 
distort the nature of community in general and which therefore also constitute the underlying 
“logic” of every unjust ethical and political “ism” and exclusion.  
So, let me then be clear about the argumentative strategy I have adopted here. Any move 
from the descriptive to the prescriptive or from the ontological to the normative will always be 
logically illicit provided we posit a radical, unbridgeable gulf between them. The point here, 
however, is not to commit such a blatant naturalistic fallacy. The point is not to move directly 
from the ontological to the normative, or directly from a description of the fundamental 
structures of lived experience to ethical and political principles, but to show that a certain 
normative framework (i.e., anthropocentrism or human-centered speciesism) has always 
depended upon certain ontological (as well as epistemological) commitments; therefore, to 
dismantle such ontological commitments is also to dismantle the normative framework they 
support. Moreover, the point is also to show that ontology and normativity, that “facts” and 
“values” in general have never really been divorced from one another in the first place, as is 
already indicated by the fact that ethical and political frameworks always rest upon ontological 
presuppositions and that, conversely, ontological presuppositions and categories always have 
ethical and political implications.  
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Thus, my aim here has been to articulate the ontological precondition for overcoming 
anthropocentrism, which is also the ontological precondition for any kind of ethical involvement 
or responsiveness at all: intercorporeity, or what I have called “radical community.” My aim has 
been to show that Merleau-Ponty dismantles the ontological edifice of any anthropocentric or 
human-supremacist conception of the moral community, and to indicate the kind of moral 
community we might cultivate in its place, or rather the kind of community within which we 
always already exist even though various metaphysical or conceptual abstractions and social 
institutions actively suppress it. Though Merleau-Ponty did not write nearly as much on ethics 
and politics as he did on ontology, his ontological project was never purely an ontological project 
(as no ontological project can ever be), but was always an ethical and political one as well, and 
my thesis is that his ontology precisely provides the necessary resources for dismantling 
anthropocentrism, that indeed his ontology entails the decentering of any supposedly “central” 
standpoint in the world (including especially a “human” one) and the destruction of any 
imagined hierarchies (or “ladders”) of being. Intercorporeity dismantles traditional 
anthropocentric ethical and political boundaries because it can never be restricted a priori only to 
one form of embodied life and because, moreover, it reveals the fundamental intertwining – the 
“lateral” interrelatedness – of all forms of embodied life, hence of all “goods.” “Selves” are 
necessarily embodied and necessarily in community with (embodied) others, and since every 
community is thus one that is among or between embodied beings – since every community is a 
community in and of flesh – there can never be a sharp, decidable, transcendental demarcation of 
communal boundaries. And every community is necessarily a moral community, since to be a 
living body is to be a vulnerable body, or since to be a living body is already to be polarized 
toward a “Good,” already either to flourish or to fail to flourish in some way or to some extent.  
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The “radical community” in which all embodied beings – human and a non-human alike – are 
embedded, therefore, has always already been a radical moral community, and thus it is one that 
not only any cogent ontology must honor in its conception of the world, but one that any cogent 
ethical or political philosophy must honor in its conception of “the Good.”  
When I was a child, I wanted a dog desperately, but for a long time my father was 
adamantly opposed to getting one. Before finally agreeing to get a dog, my parents allowed me to 
have a Guinee pig. I loved this Guinee pig, but he unfortunately died unexpectedly not very long 
after we got him. As a child I was also, at times, as exceptionally cruel toward animals as I was 
fascinated by them: I sometimes collected caterpillars and made makeshift terrariums for them 
out of my mother’s Tupperware only to smash them later; I took delight in stepping on snails; at 
day camp (on at least a couple of occasions) I plucked moths off of trees and tore off their wings; 
at day camp I also took delight in deliberately stepping on tiny frogs I might come across in the 
grass; I was often cold and mean-tempered toward my babysitter’s dog, often shoving or hitting 
him when he was near me even though he had only been minding his own business; sometimes I 
would chuck rocks into flocks of geese. On one such occasion, a friend of mine and I were 
throwing rocks at geese that had gathered on the athletic field of our elementary school, laughing 
as they scattered and squawked; neither of us noticed our rocks actually make contact with any 
of the birds, yet as we were leaving to go home, I noticed one of them limping across the field, 
its leg or foot obviously injured, perhaps even broken. I do not know whether it was I or my 
friend who was directly responsible for that, but to this day the image of that goose limping 
across the field haunts me; it is a deep-seated source of anguish and shame for me, one that has 
persisted in my memory just as vividly as any of the significant wrongs I have ever committed 
against fellow humans. To pose Derrida’s question (the question that is the right one to pose 
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here, and one that is profound yet deceptively simple): “whence this malaise?”874 If the 
arguments I have developed up to this point have been successful, we should already have an 
answer to this question. Indeed, developing an answer to this question and extrapolating its 
implications has been the overarching aim of this project.  
I do not wish to armchair psychoanalyze myself, but I imagine there is likely some 
connection between my frustrated desire for a dog (compounded later by my grief over my 
prematurely departed Guinee pig) and my childhood callousness toward other animals. Though I 
was “just” a child, I am profoundly ashamed of such behaviors and have a lump in my throat as I 
recount them. Perhaps my chosen topics of concentration in philosophy are part of an effort to 
atone somehow for all of this (after all, perhaps Nietzsche is right to observe that “every 
philosophy…is the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious 
memoir”875). The point of this confession, however, is neither catharsis or expiation nor merely 
to make an empirical claim about human psychology, but to reinforce the point that, at the 
deepest ontological level, my subjectivity has been, and continues to be, shaped by my affective 
relations not only with human but also with non-human others, that so much of what I now know 
about the nature of love and cruelty and even about myself I have learned from all of the animals 
I have ever loved and harmed. My parents were, and continue to be, the very best, most 
supportive and loving parents anyone could have. Especially since I was as an only-child, they 
doted upon me incessantly, loved me almost asphyxiatingly, tended to my every need, satisfied 
nearly my every desire, and nurtured my every interest or passion, and despite what my 
behaviors toward animals as a child might suggest, I was generally a sweet, happy, well-
																																																								
874 The Animal That Therefore I Am, p. 4. 
875 Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. Walter Kauffman (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1989), §6, p. 13. 
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mannered child. But my parents alone could not teach me everything about what it is to love and 
to be loved, what it is to act in the world kindly or cruelly, or even what it is “to be human.”  
The cliché is that it takes a “village” (not just a “family”) to raise a child. My contention 
is that it takes a “jungle” – a whole ecosystem – to do so, and that indeed (as I and Merleau-
Ponty argue) what we call a “village” or a “family” or a “community” is always already 
composed of human and non-human beings, is always already open to, and suffused with, 
affective, carnal bonds with non-human as well as with human others, is always already 
intercorporeally, “interanimalistically” grounded and shaped in ways that refute any divisions of 
the world along supposedly neat, essential species lines. Any particular community of embodied 
beings – whether at the scale of a “family” or that of a polis – is always already part of a “Body” 
(or process of “body-ing”) that constitutes, and that is itself constituted by, indefinitely many 
bodies and indefinitely many kinds of bodies (or body-ings), is always already embedded in a 
field of (inter)corporeal be(com)ings or in what I have called a “radical community,” and is thus 
always already implicated in anything it might pretend to exclude from itself, or is always 
already, as Merleau-Ponty remarks concerning the nature of human consciousness itself, an 
“abode of ambiguity.”876  
Not only did Sammy express his love for me when he clasped his paws upon my 
shoulders and furiously licked my face, and not only does Mr. Bojangles express his love for me 
every time falls asleep in my lap or returns my caresses with deep, rhythmic purrs, but such have 
been major, formative ways that I have learned what love is, that I have learned the kind of 
ecstasy love can be and of which flesh is capable, that I have learned the kind of love of which I 
am capable. This is, of course, an empirical truth, but it is not just that. As Merleau-Ponty 
																																																								
876 Phenomenology of Perception, p. 332. 
	 690	
remarks, “…every significant proposition of empirical psychology anticipates a 
phenomenological truth.”877 Like all empirical truths, the one I have just mentioned reveals to us 
more fundamental phenomenological or ontological truths if we know how to interpret it 
correctly, if we know how to look at it, if we know how to understand what it means to show us 
about ourselves: it shows us that we – or rather, that the bodies that we are – always already 
compose and “pair” with other bodies, that no body is essentially closed off from any other kind 
of body, that no body is ever isolated or discretely individuated, that every living body is (like 
Being itself) the singular that is also already plural, that flesh can only be shaped by other flesh, 
that flesh is inherently expressive and labile, that in order to know one’s body (hence oneself) it 
is necessary to know other bodies (human and non-human alike), that before there is ever a 
question of “inferring” mental states in others I must have already been penetrated by them, or 
that I must have already “introjected” from others anything I will ever be motivated to “project” 
into them, that no quality of mind or body – no sensation, no perception, no affect, no emotion, 
no volition, no faculty or object of thought whatsoever – has any intelligibility in the absence of 
others who show them to me, and that their intelligibility inherently includes all of the ways that 
any body could possibly show them to me.  
One of my favorite novels is Crime and Punishment, and perhaps the most poignant 
moment in this novel is a peculiar dream in which Raskolnikov regresses to an incident from his 
childhood in which he witnessed the cruel beating of an old cart-horse as it struggled under a 
load far too heavy for it to bear; it is lashed first with a whip, then bludgeoned to death with an 
iron crowbar by its master; the horse and its master are surrounded by a mob, and the few voices 
of protest are soon drowned out by laugher and cheer; several of the onlookers even join in on 
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the beating. Young Raskolnikov breaks away from his father and rushes into the crowd, throws 
his arms around the dead horse, breaks into sobs, and cradles its head in his arms. What are we to 
make of this scene? Is this dream merely an instance of “hysteria”? And can we simply dismiss 
the young Raskolnikov’s reaction as puerile or “irrational”? Raskolnikov, indeed, sometimes 
suffers from intense bouts of fever and alcohol-induced delirium. However, we should also recall 
that it is precisely cold, utilitarian “rationality” that allows Raskolnikov (in his adult, sober, 
waking life) to justify (or at least rationalize) murdering the old pawnbroker and her innocent 
sister with an axe. Is this dream, then, “nothing but” the phantasm of a feverish mind, a transient 
episode of delirium that holds no deeper meaning? Or is this dream rather a revolt of the deepest 
part of Raskolnikov’s self against that “waking” rationality that suppresses and estranges him 
from what he lives, the upsurge of an affectivity or intercorporeality that constitutes what it is to 
be a living body? If Raskolnikov’s “reason” can drive him to senseless homicide, then his “non-
reason” – his unconscious, his body – is more wakeful or more “rational” than anything in his 
reflective, “rational,” waking existence. If reflection or “reason” represses the truths we “know” 
by direct, corporeal and affective acquaintance, then only something not fettered to its 
constraints or ill-conceived machinations may lucidly reveal such truths to us. This is the 
phenomenological lesson of Raskolnikov’s dream and even of the novel as a whole. 
Raskolnikov’s dream of the horse – his dream of an immediate, embodied overture of 
compassion to a suffering, dying animal – is the irruption, the rebellious cry of what he knows 
prior to reflection, and it is perhaps the most lucid, indeed the most “human” moment in the 
story. The horse figures not as the object of an oversensitive child’s animistic flight of fancy, nor 
is it simply an efflux of febrile delirium: it is a genuine Other, a “Thou”; it is a living body that 
(like every living body) addresses us and whose address to us discloses the fact that, as the very 
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condition of its possibility, we are always already bound to one another – that is, always already 
bound to any and all embodied Others – in our vital, embodied existence, that we are always 
already tied to any beings who do or can address us.  
Raskolnikov’s dream, the shame I feel about having harmed animals as a child, and all of 
our lived experiences of finding ourselves addressed by non-human others disclose to us the 
basic ontological fact that human and non-human bodies are always already intertwined with one 
another, or always already open and addressed to one another; moreover, it begins to disclose 
that there is nothing “human” whose being or intelligibility as such is not already buttressed by 
webs of relations with non-humans, that there is nothing that is part of our “humanity,” nothing 
within the ambit of our subjectivity, that is not constitutively embedded in a more-than-human 
world. Humans are different from geese and from horses. Yet humans, geese, horses, and all 
embodied beings are also, simply in virtue of their shared embodiment, “parts” of one another, 
promiscuously involved with one another, “thorns” in one another’s flesh, the flesh of one 
another’s flesh, irrecusably, indissolubly together in flesh, together yet also other in flesh. 
“Flesh,” again, does not just mean shared corporeality (though it saliently does mean this): in 
Merleau-Ponty, it also designates the paradoxical compresence of togetherness and distance, the 
paradoxical constitution of togetherness through distance; it designates the paradoxical co-
constitution of selfhood and alterity, the paradoxical constitution of selfhood through alterity; it 
designates the aporia of genuine community, that is, the aporia of a kind of community instituted 
through neither the totalizing inclusion nor absolute exclusion of what is “Other,” the paradox of 
a community instituted through its distension into, yet never consumptive incorporation of, what 
is “outside” itself; it designates the paradox that “inside” and “outside” are co-constitutive, which 
means nothing is ever really purely one or the other, that nothing is ever wholly within or wholly 
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outside the boundaries that mark out any distinct compass of carnal existence; it designates, in a 
word, the paradox of difference.  
Raskolnikov is affected by the horse’s plight for the same reason I was affected (and am 
still affected) by the goose whose leg I am partially (if not solely) responsible for having 
maimed: there is a necessary, undeniable continuity of flesh and affectivity. All affects (hence all 
living bodies) are already in composition with one another because affectivity is ecstasy, because 
to be affected (hence to be a living body) is already to be outside oneself, already to be with and 
within the bodies of others who nevertheless (paradoxically) remain Other, who in fact must be 
genuinely, irreducibly Other if I am to be affected by or situated in any kind of relationship with 
them at all, if indeed I am to be a “self” at all. “Humanity” and “equinity” are different, yet true, 
fundamental difference – difference “worthy of the name” – is never opposition or mutual 
exclusion, and so even though they are different, it is impossible to determine with transparent 
clarity or sharp precision where one ends and where the other begins, and this impossibility is 
not merely an epistemological defect or limitation, but an ontological condition: it is impossible 
to ascribe any such determinacy to either of them because no kinds of living bodies possess or 
express any determinations apart from one another, because nothing in carnal existence is ever 
isolated or self-contained in its being or meaning; thus, the difference between them is (like all 
differences) also a limit through which, as Merleau-Ponty often says, they “encroach upon” one 
another, and neither would be what it is without this encroachment upon or passage into the other 
any more so than it would be what it is without being different from the other at all. In short, 
binary opposition effaces or represses difference just as much as any imposition of identity or 
presumption of “sameness,” and our task is to draw the consequences of this as rigorously as we 
can (consequences that cannot but be ethical and political as well as ontological). Humans and 
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horses are different, yet there is always “humanity” in a horse and there is always “equinity” in a 
human. And I – along with Raskolnikov – learn more about what it is to be “human” by learning 
about what it is to be “horse,” and indeed I only ever learn what it is to be human – I only ever 
become (and am ever becoming) human – by discovering, exploring, and surrendering myself to 
the carnal, affective bonds with indefinitely many other kinds of living bodies of which my own 
is capable and with which it, even down to the “simplest” sensation or motor power, is already 
entangled.   
In particular, there is human vulnerability in a horse and there is equine vulnerability in 
our own humanity, and this shared vulnerability – which is also shared flesh – is not only 
synonymous with that affectivity or reflexivity that binds all living beings together while at the 
same time distinguishing them from one another, it is also that which addresses us whenever we 
encounter an Other, whether it be through the outstretched hand of a human, through the labored, 
dying breaths of a horse, through the injured leg of a goose, through the broken wing of a baby 
bird, or through the intricate craftsmanship, vital function, and gossamer fragility of a spider’s 
web; it this vulnerability to which we are always responsive in some manner, it is this 
vulnerability that constitutes us as the living bodies that we are, it is this vulnerability through 
which learn who or what we and Others are, it is this vulnerability that expresses the most basic 
“We” to which “we” and others belong, and it is this vulnerability that is therefore the foundation 
– the “Ur-phenomenon” – of ethics and politics.  
This mutual vulnerability expresses the being-together of living beings that comes before 
and disrupts any reflective, deliberative considerations of “who we are” or of how “we” should 
act in the world and live together: before any abstract ideas of rights and contracts, before any 
abstract constructs of sovereignty, before any abstract criteriology of interests, before any 
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abstract deductions of duties or balance sheets of positive and negative utilities, before the 
imposition of any such abstractions, before especially the imposition of false and oppressive (yet 
often naturalized) abstractions such as borders, debts, and social hierarchies. When I confront, 
say, the injured wing of a bird or a spider’s web in my path, I do not pause to deduce duties from 
a priori imperatives, to calculate positive and negative utilities, to tabulate debts, costs, and 
profits, to consider properties that confer moral rights, or to enumerate necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for communal, hence moral, standing: in fact, all such deliberations betoken 
the death of authentic, lived ethical experience, or a context in which truly ethical responsiveness 
is no longer possible. In any case, this shared vulnerability from which any moral experience 
arises enunciates and saturates the “We” that comes before any questions concerning who or 
what should be “included” or “excluded” from “our” community or from the circle of “our” 
moral and political concern; it is that ever-gaping wound in our flesh, in ourselves, in our being 
through which we pass into (and are already in) one another, that never-to-be-sutured wound that 
paradoxically sutures our bodies to one another, that openness of the living body to the world 
and to other living bodies that constitutes selfhood and community yet always puts selfhood and 
community in question; it is that ecstasy that is synonymous with sentient flesh, with selfhood 
and community, or rather with selfhood through community; it is that Einfühlung that is also the 
direct (ap)presentation in lived experience of the needs, flourishings, and sufferings of others, or 
that is also the immanence of what we call “the Good.”  
As we have seen, if and when others address me, they fundamentally do so, in some 
fashion, through their living bodies, which is also to say through these bonds of affect, 
vulnerability, and interdependency that already tether us and all living bodies to one another, that 
make us an “us” or a “we” before we ever oppose “ourselves” to any “them.” Shared sentient, 
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self-reflexive flesh is shared vulnerability, and it is our shared (sentient, self-reflexive) flesh, 
hence our shared vulnerability as sentient, fleshy beings, that makes any presencing of alterity, 
and thus any presencing of moral phenomena, possible. This shared flesh or vulnerability – this 
primordial “kinship of finitudes”878 – is attested every time an Other appears to me and addresses 
me, especially every time an Other expresses its needs to me, its flourishing or its destitution to 
me: needs that already overlap with my own, or a condition of flourishing or destitution in which 
I already participate, simply in virtue of the flesh that we share and without which they would 
never be presentable to me at all. No living, vulnerable body in my field of experience can fail to 
address me: the presence of a living, vulnerable body is an “address” of some sort, at once a call 
for a response and a response, a dialectical, meaning-directed agency or what Merleau-Ponty 
often calls a movement of “interrogation.” We will recall that, for Merleau-Ponty, “it is not a 
positive being but an interrogative being which defines life”879: every living body, in the manner 
in which it copes with the world, is a response to others and to the world and a response to their 
responses, a questioning that calls others and the world into question, an expression of needs, 
desires, intentions, projects, and goods to which others and the world will be (more or less) 
congenial, hostile, or indifferent, but which cannot fail to implicate them – to incorporate them, 
to share its (vulnerable, desirous, needful, intentional, inherently expressive) flesh with them – in 
the drama and labor of its existence.  
Any encounter I have with an Other – whether it be an encounter with a human or other-
than-human Other – discloses the flesh that we share, the affects or vulnerabilities that let us 
come to presence for one another, that already destined us to address one another upon our first 
acquaintance, that already entangled us with one another even before our first acquaintance. Any 
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particular encounter with an Other discloses, as its immanent (“quasi-transcendental”) condition 
of possibility, the radical “We” that founds not only every “I” but every particular “we,” the Ur-
community (Urgemeinschaftung) of beings that founds the very distinction between “inside” and 
“outside” and that thus always interrupts any questions – that puts into question any questions – 
concerning “inclusion” and “exclusion,” or that always disrupts any formulation of strict 
conditions for membership in a particular community or any calculus of ethical and political 
status: any construction of borders, any circumscription of hearth and home, any deduction of 
rights, any establishment of laws, any negotiation of contracts, any tabulation of debits and 
credits; it discloses the “il y a” that “is the establishment of the very framework and the principle 
of all calculus, of all economy…this being-there by difference and not by identity.”880 Since it is 
outside even the very distinction between “inside” and “outside,” or since it institutes, subtends, 
and aliments every interiority (whether it be the interiority of a self or the “interiority” of a 
specific, empirical community of selves), this radical “We” is always a liminal and never 
totalizing, always a differentiating and never reductively unifying space of cohesion; as such, it 
is necessarily an undecidable community, and it necessarily imparts its undecidability to those 
beings and communities of beings it founds. This radical community – this originary community 
(or communalization) of bodies and of communities of bodies – is, along with the bodies or 
communities of bodies embedded in it, very “real” indeed; it is not nothing; but like everything 
real – like every body, or like every “determination” of being, identity, or meaning – it is 
nonetheless indeterminate, “ambiguous,” porous, and ceaselessly becoming; in fact, it is the 
indeterminacy, ambiguity, porosity, or becoming – that is to say, of course, the “Flesh” – of “the 
real” itself.  
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As we saw in the previous chapter, all of our lived experiences with others – all of our 
lived, affective experiences with human but especially with non-human others – disclose our 
primordial, corporeal, ever-open ‘being-together’ with others, our basic communal enmeshment 
with other living bodies that founds, aliments, and envelops every particular community, 
identity, or affective relationship. Intercorporeal, affective relationships with others are specific 
instances of a basic communalization of all beings that is the very source of affectivity itself, or 
that is itself the movement of reflexivity of which the reflexivity of the sentient body or of 
identity at any register of reality is but one expression. For Merleau-Ponty, the flesh of the living 
body that defies the traditionally assumed dichotomy between subject and object, and the 
intercorporeity between living bodies that similarly defies any assumed dichotomy between self 
and Other, discloses Being as what he calls “Flesh,” that is, as the medium in and through which 
all relations, hence all distinct, relationally constituted beings or phenomena, are constituted as 
such, or rather as simply the relationality of all particular relations; it designates, as we have 
seen, the “between-ness” of any relationship between things, that is, the simultaneously 
disjunctive and conjunctive space that enables any distinct thing to be together with other things, 
hence that enables any distinct thing to be, at all. The “flesh of the world” (or simply “Flesh”), 
then, is the intrinsically and infinitely parturient, differentiational plane or process within and 
through which anything in the world, and especially any specific “self” or community, comes to 
presence or meaning. The lived body and intercorporeity are sites and surface effects – albeit 
exemplary sites and surface effects – of a more basic relational process at work in the world and 
at the core of all things and phenomena, of a coming-into-being of things that is, necessarily at 
the same time, their coming-together, or of a genesis of things through difference that, as such, 
entails their overlapping or mutual “encroachment.” This communalization through which all 
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things – especially all (inter)subjectivities – emerge into being and meaning is what I have 
proposed we call “radical community,” for it is, again, precisely a community that is radical in 
the original sense of that term: it is the intercorporeal community that constitutes the radix of 
every distinct intercorporeal community (whether between beings within a species or between 
beings of different species), the Ur-community within which all subjectivities, or rather within 
which all distinct communities of subjectivities, are already embedded.  
Far from being a totalizing monolith into which all differences between particular beings 
or communities would be absorbed, this Ur-community – this primordial community of 
communities or this radical community – is itself difference (or differentiation), hence 
relationality, all the way down. “The flesh of the world” is radical community, and as such it 
does not erase but rather renders fluid and ultimately undecidable the boundaries or “limits” 
through which distinct identities and communities are constituted, for as the lived body antecedes 
and founds the very distinction between subject (interiority) and object (exteriority), so does “the 
flesh of the world” analogously antecede and found the very distinction between every “inside” 
and every “outside” and thereby always already internally disrupts (or “de-constructs”) any 
supposed opposition between the two. Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh, or rather his 
ontology of “radical community” (which is also an ontology of radical difference), is precisely 
beyond the false alternatives of either a totalizing, assimilative universalism or an atomizing 
isolationism or relativism; that is, it shows us that communities are never fundamentally 
instituted through either the reductive inclusion or oppositional exclusion of what is “Other” 
(which are, indeed, the only conceivable ways communities may be determined in classical 
liberal ethics and political theory). According to traditional notions of community, one is either 
wholly inside or wholly outside of a community; one is either entirely included or entirely 
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excluded. Flesh (or radical community), however, demonstrates that such an opposition between 
“inside” and “outside,” hence between the traditional alternatives of (appropriative) inclusion 
and (absolute) exclusion, is just as false as the analogous oppositions of mind and body and self 
and Other because it institutes, and is therefore below, the very distinction between “inside” and 
“outside” in the first place and because, moreover, it entails the coupling of every “inside” with 
an outside, or of every community with other communities, in just the same manner that it entails 
the couplings of distinct living bodies.  
In the same way that reductive materialism is simply the logical counterpart to dualism, 
in the same way that subjectivism is simply the logical counterpart to an absolutist, “God’s eye” 
conception of objectivity, or in the same way that the notion of a “mere” appearance is simply 
the logical counterpart to the notion of a reality “behind the scenes,” so is the totalizing or 
reductive appropriation of otherness simply the logical counterpart to the strict negation or 
exclusion of otherness. As we have seen, however, to reject one term of a binary is necessarily to 
reject the other, and Merleau-Ponty shows that we must reject both of these latter binary 
alternatives in any sound account of our relations with others and thus in any sound account of 
the nature of community: neither alternative – neither appropriative identity nor dualistic non-
identity, neither assimilation nor exile – can account for the possibility of any relationship to 
alterity, and given that a relationship to alterity is constitutive of any identity, they also cannot 
account for the constitution of either selfhood or community.  
In Merleau-Ponty, no community can ever be understood to be totally isolated for the 
same reason that no “self” can ever be understood to be totally isolated; thus, every community 
(just like every living being of which a community is composed) is constituted by webs of 
relationships with its “others.” Alterity is fundamentally constitutive of any specific community 
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– any specific circle of intersubjective existence – for the same reason it is fundamentally 
constitutive of subjectivity; indeed, any relationship with alterity is community itself. However, 
alterity can only constitute community or subjectivity insofar as it is not effaced or 
consumptively absorbed into the latter. Only irreducible alterity can constitute selfhood and 
community, for anything else is not truly “alterity” at all, yet irreducible alterity cannot be 
conceptualized as oppositionally excluded from the community or “self” it constitutes, for then 
there would in fact be no relationship between them at all. No community can ever be constituted 
by the absolute exclusion of otherness, for such isolationism or solipsism is ontologically 
impossible for reasons I have already elaborated, yet this also means that no community can ever 
“include” otherness in any way that would erase or “totalize” it, for that would reinstate the very 
sort of isolationism or solipsism we have just rejected (and must reject). If a community can 
never be totally isolated from otherness, then neither can it be a “totalization” of otherness, and 
this is, in short, the double-bind or aporia at the heart of every community, the double-bind or 
aporia that is community: no community can ever truly be founded upon the absolute exclusion 
of others, yet it also cannot absolutely include such others either. In other words, the radical 
community in which every particular community is embedded signifies, in a sense, a kind of 
“inclusivity” that is below the conventional opposition between “inclusion” and “exclusion,” for 
it is, in fact, a process through which communities are instituted through differentiation, and (as 
we have seen) differentiation entails imbrication. Every particular community is instituted as the 
distinct community that it is only through a process that entangles it with other communities, 
hence through a process that necessarily blurs its boundaries or refuses it any purity or closure of 
identity, a process that, in a word, renders it irreducibly “ambiguous.”   
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So, if no “community” can ever be understood as utterly isolated, autonomous, or self-
enclosed – that is, if no “we” can ever exist independently of its relations with other “we’s” for 
the same reason that no “I” can ever exist independently of other “I’s” – then neither can it ever 
be understood as something into which alterities would be totally assimilated, for that is to erase 
such alterities altogether and thus to construct such a community as isolated, autonomous, or 
self-enclosed after all. It follows that no genuine community can ever be constructed as either the 
totalizing, reductive appropriation or as the absolute, oppositional expulsion of otherness(es). 
Any community “worthy of the name” cannot exclude its extra-communal “others,” yet so too 
can it not include them in such a way that would efface their genuine, extra-communal otherness. 
Everything, again, comes down to the “both/and” logic of difference (or of the chiasm): there 
must be others who are outside of my community, and these others who are outside of my 
community are also part of my community, or are never absolutely outside of it; my community 
must “include” or already be open to others who are outside of it, and it must not include them 
absolutely. The paradox here is the same as the general paradox of alterity: others are “not” me, 
yet this “not” cannot signify strict negation; others are “not” me, yet they are also constitutive of 
me, such that there is no sharp, decidable line between where I end and where others begin. And 
what is true of “the self” relative to others is analogously true of any community relative to other 
communities (or relative to extra-communal others). 
In order to reject any construction of “community” predicated upon the total exclusion of 
otherness, it is also necessary to reject any construction of community predicated upon the 
consumptive, assimilative incorporation (or “melting pot” dissolution) of otherness. That is to 
say, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of what I have called “radical community” is neither absolutely 
absorptive homogeneity nor atomistic heterogeneity, neither self-enclosed identity nor 
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oppositional non-identity, neither reductive continuity nor dualistic discontinuity: the alternatives 
that compose these (roughly equivalent) dyads are logical counterparts, and they are all equally 
irrelational; thus, genuine, radical community designates neither side of these traditional 
conceptual antitheses and is precisely what escapes and unsettles them: it is difference, or 
genuine relationality, all the way down. For the same reason that every “I” must be embedded in 
a “we,” so too must every “we” be embedded in an “Ur-We,” a field of relations with other 
communities that constitutes it as the distinct community that it is yet, necessarily at the same 
time, folds it into other communities or renders the boundaries between it and other communities 
never sharply determinable and “ever-gaping open.”881 In Merleau-Ponty, the “flesh of the 
world” (or simply “Flesh”) explains the possibility of (or is already) precisely a non-
appropriative in-corporation of otherness, a non-assimilative yet also non-exclusionary 
community, which is, again, the only kind of community “worthy of the name,” the only kind of 
community that any living being – human or otherwise – inhabits, and the only kind of 
community that has ever constituted what we call a “self.”   
Thus, it is never the case that any embodied being is either wholly “inside” a community 
or wholly “outside” of a community in the same sense that my living body is never either purely 
an internal subject of experience or merely an external object of experience, for the boundary 
between any community and its “outside” or its “others” – just the like the boundary between 
interiority and exteriority and between “self” and “Other(s)” – is never sharp or impermeable but 
always a site of passage between them, indeed already constituted by its “outside” or its “others” 
in the first place. As selfhood or interiority is constituted as such by its distension into what is 
other than itself, so too is any community. The skeins of carnal relations that constitute me as a 
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distinct self at the price of depriving me of absolute solitude or privacy are the very same as 
those that constitute any distinct community as such at the price of depriving it of total isolation, 
autonomy, or sovereignty. Merleau-Ponty’s ontology simply extends to the nature of community 
what was always known to be true concerning the nature of the “self,” or applies to “the We” 
what is necessarily true of “the I,” namely that it can never be isolated and is always already 
entwined with its “outsides” or its “others.” We have seen that what is true concerning the 
relationship between self and Other is true concerning the relationship between “humanity” and 
“animality” and is also true, yet more generally, concerning the relationships between any 
particular intercorporeal communities. There is no such thing as an isolated community, and also 
no such thing as an isolated “humanity,” for the same reason that there is such a thing as an 
isolated self. The core thesis of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology – and one that succinctly articulates 
what he means by the relational, “chiasmatic” institution of all things – is that “inside and 
outside are inseparable.”882 This inseparability – this differentiation yet necessary, correlative 
overlapping – of “inside” and “outside,” of “selfhood” and “alterity,” of every “Us” and every 
“them,” is precisely the radical community that precedes and institutes every particular 
community, the community that therefore precedes and resists any supposed divisions between 
particular communities, the community that unsettles any supposed oppositions between any 
“us” and any “them,” any “we” and any “other we’s.” Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s ontology discloses 
and foregrounds the irreducible ambiguity that constitutes any distinct being, identity, or 
community, the intertwining of all things – hence the primordial, positive indeterminacies or 
liminalities – from which any kind of determinacy is derived; it discloses the relational 
embeddedness, hence the fluidity, openness, or undecidability, of every boundary; it discloses 
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the worldly, incarnate, even aporetic “both/and” logic endemic to the constitution of any 
category or community of beings – and endemic to the very Being of beings – that precisely 
disrupts the abstract, “either/or” logic through which we conventionally police the borders of 
categories and communities.  
We have seen that, toward the end of his career, Merleau-Ponty was led to discover a 
layer of intersubjectivity or intercorporeity that is more basic than that which had traditionally 
been taken for granted (by himself and others) as basic, that is, one that is more basic than any 
supposed sphere of exclusively human interaction; he was led to discover an “interanimality,” or 
an interspecific intersubjectivity, that is prior to, and the condition of, any intra-specific (e.g. 
“human”) intersubjectivity. Of course, since intersubjectivity is always already intercorporeity – 
that is, always already a relationship between bodies – it was always the case that it could never 
be sharply restricted to only one kind of embodied being, since all embodied beings are, in virtue 
of their embodiment and no matter how significantly different their bodies may be, 
fundamentally continuous with, or never ontologically divorced from, one another. Merleau-
Ponty’s concept of “interanimality,” then, simply makes explicit what is entailed by his 
understanding of Being as “Flesh”: all subjectivities are constituted as such within skeins of flesh 
coiled back and over upon flesh, an inter-carnality that does not obey “species” boundaries – or 
the boundaries of any supposed community of carnal beings – for the very reason that it is the 
source of all of them, or for the very reason that is the source of every form of sentient, carnal 
being. All subjectivities are constituted, in other words, by an elemental differentiation from one 
another that entails, or simply already is, their communalization, by an element, then, that is the 
source not only every particular embodied being but also the source of any particular community 
of embodied beings and that I, therefore, call a radical community. This is precisely what 
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Merleau-Ponty intended to signify as “interanimality” (or, yet more broadly, as “Flesh”), namely 
the intercorporeal differentiation and imbrication of all things that constitutes them as the distinct 
things – or as the distinct communities of things – that they are, that “encroachment of everything 
upon everything”883 that decenters not only the anthropocentricity of conventional 
phenomenological accounts of (inter-)subjectivity and meaning but also any such supposed 
“centricity” – any such pure, isolated, privileged origin or supreme perch – in the order of 
worldly being or meaning, including especially any (explicitly or tacitly) essentialist – hence 
solipsistic, isolationist, or supremacist – notions of identity and community.  
To be clear, “interanimality,” or the pairing or co-constitution of humanity and animality 
– or rather the foundational overlapping of all communities of living beings, or the radical 
communalization of all communities – does not necessarily generate or signify a perfectly 
harmonious, peaceful or congenial communion of living beings or communities884; rather, it 
signifies a certain indeterminacy or ambiguity as the constitutive condition of community, an 
aporetic relational dynamic that we conceal and even attempt to expunge or master through 
various metaphysical abstractions, conceptual analyses, and clerical, technocratic (“liberal”) 
sorting apparatuses and classification schemes, in particular through the attempt to define 
“community” in terms of a transparently recognizable and intelligible or supposedly essential set 
of properties shared by all and only its members (or in terms of “necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions” for community membership). To put the point positively, “radical community” – or 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh – signifies an enmeshment with otherness that precisely 
disrupts our pretensions to any sort of closure, purity, or sharp delimitation of identity or 
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884 Thus, Merleau-Ponty affirms that an inter-animality or crossing of Umwelts happens even between species that 
are “usually enemies, as the rat lives among vipers” (Nature, p. 173). 
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community. In short, the point here is that nothing in existence is ever “pure.” No categories of 
being or identity, no genus or species, no subject or object, no framework of knowledge, nothing 
immanent, nothing transcendent, nothing internal, nothing external, nothing perceptible, nothing 
abstract, nothing “mental” and certainly nothing corporeal (as everything ultimately is), no 
source of existence or meaning, no community, lifeworld, or form of life, is ever “pure.” Purity 
is perhaps the most fundamental abstraction. Nothing is ever purely what it “is,” and that means 
that nothing is ever purely not what it “is not.” In short, if there is no such thing is as purity of 
existence, identity, meaning, and thus community, it follows that there is no such thing as purity 
of exclusion: to say that nothing is ever “pure” or self-contained is to say that nothing may ever 
pretend to exclude absolutely from itself what is “other” than itself, for what is “other” than itself 
is constitutive of what it itself is. Thus, all pretenses to strict, oppositional exclusion are but 
merely pretenses. The point, again, is not there are no such things as distinct beings or 
communities but that, at the fundamental ontological level, there are no such things as strict, 
mutual exclusions, or no such thing as pure, self-contained beings, identities, or communities. 
The point is not there are no such things as boundaries, but that there are no such things as sharp, 
essential, fixed, clear, or impermeable boundaries. Boundaries are real, but strict divisions or 
borders are not. All borders are false abstractions. All borders are barbarisms. This is what it 
means for things to be constituted chiasmatically: that they be constituted as what they are by 
their contamination by what is other than what they are, which means that what is Other must be 
truly, irreducibly Other, yet not “Other” to the pitch of contradiction, or not so “Other” that it is 
ever a completely excluded Other. If there is no purity of “selfhood,” so too is there no purity of 
otherness. But this does not mean there is no such thing as selfhood or as genuine, irreducible 
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otherness: the only way to conceptualize selfhood or otherness correctly is to conceptualize them 
as co-constitutive, that is, as equally impure.  
The crucial point here, and the one that we encountered in our discussion of Merleau-
Ponty’s appropriation of Gestalt psychology (that is, in our discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s 
concept of “écart”), is that anything that is ever taken to be, or adopted as, a “foreground” is in 
no way a central, privileged, originary site of meaning, but one node among infinitely many 
others through which flesh expresses itself, or but one manner in which Being is incarnated, a 
stable albeit fugitive hiatus in the becoming of life and worldly meaning. The point here is that 
any sort of foregrounded site of meaning, style of existence, or experiential standpoint – like the 
one we call “human” – is always already decentered in the ontological and semiotic order of 
things, for it is not the source of its own being or meaning let alone the source from which the 
being or meaning of anything else could be negatively derived; rather, what is fundamental is the 
reciprocal exchange of sense between itself and its “Other(s),” which is also to say the space 
itself through which they are differentiated as such that lets such an exchange of sense happen in 
the first place; what is fundamental is the non-foregroundable dehiscence in Being that couples 
the terms it separates because it is a cleavage, or opening, between terms from within a common 
elemental or relational medium, a medium, it must be underscored, that is not an amorphous, 
monistic, undifferentiated ground or “mass” – not a hypokeimenon or heap of “prime matter,” 
not John Locke’s “I know not what” that is supposed to support perceptible qualities – but is 
itself inherently differentiational, or inherently generative of difference. As we have seen, 
humanity is of animality, yet this of does not designate descent from a simple, undifferentiated 
origin but rather designates the relational openness – the irreducible, “fecund” distance or 
differentiational space – between them, the already multivocal and pluriform yet conjunctive, the 
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already pluralizing and communalizing flesh between them; it indicates the element from and in 
the midst of which they both (along with everything else in perceptible and intelligible reality) 
arise and exist in common. When we hear “of” in this respect, we should hear not “on the ground 
of” so much as “in the midst of”; the human way of being is simply one particular incarnation of 
the carnal world in precisely this sense of that preposition: it is utterly enveloped and invaded by 
the world – by “nature” or by “animality” – from all sides yet is also apart from it as a distinct 
manner of being or “fold” within it, as a particular way of summoning or sublimating the flesh of 
all other beings. “Humanity” is “of” animality in the sense that to be human is to express in 
distinctive ways the corporealities of all other living beings or “animals”; it is to express the 
sensibilities and vulnerabilities, the modes of affect and intentionality, the capacities and 
incapacities of all of the other bodies in creative dialogue with the world we inhabit in common, 
the world we inhabit differently yet together all the same. Other animals are “me” and are not 
me; animal bodies are and are not my body; their living bodies are other than mine yet they are, 
nonetheless, living bodies, hence articulations of myself and my world, hence enfleshments of 
the same flesh, hence the flesh of my flesh.  
Any standpoint – whether experiential/epistemic, ontological, or ethical – that postures 
itself as “central” or “primary” in the order of things, relative to which all other things are merely 
secondary or marginal in their meaning, being, or value, is at once decentered by those very 
“margins” themselves, for it is precisely these margins that, like the edges through which, say, a 
tent is staked into the earth, anchor it as such and which are therefore not merely or even 
“margins” at all; on the contrary, since without such margins or horizons no standpoint would 
show up in the world, they are foundational to whatever hold upon the world such a standpoint 
enjoys, yet nothing that is foundational may be regarded as truly marginal or secondary, and 
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nothing that has a foundation may be regarded as truly “central” or “primary.” There is never a 
center without a periphery, never a foreground with a background, but the profound insight this 
reveals to us – the profound ontological kernel of truth in Gestalt psychology – is that the 
supposed autonomy of the former term in opposition to the latter (that is, the supposed autonomy 
of any foreground, or the supposed centrality of any “center”) is never anything but imaginary, 
and that the very opposition between the two is therefore, likewise, imaginary, unstable, and, in 
the final analysis, untenable; it reveals to us the fact that no position or manner of existence in 
the world is every purely central, originary, or primary and that, by the same token, neither is any 
ever merely marginal, derivative, or secondary. In short: no center ever holds, because nothing 
ever effectively functions as a “center” of meaning, being, or value at all, provided we take that 
to mean functioning as a purely autonomous, originary, nonrelational, simple locus of meaning, 
being, or value. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “what enables us to center our existence is also what 
prevents us from centering it completely…”.885 Nothing, then, is ever truly “central,” and 
therefore nothing is every truly “marginal” either. There is never any such thing as a “center” of 
meaning, being, or value: there are only nodes in the pluriform field of experience and existence 
that we otherwise, in perhaps a misleadingly totalizing or homogenizing way, call “the world.” 
And likewise, there are never truly any such things as “margins”: there are only the threads 
through which any particular node of meaning, being, or value is tied to the world, only those 
warps and woofs of relations in the fabric that holds together any standpoint, identity, or form of 
life. The only “margins” are those that have been constructed in order to marginalize certain 
beings for the profit of others: such margins are “real” in the same way that any social 
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construction is real, but they are not necessary or fundamental features of reality, and they can 
therefore be undone just as well as they can cemented in our imaginations and institutions.  
Reality is neither dualistic nor reductively monistic or homogenous, and so it is never the 
case that any being, or that any category or community of beings, is ever completely excluded 
from or subsumed by any other: there is only irreducible plurality, and therefore only irreducible 
relationality. There are differences, and therefore so too are there distinct beings, identities, and 
sites of experience and meaning, but fundamentally there are never anything but differences, 
never anything but the fluid and porous interstices between everything that is and in virtue of 
which anything is. There are distinct, definable “selves,” “entities,” “forms of life,” and 
communities, but these are only knots of relations and imbrications embedded within a plane of 
yet further relations and imbrications. There are foregrounds and backgrounds, figures and 
horizons: there is no question of denying this axiom of Gestalt theory. However, what is truly 
primary or foundational is never the foreground nor even the background or horizon amid which 
every foreground stands; rather, what is foundational is the very opening or dehiscence between 
the two, the non-foregroundable space through which they endlessly fold or shift into and out of 
one another, the “hinges,” “clear zones,” or “pivots”886 through which they ceaselessly take up 
and yield to the place of one another and, in turn, reconfigure one another and clear the way for 
the appearances of ever new figures or “others,” ever new horizons or vectors of being, ever new 
“rays of the world”887 in the universal kaleidoscopic unfolding – in the primal differentiation and 
overlapping – of phenomena and perspectives, of bodies and meanings, of “lines of force and 
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dimensions”888 that Merleau-Ponty calls “the Flesh,” “écart,” or “chiasmatic” relationality and 
that we otherwise call “Being” or “Nature.”  
Thus, it should be clear that Merleau-Ponty never denies the existence of distinct 
identities or of “individualities,” for then his (or any similar) ontology would indeed plunge all of 
existence into an undifferentiated monistic substance or sheer nothingness, a Parmenidean 
plenum that would efface all apparent differences between things in the world; on any such 
account, Being would indeed be a “motionless identity with itself”889 or a “night in which all 
cows are black.” It should be clear, then, that Merleau-Ponty vehemently opposes, and seeks to 
develop an alternative to, any such ontology; as he writes in one of his working notes to The 
Visible and the Invisible: “Start from this: there is not identity, nor non-identity, or non-
coincidence, there is inside and outside turning about one another…”.890 As I hope to have 
shown in the previous chapter, Merleau-Ponty offers an ontology that is beyond the classical 
alternatives of (reductive) monism and dualism (or any crude atomistic or relativistic pluralism), 
beyond the dilemma of scientistic naturalism and Platonic/Cartesian supernaturalism; he 
provides a conception of Being that is below the classical antitheses of identity and opposition, 
sameness and contradiction, immanence and transcendence, ideality and materiality, the 
transcendental and the empirical. In a word, Merleau-Ponty provides an ontology of (genuine) 
difference, which is precisely the only kind that can take seriously or explain correctly what it 
means to exist as a distinct being (or within a distinct community of beings), what it is to have 
“identity” or “individuality,” what it is to be a “self” and an “Other.” There is individuation, and 
thus there are “individuals.” Individuality is a real phenomenon, for without it experience (or 
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distinct existence) would be impossible. However, there are no utterly isolated individuals. 
Individuals – and, by extension, individual communities – are constituted relationally all the way 
down. Merleau-Ponty argues and continually insists that the same fundamental relatedness that 
obtains between and constitutes embodied subjectivities also obtains between and constitutes 
communities of embodied subjectivities, that in just the same way that there is intercorporeity 
between living bodies, so too is there intercorporeity between worlds, or so too is there an 
“interworld” (or a space of inter-world-ing). As we know quite well concerning every actual 
“individual” (human or non-human) body, “individuality” is not the antithesis of hybridity or 
community but is in fact always a form and effect of it. Though phenomenology teaches us to be 
suspicious of binaries and that most binaries are in fact false, not all of them are; not every 
dilemma is a false dilemma, and the fundamental dilemma of ontology – which is not a false 
dilemma – is this: we may either have static, atemporal, undifferentiated (Parmenidean) Oneness, 
or we may have difference all the way down, and we cannot have both. We must, of course, 
accept the latter alternative, and what remains to be done – what always remains to be done – is 
to extrapolate its consequences rigorously and let them inform further thinking and living.  
So, Merleau-Ponty shows us that insofar as we struggle to understand our own 
“humanity” in opposition to animality we do not know what our humanity is at all and, 
consequently, that we do not know what “animality” is either. There is no self without others, 
and no humanity without animality. In order for us to learn what our humanity is, we need to re-
attune ourselves to non-human life. We fail to understand our own “humanity” insofar as we 
endeavor to understand it in isolation from “animality” for the same reason that we necessarily 
fail to understand the (“human”) self in isolation from (“human”) others or for the same reason 
that we necessarily fail to understand subjectivity in isolation from corporeality; the same 
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chiasmatic relationship that obtains between self and Other or between subjectivity and 
corporeality also obtains between “humanity” and “animality.” We cannot understand “who we 
are” to the extent that we attempt to do so in such a way that excludes animal alterities from who 
or what we are, or in such a way that disavows our own continuity or enmeshment with what is 
“other” than “us,” for just as there is no self without others, so too is there no “us” without 
“other-than-us” us’s, and finally there are no “we’s” or “us’s” or communities at all without a 
broader community of all such communities, without a radical community from or within which 
all particular communities are differentiated as such and in virtue of which they may claim for 
themselves neither absolute solitude or autonomy nor a central, privileged station in the order of 
existence.  
Since nothing is ever isolated, nothing is ever “pure”; again, there are only relations all 
the way down. Thus, there are divergent and intersecting axes of meaning and being, hence 
differences and limits, but there are no “essences” (in the classical sense of the term), no fixed, 
stable, impregnable boundaries or identities, no pure origins or centers of truth, being, meaning, 
and value; there are only contestable, labile, bounded yet ever-open regions of being-together, 
only shifting, mobile vectors of coexistence and otherness, only enfleshments and the their 
affects, only bodies and communities of bodies in the making, only beings in relations and only 
relations in genesis, only becomings. There are no pure, simple origins or central, autonomous, 
Archimedean loci of existence, knowledge, meaning, or value. For this reason, one has already 
erred whenever one regards the standpoint, style of being, or identity-category from which one 
experiences and thinks about the world to constitute such a pure, simple, autonomous, central 
source of knowledge, meaning, or value. Since there are no simple ontological origins (and also 
no pre-given ontological destinations) – since there is no single, self-contained being or identity 
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from which the being, identity, meaning, or value of anything else may be unilaterally derived – 
there are no ontologically basic hierarchies. Again, this is why Merleau-Ponty insists upon the 
fundamental laterality of every ontologically primary relationship; as we have seen, in Merleau-
Ponty “laterality” is the contrary of “hierarchy.” Though we typically conceptualize hierarchies 
as ladders, they can also be (and indeed always also are) wheels: privileged centers of being, 
meaning, or value around which derivative, subordinate, marginalized, or deprivileged others 
orbit, or relative to which all other things in the world ultimately, centripetally refer. Hierarchies 
consist not only of relations between lower and higher rungs on a kind of “ladder,” but also of 
relations between “centers” and “peripheries.” Any schema in which things are organized in 
terms of a center and a periphery is hierarchical, for it constructs a certain position in the world 
as one relative to which all other beings, identities, or forms of existence may be negatively 
derived and measured, a position in the world in whose orbit all other “positions” are but 
satellites. So, if there is any normative injunction that follows from Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, it 
is to decenter every apparent “center” of being, meaning, or value and thus to dissolve all 
apparent “margins” or “peripheries”; it is to break the wheel of every hierarchy and to “get the 
walls out of our heads.”  
Human beings are the most ontologically insecure beings we know to have ever existed; 
this is proven by the great extent to which we neurotically attempt to distinguish ourselves from 
the rest of animate existence, and though “human exceptionalism” is a thesis that would be 
comedic if it were not so destructive, perhaps ironically this is the one thing that (if anything) 
defines us uniquely: our profound ontological insecurity, the fact that we are the only animals 
that obsess over the question concerning what essentially makes us the kinds of animals that we 
are, the fact that we so desperately crave an answer to the question concerning what (if anything) 
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distinguishes us absolutely from all other forms of life. It is obvious how dangerous this 
insecurity is. However, it is dangerous only insofar as it motivates us to take flight into the false 
comfort of ontological security, which is in fact the true danger. The true danger is the notion 
that there is ever any such thing as a pure, “uncontaminated,” isolated, or autonomous identity or 
source of meaning to which one might cling; the true danger, the gravest violence is to attempt to 
expunge from oneself or from the world the ambiguity (or positive, “fecund” indeterminacy) that 
always already inflates everything to meaning and presence in the first place. Merleau-Ponty’s 
ontology teaches us that we must attempt to think and to comport ourselves in the world in such 
a way that our existence or identity – that this royal “we” – is always registered as fluid, porous, 
ambiguous, and questionable, or in such a way that we are always disclosed to ourselves as 
enmeshed with what is other than ourselves, as always in a process of becoming who or what we 
are, as always implicated in a “never-finished differentiation,”891 and thus as in no way the center 
or eschatological fruition of any universe. This is, I think, the ethical crux of any philosophy of 
difference, “ambiguity,” or “radical community.” And it is perhaps why Merleau-Ponty, who did 
not explicitly write very much on ethics, elliptically and provocatively remarks that his notion of 
ambiguity may “give us the principle of an ethics.”892  
As I argued in the previous chapter, one must, indeed, acknowledge that one cannot 
escape or absolutely transcend one’s own situated, material perspective in the world (for there is 
no such thing as a “view from nowhere”), yet, in acknowledging this, one in fact opens oneself to 
appreciating and affirming others, even to risking oneself in suspending one’s own comfortable 
absorption in the familiar, even to exercising one’s innate vulnerability as a finite, bodily being 
in the effort to form bonds of affection, solidarity, or at least partial understanding across 
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apparently unfathomable depths and impassable distances. As we have discussed, one always 
risks oneself in truly extending oneself to an Other, and perhaps this risk is the only kind of risk 
worthy of the name. And is not “the animal” the “Other” par excellence? “…Isn’t the animal,” 
Derrida asks, “more other still, more radically other…than the other in whom I recognize my 
brother, than the other in whom I identify my fellow or my neighbor?”893 If to be “Other” is to 
exceed one’s own familiar horizons of experience and intelligibility, do we not have to step 
outside our own human standpoint or community in order truly to encounter otherness? If we 
never take leave of our “all-too-human” domain, do we not remain absorbed in “sameness” and 
deny ourselves any relationship with genuine “transcendence” or “alterity”? Is it not insufficient 
that we only allow ourselves to be exposed to, indeed to extend respect and hospitality to, human 
others? Is that really hospitality? To welcome and affirm otherness, do we not have to open our 
own human standpoint or community to that which is other-than-human? Must we not open our 
doors to “the animal” – must we not always be ready to let “the animal” into our community, 
into ourselves through the threshold between us – if we are ever to practice hospitable living, or 
if we are ever truly to enrich our community through a transgression of its boundaries?       
Moreover, if alterity truly is constitutive of what it is be a “self” or “subject,” must it not also 
already be the case that we are constituted by relationships with “animal” alterities, that 
“humanity” is inseparably enlaced with other-than-human-alterities, that indeed genuine alterity 
has always already been other-than-human alterity, that non-humans have always been present in 
and amidst “our” community? Must it not also already be the case that the presence of other-
than-humanness has always already infested our humanity, has always already lefts its traces – 
its pawprints, its dander, its ecdysial residue, its trails and secretions – on us? Must our doors not 
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already be open to “the animal”? Paradoxically, must animals not have already passed through 
the threshold between us and them in order for us ever to have been an “us”?  
Here, I think, we broach Levinas’ fundamental error, the woeful contradiction that derails 
his philosophical project: he goes on at length about the importance of “radical” alterity and 
provides often brilliant phenomenological analyses of it, yet in the end he maintains that it is 
either only or exceptionally the human face through which alterity is revealed, that “the epiphany 
of the face qua face opens humanity”894 and that a dog, for example, although not without a 
“face,” does not present a face in its “purest form.”895 As Derrida remarks ironically, this is quite 
a “surprise, coming from a thinking that is so “obsessed”…so preoccupied by an obsession with 
the other and with his infinite alterity.”896 For Levinas, the foundation of ethics is a relationship 
with otherness: only otherness interrupts the self-absorption of the ego and, in imposing upon it 
the demand to respond to something that transcends it, always already makes it a proper – an 
especially and primarily ethical – “self” or “subject.” Yet, in the end, for Levinas, the so-called 
“Other” must be a human other; the face of the other must resemble my own; thus, the “Other” is 
not really – or at least not radically – “Other” at all. In Levinas, “[the] subject of ethics, the face, 
remains first of a fraternal and human face.”897 On his own terms, Levinas’ refusal to extend full 
alterity to non-human animals is a refusal of alterity as such. Levinas goes on at length about 
otherness, and he goes on at length about how otherness must precisely disrupt and in principle 
be irreducible to what he designates as “sameness,” or anything whose meaning, being, or value 
is constituted only relative to the ego and its narcissistic enjoyments, concerns, and schemas of 
																																																								
894 Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University 
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knowledge, yet he also suggests that “the Other” can only have a very specific kind of face, 
namely the assumed human one of that very ego or subject with which his phenomenological 
examination of subjectivity and ethics begins. In other words, the Other must be “absolutely 
Other,” yet also “the Same” – that is, comfortably within the abode of my own familiar, human-
centered experiences of the world – after all.  
In Levinas, the Other must be irreducible to me, and the otherness of the Other must be 
revealed through a “face” that, as a transcendental condition of its revelation, is irreducible to 
any literal, empirical, or physical “face,” yet the “Other” must reflect my own visage after all: 
the otherness of the Other must be revealed through a face with two eyes, two ears, a mouth, and 
a nose arranged just so (or at least in the general manner of a typical human’s physiognomy). I 
think this is one of the fundamental contradictions that characterizes and beleaguers Levinas’ 
whole philosophy, and given his otherwise rich descriptions of lived, ethical experience, it is one 
that makes it such a disappointment. As Lingis remarks, “…he [Levinas] wants to find ethical 
experience only in the face of his confrontation with another human being…all this seems to me 
so limited. If it’s true that I feel that hunger and need of another human being is a demand put on 
me, then it is also about other species. If I come upon an injured bird or deer in a path, it is 
exactly the same thing, it seems to me.”898 For Levinas, only a human face can disclose alterity, 
or only within the circle of humanity does otherness have a place in the world, but in the end this 
means that it is only from within what Levinas himself calls the sphere of “sameness” – only 
from within the circle of the ego’s quotidian absorption in the world (insofar as this ego is 
always implicitly a human ego) – that there is such a thing as otherness, but on Levinas’ own 
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terms this does not merit being regarded as “otherness” at all. Levinas is right that anything that 
remains within the orbit of the ego is not truly “Other,” but if this ego is defined as “human,” 
then it must follow that nothing within the orbit of humanity (qua humanity) can be truly, or at 
least most radically, “Other” either.  
So, if there is such a thing as “radical alterity,” if there is such a thing as “alterity worthy 
of the name,” it cannot be a human face, or at least it cannot only or merely be a human face, that 
presences it: it must also be presenced by a canine face, a feline face, a bovine face, an ovine 
face, a cervine face, a porcine face, a murine face, an ursine face, an equine face, an elephantine 
face, a cetacean face, a phocine face, an amphibian face, a piscine face, an avian face, an 
ophidian face, a chiropteran face, an arachnid face, a vermicular face, an octopean face, a 
molluscan face, a scyphozoan face; all of these faces and more are the kinds that truly bring me 
face-to-face with otherness. And if we are able to recognize our own (human) faces in the mirror 
and in one another, it must have always already been the case that all of these other “faces” – all 
of these other diverse forms of embodied life with which our own is enmeshed – taught us how 
to do so, that they in fact taught us what “a face” or what “otherness” as such really is and that 
therefore, no matter how much we wish to repress or disavow the fact, have from the beginning 
shaped, encompassed, invaded, reflected, refracted, haunted our own sense of what “we” are, our 
own sense of what is “our own.” As Merleau-Ponty argues, it is always already the case that all 
of these other, non-human othernesses lift human otherness – or one’s sense of a human “we” – 
to being and intelligibility, just as it is always already the case that human others or that a human 
“we” lifts me – my “ego” or my selfhood – to being and intelligibility.  
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So, if there is an experience that truly “subjectifies”899 me, an encounter that interrupts or 
“paralyzes”900 the economy of my “sojourning,”901 appropriative egological enjoyments and 
activities, or if there is what Levinas calls a “traumatism of astonishment”902 that primordially, or 
at least most exemplarily, awakens me to what I am, it cannot consist only in an encounter with 
an “all-too-human” alter-ego; rather, it must also be an encounter with non-human otherness, an 
encounter with a kind of radical otherness that is, as such, paradoxically constitutive of me, an 
encounter with an “animal” alterity that is paradoxically constitutive of my humanity, an 
encounter with a being who is irreducibly Other than me yet, paradoxically, an “animal that 
therefore I am,” too; it must also be an encounter with the wails of a deer who, having recently 
been struck by a car, lies dying on the side of the road; it must also be an encounter with the 
broken wing of a baby bird at the foot of the tree from whence it fell; it must also be an 
encounter with the terror of a cow or a pig who, in his final moments, futilely attempts to flee his 
fate with the slaughterhouse; it must also be an encounter with the listlessness of the tiger who 
paces back and forth in his cage at the zoo; it must also be an encounter with the elephant who 
sways in mourning over the death of one of its own; it must also be an encounter with the 
emancipatory optimism and perseverance of the octopus who ceaselessly invents new ways to 
escape its captivity; it must also be an encounter with the cunning of the raven who hides his 
cache of food from his comrades; it must also be an encounter with the kindness of the rat who 
would rather forgo the greater profit than deny his friend the pleasure of a treat; it must also be 
an encounter with the altruism and bravery of dolphins who protect swimmers from sharks in the 
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open seas; it must also be an encounter with the turtle stuck on its back, whose helplessly flailing 
legs express a plea for help and impress upon me the demand for a response just as much as any 
outstretched hand; it must also be an encounter with the destitution of a duck’s oil soaked body; 
it must also be an encounter with the manta ray who intentionally approaches a scuba diver and 
turns itself over to reveal the fish hooks stuck under one of its eyes; it must also be an encounter 
with the worm who squirms in protest against oblivion under one’s foot; it must also be an 
encounter with the ecstasy of the puppy who insatiably licks one’s face upon arriving home; it 
must also be an encounter with a cat whose deep, rhythmic purrs of contentment and tenderness 
swoon into my chest or lap and invite my caresses; it must also be an encounter with the eyes or 
jaws of a crocodile that, as Val Plumwood describes,903 reflect back to oneself the predatory 
indifference with which one tends to regard the rest of the living world and thereby show that 
one is, in fact, always already potentially prey as well as predator, that one is already meat, too, 
and that thereby force one to confront the inconvenient continuities between oneself and the rest 
of world one wishes to dominate or to not have to be much concerned about at all, the material 
vulnerabilities – the susceptibility to dismemberment, consumption, decay, and unspeakable 
suffering – one otherwise represses and displaces onto other creatures yet which nonetheless are, 
in truth, among the deepest, most important aspects one’s creaturely being.  
If there is, moreover, such a thing as an experience that poses the question of hospitality 
or that calls my own ‘being-at-home’ in the world into question, it is not originally – or at least 
not only, or at least not most paradigmatically – an encounter with another human in need of 
shelter; it is an encounter with the cockroaches who scurry about under my stove, with the mice 
who dwell in my walls or cupboards, with the beaver or opossum who tunnels beneath the 
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foundation of my house, with the spider who spins its magnificent web across the threshold of 
my front door, with the racoons who scavenge my garbage, with the deer who graze upon my 
yard, with the aphids or caterpillars who feast upon my garden, with the stray cat who visits me 
for food and water, with the stray dog, outside in the frigid depths of a Chicago winter, bereft of 
the warmth of a home and family, with the birds who nest in the tree outside my bedroom 
window: these are what call the boundaries within which I dwell, the walls I erect for myself in 
the world, into question; these are what truly pose the question of hospitality: whether one 
happily welcomes, grudgingly tolerates, simply ignores, or attempts to eradicate them, a response 
one way or another is what they unavoidably demand, and the question concerning who or what 
has a place in my home, the question concerning what indeed even is my home, the question 
concerning who or what is my kin, and therefore the question concerning who or what I even 
really am, is the one they unavoidably pose. Moreover, insofar as it is even possible for them to 
present such demands or questions in the first place, they already offer testament to a more 
profound kinship – what Merleau-Ponty, again, calls a “strange kinship”904 – between us, yet one 
which we are prone to forget or disavow; they already indicate a deeper, “radical,” quasi-
transcendental community to which we all belong and which is, as such, outside any binary 
(“either/or”) logic of inclusion and exclusion, or which signifies an “inclusivity” that is prior to, 
and the very condition of, the abstract categories or sorting apparatuses of classical liberalism, 
prior to questions of membership and rights, prior to the oppositions between “public” and 
“private” and “citizen” and “alien”: a “body-politic” that is, like indeed my own body, an 
assemblage of heterogenous bodies and communities in symbiosis. If we are truly to resist what 
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Levinas calls “the imperialism of the same,”905 I think it is clear that we must resist (especially 
Levinas’) “humanism,” and that means resisting “human/animal” dualism wherever we find it, 
perhaps even resisting the very opposition between “sameness” and “otherness” (which, in 
Levinas, always risks collapsing into dualism) as well. Levinas is right to insist that the self is 
only constituted as such in response to Others, that the “subject” is precisely “subjectified” by its 
responsiveness to what it can never assimilate to itself. Likewise, for Merleau-Ponty, since 
subjectivity is always already intersubjectivity, I am constituted all the way down by others to 
whom I am responsive. “I am no more than the respondent for the interpellation that is made to 
me,”906 yet, as a living body, I am always already responsive (in some manner) to any other 
living bodies, that is, to non-human others as well as to human others. I am thus already all of 
those “animals” I have ever loved or helped or even ignored, and I am also all of those animals I 
have ever harmed, killed, or consumed.  
The issue of “consumption” – that is, the issue concerning whose flesh we are willing or 
unwilling to consume – brings me to the title of this concluding chapter, and is one that 
dramatically poses the larger issues I have been addressing here. As I have attempted to make 
clear up to this point, community is inherently aporetic (inherently a “possible impossibility” or 
“impossible possibility,” to borrow a concept from Derrida), yet there is an aporia endemic to 
conventional (especially classically liberal) notions of community, or endemic to any flawed or 
spurious constructions of community, that rends them apart from within: such communities 
attempt to constitute themselves by exclusions that, precisely because such exclusions are 
constitutive of them as such, are not truly exclusions; such communities are constituted by 
excluded others that, precisely because they are constitutive of them as such, are not truly or 
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wholly excluded from them, and which therefore tacitly dispel the fictive isolation, autonomy, 
purity, or exclusionary, “gated country club” or “walled-garden” security such communities 
suppose themselves to enjoy. Any attempt to define a community relative to others to whom 
membership would be absolutely closed, or any attempt to define a community in terms of 
utterly fixed and uncrossable borders, is undermined by the conceptual, ontological, and 
performative impossibility of such closure or purity of existence. The borders of such a 
community are already transgressed by the exteriority they pretend to seal away, by the otherness 
such a community falsely otherizes as absolutely excluded from itself or as the negation of itself. 
The upshot of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the human-animal relationship is essentially the 
deconstructive one that any “human” standpoint already necessarily “includes” – is already 
constituted or shaped by – what it might pretend to exclude from itself or to displace outside 
itself: what “we humans” call “animality.”   
The attempt to define community through such self-defeating exclusions, and in 
particular the attempt to define community through the imposition of an erroneous, inherently 
unstable human/animal binary, is perhaps revealed no more clearly or dramatically than by 
dominant normative attitudes toward carnivorism, that is, by patently irrational yet deep-seated 
attitudes concerning whose flesh it is (and is not) acceptable to consume. As we have seen, non-
humans clearly present ethical appeals to me or impose ethical demands upon me. The 
possibility of such appeals or demands, however, discloses a more basic, “background” ethical 
community or inter-relatedness already in place, a radical ethos in the original sense of the term, 
that is, an abode or space in which we – human and non-human beings alike – already commonly 
dwell. The question whether to extend hospitality to a creature who entreats entry or trespasses 
into my home discloses, as a condition of its givenness – as the condition of the possibility for 
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such a question of hospitality even to present itself – a background life of ethical involvement 
already up and running, a radical (moral) community in which we are already commonly situated 
and implicated. However, there are many ways in which we repress this fact, many ways in 
which we self-defeatingly attempt to deny the ties that bind us to other forms of life, or many 
ways in which we attempt to “otherize” others so that they are not even “others,” often not only 
in order to rationalize exploiting or murdering or not really giving much thought to them at all, 
but also in order to displace outside ourselves – that is, to displace onto such “others” – those 
aspects of our own existence we would rather not confront honestly or would rather pretend to 
transcend.  
Yet, as I mentioned earlier, repression is inherently self-undermining: through repression, 
the ego attempts to deny or to expunge from the purview of its awareness some aspect of itself, 
yet doing so is a performative contradiction, for the ego would never attempt to repress 
something that is not, indeed, a part of itself in the first place; therefore, the ego always affirms 
through repression that which it seeks to deny through repression, and this is why, as Freud 
knew, repression never truly succeeds: what is repressed is never erased, but is rather driven into 
the depths of the unconscious from which it inevitably reemerges in new guises and has effects – 
usually deleterious effects – on one’s conscious life (and on the lives of others). What is true of 
repression at the level of individual subjectivity, however, is also true at the level of 
intersubjectivity (or community). Unfortunately, one of the most common ways in which we 
humans conceptualize the most basic community to which we belong – that is, one of the most 
common (yet self-defeating and fallacious) ways in which we conceptualize the community of 
“humanity” – is precisely through the repression of our constitutive enmeshments with non-
human forms of life or with a more-than-human (“natural”) world, or through the attempt 
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circumscribe “humanity” within fixed and impermeable boundaries. As I will now elaborate, this 
is exemplified by the manner in which our conception of “food” informs our conception of 
community, by the manner in which our sense of “who we are” is often quite literally 
constructed (speciously and speciesistly) in terms of which bodies we refuse to eat and which 
bodies we not only deem it permissible to eat but also actively encourage one another to eat and 
even take great delectation in eating. Our attempt to constitute a (“human”) community through 
the repression of our constitutive ties to various (“non-human”) alterities – indeed, any notion 
that we occupy or command a “pure” and utterly isolated or sovereign community – clearly 
inflicts grave violence upon those alterities we attempt to repress or absolutely exclude or 
“purify” from ourselves (and often even inflicts grave violence upon “ourselves”); such 
repression is in itself an act of violence. Yet, the self-defeating or specious nature of such a 
violent construction of community holds out the promise that, provided we recognize it for what 
it is, we might cultivate in its place a less violent community, a better, more just manner of living 
together and with Others. As Freud believed, the hard work of undoing repression is necessary 
for the psychical health and integrity of the individual, and provided there is such a thing as 
repression at the level of a “collective unconscious” (or provided there is no such thing as an 
absolutely isolated individual), it stands to reason that it is also necessary for the health and 
integrity of a community.  
How we define “food,” or what (and who) we judge to be edible, has much to do with 
how we typically conceptualize, perform, and enforce a shared moral and political identity. The 
issue concerning whose flesh we judge to be acceptable to consume, and the issue concerning 
how we are – or how ultimately, in fact, we are not – able to justify such a judgment and the 
practices supported by it, reveals one of the most salient yet fallacious and needlessly violent 
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ways in which we typically construct a sense of community, as well as the general sort of “logic” 
or pathology at play in the construction of any false or oppressive, chauvinistic or supremacist 
conception community. In doing so, it also reveals the community to which we truly belong, the 
radical community we often attempt to repress through spurious marginalizations, exclusions, 
and hierarchies.  
 In any critical examination of our conception of the moral community, it is necessary to 
examine the lines we draw (often unreflectively) between those who do and those who do not 
have moral worth, to examine how we determine who or what falls on which side of such lines, 
and then to interrogate the assumptions that motivate such discriminations and thereby 
interrogate the acceptability or stability of such lines. As I have been suggesting, what (or who) 
we eat, and conversely what (or who) we refuse to eat, reflects our sense of what (or who) we 
are, for it is precisely in drawing such a line between edible and inedible flesh that we typically 
attempt to draw a line between “ourselves” and morally sub-considerable or non-considerable 
“others.” The production, preparation, and consumption of “food” are inherently normative 
practices through which we ritualistically police the outermost boundaries of moral 
considerability. Our concept of food – or rather our concept of who or what may be regarded as 
consumable – saliently determines how we draw a line between who or what does and does not 
have intrinsic or full-fledged moral standing, or how we circumscribe the scope of our moral 
community; indeed, it is perhaps the most common way in which we attempt to impose an 
impenetrable, insurmountable border between “self” and “Other,” “us” and “not-us,” “human” 
and “animal,” but if my (and Merleau-Ponty’s) arguments up to this point have been successful, 
no such border really exists; any such border is a false and thus unstable (or intrinsically self-de-
constructing) imaginary, one that – like all such imaginaries – may come to be reified through 
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thoughtless practices and habits of thinking that affirm it, yet nonetheless violates lived 
experience or the very conditions of its own construction and thus collapses as soon as we 
wakefully attend to it.  
In particular, the points I am making here are demonstrated by the curious taboo against 
cannibalism that we (at least in the West) commonly observe, that is, by the curious fact that 
many of us not only regard as acceptable but also encourage and take great delight in the 
consumption of “animal” flesh yet are deeply, reflexively averse to the consumption of human 
flesh; indeed, we do not merely express disgust toward the consumption of human flesh but 
condemn it so strongly that it is often constructed as “monstrous,” as a transgression more severe 
or depraved than most other moral evils: to eat a human being is to cross an uncrossable line. So, 
what is really going on here with this disparity between our attitudes toward the consumption of 
human and non-human flesh? There are two distinct questions to unpack here: why does the 
consumption of human flesh repulse us? Conversely, why does the consumption of non-human 
flesh not repulse us? In other words, why do we have such an aversion to cannibalism, and why 
do we not have the same aversion to ordinary carnivorism (i.e., to the sort that we practice when 
we sit down to a meal of non-human meat)? 
My hypothesis is that both of these questions, and that the answers to them, are 
interrelated: the taboo against cannibalism and the widespread acceptance of non-cannibalistic 
carnivorism are in fact two sides of a single psychosocial complex. Consider first the taboo 
against cannibalism. Why are we so repulsed by the notion of eating human flesh? Like most 
taboos, this one does not seem to be a rational norm once we examine it closely; like many 
taboos, it seems to be little more than a socially constructed superstition or phobia. Yet, as Freud 
knew very well, taboos are quite telling if we wish to understand ourselves.  
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The taboo in question here is critically examined by the classic horror film The Texas 
Chainsaw Massacre (dir. Tobe Hooper), and though I do not have the space here to provide an 
extensive reading of this film, it is a pertinent point of reference. The Texas Chainsaw Massacre 
is unquestionably one the most culturally and aesthetically influential horror films in the history 
of cinema. Even if one has not seen this film, one is likely familiar with its main antagonist, 
“Leatherface,” who surely belongs in the pantheon of culturally significant “monsters” (along 
with the likes of Dracula, Freddy Krueger, Jason Voorhees, Michael Meyers, Pinhead, and so 
on). The imagery of an imposing, hulking man concealed behind a mask made of human skin, 
donning a butcher’s apron, grunting and sometimes squealing like a pig, and wildly wielding a 
chainsaw in pursuit of human prey for the purpose of cannibalistic consumption, is as striking 
and unsettling today as it was when it first premiered in 1974 (thus predating by four years John 
Carpenter’s Halloween, which is usually credited with birthing, or at least popularizing, the 
slasher sub-genre).  
Leatherface and his family hunt and kill other humans for food, and indeed they do so in 
ways that are coded as not relevantly different from the manner in which humans hunt and kill 
non-human animals for food. All of the horrors presented in the film – the actions of Leatherface 
and his family in preying upon the main characters – are presented as analogous to the killing 
and preparation of cattle for food. For example, when we first encounter Leatherface, he lures 
one of the main characters (Kirk) into his house by squealing like a pig, and immediately 
proceeds to beat him to death with a hammer, which is the very method used for killing cows in 
slaughterhouses that had coincidentally been described earlier in the film. And Leatherface is, of 
course, always donning a standard butcher’s apron. When Kirk’s girlfriend, Pam, later goes 
searching for him, she is eventually apprehended by Leatherface; as she’s kicking and 
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screaming, Leatherface hangs her on a meat hook, and then proceeds to use his iconic chainsaw 
to dismember Kirk’s body in front of her. What is most striking about this scene is that 
Leatherface does not exhibit even the slightest hint of malice or obvious, “mustache twirling” 
sadism in his actions. He places Pam on a meat hook in an utterly nonchalant way, as though her 
screams do not even register perceptually (let alone ethically), and he dismembers Kirk’s body in 
a purely mechanical fashion, as nothing more than a rote chore. What is supposed to strike us as 
horrifying here is not simply Leatherface’s violence, but the completely casual indifference with 
which he performs it: the very same sort of attitude with which we, of course, perpetrate and 
support violence against non-humans, or the very same sort of attitude that, as Adorno describes, 
we exhibit whenever we regard an animal as “just an animal.” Later in the film, during the iconic 
dinner table scene in which the film’s “final girl,” Sally, is a captive dinner guest, the “father” of 
the family remarks: “I ain’t take no pleasure in killing, but some things gotta be done.” Of 
course, this is less a statement of a practical matter of fact than it is the common manner in which 
we always rationalize or “naturalize” exploitation and cruelty. That the father says this while 
Sally is hysterically crying and pleading for her life suggests that what is truly “monstrous” is 
not, in fact, a supernatural monster like Freddy Krueger or Jason Voorhees but rather the kind of 
evil that Hannah Arendt famously characterizes as “banal”: an internalized (and institutionalized) 
casual, thoughtless indifference to the suffering and wellbeing of others, or a docile compliance 
with the organized oppression and brutalization of others, that is utterly ordinary or “all too 
human,” a kind of evil that is far more unsettling than any other precisely because it is 
unexceptional, or precisely because it is not something we may comfortably externalize in the 
form of some preternatural, inexplicable “inhuman” force or agency (as is the case in Lovecraft’s 
writings, for example). Freddy Krueger may be terrifying, but not just anyone can be Freddy 
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Krueger. Far more terrifying is the monster that anyone can be, the monster that we ourselves 
perhaps already are.      
We strongly recoil from the thought of eating other humans, yet many if not most people 
not only do not recoil from the thought of eating animals but embrace the practice gladly. The 
Texas Chainsaw Massacre, of course, wants us to examine the assumptions implicated in this 
disparity, and suggests that such a disparity, in fact, reflects an indefensible double-standard.  
So, the Texas Chainsaw Massacre is decidedly not about the horror of watching 20-somethings 
on a road trip being hunted and slaughtered by a deranged butcher; it is not a film about the 
horror of a human family that preys upon other humans for food; rather, it is about the extent to 
which these horrors mirror others with which we are already complicit and about the 
psychosocial complexes and flawed conceptual frameworks that underpin and motivate our 
complicity: our complicity, that is to say, in the horrors of killing non-human animals for food; it 
is about the horror of the delectation we take in consuming murdered flesh, and it is about the 
horror of how murdered, ingested and digested flesh cements the borders we typically erect to 
establish a moral, political, and cultural community; it is a film that intends to prompt us to 
question the assumptions according to which we conceptualize and police the outermost 
boundaries of moral considerability. In short, insofar as we needlessly kill and consume the flesh 
of other animals, The Texas Chainsaw Massacre suggests that we are all butchers like 
Leatherface and his family: those who willfully suppress our capacity for empathy, or rather 
those who, as living bodies, repress the vulnerabilities and bonds with other living bodies that are 
essential to our embodiment and that make empathy possible in the first place: carnal 
vulnerabilities and bonds that in fact always already disrupt any supposed opposition, or blur any 
supposed line, between ourselves and those whose flesh we murder and consume.  
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Of course, it is easy to explain why what Leatherface and his family does is wrong 
insofar as they commit murder, i.e., they kill and eat people who do not consent to be meals. 
However, murder alone does not quite seem to capture the evil or depravity we readily ascribe to 
their practices. Their actions are commonly regarded as far more egregious than simple murder. 
In murdering other humans in order to eat them, they seem to overstep an even more significant 
moral line, and it is this line that the film really wants us to examine. Arguments against murder 
are not interesting; what are more interesting are arguments against cannibalism, since in fact 
such arguments seem to be conspicuously wanting. Everyone will readily agree that it is wrong 
to kill other humans in order to eat them without their consent. However, what if the people who 
Leatherface and his family ate had volunteered to be killed for food? What if, moreover, 
Leatherface’s family only ate those who died of natural causes and who expressed their 
willingness for their postmortem flesh to be used for food (much like how many of us check the 
organ donor box on our driver’s licenses)? My intuition is that most people would still be 
repulsed by the practice. My intuition is that, even if we had sufficient evidence that a person 
died of natural causes and expressed consent to be consumed, we would most likely refuse to eat 
that person if we were offered to do so; indeed, some might even prefer to starve rather than 
consume the flesh of a fellow human. Consider, for example, the (in)famous case of Uruguayan 
Air Force Flight 571. This flight, which crashed into the Andes in 1972, became a media 
spectacle because its survivors resorted to cannibalism in order to stave off starvation. The 
survivors only ate those who had perished in the crash, and they reluctantly resorted to doing so 
only in order to survive, yet nevertheless this incident was received by the general public with 
repugnance, and many even morally condemned the survivors.907 This should strike us as 
																																																								
907 An interesting side-note here is that one of the survivors, in order to defend himself and his fellow survivors 
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strange, to say the least. As Freud knew, the things that instinctively repulse or disgust us – the 
things we most strongly, uncritically resist, even and especially when there are no apparently 
good reasons to do so – tellingly reveal much about ourselves (as every psychoanalyst knows, 
the most significant and productive moment in analysis is precisely when the analysand resists or 
attempts to avoid some topic, for that is when one knows one has struck a nerve rooted in the 
deepest reaches of the unconscious). We kill many non-human animals for food often without 
giving it a second thought, yet eating other humans is so odious to us that it is widely considered 
beyond the pale regardless of the circumstances (nearly everyone is a Kantian when it comes to 
opposing cannibalism); indeed, it is often regarded as the most extreme mark of venality. 
Leatherface and Hannibal Lecter are not “monsters” because they murder people. Murder is 
wrong, of course, but also rather commonplace. Murdering people for the purpose of eating 
them, however, is unthinkable. It is telling that we would probably regard a person who murders 
people simply for the pleasure he or she takes in murder for its own sake to be somehow less 
monstrous or nightmarish (even if only very slightly less so) than someone who murders people 
for the pleasure he or she takes in the taste of their flesh.  
So, to return the question I posed above, what is going on here? Why do we tend to have 
fundamentally opposite reactions to the practices of Leatherface and his family and to those with 
which we ourselves are compliant when we eat animals? Why are we so deeply, viscerally averse 
to eating other humans, while we hardly flinch at the notion of killing non-humans for food? As I 
will soon suggest, our literal viscera seem to have much to do with it. The answer to this question 
that immediately presents itself is that the taboo against cannibalism indicates the manner in 
which we commonly construct and police the broadest boundaries of our moral community or 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
against public condemnation, claimed that their cannibalism was consistent with Christian values by comparing it to 
the taking of communion.  
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polis, i.e., the line that separates who or what does and does not have full moral standing. That is 
to say, we typically construct the outermost boundaries of moral considerability in terms of who 
or what is and is not consumable, or in terms of which bodies are and are not at least potentially 
edible (or “on the table” for being consumed, pun intended). I think that this largely explains 
why eating human flesh is a widely heeded taboo and why, conversely, eating non-human flesh 
is not only not taboo but is a widely encouraged practice; it has everything to do with how we – 
even if largely unconsciously – conceptualize, erect, and enforce the borders of the moral 
community.  
This point brings me, finally, to the title of this concluding chapter: “We Are What We 
(Do Not) Eat.” We are all familiar with the saying “we are what we eat,”908 which has been a 
cliché for quite some time. As I will soon discuss, I think that there is an important sense in 
which we indeed are what we eat, however there is also a sense in which we are what we do not 
eat, in that we typically define the “We” – our fundamental moral and political community – as 
consisting of those beings whose bodies are categorically forbidden from being eaten. Those who 
are taken to belong fully to the moral community are precisely those whose bodies are off the 
table, those who are accorded a special dignity that proscribes the consumption of their flesh. We 
are what we do not eat in the sense that the broadest boundaries of the moral and political 
community are typically constructed in terms of who or what is and is not consumable. This is 
why the consumption of many if not most non-human animals is widely considered acceptable, 
for most non-human animals are excluded from the moral community; indeed, the very category 
of “the animal” usually designates any living entity that is not a full-fledged member of the 
																																																								
908 This saying was supposedly first coined by French lawyer and politician Jean Anthelme Brillat-Savarin in a book 
on gastronomy in 1825, in which he proclaims: “tell me what you eat, and I’ll tell you what you are.” However, this 
notion was perhaps more famously taken up by Ludwig Feuerbach in his essay Concerning Spiritualism and 
Materialism (published in 1863), in which he writes that “man is what he eats.” 
	 736	
moral and political community (which further reinforces the fact that such a category has always 
been a moral and political category). We should also observe that this explains why consuming 
non-human animals is not only widely considered acceptable but is also strongly, systemically 
encouraged, and why vegetarianism or veganism is often resisted or lambasted (naturally, the 
underlying ideological impulse here is to enforce, and neutralize any potential challenges to, 
status quo ethical boundaries). Moreover, this is also why cannibalism is so commonly regraded 
as abhorrent, for to engage in cannibalism is precisely to transgress the apparently foundational 
boundaries of the moral community; it is to overstep, flout, and thus threaten the moral line that 
seems to hold human society together, a line that is also usually supposed to sharply separate 
“the human” and “the animal.”  
As Val Plumwood puts it, we conceptualize ourselves as “eaters of others but never 
ourselves eaten.”909 In short, we do not eat “our own” because we define “our own” as precisely 
those whose flesh we do not eat. This is correct but also rather circular. What remains 
unexplained is precisely why we define “our own” – the scope of the moral community – in such 
a way. Why, in fact, is such an obsession with food – or why is such an obsession with the 
consumption (and non-consumption) of flesh – so deeply constitutive of our conception of who 
“we” are, so endemic to our sense of a shared identity and moral dignity? Why exactly does the 
taboo against cannibalism serve the ideological function that it does? Why do we reflexively 
define the limits of ethical considerability in such a manner? Why, that is, do we think that eating 
our fellow humans crosses a line that threatens the very foundations of human identity and 
society? As is usually the case when genuine reasons are absent, I think the reason for this is a 
deep, often unconscious, psychopathology. My answer to these questions is that our reflexive 
																																																								
909 The Eye of the Crocodile, p. 18. 
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aversion to eating one another, or our impulse to condemn cannibalism as the most profound 
violation of ethics (one even more repugnant than ordinary murder), is grounded in a deep 
existential anxiety concerning our very own consumability, which is to say our materiality and 
the vulnerabilities that essentially accompany it. Our aversion to consuming other humans has 
much to do with our own refusal to confront authentically our own meatiness and mortality, the 
often terrifying, destabilizing inevitabilities of death and decay; it is in fact an effort to repress 
such vulnerabilities and unnerving truths and, therefore, our own carnality.910  
We are essentially embodied beings, and embodiment entails mortality and, therefore, 
indeed, edibility. This is something we all know, yet it is also something we typically attempt to 
repress, and we do this by constructing ourselves as predators and never, in principle, as possible 
prey; at one level, we know we are consumable, yet at another level we also pretend as if we are 
categorically unconsumable because we cannot bear to confront our finitude, which is also to say 
our “animality,” our fleshy vulnerabilities, our messy continuities with others (especially those 
we “otherize” as “animals”) and with the natural world, hence our potential to be someone else’s 
meal, our equal potential to be prey as well as predator. Though we attempt to repress our 
embodiment, mortality, or edibility, what is repressed always finds a way to surge up from the 
recesses of the unconscious to impact how we live, and in some cases certain disruptive 
																																																								
910	It is relevant to mention here	the symbolism of Leatherface’s mask of human skin. As striking and disturbing as 
such an image is, it serves more than just to shock and disturb us. In choosing to conceal whatever individual, 
autobiographical identity he may have behind a mask of human skin, Leatherface is indeed choosing to perform his 
identity in a particular way, and in a way that is, in a perverse albeit undeniable sense, more honest or authentic than 
the way we perform our own when we kill and eat animals. In wearing a mask of human skin, Leatherface is 
performing his identity in a way that blatantly affirms and conveys, rather than denies or tries to repress, the 
ontological, material continuity between himself and his victims; his mask precisely blurs the boundary between his 
own flesh and the flesh of those he butchers; he is in fact enacting the truth of “being what he eats,” and in that sense 
he is not so much wearing a mask at all, while it is precisely we who are the ones who wear masks when we pretend 
to be categorically opposed to the animals we kill and consume. The Texas Chainsaw Massacre does not thereby 
suggest that Leatherface is better than us morally (if anything, it simply invites us to consider that he may not be any 
worse than we often are morally), but it does suggest that he is at least more authentic or honest.    
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experiences or events arise to shake us out of comforting metaphysical illusions. Plumwood 
describes finding herself between the jaws of a crocodile as precisely this sort of experience:     
It is not a minor or inessential feature of our human existence that we are food: juicy, nourishing bodies. 
Yet, as I looked into the eye of the crocodile, I realized that my planning for this journey upriver had 
given insufficient attention to this important aspect of human life, to my own vulnerability as an edible, 
animal being…Of course, in some very remote and abstract way, I knew it happened, knew that humans 
were animals and were sometimes – very rarely – eaten like other animals. I knew I was food for 
crocodiles, that my body, like theirs, was made of meat. But then again in some very important way, I did 
not know it, absolutely rejected it.911  
 
We are all sentient flesh, but flesh we are nonetheless. Every living being is, by virtue of being 
an incarnate being, consumable, which is also to say susceptible to death, aging, decay, 
suffering, illness, and manifold forms of violence. Our carnality means that we may be preyed 
upon, maimed, tortured, killed, and, yes, eaten. There is simply nothing that reminds us more 
vividly of our own carnality – of our own meatiness and messy vulnerabilities, of our transience 
and mortality – than the thought of being eaten, the vertiginous notion of ourselves being 
ingested and digested, reduced to food and excreted matter. This is why we recoil from and 
condemn the notion of eating other humans yet often embrace eating non-humans: it is a 
(misdirected, ultimately impossible) effort to cope with anxieties we harbor concerning our own 
embodiment through the construction and performance of an identity – a shared, communal 
sense-of-self – intended to repress, exclude, or “otherize” our embodiment and, thus, the 
anxieties rooted in it; that is, it is an effort to conquer or resolve through repression – to distance 
from ourselves as much as possible – our own materiality and the vulnerabilities entailed by it. 
We do this – we distance ourselves from our own inherent edibility and, by extension, our 
materiality – by defining ourselves as precisely inedible in opposition to other bodies that are 
																																																								
911 The Eye of the Crocodile, p. 10. 
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edible, other bodies that may rightfully be killed for food because they are, unlike us, “just 
bodies.”  
Thus, in eating other animals while refusing to eat fellow humans, we enact an identity 
that distances from ourselves as much as possible our irrecusable materiality, or that at least 
attempts to exclude embodiment and bodily vulnerability from our conception of our being. In 
eating other animals while refusing to eat fellow humans, we implicitly deny that we are akin to 
those animals; we implicitly affirm ourselves to be essentially not like them, essentially 
something more than consumable flesh. We are beings who are not consumable, hence beings 
whose embodiment is not an essential aspect of the kinds of beings that we are. So, insofar as we 
unconditionally condemn cannibalism yet embrace other forms of carnivorism, even the most 
anti-Cartesian thinkers among us ultimately affirm themselves to be “ensouled” bodies in 
opposition to the soul-less bodies they consider it permissible to eat, bodies they consider it 
permissible to kill in order to eat because, after all, such bodies are (unlike themselves) “just” 
bodies. It is clear that our deep-seated anxieties concerning our own mortality and bodily 
vulnerabilities are not only at the heart of the common yet unfounded taboo against cannibalism, 
but are also at the heart of human/animal dualism and Platonic/Cartesian somatophobia. Sitting 
down to a meal of non-human flesh is, we might say, a ritualistic form of violence through which 
we attempt to disavow or master our very own susceptibility to that very form of violence, which 
means disavowing, as a constitutive aspect of our existence, the carnality that renders us 
susceptible to violence in the first place and that sentences us to death and putrefaction. Yet, all 
“souls” are embodied, and all living bodies are “ensouled.” Subjectivity is necessarily enfleshed, 
and all forms of flesh are necessarily continuous with one another. Thus, if one feels disgust 
toward eating a fellow human, one should feel the same disgust toward eating an “animal,” for 
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the latter is, in fact, equally a form of “cannibalism.” If I eat an “animal,” I am indeed eating “the 
flesh of my flesh.”  
 This point brings me to other side of the equation I mentioned earlier: while in one sense, 
or at one level, we “are what we do not eat,” in another sense, and in fact at the fundamental 
ontological level, we undeniably are what we eat insofar as we, too, are incarnate, hence mortal, 
subjectivities; we too are living bodies; we too are sentient, vulnerable flesh; we too are meat. 
Our effort to repress our embodiment by drawing a sharp line between non-edible and edible 
bodies and by placing ourselves strictly and nearly exclusively on the former side of that line is a 
misguided and self-defeating ruse, for we are essentially vulnerable, bodily, mortal, 
decomposable, and consumable beings, as all living beings are. As Merleau-Ponty remarks, 
“inasmuch as we are incarnate beings, violence is our lot.”912 Of course, one of the things 
Merleau-Ponty means by this is that susceptibility to violence is essential to our corporeality (and 
therefore to our being), yet this essential truth about our condition is something we attempt to 
repress by displacing it exclusively onto others (i.e., “animals”) whom we deem it acceptable to 
consume, or something we pretend to transcend by constructing ourselves – that is, our 
“humanity” – as somehow ontologically exceptional or supreme relative to all other forms of 
life, that is, as inedible. As Plumwood writes: 
Although, by definition, all ecologically embodied beings exist as food for some other beings, the human 
supremacist culture of the West makes a strong effort to deny human ecological embodiment by denying 
that we humans can be positioned in the food chain in the same way as other animals.913 
 
We may eat other animals (while refusing to eat other humans) in order precisely to repress our 
intercorporeal continuities with them, or in order to deflect the “repugnant” truths about bodily 
existence we would rather not confront honestly (truths that are encapsulated literally and 
																																																								
912 Humanism and Terror, p. 109. 
913 The Eye of the Crocodile, p. 16. 
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symbolically by the notion of one’s flesh being eaten), yet like all forms of repression, such an 
effort is inherently self-undermining. All forms of repression are, again, self-defeating because 
the truths that are disavowed through repression are, by virtue of that very disavowal, 
simultaneously affirmed by it. We only attempt to repress or to displace outside ourselves those 
things that are truly constitutive of what and who are. Thus, the prohibition against cannibalism, 
coupled with an endorsement of non-cannibalistic carnivorism, reflects what is, in the end, a self-
defeating effort to efface, otherize, or overcome our very own animality, our essential carnality 
or “meatiness.”914 In our disgust toward and severe condemnation of cannibalism, or in posturing 
ourselves as eaters of others yet inedible ourselves, we “doth protest too much.”  
Ironically and in truth, the very “brutishness” Leatherface exhibits in his predation and 
butchery, and presumably the similar brutishness we exhibit in our own common forms of 
predation and butchery, also exhibits the very “animality” – or at least a characteristic 
stereotypically attributed to animality – that we otherwise, at the same time, disavow in ourselves 
in opposing ourselves to the “animals” we eat.915 As The Texas Chainsaw Massacre suggests, 
there is no relevant difference between the violence of cannibalism and the violence of other 
forms of carnivorism, for to posit such a difference is ultimately to posit a sharp line of 
demarcation between “ourselves” and those we otherize as “animals,” yet, as we have seen, no 
such sharp line of demarcation exists: “human/animal” dualism is, like every dualism, a false 
																																																								
914 I wish to mention here that our violent aggression toward animals is a pathology of a piece with other forms of 
violence, or with other toxic and abusive enactments of identity that are supposed to repress various anxieties and 
insecurities. Just as homophobia implicitly affirms the fragility of heterosexuality, and just as misogyny implicitly 
affirms the fragility of masculinity, aggression against non-humans similarly implicitly affirms the fragility of our 
identity as human, or reveals deep sources of anxiety that shape our existence and that we attempt to distance or 
exclude from ourselves by oppositionally displacing them onto non-humans, that is, by pretending that we do not in 
fact share with non-humans their messy embodiment, their flesh, their inherent edibility.  	
915 Thematically, this is most likely why Leatherface never “speaks” but rather only grunts or squeals. His behavior 
is intended to parodically perform the very “animality” we humans typically displace onto those beings we call 
“animals.” 
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abstraction. Whether I slaughter pigs or other humans for the pleasure of how they taste and in 
order to assuage whatever pathological anxieties about my own existence I might harbor, I 
needlessly inflict violence upon another living being, and in doing so repress not only their 
subjectivities but also my own subjectivity, for in doing so I must repress the vulnerable flesh 
that we share and in virtue of which we are subjectivities at all. The basic lesson here is that 
borders are inherently unstable – indeed, are either false or contingent rather than natural or 
essential constructs – if those forms of violence through which they are enforced are not 
relevantly different from those through which they are transgressed. Our (seemingly 
ungrounded) revulsion to cannibalism ought to prompt us to question the categories and 
assumptions that inform our other predatory and carnivorous practices and that, by extension, 
inform how we construct the boundaries of a moral and political community. Perhaps the most 
profound “food for thought,” then, consists of questions concerning how we do and should think 
about food. Questions concerning “what (or who) is for dinner” – questions concerning who is 
on the table, who is always off the table, and who is allowed to be at the table – are, I think, 
among the fundamental questions of ethics and political philosophy. 
Thus, everyday carnivorism (the killing and consumption of non-human flesh) and the 
widely accepted taboo against cannibalism are two sides of the same pathology: the ultimately 
self-defeating repression of our own embodiment. As this pathology often informs how we 
construct our sense of “the moral community” (in that we conceptualize the boundaries of the 
moral community in terms of those who are and who are not edible), recognizing it for the self-
undermining (and violent) pathology that it is has profound ethical and political implications, 
implications for how we conduct ourselves in the world and conceptualize our relations with 
others, human and non-human alike. We attempt to mark and sustain a sharp line between 
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ourselves and those whose bodies we murder for consumption, yet no such line, of course, 
“really” exists. Human beings may differ in many significant ways from many non-human 
beings, just as many non-human beings differ significantly from one another. Yet all living 
beings are of the same flesh. Human beings are, like all forms of subjectivity, essentially 
embodied beings, and to be an embodied being is to be inescapably, incessantly vulnerable to 
violence, and a renewed affirmation of this shared vulnerability may provide the basis for a 
better, more just, less violent, non-anthropocentric ethical and political framework. For Merleau-
Ponty, all forms of life are characterized by an essential “fragility”; life is “not a hard nucleus of 
being, but the softness of the flesh.”916 This is perhaps why Merleau-Ponty draws our attention 
not only to the differences between ourselves and non-human others but also to the “weaknesses” 
or vulnerabilities, “failures and limitations” we share with them, weaknesses or vulnerabilities 
we possess, and to which we are responsive, simply in virtue of being embodied beings: 
weaknesses or vulnerabilities that do not efface the differences between us but nevertheless 
refute any supposed essential ontological (and ethical) oppositions or divides between us and 
which are, indeed, synonymous with our ontological (and ethical) continuity. Thus, Merleau-
Ponty claims that “[the animal] displays very clearly the struggle involved in existing in a world 
into which it has been thrown, a world to which it has no key. In doing so, it reminds us, above 
all, of our failures and our limitations.”917 I think that this reminder is significant, for it deviates 
from our traditional tendencies either to stress (often to the point of dualism) differences in 
“capacities” between humans and non-humans or to stress (in ways that reproduce the very 
anthropocentrism one might thereby intend to combat) shared capacities between humans and 
non-humans. Merleau-Ponty insists that animals ought to remind us not of how “special” or 
																																																								
916 Nature, p. 238. 
917 The World of Perception, p. 76. 
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“exceptional” we are, but on the contrary of how vulnerable we too are as embodied, animal 
beings. Animals fundamentally teach us not about our own superiority but, on the contrary, about 
our common flesh and finitude.  
Merleau-Ponty does not develop the ethical implications of this line of thinking, but I 
think this line of thinking rightly suggests that shared incapacities, or shared “weaknesses” and 
vulnerabilities – not, as is traditionally (anthropocentrically and also ableistly) posited, shared 
capacities – are the foundation of a moral community. Thus, Merleau-Ponty suggests here a 
profound reorientation of ethical thinking, since typically ethical considerability is defined in 
terms of the possession of certain properties or capacities, and typically those who argue that we 
should extend ethical consideration to animals do so by indicating certain morally relevant 
properties or capacities we share with them. However, it is our shared vulnerabilities or 
weaknesses – not our shared “capacities” – that in fact motivate and make possible our attentive 
concern for embodied others; it is in fact our shared vulnerabilities or “limitations” that make us 
dependent upon one another and that enable us to be responsive to, or to care for, one another’s 
needs. By drawing our attention not to our shared capacities but rather to our shared incapacities, 
Merleau-Ponty suggests, I think, an approach to ethics that undermines anthropocentrism or 
human-supremacism in a way that does not erase the meaningful differences that may obtain 
between humans and non-humans. Such an approach would be the foundation for more 
responsive (and responsible) ethical thinking and acting, that is, for an “ethics of care” that 
would be both radically egalitarian yet also radically attentive to particularity, which is also to 
say an ethics that truly takes our communal embeddedness with others (and with other 
communities of others) seriously, an ethics that would ground ethical consideration in difference, 
that is, not in either a totalizing “sameness” or in any sort of dualism or supernatural 
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transcendence; in other words, such an approach to ethics would be grounded in the recognition 
of what Merleau-Ponty calls a “strange proximity,”918 a proximity that is “consonant” or 
“synonymous” 919 with distance. At an ontological level, this proximity that is consonant or 
synonymous with distance is “flesh”; at the level of ethical comportment, it is vulnerability, that 
is, one’s reflexive, corporeal recognition of another’s needs, one’s affective responsiveness to 
another’s potential for flourishing or suffering. Sentient flesh is, by definition, vulnerable flesh, 
and so to share sentient flesh is to share vulnerability, and to share vulnerability is to share a 
“Good,” even to share an “ethos.” If there is such a thing as a “univocity” of Being that is 
synonymous with difference or relationality, it is what Merleau-Ponty calls “flesh”; yet this 
univocity of Being is also a univocity of ethical-being, which is precisely being-vulnerable, 
being always already caught up in webs of interdependencies and affective relations with other 
living bodies.  
In short, we may attempt to distance ourselves from our own materiality, but material 
beings we nevertheless essentially are, and materiality is the fundamental equalizer. Any 
violence I inflict upon others is violence I inflict upon flesh I share with others. “Animal others” 
are “the flesh of my flesh,” and thus despite the ways in which we attempt to separate our flesh 
from theirs through certain normative culinary practices, when we consume an animal – when 
we consume any living being – we are always also consuming our own flesh. We thus literally 
are what we eat. Carnivorism is, indeed, always “cannibalism,” and only bad metaphysics or 
some sort of psychopathology may convince us otherwise.  
So, if we acknowledge rather than repress our embodiment, we may be able to cultivate 
more compassionate and egalitarian habits of dwelling and attunement. When we falsely (and 
																																																								
918 See, again, Merleau-Ponty, Signs, “Introduction,” p. 15. 
919 See, again, Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 135. 
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pathologically) construct ourselves as somehow divorced from or above materiality, so too do we 
construct ourselves as divorced not only from other forms of life but even, in truth, from one 
another, and we know all too well the consequences of such a pathological construct. Despite the 
apparently endless debates that continue to be had among competing moral theories, I think it is, 
in the end, incontestable that vulnerability, or rather that responsiveness to the vulnerabilities of 
others (and vulnerability is always already a responsiveness to the vulnerabilities of others), is 
the foundation of ethical and political life, the “Ur-condition,” so to speak, of having (and 
sharing) a “Good.” Exposure to, hence implication in, violence is the foundation of ethics, and to 
be an embodied being is already, necessarily or by definition, to be exposed to and implicated in 
violence. It is thus that our embodiment is not only the necessary precondition for ethical 
existence but is already – and without being a contradiction in terms – ontologically ethical. As 
Merleau-Ponty writes:  
…A pure consciousness would be in such a state of original innocence that any harm done to him would 
be irreparable. But to start with a pure consciousness is beyond my grasp; even if I tortured his body I 
could not do him any violence. In such a case the problem of violence does not arise.920     
 
If we could neither flourish nor fail to flourish, or if we were disembodied souls that, as such, 
could never be penetrated by the often harsh contingencies and tribulations of material existence 
– if neither the world nor other living bodies could ever “get under our skin,” or if, that is to say, 
we could never truly do violence to one another through our bodies because, as pure spiritual 
beings, we would be insulated from such violence – there would never be any such thing as 
“good” or “bad,” or questions concerning “right” and “wrong” would never arise for us. One 
must not merely “have” a body but must truly be a body in order to have a “good” and in order to 
be receptive to, as well as implicated in, the goods (and bads) of others. If this is correct, then 
																																																								
920 Humanism and Terror, p. 108-109. 
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insofar as we repress or attempt to separate ourselves from our materiality, so too do we repress 
or separate ourselves from the very possibility of ethical living and thinking at all.  
I have been attempting to demonstrate here that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy provides the 
resources for developing a thoroughly non-anthropocentric ethical framework. Moreover, 
however, I have also made the stronger claim that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy (in particular, 
that the ontology he develops in his later writings) entails such a framework. Lastly, then, before 
I bring this chapter and this project as a whole to a close, I wish to articulate the argument for 
this claim, an argument that, given all of the arguments I have developed thus far, is rather 
straightforward, and one whose premises will not require extensive elaboration. 
It seems to me that anthropocentrism is, in the final analysis, logically analogous to every 
bad “ism” (that is, to every chauvinistic moral or ideological framework), but in particular I think 
we may most clearly expose its fundamental, fatal flaw by showing that this flaw is analogous to 
that of another false, yet perhaps more easily refutable, moral theory: ethical egoism. The case 
against any strictly anthropocentric moral theory that follows from everything that I (and 
Merleau-Ponty) have argued up to this point, then, is this: we can show that ethical egoism is 
false because it is essentially committed to a kind of solipsism, yet this solipsism is analogous in 
all relevant respects to the basic ontological assumption of anthropocentrism; therefore, 
anthropocentrism is false for reasons that are analogous to those that show ethical egoism to be 
false. The falsity of ethical egoism implies the falsity of anthropocentrism because both 
presuppose relevantly similar false abstractions. In short, both ethical egoism and 
anthropocentrism depend upon a kind of solipsism, and so to refute the former is also to refute 
the latter; indeed, to refute solipsism in general is to refute every moral or political framework 
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that posits a fundamentally isolated ethical subject, whether this subject be an individual self or 
an individual community.  
Ethical egoism (which, from this point forward, I will refer to as simply “egoism”921) is a 
moral theory that few philosophers have ever advocated, yet it is one that many philosophers 
have attempted to refute. From Plato’s treatment of Thrasymachus and the ring of Gyges in the 
Republic to Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, John Stuart Mill, Marx, and Rawls (to name 
just a few), the “problem of egoism” is one that has occupied much attention in ethics and 
political philosophy, for egoism is a view that seems to violate many deeply held moral intuitions 
(and to have many apparently unacceptable consequences), yet it has also been rather recalcitrant 
to refutation. Of course, arguments in favor of egoism are easy to critique (and I do not think that 
any of the arguments that have ever been proposed in favor of it are sound), yet to critique 
arguments in favor of a theory is not to demonstrate that it is false (even if arguments for a view 
are poor, the view in question may nevertheless be true, and to suppose otherwise is to commit 
an ad ignorantiam fallacy). So, many philosophers have attempted to develop arguments of their 
own against egoism, and usually these have turned out to be nearly as flawed as the traditional 
																																																								
921 “Egoism” is an ambiguous term because it may designate at least two distinct (and indeed mutually exclusive) 
theories: on the one hand, it may refer to the theory I am discussing here (ethical egoism), which is a moral theory, 
or a theory of right and wrong conduct. On the other hand, it may refer to the theory of psychological egoism, which 
is not a moral theory at all, but is rather a theory of human nature. According the latter, all human actions are (as a 
metaphysical or natural fact) necessarily motivated by self-interest, whereas, according to the former, all actions 
should be motivated by self-interest. Psychological egoism claims that altruistic conduct is impossible, whereas 
ethical egoism acknowledges that altruistic conduct is possible but claims that such conduct is immoral. Thus, 
psychological egoism does not make a normative claim, and in fact, if it were true, it would render all normative 
theories moot (given that it is, in fact, a version of strong determinism). And though, as I have argued, ontology and 
ethics, “facts” and “values” are not separable from one another, it is nevertheless the case that psychological egoism 
(which is merely a descriptive theory) cannot provide support for ethical egoism or, indeed, for any normative 
theory. After all, if all of our actions truly are necessarily determined by self-interested motives, there is no point in 
arguing that they should (or ever should not) be motivated by self-interest. There is no point in arguing that we 
should perform actions we are already determined to perform anyway, nor (given the principle that “ought implies 
can”) is there any way to argue that we should ever resist actions we are determined to perform. Now, I think 
psychological egoism is just as erroneous as ethical egoism, but to critique it is beyond the scope of my focus here 
(however, that being said, the major flaw of ethical egoism can easily be shown to be a major flaw of psychological 
egoism as well). So, when I refer to “egoism” here, it should be understood that I mean ethical egoism, not 
psychological egoism.    
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arguments for egoism itself. Many have attempted to demonstrate, for example, that egoism 
commits some sort of fundamental logical error or inconsistency or that it is self-undermining in 
some way, and I do not find most of these kinds of approaches to be convincing or successful. 
However, here I am not going to survey the history of philosophical treatments of egoism, but 
will only draw attention to what I take to be the most decisive (and perhaps the only decisive) 
refutation of it.  
In short, egoism is a moral theory that posits that an action is morally right if and only if 
it maximizes the self-interest of the agent who performs it (and is thus morally wrong otherwise). 
Egoism, then, is a particular form of consequentialism, since it defines right and wrong actions in 
terms of their consequences, yet it is opposed to most other forms of consequentialism (that is, to 
various versions of utilitarianism) because it claims that the interests of others should never 
matter to me or be counted in my deliberations as equal to my own. According egoism, the 
supreme (and indeed only) moral duty that any agent has is to act in such a way that exclusively 
aims to advance his or her own interests. Egoism does not deny that I can, in fact, care about and 
seek to aid or realize the interests of others for their own sake, but it does deny that it is ever 
morally right to do so. According to egoism, to aim to advance the interests of others as ends in 
themselves is morally wrong, a violation of the one and only moral duty one has, namely the 
duty only to promote one’s own interests. To be clear, this is not to say that it is never 
permissible to help advance the interests of others; rather, it is to say that is never permissible to 
advance the interests of others for their own sake. Egoism licenses literally any kind of action – 
no matter how apparently cruel or beneficent – as long as it maximizes the self-interest of the 
agent who performs it. Thus, on an egoistic view, I am permitted to care about and take up the 
interests of others instrumentally. If ever there is a situation in which helping to advance another 
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person’s interests ultimately advances my own, then helping to advance another person’s 
interests is the right thing to do. According to egoism, then, it is only ever morally right to 
advance another person’s ends merely as a means to advancing my own; it is never right to 
advance another person’s ends as ends in themselves. Whenever I consider what I ought to do, 
egoism dictates that I ought only to calculate and perform the course of action that will maximize 
my self-interest. Only purely self-interested conduct is morally right; conversely, purely altruistic 
conduct is always morally wrong.  
As I have mentioned, many responses to egoism have been developed throughout the 
history of Western philosophy, but I think that the only decisive refutation of it consists in a 
refutation of the fundamental ontological commitment upon which it depends: radical 
individualism. It is obvious that egoism depends upon a radically individualistic account of the 
self, and given all of the arguments I have developed up to this point, such an account of the self 
is clearly a false abstraction. Egoism is only able to posit the exclusive pursuit of self-interest as 
morally right – or in fact is only able to posit things that would be exclusively in one’s own self-
interest to pursue in the first place – because it posits such a thing as a self whose existence is 
fundamentally isolated from others. Only a self that is fundamentally separate from others is one 
whose interests may be considered fundamentally separate from others. Egoism claims that 
everyone ought to pursue their own interests exclusively, or that the highest good is the good of 
the individual. Such an account of right conduct or of “the Good” clearly assumes a particular 
account of what it means to be a “self” or “individual”: it assumes that selfhood or individuality 
is something prior to sociality or community; it assumes that the self is essentially atomistic or 
asocial, that is, radically independent of its ties to others or to a community. Only if individuals 
are fundamentally isolated from others may their goods or interests be fundamentally isolated 
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from others. I can only conceive of my own interests as radically separate from others – as 
interests that are strictly, exclusively “my own” – if I conceive of myself as radically separate 
from others. Only if I am isolated can I have, or be oriented toward, a Good that is exclusively or 
absolutely my own. Egoism logically depends upon a radically individualistic or atomistic 
conception of the self. Egoism thus reduces to solipsism, and so in order to refute egoism it is 
sufficient (and perhaps necessary) to refute solipsism. And we have already refuted solipsism.  
Though hardly any philosophers have regarded egoism as a sound moral theory, the 
conception of the self to which it is wedded is one that is, in fact, deeply rooted in Western 
philosophy, politics, and culture. So, although not many philosophers have been egoists, many 
have accepted or advanced the atomistic or solipsistic notion of the self that underlies egoism. 
Egoism is an offshoot – indeed, it is the logical consequence and purest distillation – of the 
ideological framework that has dominated Western culture at least since the Enlightenment, 
namely classical liberalism. Given the fact that in our contemporary American lexicon the term 
“liberal” tends to designate political views left-of-center on the mainstream political spectrum, 
the category of “classical liberalism” (or of simply “liberalism”) may invite confusion, for in 
political philosophy it does not mean what “liberal” tends to mean in contemporary, everyday 
American political discourse. Classical liberalism is the ideology that we inherit from European 
Enlightenment political theory, metaphysics, and epistemology, beginning (roughly) with 
Hobbes and further developed by philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, 
and Mill. “Classical liberalism” is an ideological framework that in fact encompasses what today 
we classify as “conservative” and “liberal” views alike. With only a few exceptions (such as 
various Marxist and anarchist theories, which are often classified as “leftist”), classical liberalism 
covers the entirety of our contemporary spectrum of political views.  
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I do not have the space here to elaborate fully classical liberalism’s theoretical 
commitments and the history of its development. For our present purposes, however, we can 
define classical liberalism in terms of its central and most distinctive commitment: individualism. 
We can define classical liberalism as the theoretical framework according to which the 
“individual” is the fundamental unit of social reality and analysis; it is defined by an 
individualistic account of selfhood, agency, and social institutions, as well as by an 
individualistic derivation of normative (i.e., ethical and political) principles. Classical liberalism 
posits the individual as metaphysically prior to, and independent of, society, and understands 
social phenomena, or political systems and institutions, in terms of the aggregate behaviors and 
motivations of fundamentally discrete and separate individuals. Thus, classical liberalism is 
committed to an atomistic or monadic conception of the self: the assumption that individuals are 
essentially isolated and separate from one another, or essentially independent of any social roles 
and relationships. On a liberal view of the self, the self is not constituted by any situated, 
embodied social markers of identity. Since, on this view, the self is metaphysically prior to, and 
independent of, any social roles and relationships, it is radically free to craft for itself its own 
identity and destiny. As Will Kymlicka writes:  
On the liberal view of the self, individuals are considered free to question their participation in existing 
social practices, and opt out of them, should those practices seem no longer worth pursuing. As a result, 
individuals are not defined by their membership in any particular economic, religious, sexual, or 
recreational relationship, since they are free to question and reject and particular relationship…the self is 
prior to its socially given roles and relationships…922 
 
The “liberal self,” then, is an utterly solitary, atomic, deracinated self, a self that is divorced from 
others and untethered to any time or place or even to any particular (gendered, sexed, racialized, 
or otherwise culturally inscribed) body; it is a self that is unencumbered by any essential social 
																																																								
922 Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, Second Edition (New York, NY/Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 221. 
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attachments, a self that is abstracted entirely from any intersubjective characteristics, roles, and 
relationships; it is a radically independent and autonomous, asocial or isolated self. Of course, 
liberalism acknowledges that individuals have social roles and relationships, but according to 
liberalism individuals only choose to adopt such roles or to enter into such relationships, and are 
therefore intrinsically not defined or constituted by those roles and relationships: individuals 
exist apart from their social roles and relationships in much the same way that, in classical 
metaphysics, a substance exists and subsists apart from its properties. The liberal self may have 
relationships with others, but these do not penetrate or shape the core of its being; they are only 
ancillary or adventitious features of its existence. In other words, liberalism maintains that the 
individual is essentially free to adopt or abandon any social markers of identity in much the same 
way that one is free to adopt or abandon articles of clothing: presumably I remain the same self 
regardless of how drastically I might decide to change my style of attire, for – at the fundamental 
ontological level – I am not the clothes I wear; I choose my clothing, and a chooser is always 
prior to, or separate and distinct from, what it chooses, and this is how liberalism conceptualizes 
the relationship between the self and its social roles and relationships. Thus, the liberal self is 
fundamentally an island unto itself, which is why Marx sarcastically remarks that bourgeois 
political economists (i.e., classical liberal political philosophers) are “fond of Robinson Crusoe 
stories.”923  
Classical, Enlightenment liberalism is perhaps best exemplified by Hobbesian social 
contract theory and Cartesian solipsism. In general, social contract theory deduces moral and 
political principles and institutions from the supposed consent of free, rational, self-interested 
individuals. Contractarian moral or political theorists ask us to perform a particular “thought 
																																																								
923 Capital, Volume I. Trans. Ben Fowkes (London, UK: Penguin Classics, 1990), p. 169.  
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experiment” (or epoché): they ask us to abstract human beings from their social and historical 
context – to strip away any characteristics that might belong to human beings by virtue of 
modern civilization – and thus to imagine them in a pre-social, pre-civilized condition, or in what 
is often referred to as a “state of nature.” Though the philosophers that belong to the social 
contract tradition of political theory have different accounts of how human beings would be in 
such a state of nature, they each reason that legitimate moral and political principles are those 
that such pre-social individuals would agree to for the sake of their own interests. Hobbes, for 
example, famously assumes an egoistic theory of human psychology; that is, he assumes that 
human beings are essentially isolated and self-interested, and that life in a state of nature – life 
without the rules that civilization imposes upon us – would therefore be, as he famously puts it, 
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” or a “war of all against all”; however, given our 
individual needs and desires for self-preservation, it would be in our best individual interests to 
come together and enter into a contract according to which we give up some of our natural 
freedom for the sake of the security and welfare that only a State can provide, and from this we 
proceed to establish the principles according to which such a State would best function. We 
should notice here that for Hobbes (as for all thinkers in this tradition) it makes sense to 
conceptualize individuals as abstracted from any concrete social context or as isolated from one 
another. For Hobbes, individuals in a “state of nature” are essentially atoms or billiard balls 
propelled along trajectories of self-interest that every now and then collide with another, upon 
which time conflicts arise requiring some form of resolution. And for Hobbes, a State or society 
is simply the ultimate means of conflict resolution that atomistic, rationally self-interested 
individuals would construct for themselves. Society is a contract just like any other, and just like 
any other contract it derives its legitimacy from the free consent of the parties or contractors 
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involved in it. Even though most social contract theorists admit that such a “state of nature” is 
not meant to be understood as a literal, historical time and place, they nevertheless advance the 
notion that individuals are in some sense fundamentally prior to society: society is a contractual 
arrangement agreed to by free contractors, but that means that such contractors are themselves 
logically prior to “society”: there may have never been, as an anthropological or historical fact, 
such a thing as a human being in such an asocial state of nature, yet it is still the case that the 
individual is a priori, metaphysically independent of social relationships. So, on this view, 
“society” is not something that constitutes the “self,” for logically the relationship is the reverse: 
“the self” constitutes society in a contractual arrangement with other selves, and such selves (or 
“contractors”) are therefore, by definition, originally asocial. Such a reduction to a “state of 
nature” is clearly similar in certain ways to Husserl’s reduction to a “sphere of ownness.” 
However, unlike Husserl or Merleau-Ponty, liberal social contract theorists fail to realize that 
such a reduction is, in fact, impossible, or that the very notion of an asocial self is a conceptual 
absurdity, an entity that not only has never historically existed but one that can never, in 
principle, be encountered experientially or even conceptualized consistently. As we have seen, 
the concept of an asocial self is a contradiction in terms, for there are no intelligible 
characteristics of a “self” that do not ultimately derive from relations with others.   
As for Cartesian solipsism, nothing is perhaps most emblematic of classical liberalism 
than Descartes’ presumption to be able to doubt the existence of others altogether. In his search 
for absolutely certain, indubitable truths, Descartes famously retreats inward, takes stock of all of 
his beliefs, and systematically discards those that are even the least bit uncertain. Of course, as 
we know, Descartes famously concludes that the only thing of which he can be certain is his own 
bare existence, or his own consciousness. Anything supposedly outside his own mind, including 
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his body and especially the existence of other people, may be doubted; the only thing that cannot 
be doubted is the only thing to which he has direct and immediate access: his own existence as a 
mind, for that is entailed by the very act of doubting anything in the first place. Descartes, then, 
formulates the metaphysical scaffolding of liberal political philosophy, namely the kernel of 
radical individualism that was in fact already advanced by Hobbes before him and that would be 
taken for granted by liberal thinkers after him: the self is, fundamentally, an isolated ego. Any 
relationships with others, or even the mere existence of others, may be doubted and are therefore 
not essential to subjectivity, or not constitutive of what it is to be a self.  
So, in classical liberalism the fundamental unit of social reality and analysis is a presocial 
or asocial entity. This is, indeed, a patent contradiction, but it is also an often pernicious, 
insidious abstraction. There are such things as “individuals,” but individualism (at least in its 
traditional Western formulations) always misdescribes what it is to be a “self” or an “individual,” 
for it posits the “self” or the “individual” as an entity that is independent of its ties to others, as 
something that may “have” but is nevertheless not constituted by its communal roles and 
relationships; as such, it is at best a false abstraction and at worst an oppressive ideology 
intended to suppress our constitutive solidarity with others in order to safeguard certain 
institutions or systems of power that would be threatened by an awareness of that solidarity. 
Now, we may contrast a classical liberal concept of the self with a broadly “communitarian” one. 
Communitarianism, like classical liberalism, encompasses a broad range of (often disparate) 
views, but in general, or broadly construed, it rejects classical liberal individualism. A 
communitarian concept of the self, as its name suggests, affirms the primacy of community in the 
constitution of selfhood, identity, and lived experience; it affirms the fact that subjectivity is 
necessarily founded intersubjectively, that there is no such a thing as a self that could ever be – 
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logically or in fact – removed from its social roles and relationships. Communitarianism affirms 
the fundamentally communal embeddedness of “selves,” bodies, and identities, the 
intersubjective constitution of experience, agency, knowledge, and flourishing. 
If the arguments I have articulated up to the point are sound, then I have already 
established that an egoistic or liberal conception of the self is necessarily false and that a 
communitarian one is necessarily true. We have seen that there is no such thing as a self that is 
prior to or outside of a community, no such thing as subjectivity without intersubjectivity, no 
such thing as an “I” independent of a “We,” no such thing as an individual that could exist 
independently of its bonds with others. Egoism (or, more generally, classical liberalism) is an 
utterly mistaken understanding of what is to be a self, for selfhood is intersubjectively 
constituted. A self can only emerge in the world – can only achieve even a minimal awareness of 
itself or of anything at all – amid communal horizons of being, meaning, and knowing. To be a 
self is to be a member of a community. A self is nothing but an ensemble of overlapping social 
roles and relationships, a skein of affective bonds with other living bodies. No one “springs forth 
from nothing” or is “king on his desert island,”924 and this is why we must reject the false notion 
that we begin from an atomistic, asocial condition and only later construct a community through 
some sort of deliberative and contractual calculus or negotiation, and it is also especially why we 
must reject the notion that there are ever such things as interests, goods, or ends that are 
radically, exclusively “mine,” since, as we have seen, there is no such thing as “mineness” at all 
without otherness. In short, if there are no such things as isolated individuals, then neither are 
there such things as isolated, individual interests or goods. Every “good” is always already a 
communal Good; every “interest” is always already caught up inextricably in relations with 
																																																								
924 Merleau-Ponty, Signs, “Introduction,” p. 14. 
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others. Egoism is essentially, irredeemably solipsistic; it is true only if the self is utterly isolated. 
Therefore, to vanquish the “incomparable monster” of solipsism is also to vanquish egoism in 
one blow. This is why Korsgaard claims that she believes that “the myth of egoism will die with 
the myth of the privacy of consciousness,”925 both of which, as I hope to have demonstrated, are 
myths that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy dispels, and along with them he also dispels, as I will 
soon discuss, the myth of anthropocentrism.  
Since “there exists not a plurality of subjects, but an intersubjectivity…,”926 
intersubjective goods are also features of the world, features of the world that are just as real or 
“objective” as anything else that is constituted intersubjectively. The publicity (or “objectivity”) 
of the world is already the publicity of a public, common Good. Since to be a living being is to 
be oriented toward a “good,” and since to be a living being is to be enmeshed with other living 
beings, it follows that to be a living being is already to be enmeshed with the goods of other 
living beings, that is, already to be oriented toward a common Good, or already to be involved in 
a Good one constitutes with others. This is not to say that there are no such things as distinct, 
individual goods. The intersubjective constitution of objectivity also explains the intersubjective 
constitution of an objective, common Good. In just the same way that there are such things as 
distinct, individual perspectives upon an object (say, a building) that, though distinct, are not 
radically isolated or disconnected from one another but are perspectives upon one and the same 
objective thing and together constitute and disclose the objective being of that thing, so too is it 
the case that distinct living bodies (hence goods) in the world are perspectives upon, and together 
																																																								
925 The Sources of Normativity, p. 144. In this work, Korsgaard remarkably presents the same case against egoism, 
and much the same case against anthropocentrism, that I am presenting here. The basic difference between 
Korsgaard’s approach and my own is that Korsgaard appeals mainly to Wittgenstein’s argument against the 
possibility of a private language (and against the possibility of private “sensations” or mental states), whereas I am 
relying upon a phenomenological account (inter)subjectivity.   
926 Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror, p. 110. 
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constitute and disclose, a larger, shared, objective Good, a Good that outstrips each of them yet is 
shared and constituted by all of them. This must be the case if there are no isolated living beings, 
for again, if there are no isolated living beings, then neither are there any utterly isolated or 
private goods: every good must be an aspect of a communal Good, since indeed there is nothing 
in existence that is not always already communal, nothing that is not always already a knot of 
embodied perspectives, nothing that is not always already a mélange of flesh overlapping with 
flesh. All distinct, “individual” goods are interwoven aspects of a shared, radically 
communalized Good, or rather are moments in a “never-finished differentiation”927 of goods, 
which is also to say moments of an ever-communalizing “Good.” In the end, this is simply what 
it means for values not to be transcendental, supernatural, or purely private mental objects but to 
be(come) enfleshed, that is, to be immanent to bodies that strive to flourish and that only ever 
flourish (or fail to flourish) together.   
To be clear, we have not here traded egoism for what would be an equally abstract 
altruism or totalizing “collectivism.” Egoism, or the pure and exclusive pursuit of self-interest, 
and “altruism,” conceived as the complete sacrificial abolition of self-interest for the sake of the 
interests of others, are two sides of one and the same false abstraction and dilemma, and (to 
recall the same point I previously made pertaining to other similar false dilemmas) to exchange 
the former for the latter would be to “[compensate] for one abstraction with a counter-
abstraction.”928 Altruism conceived as the total absorption of self-interest into the interests of 
others or of the individual into some sort of totalizing, monolithic collective is the reactionary 
counterpart to egoism and its conception of an atomistic, acommunal, radically individual self, 
and in repudiating the latter we thus also neutralize the supposed threat of the former. Both 
																																																								
927 See, again, Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 153. 
928 Ibid., p. 68. 
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notions – egoism and a kind of radical, “self-sacrificial” altruism – equally presuppose an 
opposition between self and Other(s) that we must reject from the start or that any lucid attention 
to lived experience refutes. Indeed, the only way to reject egoism in favor of an ethics that 
coherently explains why the interests of others should (or rather always already do) matter to me 
non-instrumentally is not to demonstrate why I should care about others conceived as separate 
from myself, but rather is to show that I am always already an ensemble of social relationships, 
that my “self” is always already constituted communally, that “my” good is always already an 
aspect of a communal Good, and that egoism therefore represses the communal constitution of 
my being and flourishing. An egoist who proclaims only to be concerned about his or her own 
good is thus revealed to commit the same sort of performative contradiction as any Cartesian or 
solipsist who necessarily draws upon language or some tacit, prior experiential acquaintance 
with others in order doubt or deny that others exist.  
The point, then, is not to move from an asocial self to a non-self-interested self, or from 
egoism to altruism, but to begin from the fact all selves are already social selves. As Richard 
Norman argues (in the context of his critique of John Stuart Mill’s “proof” of utilitarianism), “we 
can bridge the moral gap between self and others only when we understand the self as a social 
self,” and thus “what we are doing here is not arguing from egoism to altruism, but revealing the 
inadequacy of the dichotomy between egoism and altruism.”929 Properly understood, a 
communal self is below any traditional, facile opposition between “the individual” and “the 
community,” “the private” and the “public,” egoism and altruism. To refute solipsism, or to 
refute the egocentricity of “the ego,” is necessarily to refute egoism, yet, as we have seen, to 
refute solipsism is not to efface any distinction at all between self and Other(s); rather, it is to 
																																																								
929 The Moral Philosophers: An Introduction to Ethics, Second Edition (New York, NY/Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), p. 117.  
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refute any supposed opposition between self and Other(s), and therefore so too is it to refute any 
supposed opposition between “self-interest” and the interests of others, hence any supposed 
opposition between egoism and altruism. To decenter the self is not simply to decenter self-
interest, but is to dismantle the very self/Other, individual/society, private/public binary as such. 
Thus, Merleau-Ponty affirms that “egotism and altruism exist against a background of belonging 
to the same world,”930 which is to say that “egotism” and “altruism” are abstractions torn out of a 
more basic communal fabric of existence, the horns of a dilemma founded yet at once undone by 
the life we truly share with one another, by coexistence in the flesh.  
This “background of belonging to the same world” entails an enmeshment of goods that 
founds yet, for that very reason, dismantles any supposed opposition between “self-interest” and 
the interests of the others, hence any traditional dilemma between egoism and altruism. So, it is 
crucial to understand that an ethics of “radical community” does not obliterate the existence of 
distinct goods and interests any more so than an ontology of radical community obliterates the 
existence of distinct “selves” or living beings. As we have seen, since subjectivity is necessarily 
embodied, continuity of embodiment is continuity of subjectivity, and continuity of (embodied) 
subjectivity is also continuity of vulnerability, which is also to say continuity of affects, needs, 
interests, or goods. Continuity of (sentient) flesh is continuity of flourishing and suffering. Yet, 
as we have also seen, continuity is not necessarily the negation of difference, and properly 
conceived it is also already difference. We may no longer think according to any strict 
dichotomy between self and Other(s), but of course this does not mean we may no longer admit 
any differences at all between them: on the contrary, we have seen that to think (radical) 
community is also to think (radical) difference. To say that our goods and interests are 
																																																								
930 “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” in Signs, p. 175. 
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intertwined is not to say that they necessarily coincide or that they are all exactly the same. 
Likewise, to say that self and Other are intertwined is not to say that they are totally fused with 
one another: self and Other are necessarily distinct but, at the same time, they are also 
necessarily inseparable. Self and Other are irreducibly different yet also inseparable from one 
another, and so too, therefore, are their interests or goods.  
So, we all have our own interests and goods, but at the same time they are never entirely 
our own. Since selves are intertwined with one another, so too are their interests or goods, but 
this does not imply that tensions or conflicts between interests or goods are impossible. To say 
that self and Other are intertwined is not to say that they absolutely coincide with one another: 
they are not separate from or opposed to one another, but they are also not identical to one 
another. Thus, just as the inseparability of self and Other is not their identity or coincidence with 
one another, neither is the inseparability of their goods and interests an absolute identity or 
coincidence of their goods and interests. From the fact that there is no such thing as an isolated 
self, it does not follow that there is no such thing as a distinct self; likewise, from the fact that 
there are no isolated, individual goods, it does not follow that there are no distinct, individual 
goods. Goods – just like the individuals oriented toward them – are interconnected or 
overlapping; sometimes they converge, sometimes they diverge, and some will be more or less 
distant from others and thus more or less difficult to reconcile with one another, but there is 
never an absolute abyss between them, and any view that attempts to carve the good of an 
individual or the good of a particular community out of this radically communal tapestry 
commits a deep – indeed, the deepest – kind of violence. Such an atomization of goods is a kind 
of conceptual or ontological violence that is, in fact, inevitably reified through, or embodied by, 
certain social institutions or systems, and it is the origin of every instance of gratuitous violence 
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in the world, the conceptual basis of every spurious, cruel, and exploitative exclusion or 
marginalization of the goods of others. Again, this interweaving or being-together of our goods – 
this overlapping of ends, interests, needs, and vulnerabilities that is coterminous with the 
overlapping of those living bodies that “have” them – generates, or rather itself already is, a 
shared, communal Good. If human beings are essentially – at the very core of their being and 
experience – communal, then the good of each participates in a Good woven from the communal 
fabric of their existence; the good of each is but a perspective upon, or but an aspect of, a (capital 
“G”) Good that they co-constitute through their carnal coexistence.  
Such a Good woven from a relationship between self and Other cannot be reduced to 
either side of that relationship; in such a relationship, I take up your good as my own precisely 
because such a relationship transforms the very meaning of “mine” and “yours,” or confounds 
any traditional opposition between self and Other. If I am in a genuine relationship with you, 
then our “goods” cannot be radically partitioned, and so it is perfectly intelligible why I would be 
motivated to pursue “your” good “for its own sake” or to take up “your” good as “my own,” 
because the truth is that your good is not entirely yours and that my good is not entirely mine; 
together, we do not possess radically separate goods but rather participate in a good that is ours, 
a good that we co-constitute. In such a case, when I recognize and take up your good as my own, 
I am not being egoistic, that is, I am not cannibalizing your good, and still less is it the case that I 
am totally abandoning or sacrificing a good that is purely “mine” in order to take up and further 
one that is entirely “non-mine,” for it is no longer the case that I can identify “your” good over 
there in opposition to “my” good over here. If I truly am in community with you, if our lives 
truly are intimately tied to one another, then when I recognize and take up your good as my own, 
what I really recognize and take up is a good that we share, a good that emerges between us, a 
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good that is itself a synergy of me-and-you; in such a relationship, there are not two radically 
separate goods that simply get added together or annexed to one another, but a good that is 
produced through an intertwining of living bodies. When selves or living bodies truly come 
together, a Good comes into being that cannot be localized in any of them apart from one 
another. Thus, when self and Other are in a real relationship with one another, a Good emerges 
that is not purely the good of one or of the other, nor one that is the simple arithmetical sum of 
two originally self-contained goods, but is a Good that is theirs together. And my own “good” is 
always already part of a Good I share and constitute with others, a good that is “my own” only 
on the condition that it is not, indeed, purely or exclusively “my own.”  
Now, given the arguments of the previous chapters, it should be clear that the refutation 
of egoism we have just discussed implies an analogous refutation of any strictly anthropocentric 
moral framework. Anthropocentrism, or any human separatist/supremacist conception of the 
moral community, is just as solipsistic as egoism; indeed, it is simply a version of solipsism at a 
different level. In egoism, the isolated moral subject is an individual human being. In 
anthropocentrism, the isolated “moral subject” is “humanity” as such. Both moral frameworks 
are equally solipsistic, for they both posit, as the fundamental or supreme bearer of moral value, 
a being or form of life isolated from all others. Indeed, as we have seen, self/Other dualism and 
human/animal dualism are ultimately dependent upon, or are simply different repetitions of, 
mind/body dualism. And in general, any notion that a community of living beings is utterly 
isolated from, or absolutely excludes, all other communities assumes the same “logic” that 
Cartesian solipsism or egoism deploys in divorcing the self from others, for it equally suppresses 
the radically intercorporeal bonds that tie together the living beings who belong to any 
community, bonds that, precisely because they are (inter)corporeal, never absolutely exclude 
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other living beings (or other communities of living beings) and in fact already envelop them in 
one another. As we have seen, just as a self is constituted intercorporeally, so too is any 
particular community of “selves”: all distinct intercorporeal communities of living bodies are 
themselves embedded in a radical, intercorporeal community of intercorporeal communities. 
Thus, just as the good of any “self” is already caught up in the Good of the community to which 
it belongs, so too is the Good of any community already caught up in, or already partly 
constitutive of, an even more basic, radical communal Good, a Good that it shares with all other 
communities, no matter how different or distant from it these other communities may be. In 
short, if there is such a thing as what I have called a radical community, then there is such a thing 
as a radical communal Good, a (quasi-transcendental) Good that is woven from the 
differentiation and attendant overlapping or compresence of every specific, empirical 
community. As I have continually emphasized, there are never sharp divisions between forms of 
flesh, no matter how deeply divergent from one another they may be. All living bodies fold into 
one another, and this means that so too do all of the goods they embody or strive to realize. All 
living bodies are oriented toward a good, and all living bodies, as well as all communities of 
living bodies, are fundamentally intertwined. In order to isolate the good of either a single living 
being or of a single community of living beings, one ultimately has to repress the flesh in virtue 
of which any living being or community “has” a good or even exists as such at all.    
A radical community is not one that obeys any sharp lines of demarcation (whether those 
of species or otherwise), and every community is always already a moral community. We are 
thus compelled to acknowledge that “we” are embedded in a larger, radical “We” that is also a 
radical enmeshment of all goods, human and non-human alike. We are thus compelled to 
acknowledge that the radical community that constitutes “us” is also already a radical moral 
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community, a community in which “our” goods are entangled with those of all other living 
bodies (or with all other communities of living bodies). As soon as there is such a thing as 
vulnerability – as soon as there is such a thing as life or subjectivity or sentient flesh – there is 
flourishing and suffering, there are goods and bads in the world, and if all living, vulnerable 
bodies are fundamentally tied to one another, so too are all flourishings and sufferings, all goods 
and bads. As soon as there exists a community of living bodies, so too does there exists a 
common flourishing or a common good, and if there is such a thing as a radical community of 
living bodies, so too is there such a thing as a horizon of radical flourishing, or so too is there a 
radical Good in which they all participate, a (capital “G”) Good that they each (ap)presence in 
their own way.  
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology demonstrates that no community of living beings can ever be 
absolutely exclusionary. If there are no isolated, self-enclosed living beings, then so too are there 
no isolated, self-enclosed communities of living beings, and in particular, as Merleau-Ponty 
argues, there is certainly no isolated, self-enclosed “human” community: there is no human 
community that is utterly isolated either from other human communities or from non-human 
communities. Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s ontology suggests a critique of anthropocentrism analogous 
to the one it levels against egoism. If there is nothing identifiable as “human” in isolation from 
other forms of life, then so too is there nothing identifiable as a human good in isolation from 
other forms of life (hence in isolation from non-human goods). Egoism is false because there is 
no such thing as an isolated individual and therefore no such thing as an isolated individual good. 
Likewise, anthropocentrism is false because, as Merleau-Ponty argues, there is no such thing as 
an isolated “humanity” and therefore no such thing as an isolated “human” good, or no such 
thing as a good that could register as exclusively or essentially “human.” We see, then, that not 
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only the “myth of egoism” but also the “myth of anthropocentrism,” as well as the myths of 
every other bad or oppressive “ism,” are dispelled along with that of solipsism, for indeed they 
are all, logically, iterations of solipsism. Fundamentally, what Merleau-Ponty calls “the 
“incomparable monster” of solipsism spawns all of the other monstrous “isms” we must 
ceaselessly combat, all of the other delusions of ontological purity, centrality, separatism, and 
“specialness” that anyone committed to wakeful thinking and living must always work to dispel: 
egoism/liberal individualism, white supremacism, cisheterosexism, nationalism, ethnocentrism, 
ableism, and human exceptionalism/supremacism. Every “centrism” or supremacism depends 
upon the notion of a form of life that is, in some way, fundamentally isolated or self-enclosed, 
the notion that a particular identity or domain of existence is circumscribed by impermeable, 
absolutely exclusionary boundaries, boundaries that, as such, are usually established in terms of 
some unique characteristic (or set of characteristics) possessed by those within them, and which 
is presumed to rank those within them as more important than those who are outside of them. If 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of “flesh” demonstrates anything, it is that no such impermeable 
boundaries ever “really” exist. Differences – genuine, radical, irreducible differences – are real, 
yet differentiation is also always communalization, also always overlapping or “encroachment.” 
All chauvinisms or oppressive, monstrous “isms” are, in the final analysis, different heads of one 
and the same “monster.” The “incomparable monster of solipsism” is, so to speak, a hydra of 
many monstrous heads. 
Finally, it is important to underscore that an ethics of radical community or that, in 
particular, a genuinely, thoroughly non-anthropocentric ethical framework entails a reorientation 
in how we think about or attempt to “demonstrate” moral considerability. Such a 
phenomenologically founded, broadly “communitarian” reorientation of ethics distinguishes my 
	 768	
critique of anthropocentrism from traditional critiques of it, from those critiques that ultimately, 
in their approach, assume or reinscribe the very anthropocentrism they pretend to reject. Many 
philosophers argue against anthropocentrism, and they do so according to various disparate 
moral theories. However, regardless of their moral theory of choice – regardless of whether they 
subscribe to, say, some form of utilitarianism or some form of deontology – philosophers have 
traditionally adopted the same basic approach in their critiques of anthropocentrism. Typically, 
such philosophers begin from some presumably non-controversial account of who is included in 
“our” (always implicitly “human”) moral community and of those (“morally relevant”) 
characteristics or capacities in virtue of which they (i.e., fellow humans) are included in it, then 
proceed to indicate that the same or similar characteristics or capacities are also found in others 
(i.e., in certain animals) who currently are either outside of our moral community or are at least 
not accorded full moral standing within it, and consequently argue that the boundaries of our 
moral community ought to be expanded so as to include such (“animal”) others.  
I find all such supposed critiques of anthropocentrism to be deeply unsatisfying and 
flawed, for it is clear that such arguments for “including” animals in “our” moral community 
begin from precisely a default, anthropocentric standpoint or standard of reference, an 
unaccounted for and tacitly centered “human” We relative to which the moral considerability of 
other forms of life are derivatively evaluated, or from which the scope of moral considerability is 
concentrically expanded outward. All such critiques presuppose or start from the very kind of 
“center/margin” conceptual schema that, as I hope to have demonstrated, Merleau-Ponty’s 
ontology dismantles. In particular, one begins by conceptualizing “the moral community” as a 
circle with “humanity” at its center and simply proceeds to argue that this circle should be 
widened so as to include certain non-humans. The problem here, of course, is that one thus 
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assumes or reifies the very anthropocentricity one presumes to be critiquing, the very 
anthropocentricity that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology shows must be, or rather always already is, 
decentered. Moreover, to conceptualize any moral community as a “circle” is already to 
necessitate the marginalization (and, correlatively, the privileging) of certain of its “members,” 
for one cannot have a “circle” without a “center” and a “periphery.”  
Consider egoism, for example. One does not truly critique egoism by attempting to 
demonstrate to an egoist why he or she ought to expand the circle of his or her solitary, purely 
self-oriented moral universe so as to include others, for in doing so one concedes the egoist’s 
egocentric standpoint. In order to critique egoism successfully, one has to decenter or dismantle 
the egoist’s egocentricity, that is, one has to demonstrate that the egoist never is and never has 
been the center of any moral universe, for he or she is, at the fundamental ontological level, 
entangled in relationships with others. If one attempts to convince an egoist to expand the circle 
of his or her moral concern so as to include others, one thus leaves intact the egoist’s self-
constructed position at its center. The egoist imagines “the moral community” to be a circle with 
only one member at its center, namely the egoist him/herself. Thus, one does not truly refute 
egoism unless one abolishes the egoist’s very construct of the moral community as a circle with 
the egoist him/herself at its center: one must decenter this center and therefore dissolve the 
peripheries that exist only relative to it. One can also draw an analogy to what would be similarly 
flawed critiques of racism. We do not truly dismantle the “logic” of racism or white supremacy 
by arguing that the circle of a “white” moral community ought to be expanded so as to include 
people of color; rather, we dismantle the “logic” racism or white supremacy by demonstrating 
that people of color have never truly been excluded from the moral community all along, or we 
expose and demonstrate the speciousness of those constructs according to which people of color 
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have been conceptualized as ethically sub/non-considerable, the false construct of “whiteness” 
itself as designating some sort of pure, central subject-position or communal identity relative to 
which the value of anything else in the world can or ought to be measured.  
My contention, then, is that in order truly to overcome the “logic” of anthropocentrism or 
human-supremacism, we must do so in the same manner in which we must overcome the 
“logics” of egoism or white supremacism. In order to overcome, say, egoism, it is necessary to 
decenter the supposed egocentricity of “the ego,” to show that no ego is ever truly isolated or 
“centered” in the world but is already a nexus of communal roles and relationships, that every 
ego is embedded in community with others such that it is deprived of any purity or centrality of 
existence. Likewise, in order to overcome anthropocentrism, it is necessary to decenter (as 
Merleau-Ponty attempts to do) the supposed anthropocentricity of any “human” standpoint in the 
world, to show that “humanity” has always been entwined with “animality” or with “animal” 
alterities and that there has therefore never been such a thing as an isolated, “pure,” or “centered” 
human sphere of existence, that any “human” community has always been entwined with other-
than-human communities for the same reason that a “self” has always been entwined with others. 
In just the saw way that one only refutes egoism by demonstrating that the “I” is always already 
but an articulation or surface effect of a “We,” so too is it the case that one only refutes 
anthropocentrism by demonstrating that the “the human” is always already an articulation or 
surface effect of a “radical,” inter-animal (or “humanimal”) “We,” but one fold among infinitely 
many others in and of the world’s flesh, an expression of the flesh that differentiates forms of life 
yet is shared by all of them, the flesh that makes me who and what I am yet is never just “mine” 
or just “human,” the flesh that makes “us” us yet is never just ours.     
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So, rather than argue for “inclusion” we should dismantle those false constructs or 
imaginaries that legitimate exclusion; these are not the same modes of argumentation: the former 
conceptualizes the moral community in terms of a taken-for-granted center of moral standing 
from which the moral standings of (currently excluded) others are subsequently derived and 
measured, whereas the latter decenters every standpoint taken for granted as a central, default 
standard of ethical value, or seeks to dismantle any ethical framework organized in terms of 
“centers” and “margins” in the first place; in other words, the latter seeks to dismantle those 
abstractions that structure every exclusionary ethical framework, and thereby does not so much 
argue that certain others ought to be “included” but instead reveals that such others have never 
been absolutely “excluded” all along, or rather repudiates, as I have suggested, the false dilemma 
of assimilative “inclusion” and total, oppositional “exclusion” in favor of an ethics of difference, 
which is also to say an ethics of radical community, or an ethics that affirms rather than represses 
the intertwining of all living bodies and goods, for “intertwining” signifies a kind of relationality 
below any traditional, neat distinction between “inclusion” and “exclusion,” “inside” and 
“outside.”  
In an anthropocentric framework, “the human” is our default, central, Archimedean 
starting point relative to which the scope of ethical concern or considerability is later 
concentrically either expanded or contracted. Such a framework is logically analogous to that of 
every other bad “ism,” such as egoism, racism, sexism, ethnocentrism, nationalism, and so on. 
Each of these make the same logical or ontological mistake, which is precisely the very starting 
points from which they proceed to determine the moral worth of others. This is why I think 
critiques of anthropocentrism or speciesism that argue that our circle of moral concern ought to 
be expanded so as to include certain non-humans are fundamentally flawed, for such critiques 
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concede and reproduce the core, uninterrogated assumption of the very anthropocentric 
worldview they supposedly reject, namely the assumption of a human standpoint as a central, 
default yardstick with which to determine derivatively the moral considerability of other beings; 
indeed, such critiques thus assume a human standpoint that would be fundamentally prior to non-
human life. So, moral reasoning that proceeds to expand the scope of moral concern or 
considerability concentrically outward from some presupposed central or centered standpoint 
already concedes too much: Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy precisely shows that such standpoints 
are always already decentered by their enmeshment with other standpoints, and that therefore the 
starting points of traditional moral reasoning are already false abstractions. Such starting points 
are those that are assumed to be privileged, central founts of meaning and value. Moreover, such 
forms of moral reasoning assume that the moral community is something we constitute through 
some sort of deliberative process rather than something that already constitutes us, something in 
which we are already embedded before any questions of moral standing or of right and wrong 
action can ever present themselves in the first place. Liberalism assumes there exists some 
standpoint outside of a community – some acommunal standpoint – from which we could deduce 
or construct a moral and political community, but no such standpoint exists. It is precisely a 
collapse of genuinely communal life, or a loss of a sense of genuine community, that motivates 
every kind of nativist, tribalist, or chauvinistic construction and policing of communal 
boundaries through mechanisms of selective inclusion or exclusion; to construct a community in 
such a way is simply to assume atomism or solipsism at the level of a group rather than at the 
level of an individual.  
Thus, the logic of concentric ethical “inclusion” or “expansionism” is just as “centric” or 
solipsistic as any logic of ethical separationism or exclusionism that would, on the surface, 
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appear to be antithetical to it. A broadly phenomenological and specifically Merleau-Pontian 
reorientation of moral philosophy is one whose aim is not primarily to extend oneself outward to 
others or to expand progressively the compass of ethical concern and considerability to include 
others, for that always takes for granted the standpoint of either a solitary ego or of an exclusive, 
gated “country-club” association of egos, so to speak, as its point of departure, and such a point 
of departure is always, as we have seen, phenomenologically and ontologically erroneous; rather, 
the aim of such a reorientation of moral philosophy is to recognize, foreground, and affirm the 
ties that always already bind us to one another and, one hopes, to strengthen those ties through a 
renewed and enriched affirmation of them. So, I hope I have here addressed one major way in 
which my arguments throughout this work might be misinterpreted. I have not attempted to 
demonstrate the mindedness of non-human beings, or to critique those assumptions that lead us 
to doubt the mindedness of non-human beings in various ways, in order to argue for their 
“inclusion” in our “human” moral community; rather, my point has been to use phenomenology, 
and in particular Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and later ontology, to show that non-human 
beings have always already been, in fact and in principle, “members” of “our” moral community, 
for that moral community has always been a community that has never been just “ours,” a 
community in which “we” have always been embedded with other “we’s.”  
The point, then, is to change the basic question we usually ask in moral and political 
theory. The question we usually ask is some version of “why ought X be included in our moral 
and political community?”, which naturally assumes that “X” was not always already a member 
of one’s moral and political community in the first place. For example, most people would no 
longer ask and attempt justify answers to questions such as: “why should black people be 
included in our moral and political community?” or “why should women be considered just as 
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morally important as men?” We simply assume, as we should, that black people and women are 
or ought to be equal members of the moral community. In fact, not only are such questions 
uninteresting, even simply posing them is morally repugnant. The moment one poses or attempts 
to answer either of these questions, one has already conceded too much. The burden of proof 
should be on anyone who would exclude black people or women from the moral community, and 
if there is anyone who would do so, the appropriate response is not to argue for the “inclusion” 
of black people or women on the racist’s or misogynist’s own terms but to dismantle the 
assumptions or conceptual schemas that support a racist or misogynistic conception of the moral 
community, that is, to dismantle the constructs of white exceptionalism or phallocentrism. I have 
attempted to adopt a similar approach in my critique of anthropocentrism. Thus, the question I 
have really been asking and attempting to answer here has not been the question concerning why 
non-humans should be included in “our” moral community, but rather the question concerning 
why or how non-humans were or ever could have been excluded from our moral community in 
the first place, and to expose the specious conceptual frameworks that have supported their 
exclusion or marginalization. To argue for the inclusion of non-humans in our “human” moral 
community is already to begin from the position that they have not always already been 
“included” in it, or is already to position “humanity” as something that exists or is intelligible 
prior to, or independently of, other-than-human alterities. My point has been to demonstrate that 
precisely such a position has always been false, that it has always been a position that concedes 
too much. My point has been to critique and expose as false the very assumption that there has 
ever been a human moral community in isolation from other communities of living beings. My 
point has been that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology shows that such an assumption is false, yet it is 
precisely this assumption that underlies most conventional theories in animal ethics, not only 
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those that defend anthropocentrism or speciesism but also those that attempt to combat it by 
arguing for the inclusion of most if not all non-human beings in the moral community. To argue 
that moral concern ought to be expanded in order to include non-humans is already to assume a 
central, sovereign, transparently intelligible “human” standpoint or community isolated from 
non-humans in the first place, or is already to assume that “we” have not already been enmeshed 
with “them” from the very start, and these are exactly the assumptions that, following Merleau-
Ponty, I have argued we ought to reject. 
The fundamental question, then, is not “how ought we to determine the moral 
community?”, for this question already concedes too much in assuming, as does classical 
liberalism, that “we” determine the moral community in the first place, that we deliberatively 
choose, from an asocial standpoint, who is going to count and who is not, who is in and who is 
out. My point is to interrupt this question by showing that a radical moral community – an Ur-
“We” – must always already be in place in order for us even to be able to ask it in the first place, 
much in the same way that the question concerning whether and how I might be able to know 
that other people exist is one I would never be able to pose or contemplate if I were not always 
already immersed in relations with others. What we have to do is to understand the nature of this 
primal “We” that allows us even to pose questions concerning moral and political inclusion or 
exclusion, yet if we understand this radical We correctly, we realize that it signifies the 
envelopment of all forms of life in one another, that it generates boundaries between forms life 
or between communities of living bodies that, though real and often significant, are always 
undecidable, fluid, and porous, or are never determinable as lines of strict inclusion or exclusion. 
A non-anthropocentric ethical framework is, minimally, one that does not restrict the 
scope of moral considerability, impingement, or responsiveness (or responsibility) to inter-
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human relations, and such a framework is entailed by the fact that inter-human relations are 
never a priori exclusively inter-human, or by the fact that there is no such thing as an isolated, 
exclusively human community or purely self-contained “humanity” for the same reason there is 
no such thing as an isolated, purely self-contained (human) self or individual. Moreover, any 
enumeration of criteria or properties that would be necessary for ethical considerability or 
standing, any abstract deduction of universal duties or rights, or any abstract calculus or ranking 
of interests and utilities, is precisely unethical for the reason that it negates or suppresses the very 
encounter with alterity that is constitutive and distinctive of ethical experience and 
responsiveness. It is my contention, then, that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology dismantles any 
anthropocentric ethical (and political) framework and supports (indeed entails) a thoroughly non-
anthropocentric one, one that takes seriously the important, distinctive features of human life yet 
also recognizes the irrecusable embeddedness of those features in a more-than-human world, one 
that does not dissolve humanity into “animality” yet recognizes the constitutive intertwining of 
the two, the originary limit between what is human and what is other-than-human that makes it 
impossible ever to determine where one ends and where the other begins; it is a framework that 
grounds ethics not in a classically human-centered intersubjectivity but in an anti-essentialist or 
anti-speciesist, always human-decentered interanimality, that is, in a radical community. It is 
thus that Merleau-Ponty is able to affirm the ethical value (and ontological distinctiveness) of 
“humanity” in such a way that makes no concessions to anthropocentrism or to any sort of 
human exceptionalism, and it is thus that his philosophy in fact enjoins us always to 
problematize – even to transform in ways that go beyond anything conceivable in traditional, 
hegemonically human-centered philosophy – the very categories of “humanity” and “animality.” 
It is thus that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy perhaps provides (as he provocatively suggests it 
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does) the basis for what might be an “antihumanistic humanism.”931  
As I suggested earlier, webs of interdependency are not necessarily webs of “harmony.” 
“Intertwining” is always an intertwining of what is irreducibly different; intertwining is 
differentiation. So, as is the case with the intertwining of anything, the fact that all goods are 
intertwined does not mean that they coincide with one another: there can be, and often are, great 
distances and variable tensions between goods. This is precisely why living ethically – why 
living a good life – is hard rather than easy, an infinite, ever-open rather than a neatly calculable 
or ever finished task. For me, ethical life is an infinite task not in the sense that it consists of 
“debts” that I can never fully repay, but in the sense that my own life or good is inextricably 
intertwined with other lives or goods to such an extent that I will never be able to advance all of 
them, that many of them will necessarily elude my attention or concern, and that I will even 
inevitably harm many of them. It is precisely because I inhabit what I have called a “radical 
community” – it is precisely because I am caught up in webs of interdependencies with all forms 
of life – that I will never be able to give myself to all who should and do already matter, and this 
is a hard truth I should never cease to suffer, a truth that any sound account of ethics must 
confront honestly. 
I do not think it is correct to think of ethics in terms of “indebtedness”; that is how a 
capitalist thinks of ethics. Our primary, immediate relationships with others – ontological as well 
as ethical – are always (as Derrida and others have argued) “aneconomic.” Primary or genuinely 
ethical relationships are never “transactional” or “contractual”; they are never “exchanges” in 
any economic sense of the term and in fact disrupt all such circuits of economic exchange. If I do 
																																																								
931 Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, p. 37. 
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something for someone because of what I expect to get of it, I am an egoist or a capitalist, not 
someone who is doing something for someone with whom I am intimately or truly communally 
involved or whose good I acknowledge as intertwined with my own in any correct understanding 
of that term, and thus in order to think about ethics correctly – and in order to live ethically – we 
must, in fact, jettison from moral philosophy all references to “debts” and “obligations,” 
“investments” and “contracts,” or all talk about what we “owe” to one another. H. Peter Steeves 
describes the manner in which certain Inuit peoples exhibit this sort of communitarian, 
aneconomic way of being, and it is one that we ought to regard as a paradigm case of what it 
really means to dwell in the world ethically:     
A few years ago, I…discovered that expressions of gratitude aren’t made among the Inuit of Greenland. 
In fact, “thank you” is considered an insult. The Inuit live together and assist each other as part of the 
fabric of their lives. Benevolent giving, openhanded helping, non-economic exchange, and generous 
sacrificing are just part of living an ordinary life in common – the taken-for-granted backdrop of real 
community. To call attention to what others do for us would be to say that such commitment to mutual 
flourishing, such love, isn’t the norm.932  
 
I do not do things for those I love, or for those with whom I am genuinely in community, 
because I have some sense that I “owe” it to them to do those things; the concept of a social 
contract, like the concept of asocial contractors who devise and enter into such a contract, is an 
abstraction that, like all abstractions, always comes too late and deforms how and what we live; 
nor do I do things for intimate others because of what I expect to get out of it or because I wish 
to place these others in my debt: I do things for those I love simply because I love them; I do 
things for intimate others – for those with whom I exist in genuine community – simply because 
of the intimate, communal ties that bind us, or simply because of a kind of intimacy or being-
together that is below or beyond any facile opposition between egoism and altruism or that is 
																																																								
932 H. Peter Steeves, “Against Gratitude?”, in Sharing Gratitude: Daily Reflections. Ed. Mary M. Dalton (Winston-
Salem, NC: Library Partners Press, 2019), p. 97. 
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certainly prior to any calculus of self-interest, for it is in fact below any strict opposition between 
self and Other in the first place. I do things for intimate or communal others because that just is 
what it means to be in an intimate relationship or in community with others: notions of 
“contracts” or “debts” never factor into it at all. Contractual calculations come into play in 
mediating our relationships with others only when those relationships cease to be genuinely 
ethical or communal: I do not, for example, do the dishes for my partner or help edit the essays 
that my partner writes for her therapy practice’s website because doing so satisfies the terms of 
some contract we devised or to which we even tacitly consented at the beginning of our 
relationship, nor do I do these things because I have first calculated that it is in my “self-interest” 
to do them, or because I wish to put my partner in my debt, or because in general I expect some 
return on my investment. I do such things for my partner simply because I love her and because, 
in a relationship, one’s life and thus one’s flourishing is entwined with the life and flourishing of 
another in such a way that, though both retain their distinct identities, one can never say where 
one’s life or good ends and where the other’s begins. In short, to conceptualize my reasons for 
doing good things for the people I care about or for those with whom I exist in true community 
in some sort of contractualist, egoistic, or economic way is precisely to deform the very character 
of the moral life, to distort what it means to care about others ethically; it is to distort the 
intersubjective, interpersonal ties that truly bind us together ethically and to impose upon our 
lived experiences of ethical concern and action abstractions derived from metaphysical 
frameworks and political institutions that have a stake in keeping us from truly living ethically.  
When relationships become merely transactional, that is precisely when they become 
unethical (or at least non-ethical). Ethical relationships with others – just like our fundamental 
ontological relationships with others – are lateral rather than hierarchical, and are reciprocal 
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without being merely transactional (or without being mere “exchanges” in the economic sense of 
the term), for they precede, found, and disrupt any fixed opposition between self and others that 
every economic or transactional conceptualization of our relationships with others – hence any 
rigid distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding motives – presupposes. Though 
ethical relationships are sometimes asymmetrical (like many relationships of care, such as those 
between a parent and a child or between an adult child and an elder parent), they are never 
fundamentally or strictly hierarchical, as are all relationships between a creditor and a debtor; 
they are ultimately rooted in our lateral relations with others, in our mutual dependencies and 
vulnerabilities, in relations with others that displace every supposed hierarchical ordering of 
goods or interests just as they displace any hierarchical ordering of beings or modes of existence. 
Indeed, I think we must acknowledge that all “ethical” (and political) hierarchies ultimately 
involve certain people in positions of privilege exploiting the interests of others: one only ever 
puts others in one’s debt in order to exercise power over them, and if there are such things as 
debts that can never be repaid, they are not the bonds that truly tie together members of a 
genuine moral community or equal participants in a radically communal, intercorporeal Good, 
nor do they signify bonds we ought romanticize or theologize as bonds to some sort of spiritual 
transcendence, but rather are the bonds of slavery or indentured servitude, bonds to a despotic 
and not a moral power. As is perfectly obvious with respect to capitalism (which structurally 
depends upon debt in order to operate), debt is an institution that exists solely as a means of 
oppressive social control, or solely as a means to entrench extant inequalities. If we are to dwell 
in the world ethically, it is necessary not to think of ourselves as fulfilling debts to others, and 
moreover it is necessary not to think of ourselves as in thrall to certain “infinite” debts: on the 
contrary, in order to dwell in the world ethically, or in order to realize an ethical world – the sort 
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of world in which we should all wish to live – it is necessary to cancel all debts, now and 
forever. It is for this reason that, tempting though it often is, I resist conceptualizing ethics in 
terms of “debts” to be amortized or “investments” to be returned: at best, this way of thinking 
about ethics does a profound disservice to lived, ethical experience or to the kinds of ethical 
relationships with others in which we always already find ourselves, and at worst it helps 
legitimate or naturalize oppressive systems and relations of power.  
So, my claim that ethical life is an “infinite task” has nothing to do with the notion that it 
consists of infinite debts; rather, it has to do with the fact that my own suffering and flourishing 
is entwined with the sufferings and flourishings of others, and this precisely does not mean that 
they always coincide or harmonize with one another; they are surely never opposed to one 
another, but inevitably there are going to be great distances and irresolvable tensions between 
certain of them, and of course any decision that I make to help, care for, or even to love certain 
others will always also be a decision not to help, care for, or love other others. There is, then, a 
sense in which every decision is an act of violence, for in order to choose to actualize one 
possibility one must exclude, or leave unactualized, other possibilities, yet it is an act of violence 
that is always necessary, for without it nothing would ever be decided at all, no one would ever 
act at all, indeed subjectivity would thus be withdrawn into the innocence of an interiority utterly 
untouched by the world (or would be what Hegel referred to as a “beautiful soul”), which is of 
course no interiority or subjectivity at all. This is another reason why Merleau-Ponty claims that 
violence is endemic to life. When he claims that “inasmuch as we are incarnate beings, violence 
is our lot,” the context in which he makes this claim makes it clear that he does not just mean 
that susceptibility to violence is our lot, but also that complicity in violence is our lot. Thus, 
immediately before he makes the above claim, Merleau-Ponty states that “we do not have a 
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choice between purity and violence but between different kinds of violence,”933 and I think this is 
also, fundamentally, the point Derrida makes when he claims that he does not believe in 
“absolute vegetarianism” and that “a certain cannibalism remains unsurpassable.”934 Setting 
aside for the moment things such as capitalism and colonialism that make living ethically 
impossible, the truth is that all life lives on violence in some way or another. Even the most 
committed vegan, for example, cannot live without harming or destroying other living things 
(i.e., plants and trees). In fact, as Derrida suggests and as Merleau-Ponty would have to agree, to 
ingest anything is to ingest flesh that I myself am, and often it is, unavoidably, to kill the flesh of 
a living Other, to kill flesh that, though truly Other, is also the “flesh of my flesh.” In order to 
recover from a recent bout of pneumonia, I had to take a bacteria-killing antibiotic. When my 
family and I chose to welcome Sammy and Dexter into our family, we had to exclude, and leave 
to languish in cages for an indefinite amount of time, other dogs equally deserving of our love. 
The money I give to one homeless person is money I cannot give to another. The time I have 
devoted to writing all of this is time I otherwise might have spent helping others in my 
community. Every decision is violent to some extent. As I (and Merleau-Ponty and Derrida) have 
insisted, ontological “purity” is always an illusion or false abstraction, but so too, then, is moral 
purity. Purity is never something we either can or ever ought to seek to realize, whether it is the 
ontological purity of an identity or the supposed moral purity of an action. There is never such a 
thing as moral purity for the same reasons that there is never such a thing as ontological purity, 
and this is a fact that we, in seeking to live morally, have to confront soberly and restlessly. 
Indeed, if there is any decisive proof against the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, 
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934 Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow…A Dialogue. Trans. Jeff Fort (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 67. 
 
	 783	
and supremely benevolent cosmic architect, it is the fact that it is impossible to be alive without 
inflicting some sort of violence upon others, the fact that life is violence. There is no 
prelapsarian, ahistorical utopia to which we may ever retreat, no heaven we can ever hope for 
either in this life or beyond it. Setting aside the fact that certain acts of violence are often 
permissible (and perhaps even necessary) for moral and political reasons, a purely non-violent 
existence is never possible; it is never ontologically possible and (if “ought implies can”) 
therefore never ethically possible, and so it is not something to which we ought to aspire (as 
Hegel argued, the “beautiful soul” is always a hypocritical fiction). However, the appropriate 
response to this fact is not nihilism or quietistic resignation but the resolve to strive to live in the 
least violent and unjust ways, or in the most just and melioristic ways, one can, and also always 
to acknowledge with anguish rather than repress the violence one will always have wrought upon 
other bodily beings in the world, to remain ever awake to one’s ensnarement in webs of suffering 
and injustice, and thus never truly to be at moral ease with existence.   
As we have seen, difference is not opposition, but so too is it not syncretic communion: it 
entails boundaries that are fluid and porous yet does not abolish boundaries altogether. This 
means that in order to be a self, and that in order to exist in community with other selves, one’s 
selfhood and community will depend upon certain boundaries that, though never sharply 
decidable or exclusionary, will have to distance certain others from the purview of one’s 
attentive concern, yet unless one appeals to specious metaphysics (of the sort I have criticized 
throughout this work) in order to rationalize one’s commitments, these others will always equally 
merit one’s attentive concern. If my flourishing is always already implicated in other flourishings 
(and vice versa), it will also always already be implicated in other sufferings (and vice versa). 
We will never be able advance or help realize every good in the world. But my point – and the 
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point of any kind of ethos that we may derive from what I have called the radical community in 
which we and everything is embedded, the core of any ethos one may infer from our radically 
communal being – is that we at the very least ought not to use bad metaphysics or bad 
epistemology in order to attempt to justify such moral exclusions.  
Ethics is an infinite task, then, because it is not possible for me to flourish or for me to 
advance the flourishings of others without also not attentively concerning myself with or actively 
advancing the flourishings of other others, without, in some cases, causing (or at least failing to 
notice or ameliorate) other sufferings. In chapters three and five I argued that knowing the world 
is an infinite task because it involves taking into account all of the possible perspectives – that is, 
the infinite number of perspectives – through which the world may be disclosed. Since the world 
is composed of all of the possible perspectives to and through which it may appear, it will never 
be possible to take every perspective into account; it will never be possible to do justice to every 
perspective. The point here concerning ethics is precisely analogous to this point concerning 
knowledge: ethics is an infinite task because it will never be possible to take into account every 
perspective on the Good, because it will never be possible to attend, advance, or do justice to 
every possible and actual good in the world, because to realize certain goods will also mean that 
certain other goods will remain unrealized (or under-realized), even harmed. To do justice to one 
perspective or good will always be to do injustice to certain others. Not to do justice to certain 
perspectives or goods is to do injustice to them, and in this sense there is a certain violence or 
injustice that will never be eradicable from existence, yet this should inspire not nihilistic 
resignation or despair but, on the contrary, intense, compassionate pain, a compassionate pain 
that should precisely prompt one to work to realize the least violent or unjust world that is 
possible, a less violent or unjust world that is always, as such, beyond the horizons of the one we 
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presently inhabit, a world beyond the one that even our present one allows us to imagine; it is the 
task of ethics (and politics) precisely to imagine and seek to realize such a world in which we 
should all want to live yet which is, as such, always, paradoxically, unthinkable or impossible 
from within the horizons of the one in which we actually live.  
Though, as I have mentioned, I regard ontology and ethics (and all areas of philosophical 
inquiry) as intertwined, this is why ethics will never be reducible to ontology (at least in a certain 
sense of the term): ontology has to do with “the way things are,” but ethics must always think 
beyond “the way things are”; ethics must always be the radical effort to imagine worlds beyond 
the one in which we exist, even the effort to imagine “impossible” worlds. Every time one hears 
someone remark “well, that’s just the way things are” (usually as a way to dismiss some moral or 
political critique of the status quo) one hears (or one ought to hear) not a sober assessment of 
reality, not a pure, accurate description of “things,” but rather a reification of a contingent 
construction of reality that is, as such, anything but “just” the way things are; one should also 
hear despair and servile acquiescence; one should hear thoughtlessness; one should hear an 
“asinanity”; one should perhaps even hear radical evil. This is not “naïve idealism.” Or if ethics 
is “idealistic,” it is so only in the sense that it necessarily resists the hegemony of any naïve 
“realism,” that is, the reification of any extant set of circumstances as natural or essential and 
thus as unchallengeable or untransformable when the truth is always otherwise, when the truth is 
that “reality” is never “real” in the ways in which many people – not only political theorists and 
pundits but also ontologists – often think it is. It is, then, the task of ethics (and politics) to 
imagine and seek to realize an impossible world, a world in which everything that can flourish 
does flourish, a world of radical equality and flourishing, a world of radically equal flourishing. 
The power of ethical thinking to envisage and seek to realize such a world is its distinctive 
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power, and the impossibility of such a world means its distinctive power is one that is always in 
process of actualization. Our world, for better or worse, is always becoming, always in process of 
actualization. The task of ethics (and politics) is to help the world become ever better, to help 
actualize the world for the better and not for the worse, for the (radical) Good and for the 
(radical) Worst: that is its infinite task.  
I am convinced that any considerations of non-human animals (ethical or otherwise) that 
are not phenomenological are fundamentally flawed, indeed (to put it bluntly) quite worthless. 
We must begin from, and always return to, what it is actually like to be with particular non-
human others in lived experience, and in order to do this we must surrender ourselves to 
experiences and relationships with them. But this requires rigor; as Lingis and Deleuze would 
say, it requires that we “become active” in a particular way; it requires the rigor of suspending as 
much as we can our conventional anthropocentric schemas of knowledge and interpretation, the 
rigor of cultivating liberated, charitable engagements with other othernesses, the rigor of “letting 
others show themselves.” It requires the rigor of seeing, listening, and feeling, which is also to 
say the rigor of ceaselessly subjecting to critique the abstractions that may get in the way of 
seeing, listening, and feeling, the rigor of never ceasing to question whether we are seeing, 
hearing, or feeling what and as we ought to be.  
If we are committed to justice, we must ceaselessly attend to marginalized suffering, and 
that of course means challenging the marginalization of marginalized Others and their suffering. 
In order to attend to marginalized suffering, we must interrogate the very constructs of such 
“margins” themselves, which also means to interrogate this very royal “We” in the first place, 
this singular plural pronoun that so often functions as nothing but an empty placeholder deployed 
in order to legitimate, naturalize, or police such margins. So, to attend to the bodies, voices, and 
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sufferings of marginalized others is of course never to reinforce or naturalize their 
marginalization; on the contrary, it is the necessary first step toward undoing it. And no others 
are more marginalized than those we call “animals.” Indeed, as I have mentioned, it is not an 
accident that when humans are marginalized they are nearly always “animalized”; we might even 
say that all marginalized others are, in a sense, “animal others,” for “the animal” really is just an 
empty placeholder to which we relegate any being we wish to exploit, oppress, or simply not 
have to think very much about at all. In a sense, every moral/political caste system is a 
“human/animal” caste system or hierarchy, regardless of whether or not those at the bottom of it 
are actually (biologically) “human.” It is clear that “the animal” is not a “natural kind”: in truth, 
there is no such thing as “the animal.” But if “the animal” is not a natural kind, if it is inherently 
an ethically fraught, politically constructed category, and if moreover the category of “the 
human” is only intelligible relative to it, then we also ought to stop pretending that “the human” 
is just a natural kind or biological concept; in one of its valences it does mean “Homo sapiens,” 
yet it is untenable and simply disingenuous to pretend that this is all it means; it is not and never 
has been reducible to the definition of it found in biology textbooks, but has always been an 
inherently ethical and political construct. So, if justice demands radically rethinking (if not 
abandoning entirely) those categories through which others are arbitrarily marginalized, then we 
clearly must rethink or problematize the category of “the animal,” and if we must do that, then so 
too must we rethink or problematize the category of “the human.”  
If we wish to attend to marginalized others in order to help dismantle their 
marginalization, we must work to decenter the very centered, privileged standpoints relative to 
which they are marginalized, which also means we must work to decenter the standpoint – the 
“we” – that “we” occupy. We must work to decenter “the human” in order to presence rather 
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than occlude or silence the alterities that always already shape it. Indeed, we must dismantle all 
frameworks in which any standpoint is “centered.” To decenter one’s own standpoint is never to 
extricate oneself from it entirely, for to do so is never possible. But it does mean achieving a 
certain critical distance from one’s own standpoint, a distance that would not further distance us 
from those at the margins but would precisely bring us into closer, deeper proximity with them; 
such a distance is one that would be proximity with others, a proximity that would be an 
affirmation of otherness, a proximity that would not dissolve the differences between ourselves 
and others but that would dissolve the margins that hold others apart from us in specious and 
oppressive ways and that, in doing so, keep us from truly affirming or appreciating them.  
As I have argued, I can never entirely transcend my own situated, privileged standpoint in 
the world (since there can never be any such thing as a “view from nowhere”), but it surely does 
not follow that I am entirely imprisoned within it (since no standpoint is ever utterly isolated) 
and that I am therefore helpless to do anything to challenge its arbitrarily centered, privileged 
status. I am a white, cishetero, able-bodied man who has benefitted from a stable, middle-class 
upbringing. I will never fully be able to know what it is like to be a black person under white 
supremacy, what it is like to be a woman under patriarchy, what it is like to be queer in a 
cisheteronormative society, what it is like to be “disabled” in an ableist society, and I likely will 
never know what it is like to contend with extreme poverty. And, I must add, I will never know 
what is like to be an “animal” in a deeply, systemically human supremacist world. Yet, it is 
possible for me to achieve a critical distance from all of these intersecting axes of identity and 
privilege that constitute me and my experiences of the world, to subject them to critique in 
allyship with those upon whose exploitation, marginalization, and immiseration my own 
privileges depend, and to help undo those systems that center my own subjectivity at the 
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illegitimate expense of other subjectivities; it is not impossible for me to critique and work to 
dismantle white supremacy, patriarchy, cisheteronormativity, ableism, or class inequality. It is 
not impossible for me to help decolonize the present world in order to realize one in which we 
should all want to live. Likewise, it is possible for me to critique and work to dismantle the 
anthropocentricity of my own position in the world, the anthropocentricity that has hitherto 
falsely defined “my world.” It is not impossible for me to work to decenter and decolonize even 
my own “humanity.” This would be to “bracket” one’s “all too human” perspective so as to 
make visible all of those other perspectives it otherwise occludes or suppresses. And despite the 
importance of epistemic humility, maybe one should not be so readily pessimistic about what 
imagination, empathy, and the body can accomplish, for of course, if Merleau-Ponty is right, 
everything is intertwined with everything. For example, maybe I cannot quite know the 
degradation, suffering, and terror of pigs corralled in cages too small for them to move and sent 
to slaughter. But then again, I am Jewish, and Auschwitz indeed teaches me (as it also taught 
Theodor Adorno) something (to say the least) of the horrors of efficiently organized, 
industrialized, mechanized murder. And as Jews were compared to rats in order to legitimate 
their extermination, it also teaches me something (as, again, it also taught Theodor Adorno) of 
the ideological, bio/necropolitical function that “animalization” always inherently performs, 
whether it is weaponized against Homo sapiens or against those we thoughtlessly call “animals.”  
To challenge any margins is to challenge the privileged centers of meaning, value, 
knowledge, and identity relative to which they exist, and to challenge any privileged centers of 
meaning, value, knowledge, or identity is, reciprocally, to challenge the margins they depend 
upon (conceptually and materially) in order to hold sway as such. Moreover, to challenge any 
margins is to challenge all margins, for in the final analysis it is to challenge the very constructs 
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of “margins” and “centers” – or any “center/margin” conceptual schema – as such; it is to 
challenge any framework in which meaning and value is organized in terms a center or pure 
origin of meaning and value relative to which everything else is derivatively, peripherally 
meaningful or valuable. Such is the deep, ontological truth of intersectionality: to challenge any 
one form of marginalization or axis of oppression is to challenge all of them.  
In closing, the thesis I have sought to defend here is that an anthropocentric worldview is, 
like any solipsistic or chauvinistic worldview, demonstrably false and “asinine” (as Derrida 
would put it) or “thoughtless” (as Arendt would put it). In her account of Adolf Eichmann’s 
Nuremberg trial, Arendt draws a distinction between “thoughtlessness” and “stupidity,” writing 
that “he [Eichmann] was not stupid. It was sheer thoughtlessness – something by no means 
identical with stupidity – that predisposed him to become one of the greatest criminals of that 
period.”935 Arendt does not elaborate this distinction, but I suppose that, for her, “stupidity” 
designates an incapacity for thought, whereas “thoughtlessness” is an absence of thought 
exhibited by a being who is capable of it. Given the implicit ableism of the concept of 
“stupidity,” and given Merleau-Ponty’s own hesitation regarding the correlative concept of 
“intelligence,” I prefer to conceptualize philosophy as a radical, strenuous, concerted resistance 
to “thoughtlessness.” As Arendt knew, thoughtlessness is the basis of the most pervasive and 
deeply entrenched evils in the world, and it is, as I have attempted to show, exemplified by 
anthropocentrism, by our human pretensions to be divorced from all other forms of life and to be 
the default yardstick relative to which everything in the known universe has meaning and value. 
As Adorno suggests, such thoughtlessness is expressed, and the evils such thoughtlessness 
precipitates are portended, whenever someone says that an entity is “just an animal,” indeed, 
																																																								
935 Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York, NY: Penguin Book, 1977), p. 287-288. 
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perhaps, whenever anyone even uses the word “animal” at all, and in general whenever anyone 
speaks, thinks, or lives in such a way that shuts out or denies rather than welcomes or affirms any 
kind of alterity.  
This is why ethics is truly “first philosophy”: not just a “branch” of philosophy among 
others, but its trunk. So, though I understand yet hesitate to embrace Deleuze’s claim that 
philosophy is “useful for harming stupidity,” I agree with his insistence that philosophy’s “only 
use is the exposure of all forms of baseness of thought,” that philosophy is essentially an 
“enterprise of demystification.” 936 If indeed the goal of philosophy is wakefulness, then its 
proper function and goal is to dispel those forms “thoughtlessness” or “asininity” (bêtise) – those 
mystifications – that precisely keep us from wakeful seeing, thinking, and living. The proper task 
of philosophy is to dismantle those frameworks that obfuscate or violently silence and repress 
rather than elucidate or allow to be seen and heard the truths that urgently demand our 
recognition because they are, like all truths worthy of the name, not truths suspended above and 
beyond carnal existence but rather truths that are precisely tethered to it and to its fate, truths that 
are not merely or purely “abstract” because there are always bodies behind or entwined with 
them, bodies whose flourishing or suffering are always at stake in them, vital needs and goods 
whose visibility is always at stake in (re)learning to see them. Anthropocentrism suppresses not 
only what it truly means to be “human” but also, therefore, what it truly means to flourish as one 
as well, for it precisely suppresses all of the other forms of embodied life, and thus all of the 
other goods, with which human life is inextricably enmeshed; indeed, anthropocentrism simply 
suppresses what it means to be at all, and in doing so perpetrates grave violence and injustice – 
the very Ur-form of violence and injustice – against all beings. I think that Merleau-Ponty’s 
																																																								
936 Nietzsche and Philosophy. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 106. 
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ontology provides the best resources for decentering anthropocentricity in all of its guises, and in 
fact Merleau-Ponty explicitly came to regard decentering the human standpoint as integral to 
radical phenomenological reflection. My contention is that doing so is integral not only to a 
phenomenology or ontology worthy of the name but to an understanding of community, and thus 
to an ethics and political philosophy, worthy of the name as well.  
“All those we have loved, detested, known, or simply glimpsed speak through our 
voice,”937 and if phenomenology teaches us anything, it is that justice means doing justice to all 
those who already speak to and through us, that justice means learning how to let others speak, 
that justice means graciously attending to those voices without whom we would, in truth, have 
no voice at all, even and especially those whose voices are typically silenced by abstract, often 
oppressive categories and conceptual frameworks, those whose voices are typically drowned out 
by the loud, cacophonous chatter of powers that presume themselves to be the only ones with 
anything worth being heard, powers that mistake the value or truth of what they say with the 
loudness or authority with which they are able to force everyone to hear it, that mistake 
contingent dominance and privilege with ontological, epistemic, moral, or political merit; it also 
means using one’s voice to critique, even to shout down if necessary, such voices that have for 
far too long denied voices to others, to speak against entrenched and unjust power. For far too 
long, human beings – even philosophers – have spoken quite loudly, yet have mostly used their 
voices to silence others (indeed, to silence the vast majority of others) rather than to say much of 
anything worth saying or hearing, to reinforce rather than speak against entrenched and unjust 
power. Perhaps in the end this is all phenomenology really is or ought to be: learning how to use 
our voices to give voice, or rather learning how to use our voices to let speak, to in fact listen 
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	 793	
rather than speak, and then learning how best to respond to what is thus heard, which of course is 
still to listen, and to listen is also to learn continually how to listen, and sometimes also to speak 
against those who would keep us from listening, against those who are threatened by what we 
might hear.  
If phenomenology can truly fulfill its promise of lucidity, its promise to bring to light 
those beings and “things themselves” that most saliently and urgently address us in everyday life, 
it has to find a way to suspend, to see and listen through, those obfuscations that masquerade as 
fundamental truths, those boundaries that masquerade as essential, impermeable, and immobile 
borders, those frameworks of power that conceal themselves as “natural” or ontologically basic 
conditions of being and knowing, those particular standpoints or constructs of identity that 
pretend to be central, universal, pure founts of truth, meaning, and value, those abstractions that 
precisely oppose lucid seeing, attentive listening, sound thinking, genuine knowing, and thus just 
acting and good living. No question is more radical than the question concerning “who we are,” 
the question concerning the boundaries that demarcate this plural singular pronoun that subtends 
every experience and that we uncritically deploy in everyday thought and speech (as I just did, 
and as I have been doing throughout this work). If there is one final point I hope to have 
conveyed here, it is that we must say of “community” what Merleau-Ponty says of “the Other,” 
namely that it is “always in process of an unfinished incarnation,”938 and that we therefore must 
similarly say of the radical question of “who we are” what we must say of the flesh or of the 
“We” – the radical community – that constitutes “us,” namely that it is “ever gaping open.”939  
So, I have no doubt Merleau-Ponty would agree that everything – not just abstract truth 
and knowledge but flesh-and-blood ethical and political flourishing – is at stake in “relearning 
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how to look at the world,”940 and that relearning how to look at the world is something we must 
ceaselessly, relentlessly do because it especially means learning how the world looks from those 
vantage points that are invisible from within the one we usually occupy, the one that constitutes 
our ordinary, uncritical, royal sense of “We.” I have no doubt that for Merleau-Ponty just as well 
as for Nietzsche, in order for critical, philosophical thinking to live up to its name it must teach 
us how to “think differently – in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel 
differently.”941 Merleau-Ponty has certainly helped me think and feel differently, and I hope my 
work may play a humble role in helping others do the same. My sincere belief, which I have here 
attempted to support argumentatively and performatively, and my sincere hope, which I have 
here attempted to advance, if only in a small way, toward its fulfillment, is that phenomenology 
in general, and that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in particular, may empower us to think 
more cogently, to feel more sensitively, to see more lucidly, to listen more carefully, to dwell in 
the world more responsively and, therefore, more responsibly: never without violence, but with 
the least violence.     
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